Opinion
1:21-cv-344
04-10-2023
BENNIE D. GRAVES, Plaintiff v. KENNETH J. GAMBLE, Prothonotary, and KELLY MALONE, Deputy Prothonotary, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 21)
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Kenneth J. Gamble and Kelly Malone, ECF No. 21, be granted.
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Bennie D. Graves is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at the State Correctional Institution at Albion. In his complaint before this Court, ECF No. 8, he alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of the Defendants' pending motion.
On November 7, 2019, Plaintiff mailed multiple copies of a civil complaint (“the DOC Complaint”) to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, as well as a packet of exhibits and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The defendants named in the DOC Complaint were the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Correct Care Solutions and tweleve employees of those defendants. These documents were time- and date-stamped and signed by Defendant Kenneth J. Gamble (“Gamble”), the Erie County Prothonotary/Clerk of Records and/or Defendant Kelly Malone (“Malone”), the Deputy Prothonotary. The DOC Complaint was filed in the Court of Common Pleas on December 5, 2019.
On December 12, 2019, Plaintiff received from the Erie County Prothonotary's office the copies of the DOC Complaint, the packet of exhibits, and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which had been granted. These documents were not accompanied by an explanation or instructions. On December 16, 2019, Plaintiff wrote to Malone to ask if he was responsible for serving the defendants with the DOC Complaint himself.
On December 27, 2019, Plaintiff received a response from Gamble, advising him that service had to be accomplished by Plaintiff, that Plaintiff may have to contact the Sheriffs office for its service fee information, and that Gamble's office could not provide Plaintiff with advice about how to proceed.
On February 5, 2020, after two unsuccessful attempts to contact the Sheriffs office, Plaintiff wrote to the Prothonotary's office/Gamble, explaining his attempts and asking Gamble what he should do to effectuate service of the DOC Complaint. Plaintiff did not receive a response to this letter.
In the complaint sub judice, against Gamble and Malone, Plaintiff alleges state law negligence claims as well as a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting violations of Plaintiff s right to due process, right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff has also filed an “Amendment to Original Complaint” in which he asserts an additional state law malpractice claim against Gamble and Malone. ECF No. 19. He seeks relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages as well as an order that Defendants pay for future medical costs stemming from injuries complained of in the DOC Complaint. He has sued each defendant in both his or her individual and official capacities.
Upon screening the complaint, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs claims against a third defendant, Erie County Sheriff John Loomis, as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). ECF No. 12.
Defendants Gamble and Malone filed the instant motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6), accompanied by a brief in support. ECF Nos. 21-22. Graves filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 30. The motion is ripe for consideration.
B. Standards of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will likely prevail on the merits; the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Further, because Plaintiff is representing himself, the allegations must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's allegations of fact to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).
C. Analysis
1. Official Capacity Claims
As a preliminary matter, Defendants contend that any claims against them in their official capacities are barred by the immunity afforded to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by the Eleventh Amendment. ECF No. 22 at 3-4. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes actions in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting within their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985). The Prothonotary is part of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. It is well-settled that courts of common pleas are arms of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and are, thus, entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity that the Commonwealth enjoys. See Benn v. First Judicial District, 426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (Pennsylvania has a unified state judicial system so judicial districts (i.e., common pleas courts), being an “integral component” of the system, have Eleventh Amendment immunity).
Plaintiffs official capacity claims against the Defendants also fail because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania “is not a ‘person' subject to suit” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Whiteford v. Penn Hills Municipality, 323 Fed.Appx. 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2009), and a “claim against a state actor in his or her official capacity is tantamount to lodging the claim against the state itself, since it is the real party in interest.” Francis ex rel. Est. of Francis v. Northumberland Cnty., 636 F.Supp.2d 368, 385-86 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Therefore, a claim against a state actor in his or her official capacity is generally not cognizable under § 1983. See Alston v. Nat'l Conf of Bar Examiners, 314 F.Supp.3d 620, 626 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (holding that “[n]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1983”) (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991)).
