Opinion
C. A. 8:20-cv-03488-SAL-JDA
11-18-2020
Andre Green, Plaintiff, v. Stephen, Warden; Shivers, Classification; Capt. Carter; Bryan P. Stirling, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.
Andre Green (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and is presently incarcerated at the Broad River Correctional Institution. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such pleadings for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the pleadings in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint, which was entered on the docket on October 1, 2020. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated October 19, 2020, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in its Order. [Doc. 8.] The Court, however, noted that Plaintiff may be able to cure the deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to amend his Complaint. [Id. at 9-10.] Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies [identified in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (explaining that, as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).[Id. at 10.] Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc. 11], which was entered on the docket on November 16, 2020, along with an affidavit and statement of his claims [Doc. 11-1].
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and that, as a result, he is unable to earn good-time credits or participate in prison work or education programs. [Doc. 11 at 4, 6.] Specifically, on December 13, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred from Lieber Correctional Institution to Broad River Correctional Institution. [Doc. 11-1 at 4, 12.] Plaintiff was held in a cell in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at Broad River until December 18, 2018, when his name appeared on the “drop list” to be released to the general population. [Id.] However, he was returned to the RHU cell. [Id.] The next day, Plaintiff was escorted to a room where a Security Detention (“SD”) Board hearing was held before Defendants Shivers, Stephon, and Carter, and he was placed on security detention. [Id.] Plaintiff was never served with a notice informing him of the hearing. [Id. at 12.] After the hearing, he was returned to the RHU, where he remains. [Id. at 4, 12.] Plaintiff contends Defendants failed to follow SCDC policies and procedures, thus violating his constitutional rights. [Id. at 4, 12-13.] Plaintiff contends he was sentenced to no less than one year to eighteen months on lockup. [Id. at 13.] According to Plaintiff, his placement in the RHU on security detention has prevented him from earning work credit, attending school, participating in religious services or other programs, and obtaining jobs. [Id.]
The undersigned notes that Plaintiff's allegations in his Amended Complaint are nearly identical to those he made in his original Complaint.
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to gross negligence, inhumane and unsafe conditions, cruel and unusual punishment, unreasonable searches and seizures, and violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [Id. at 14.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants' conduct violated his rights, a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to follow SCDC policies and procedures and to stop violating his rights, compensatory damages in the amount of $1 million against each Defendant, and punitive damages in the amount of $4 million against each Defendant. [Id. at 15.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Amended Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se complaint and a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). While Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove her case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Like the original Complaint, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint appears to assert (1) a claim for violations of Plaintiff's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment and (2) a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. However, the Amended Complaint is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983 that is plausible.
Due Process Claim
Plaintiff appears to assert a due process claim related to his placement in security detention and segregation in the RHU. “Supreme Court precedent establishes that convicted prisoners possess some procedural due process rights with respect to administrative segregation, ” as well as other disciplinary measures. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 183 (4th Cir. 2018). However, while prisoners retain many constitutional rights, incarceration inherently limits certain constitutional rights of prisoners. Hall v. McCabe, No. 8:11-cv-1317-TLW-JDA, 2011 WL 5083219, at *2 (D.S.C. July 8, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5082201 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2011). When a person is lawfully convicted and confined to prison, he loses a significant interest in his liberty for the period of the sentence. See Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991).
Under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), “when an action might result in a prisoner's loss of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, minimal due process is required.” Dawson v. Cartledge, No. 4:14-cv-3259-DCN, 2015 WL 5092617, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2015), aff'd, 631 Fed.Appx. 145 (4th Cir. 2016). These limited due process rights are required in an inmate disciplinary action that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). “Whether confinement conditions are atypical and substantially harsh ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life' is a ‘necessarily . . . fact specific' comparative exercise.” Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502-03 (4th Cir. 1997)). As the Fourth Circuit has explained,
“To state a procedural due process [claim], a plaintiff must [first] identify a protected liberty or property interest and [then] demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Put differently, a prisoner claiming a violation of his right to procedural due process must show: (1) that there is a “state statute, regulation, or policy [that] creates such a liberty interest, ” and (2) that “the denial of such an interest ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'” Id. at 248-49 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). An inmate who fails to satisfy these two requirements “cannot ‘invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.'” Id. at 248 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)).Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 253 (4th Cir. 2017) (alterations in original).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to identify a protected liberty or property interest, see Jackson v. Metts, No. 1:11-cv-3415-SB-SVH, 2012 WL 1751792, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2012) (“The procedural protections of the Due Process Clause only apply to actions that implicate a protected liberty or property interest.”), and he has failed to point to a state statute, regulation, or policy that creates a liberty interest, Martin, 858 F.3d at 253. Further, even if Plaintiff had identified a protected liberty interest giving rise to due process protections, he has not alleged facts showing Defendants' actions violated his due process rights.
