Opinion
Case Nos. 5D19-758 5D19-794
01-22-2021
Clare J. GREENSHIELDS, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Mark GREENSHIELDS, Appellee/Cross Appellant.
Thomas H. Yardley, Cocoa, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Moses R. Dewitt, of Dewitt Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Thomas H. Yardley, Cocoa, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Moses R. Dewitt, of Dewitt Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
MARQUES, L., Associate Judge.
This appeal and cross-appeal arise from the trial court's order granting Clare Greenshields's ("Former Wife") motion for directed verdict. Because we ultimately determine that the trial court erred in determining Mark Greenshields's ("Former Husband") claims were compulsory counterclaims to a different lawsuit and also erred in denying Former Wife's tortious interference claim without allowing her an opportunity to present her case, we reverse and remand for a new trial on all claims.
BACKGROUND FACTS
In 2013, two years after the parties divorced, Former Husband loaned Former Wife $152,837.33 to purchase a new home ("the Orlando home"). Former Wife executed a power of attorney ("POA"), naming Former Husband as her attorney-in-fact, granting him the authority to handle the sale of her current home ("the Merritt Island home"), and entitling him to "full repayment of all and any advances including interest, insurance, utilities or other charges incurred either with the" Orlando home or with the Merritt Island home. Specifically, paragraph 7 stated:
My Attorney-In-Fact will receive no compensation except for the reimbursement
of all out-of-pocket expenses associated with the carrying out of my wishes in addition to 100% of the costs of loaning me the money to purchase my new property ... including interest paid by him on this loan and any other costs directly associated with it as well as any expenses incurred in the sale or maintenance of [the Merritt Island home]. Any money remaining from the sale of [the Merritt Island home] after reimbursing my Attorney-in-Fact and the payments made by him on my behalf will ... immediately be paid to me in cleared funds to the bank account of my choosing.
Former Wife ultimately did not sell the Merritt Island home, and the following year she moved back into the Merritt Island home and sold the Orlando home instead. From the sale proceeds of the Orlando home, she repaid Former Husband $132,826.92 of the $152,837.33 owed. She withheld $20,000.00, which was put in her attorney's trust account and which became the subject of a lawsuit she filed against Former Husband in Brevard County ("the Brevard County case").
In the Brevard County case, Former Wife alleged Former Husband owed her $20,000 in alimony arrearages per the terms of the final judgment of dissolution, and she sought enforcement of the final judgment and declaratory relief for her entitlement to the $20,000 held in her attorney's trust account. Two months after commencement of that suit, the parties entered into a mediated agreement to modify the final judgment of dissolution ("the mediation agreement"). The mediation agreement provided, in pertinent part:
6. The Wife hereby waives any and all claims she may have to arrearages in the amount of child support and alimony as of January 8, 2015. The parties acknowledge that all child support and alimony payments are current as of this date.
....
9. The Wife shall dismiss with prejudice the Complaint filed in the Circuit Court of Brevard County ... seeking declaratory relief and adjudication of child support and alimony arrears.
10. The funds remaining in the trust account of Thomas Yardley, counsel for the Former Wife, shall be released to the Former Wife, and the Former Husband waives and relinquishes any and all claims he may have to these funds.
....
15. This is the entire agreement of these parties on this subject. Unless explicitly modified by this agreement the provisions of the September 30, 2010 Marital Settlement Agreement remain in full force and effect.
Per the terms of the mediation agreement, Former Wife received the $20,000 in dispute and the Brevard County case was subsequently dismissed. The agreement was incorporated into the Stipulated Final Judgment of Modification of Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage ("Stipulated Final Judgment"), which the dissolution court entered on February 5, 2015.
In late 2017, Former Wife contracted to sell the Merritt Island home, and Former Husband contacted Former Wife and her attorney, seeking $38,203.14 in unpaid monies under the POA. Two days prior to the sale date, Former Husband commenced the instant suit, alleging Former Wife's intent not to compensate him from the sale proceeds of the Merritt Island home. He asserted breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and he also sought a declaratory judgment on his entitlement to compensation under the POA. Additionally, Former Husband filed a notice of lis pendens, which caused the buyers to back out of the sale. Former Wife subsequently filed a counterclaim, asserting tortious interference with the sale of the Merritt Island home.
