Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-2342-K.
November 9, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees in connection with the successful prosecution of Plaintiffs' claims brought under the Texas Human Resources Code § 121.001 et seq. ("THRC"). For the reasons stated below, the Court awards Plaintiffs' counsel the sum of $279,000, or 15% of the common fund secured in this case, in connection with Plaintiffs' THRC claim.
I. Background
Plaintiffs Leslie Greer and Monique Jannette brought this class action against Defendants Mockingbird Station Partners, L.P. and Simpson Texas Financing Limited Partnership for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the THRC. After a settlement was reached, the Court certified the class and approved the settlement. As part of the settlement, Plaintiffs' counsel received $160,668.50 in attorneys' fees for the prosecution of the ADA claims in the case.
In addition to the sum already awarded to Plaintiffs' counsel in connection with the ADA claims, Plaintiffs' counsel seeks additional attorneys' fees for the prosecution of the THRC claims brought on behalf of the class even though Plaintiffs' counsel is unable to separate out the work they did on the ADA and THRC claims. Specifically, Plaintiffs' counsel asks the Court to grant an additional $465,000 in attorneys' fees, which equals 25% of the common fund secured on behalf of the class.
II. Applicable Law
Plaintiffs in this case brought their claims pursuant to both Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12181- 12189 ("ADA") and the Texas Human Resources Code § 121.001 et seq. ("THRC"). While Plaintiffs sought monetary relief for their claims, private individuals seeking relief under Title III of the ADA may only obtain injunctive relief for violations of the Act. See Powell v. National Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 86 (2d. Cir. 2004). However, monetary damages are recoverable under the Texas Human Resources Code. See Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 121.104 (b) (a "person with a disability deprived of his or her civil liberties may maintain a cause of action for damages in a court of competent jurisdiction, and there is a conclusive presumption of damages in the amount of at least $100 to the person with a disability).
When a court applies state law to a claim on which a plaintiff prevails, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys' fees is governed by state law. See Keeton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 653, 656 (E.D. Tex. 1998). However, whether state or federal law controls the calculation of attorneys' fees in a case dealing with a state claim is "as-yet unanswered," because state courts and federal courts look to many of the same factors in making decisions regarding attorneys' fee awards. Robinson v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 13 F.3d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed attorneys' fees computed according to state-law guidelines in diversity cases. See Gulf Union Industries, Inc. v. Formation Sec., Inc., 842 F.2d 762, 767 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1988). Indeed, "there is a strong implication" that state law governs the manner used to calculate an award of attorney fees. Atari v. McNeal, 2002 WL 221613, *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 8, 2002) (Feldman, J.). Accordingly, the Court will apply the guidelines set out in Texas law in order to determine the proper amount of attorneys' fees to award to Plaintiffs' counsel.
Under Texas law, two methods are at the Court's disposal for calculating fees in the class action context: (1) the percentage method, when the value of the settlement can be estimated reasonably clearly; and (2) the lodestar method, which calculates fees by multiplying the number of hours expended by an appropriate hourly rate determined by a variety of factors, including the benefits obtained on behalf of the class, the complexity of the issues involved, the expertise of the plaintiff's counsel, counsel's inability to take on other legal work due to the prosecution of the class action, and the hourly rate charged in the region for similar legal work. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 960 (Tex. 1996) ( citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
Because the amount of the common fund allows the value of the settlement to be estimated with certainty, the Court will employ the percentage method in calculating reasonable attorneys' fees for Plaintiffs. The factors that counsel a court in making a reasonable calculation of attorneys' fees include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood . . . that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.Arthur Anderson Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997) ( quoting Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof. Conduct 1.04)). With these principles in mind, the Court will now discuss what it believes to be an appropriate amount of attorneys' fees for Plaintiffs' counsel.
III. Plaintiffs' Request for 25% of the Common Fund
Plaintiffs' counsel seeks 25% of the common fund awarded in this case as its attorneys' fees in connection with Plaintiffs' THRA claim. Taking into account the above-cited factors, the Court believes that 15% is a more reasonable figure.
Plaintiffs' counsel argues that, among other factors, the novelty of the case, the amount of money involved and the result obtained, and the experience of counsel litigating the case justify an award of 25%. The Court certainly agrees with Plaintiffs' counsel that it has obtained a favorable result for the class. The Court determines that a fee award of 15% of the common fund, an amount totaling $279,000, is reasonable. This figure is reasonable because (I) Plaintiffs' counsel took some risk in prosecuting a disability discrimination case pursuant to both state and federal law, and (2) Plaintiffs' counsel took this case on a contingent fee basis.
Taking into account the factors set out in Arthur Andersen, the Court determines that an attorneys' fee award of 15% of the common fund is a reasonable award in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' counsel is awarded a sum of 15% of the common fund secured in this case, or $279,000.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' counsel is awarded reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $279,000, which is 15% of the common fund secured in this case.
SO ORDERED.