Plaintiff's contention that his placement in the RHU violates his due process rights is without merit because “[a] federal or state prisoner does not have a constitutional right to any particular custody or security classification.” Dutton v. Owens, No. 0:11-cv-1014-TLW-PJG, 2012 WL 3029189, at *1 (D.S.C. June 5, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 3029186 (D.S.C. July 25, 2012). Further, although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not follow certain SCDC policies or rules as to his disciplinary segregation in the RHU, “such allegations do not state a constitutional claim.” Wakefield v. SCDC Headquarters Classification, No. 9:20-cv-1161-TMC-BM, 2020 WL 3052507, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 28, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 3051353 (D.S.C. June 8, 2020); see also Clark v. Neasman, No. 3:04-cv-2459-RBH-JRM, 2006 WL 6040828, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2006) (“An allegation that an SCDC defendant did not follow[ ] the institution's policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2006 WL 568744 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2006), aff'd, 196 Fed.Appx. 226 (4th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that his placement in RHU resulted in conditions that were atypical or substantially harsh in comparison to ordinary prison life, and he therefore fails to demonstrate that any liberty interest was implicated when he was placed in disciplinary detention. See Backey v. S.C. Dep't. of Corrs., 73 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table opinion) (noting the plaintiff's allegations of wrongful placement in administrative segregation did not involve the kind of significant or atypical hardship necessary to invoke his due process rights); Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding inmates' allegation that prison officials' decision deprived them of a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation did not constitute a deprivation of life or property by governmental action in violation of the Constitution).
Likewise, Plaintiff's claim that his segregation in the RHU has prohibited from earning work or good-time credits or participating in prison programs fails to state a due process claim. “Although a prisoner may have due process rights as to good-time credits which are taken away from him, the opportunity to earn good-time or work credits is not a constitutionally established liberty interest.” Wiggins v. Bush, No. 3:08-cv-3452-RBH, 2009 WL 6314994, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2009), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 1254878 (D.S.C. Mar. 24, 2010). And, “prisoners have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in work release [programs].” Kitchen v. Upshaw, 286 F.3d 179, 187 (4th Cir. 2002). “Similarly, inmates have no constitutional right to rehabilitation programs or education programs of any particular kind.” Moore v. O'Brien, No. 7:08-cv-00417, 2008 WL 2944556, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 29, 2008). Simply put, Plaintiff has not identified any constitutionally protected liberty interest or alleged facts showing Defendants denied him of any liberty interest imposing an atypical or significant hardship.
Conditions-of-Confinement Claim
Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff also asserts a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment, it is subject to summary dismissal. “The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment on one convicted of a crime.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 165 (4th Cir. 1995). The Eighth Amendment provides protection with respect to “‘the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined.'” Id. at 165-66 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the United States Supreme Court explained that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the alleged deprivation must be objectively “sufficiently serious, ” that it results “in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, '” and (2) the prison official must have a “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind, '” i.e., “‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 834 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court further determined that its standard for “deliberate indifference” would be “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Id. at 839-40. “In short, the Court concluded that ‘a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.'” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). Although “prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, . . . lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
With regard to Plaintiff's claim for cruel and unusual punishment arising from the conditions of his confinement, the only allegation to support such a claim is that he has been denied the opportunity to earn work and good conduct time credits, attend prison programs, and obtain a job because of his placement in RHU. However, such a cursory allegation fails to state a claim for relief. Critically, Plaintiff has failed to set forth facts to establish that the conditions about which he complains resulted in any violation of his constitutional rights because he has not identified any specific person who deprived him of the opportunity to earn credits, attend programs, or obtain a job. Although Plaintiff appears to allege the named Defendants are responsible for his continued disciplinary detention, he does not present any facts showing any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166 (“In the context of a conditions-of-confinement claim, to demonstrate that a deprivation is extreme enough to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must ‘produce evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions,' or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner's unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions.”) (citation omitted). Simply put, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. The deprivations alleged in a conditions-of-confinement claim must be serious and the defendants must be deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's needs. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wall v. Knowlin, No. 9:07-cv-3199-HMH-GCK, 2007 WL 3232129, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2007) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)). Here, Plaintiff has made no such allegations.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As noted, the Court has already afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his original Complaint, but his Amended Complaint fails to cure those deficiencies. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal without further leave to amend. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).