At trial, Former Husband testified that the POA entitled him to repayment of the loan, expenses incurred on both the Orlando home and the Merritt Island home, and four percent interest. With the interest added to the loan and expenses, he testified that he incurred just under $166,000, with Former Wife only repaying him $132,826.92. Former Wife then testified that Former Husband was already paid in full because any unpaid amounts were settled in mediation in the Brevard County case. She acknowledged that neither the mediation agreement nor the Stipulated Final Judgment references the loan or the POA, and that the mediation agreement does not state in black and white that she is relieved of the obligation to pay Former Husband back. She further acknowledged that the POA was unrelated to the dissolution proceedings.
After Former Husband rested his case, both parties moved for directed verdict. Former Husband moved for directed verdict on Former Wife's breach of contract claim and the tortious interference claim. The court denied Former Husband's motion, stating that "there are material issues of fact that have to be decided by the trier of fact." Specifically on the breach of contract claim, the court stated:
[T]here is testimony that despite the contract, the parties agreed subsequently that the contract in essence be modified by way of their mediation to resolve claims of monies owed as between them, both the money from the sale of a piece of property, as well as other monies for miscellaneous other items that he paid for, as well as things that she claims she owes him. The trier of fact, the jury has got to resolve that, I can't resolve that.
When Former Wife moved for directed verdict, she argued that Former Husband's claims for money owed him were compulsory to the claims Former Wife brought in the Brevard County case. The court, finding "that the mediation agreement resolved all of the issues of claims for money as between the two parties," concluded Former Husband's claims were compulsory counterclaims and it granted Former Wife's motion for directed verdict. Despite this, the court determined that Former Husband was entitled to interest on the loan from the date of the loan to the date he received the $132,826.92, and it instructed Former Husband to submit, within twenty days of the final order, an affidavit regarding the terms of the loan. The court ultimately awarded Former Husband $3021.64 in interest.
On Former Wife's tortious interference claim, the court said it was not prepared to find that Former Husband engaged in any willful misconduct, and it accordingly denied her claim. However, the court determined Former Wife was entitled to the difference between the original sale contract for the Merritt Island home and what the home actually sold for, plus carrying costs and interest on those costs. The court ultimately awarded Former Wife $4484.55 in damages.
On March 26, 2019, the trial court entered its "Supplement to Final Judgement on February 15, 2019," wherein it subtracted the amount of interest awarded to Former Husband from the amount of damages awarded to Former Wife. The court concluded that Former Husband owed Former Wife $2925.31 in damages and costs. This appeal and cross-appeal timely followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"On a motion for directed verdict, the court must view the evidence adduced and every conclusion therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving every conflict and inference for that party." Reams v. Vaughn , 435 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). However, "if there is any evidence to support a possible verdict for [the non-moving] party, a directed verdict is improper." Pritchett v. Jacksonville Auction, Inc. , 449 So. 2d 364, 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (emphasis in original). This Court reviews an order on a motion for directed verdict de novo. See Andrews v. Direct Mail Exp., Inc. , 1 So. 3d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
FORMER HUSBAND'S CLAIMS
The first issue we address is the trial court's determination that the mediation agreement resolved all issues under the POA and that Former Husband's claims were compulsory counterclaims to the Brevard County case.
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.170, a counterclaim is compulsory if the claim "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a). In other words, a "compulsory counterclaim is ‘a defendant's cause of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that formed the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim.’ " Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc. , 609 So. 2d 14, 19 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Yost v. Am. Nat'l Bank , 570 So. 2d 350, 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) ). "Failure to raise a compulsory counterclaim in the first suit will result in a waiver of that claim." Id.
Our supreme court adopted the "logical relationship test" to determine whether a claim is compulsory. Id. at 20. The "logical relationship test" states:
[A] claim has a logical relationship to the original claim if it arises out of the same aggregate of operative facts as the original claim in two senses: (1) that the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis of both claims; or (2) that the aggregate core of facts upon which the original claims rests activates additional legal rights in a party defendant that would otherwise remain dormant.
Id. (quoting Neil v. S. Fla. Auto Painters, Inc. , 397 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) ). Based on the plain language of the test, the "or" designates that only one of the two prongs need apply in order for claims to be compulsory.
