Opinion
A21-0287
07-01-2021
Carl Green, Appellant, v. Edina Realty, Respondent, Chamberlain Home Owners Association, Respondent, Nigel Mendez, et al., Respondents, Woodbury Police Department, Respondent, Washington County Sheriff, Respondent.
ORDER OPINION
Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-20-477 Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 2012, Rainbow House, LLC, purchased a townhome located in Woodbury. Appellant Carl Green is the sole owner of Rainbow House. Rainbow House agreed by contract for deed to assume two outstanding mortgages as payment for the property. A quit-claim deed transferring the property to Rainbow House was signed and filed with the county recorder. Rainbow House failed to pay assessments to respondent Chamberlain Home Owners Association, the development where the property is located. Chamberlain foreclosed on the property, and neither Rainbow House nor Green objected to the sale or attempted to redeem the property. Respondent Washington County Sheriff's Department (the sheriff) held a foreclosure sale, and this sale was confirmed by the district court. Green was evicted from the property.
2. Since that time, Green has repeatedly challenged the foreclosure, sale, and eviction. See Chamberlain Home Owners Ass'n v. Green, A19-1048 (Minn. App. Feb. 4, 2020); Green v. Carlson, A18-2060 (Minn. App. 2019). Green has also sued in the federal courts. Relief has been denied by all courts.
3. In this action, Green sued Chamberlain, and respondents Edina Realty, Nigel Mendez and Thomas Carlson, who are Chamberlain's attorneys, the Woodbury Police Department (the department), and the sheriff, and moved the district court under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 to set aside the foreclosure and eviction as void.
4. We review the district court's decision on a rule 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion. Peterson v. Eishen, 512 N.W.2d 338, 339 (Minn. 1994). Green alleges that the judgment is void because the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the previous owner. The previous owner was not a party to the foreclosure and eviction actions, and there is no judgment against her to void and no basis for setting aside the foreclosure and eviction judgments.
5. Green's rule 60.02 motion is a collateral attack on the earlier judgments. A party alleging a judgment is void can directly attack a judgment's validity in the same proceeding or collaterally attack a judgment in a separate proceeding. Bode v. Minnesota Dep't of Nat. Res., 612 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Minn. 2000). But the supreme court described Rule 60.02(d) as a procedural mechanism to "directly, rather than collaterally, attack a void judgment." Id. A rule 60.02 collateral attack made on a prior judgment in a subsequent proceeding is "procedurally improper" and "must fail." Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Green's rule 60.02 motion.
6. A district court may grant judgment on the pleadings upon a motion made prior to a pleading if a party fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). A party may also move for judgment on the pleadings after the time for pleading has closed. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03. We review the pleadings de novo to determine whether they set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Minn. 2020). "A claim is legally sufficient if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader's theory, to grant the relief demanded." Id. (quotation omitted). "The reviewing court must consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. (quotation omitted).
7. Green's complaint asks for reformation or rescission of the contract for deed and a restraining order based on mistakes in recording the contract for deed and quit-claim deed. None of the respondents were involved in the drafting of the contract for deed and quit-claim deed, or the execution and filing of the documents. There is no evidence that can be produced that would support a claim against these respondents. The district court did not err by dismissing Green's complaint under rule 12.02(e) and 12. 03 for failure to state a claim.
8. We review the question of whether service of process was effective de novo, as a question of law. Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Minn. 2016). An action is commenced against each party by service of a summons and complaint. Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01. A municipal or public corporation is served by delivering the summons and complaint to certain defined persons. Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(e). For a defendant city or a department of the city, the chief executive officer or the clerk must be served. Id. at 4.03(e)(2). "Generally, a valid judgment cannot be entered against a party absent lawful service of process on that party." Galbreath v. Coleman, 596 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Minn. App. 1999). The department was not properly served, and Green failed to accomplish service despite the district court's order granting an extension of time. The district court did not err by dismissing the complaint against the department for lack of jurisdiction based on invalid service of process.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's judgment is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Dated: July 1, 2021
BY THE COURT
/s/_________
Judge James B. Florey