Opinion
March 12, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Paula Omansky, J.).
The parties agree that the 1974 release here at issue is controlled by California law, which does not permit a court to deem a contract unambiguous except upon a preliminary review of the agreement in conjunction with other relevant evidence and circumstances ( see, Appleton v. Waessil, 27 Cal.App.4th 551, 558, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 676, 680 review denied 1994 Cal LEXIS 6304 [Sup.Ct., Nov. 23, 1994]). Indeed, pursuant to California law, "[t]he test of whether parol evidence is admissible to construe an ambiguity is not whether the language appears to the court unambiguous, but whether the evidence presented is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is `reasonably susceptible'" ( Winet v. Price, 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 557). We agree with the motion court that the subject release by plaintiff Greenfield considered in the context of its making is ambiguous in scope and that there are factual issues as to whether it was intended to be of such breadth as to encompass and therefore warrant dismissal of Greenfield's present claims. Accordingly, defendants' motion for partial summary judgment premised upon the subject release was properly denied ( see, e.g., Hohe v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 224 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1568, 274 Cal.Rptr. 647, 651-652). We have considered defendants' remaining arguments and find that they do not warrant a different result.
Concur — Ellerin, J. P., Nardelli, Williams and Mazzarelli, JJ.