Summary
holding that petitioner's claim of lack of knowledge of statutory time limits as result of habeas counsel's failure to advise him was insufficient to make showing of good cause needed to file untimely petition
Summary of this case from Kelsey v. Comm'r of Corr.Opinion
CV164008061S
10-17-2019
Rofio GREENFIELD (Inmate #158662) v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Hon. Courtney Chaplin, Judge
The petitioner, Rofio Greenfield, filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 9, 2016. The respondent filed its request for an order to show cause on July 30, 2019. Pursuant to Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 711, 189 A.3d 578 (2018), the court held an evidentiary hearing for this matter on September 20, 2019. The petitioner presented his testimony and two affidavits. Thereafter, the court heard argument on this matter.
In the petitioner’s Amended Petition dated July 30, 2019, the petitioner alleges that he filed a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus on August 19, 2005; and the habeas corpus court dismissed the petition on June 3, 2010. Greenfield v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-05-400-0636-S (June 3, 2010). On January 31, 2012, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal from the habeas court’s decision; Greenfield v. Commissioner of Correction, 133 Conn.App. 904, 34 A.3d 481 (2012); and the Supreme Court denied the petition for certification to appeal on March 7, 2012. Greenfield v. Commissioner of Correction, 304 Conn. 906, 38 A.3d 1201 (2012). Subsequently, the petitioner filed the current petition on May 9, 2016. The respondent avers that the petitioner has no good cause for filing the current petition beyond the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-470. The petitioner argues that he was delayed in filing the current petition due his prior appellate habeas counsel, Attorney Mark Diamond, failing to advise him of the new law going into effect after his case ended. For that reason, he argues that this court should find that he has demonstrated good cause to permit his current petition to proceed. The petitioner also argues that he would have filed the current petition within the statutory timeframe allowed if he had the requisite knowledge of the law. However, knowledge of the law is presumed and "ignorance of the law excuses no one." State v. Legrand, 129 Conn.App. 239, 271, 20 A.3d 52, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 912, 27 A.3d 371 (2011).
General Statutes § 52-470 became effective on October 1, 2012.
General Statutes § 52-470(d) provides as follows: "In the case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the following: (1) Two years after the date on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) October 1, 2014; or (3) two years after the date on which the constitutional or statutory right asserted in the petition was initially recognized and made retroactive pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court or Appellate Court of this state or the Supreme Court of the United States or by the enactment of any public or special act. The time periods set forth in this subsection shall not be tolled during the pendency of any other petition challenging the same conviction. Nothing in this subsection shall create or enlarge the right of the petitioner to file a subsequent petition under applicable law."
General Statutes § 52-470(e) provides: "In a case in which the rebuttable presumption of delay under subsection (c) or (d) of this section applies, the court, upon the request of the respondent, shall issue an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed. The petitioner or, if applicable, the petitioner’s counsel, shall have a meaningful opportunity to investigate the basis for the delay and respond to the order. If, after such opportunity, the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for the delay, the court shall dismiss the petition. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause includes, but is not limited to, the discovery of new evidence which materially affects the merits of the case and which could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence in time to meet the requirements of subsection (c) or (d) of this section." Our Appellate Court has held that "good cause has been defined as a substantial reason amounting in law to a legal excuse for failing to perform an act required by law." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Langston v. Commissioner of Correction, 185 Conn.App. 528, 532, 197 A.3d 1034, cert. granted, 330 Conn. 946, 196 A.3d 326 (2018).
Based on all of the information before the court, the court finds that the current petition was filed more than four years after the dismissal of the petitioner’s prior habeas corpus petition was deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review. The court finds Attorney Diamond’s affidavit (Exhibit 2) inconclusive for the purpose of determining whether Attorney Diamond failed to advise the petitioner of the statute of limitations that had not yet become the law when the Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal his prior habeas petition. Furthermore, this court does not find the petitioner’s affidavit (Exhibit 1) persuasive as to prior appellate habeas counsel’s failure to advise him of § 52-470(d). Even if the court did find his affidavit persuasive on that point, the petitioner’s affidavit is insufficient without corroborative evidence, of prior appellate habeas counsel’s failure to advise the petitioner of § 52-470(d), to demonstrate good cause for filing the current petition beyond the applicable statute of limitations. Langston v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 185 Conn.App. 528. Therefore, the court finds that the petitioner has failed to make a showing of good cause for filing the current petition more than two years after March 7, 2012; or after October 1, 2014.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed pursuant to § 52-470(b)(3).