The first prong of the "logical relationship test" requires "that the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis of both claims." Id. (quoting Neil , 397 So. 2d at 1164 ). Here, the bases of the claims were not the same because, as Former Husband properly argues, the Brevard County case sought enforcement of the final judgment of dissolution based on Former Husband's failure to pay child support and alimony, while the underlying lawsuit was for breach of the POA. Moreover, Former Husband is not seeking the $20,000 that was at issue in the Brevard County case, so it cannot be said that the two lawsuits "are lawsuits over the exact same transaction." While there is no doubt a connection between the two cases because of the $20,000, that connection does not mean the claims arise from the same operative facts. In fact, they cannot arise from the same operative facts since it is undisputed that the POA was executed after the marriage dissolved, just as it is undisputed that the POA was completely unrelated to the dissolution proceedings. Former Wife's failure to pay Former Husband under the terms of the POA has no logical relationship to Former Husband's failure to pay alimony and child support under the final judgment of dissolution. Thus, Former Husband's claims are not compulsory counterclaims to the Brevard County case based on the first prong of the "logical relationship test." See, e.g. , Dr. Rooter Supply & Serv. v. McVay , 226 So. 3d 1068, 1076 n.6 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ("Here, the theft claims brought in the amended complaint have no logical relationship to the dissolution case, which arose from Thomas and Laura's inability to remain married. Thus, it was error for the lower court to find that they were waived by Thomas' failure to raise them in the divorce proceeding.").
The second prong of the "logical relationship test" requires "that the aggregate core of facts upon which the original claims rests activates additional legal rights in a party defendant that would otherwise remain dormant." Londono , 609 So. 2d at 20 (quoting Neil , 397 So. 2d at 1164 ). Here, the outcome of the Brevard County case was the mediation agreement, and the only aspect of that agreement connecting the two lawsuits is the $20,000—there is no mention in the mediation agreement of expenses or interest incurred under the POA. Thus, even if Former Husband had brought a counterclaim against Former Wife in the Brevard County case for his entitlement to the $20,000 under the POA, or waived his entitlement to that money for failing to assert a counterclaim, he still would have been able to bring the underlying suit for her failure to pay him the costs and interests incurred under the POA. As such, the second prong of the "logical relationship test" is not met.
Because neither prong of the "logical relationship test" is established, we conclude that Former Husband's claims in the underlying suit were not compulsory counterclaims to the claims raised in the Brevard County case and that the court erred in directing a verdict in Former Wife's favor.
We also conclude that the court erred in directing a verdict in Former Wife's favor upon finding that the mediation agreement resolves all issues under the POA. Contrary to the trial court's finding, the mediation agreement does not resolve all issues under the POA. As both parties acknowledged below, the mediation agreement does not mention the POA, the loan, or any monies owed under the POA, nor does the agreement indicate it resolves all issues concerning monies owed. The court even indicated that there were issues of material fact surrounding the POA and mediation, expressly stating that whether the mediation agreement resolved all issues under the POA was an issue for the jury to resolve and not one that should be decided as a matter of law. Therefore, when viewed in the light most favorable to Former Husband, the court should have denied Former Wife's motion and submitted the issue to the jury. See, e.g. , Brewer v. Better Bus. Brokers & Consultants, Inc. , 727 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that, for the purposes of reviewing the order granting a directed verdict, conflicting evidence must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party).
Concluding that the trial court improperly directed a verdict in Former Wife's favor, we accordingly reverse and remand for a new trial on Former Husband's claims.
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM
The second issue we address is the trial court's denial of Former Wife's tortious interference claim. Former Wife bore the burden of establishing "by competent evidence each material fact essential to recovery," and only upon her failure to do so is it appropriate for the court "to take the case from the jury and direct a verdict" for Former Husband. See Smith's Bakery, Inc. v. Jernigan , 134 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). While the court did not grant Former Husband's motion, the court did deny this claim, and it did so before giving Former Wife the opportunity to present her case in chief. Not only was the court required to submit the action to the jury upon denying Former Husband's motion, see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.480(b), but the court's denial of the claim without allowing Former Wife the opportunity to present her case constitutes a due process violation. See Dobson v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n , 217 So. 3d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ; Edelman v. Breed , 836 So. 2d 1092, 1093–94 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). As such, we reverse and remand for a new trial on this claim.
We express no opinion on the legal viability of Former Wife's counterclaim.
CONCLUSION
Because of the trial court's errors in directing a verdict in Former Wife's favor and in denying Former Wife's claims, this court need not address the procedural irregularities or other issues raised in the appeal and cross-appeal. Both parties are entitled to a new trial on all claims, including damages, and we accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COHEN and TRAVER, JJ., concur.