The foregoing principles preclude a §1983 claim for money damages against the Defendants in their official capacities. Plaintiff argues, however, that these principles do not preclude his claims for prospective relief. ECF No. 30 at 2-3. It is true that “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.'” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10 (citations omitted). And it is also correct that “claims requesting prospective injunctive relief from official-capacity defendants do not run afoul of sovereign immunity.” See Iles v. de Jongh, 638 F.3d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Perry v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 441 Fed.Appx. 833, 836 (3d Cir. 2011)). For a plaintiffs official capacity claim to survive, however, “[t]he relief sought must be prospective, declaratory, or injunctive relief governing an officer's future conduct and cannot be retrospective....” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491,506 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984)). In determining whether the claim survives, “a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Here, although Plaintiff attempts to characterize the relief he seeks as prospective, his Complaint belies his position. He alleges that he is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion, Pennsylvania. ECF No. 8, ¶ 1. His Complaint alleges only past conduct of the Defendants and seeks an award of compensatory damages for that conduct. Id., p.9. Because Plaintiff alleges no ongoing violation of federal law, his claims cannot be considered prospective in nature.
Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss all official capacity claims against them should be granted, and these claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Section 1983 immunity
Defendants further argue that they are immune from Section 1983 liability either pursuant to quasi-judicial immunity or qualified immunity. ECF No. 22 at 4-8. In his response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues against qualified immunity but he does not respond to the Defendants' assertion of quasi-judicial immunity. ECF No. 30 at 3-4.
a. Quasi-judicial immunity
Quasi-judicial immunity applies to prothonotaries in this Commonwealth, but only in certain situations. See Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1969) (holding that prothonotaries may enjoy immunity as quasi-judicial officers); but see Tucker v. I'Jama, 173 Fed.Appx. 970 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that Clerk of Court did not have immunity in his non-discretionary rule-prescribed duty to file papers presented for filing). This type of immunity has been more fully explained as follows:
Judges are absolutely immunized from a civil rights suit for money damages arising from their judicial acts. Addlespurger v. Corbett, 461 Fed.Appx. 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2012). “The doctrine of judicial immunity is supported by a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993). Under the functional approach adopted by the Supreme Court, the doctrine only applies when an act is “judicial.” Id.-, see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (“It was the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informed our immunity analysis.”).
“Those who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process, such as court clerks and prothonotaries, enjoy quasi-judicial immunity when performing a function directly related to the court's decision-making activities or carrying out a judicial order.” Walton v. Denlinger, No. 5-5170, 2007 WL 4615960, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2007) (citing Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969)). “When judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are ‘functional[ly]
comparable]' to those of judges-that is, because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary judgment' as a part of their function.” Antoine, 508 U.S. at 436 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)); see also Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985). To determine whether an act is “judicial” the Court must look to “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).Burford v. Del. Cty., Pennsylvania, 2019 WL 7048796, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
Plaintiff baldly alleges that Defendants had “a judicial duty” to forward the DOC complaints to the Sheriffs office with instructions to serve them because the Sheriffs office “acts in such situations based upon the order of the trial court and not based upon a request by Plaintiff...” ECF No. 8 at 7. Plaintiff does not identify the source of Defendants' purported duty. The Court takes judicial notice that neither the relevant Pennsylvania statute nor the relevant Local Rule of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County prescribes such a duty. 42 Pa.C.S. § 2737 (setting forth powers and duties of the office of the prothonotaries of the Courts of Common Pleas); Erie L.R. 305 (setting forth duties of the prothonotary). The Court has identified no basis to find that Defendants had a “judicial duty” to issue an “order of the trial court” to the sheriff to serve the DOC complaint. Absent such a duty, Plaintiff has no basis for a claim against any Defendant. If such a duty potentially exists, it is one that casts Defendants in the role of the trial court performing a discretionary function. As such, quasi-judicial immunity would apply to Defendants' exercise of that discretion on behalf of the court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 2737 provides: The office of the prothonotary shall have the power and duty to:
(1) Administer oaths and affirmations and take acknowledgments pursuant to section 327 (relating to oaths and acknowledgments), but shall not be compelled to do so in any matters not pertaining to the proper business of the office.
(2) Affix and attest the seal of the court or courts to all the process thereof and to the certifications and exemplifications of all documents and records pertaining to the office of the prothonotary and the business of the court or courts of which it is the prothonotary.
(3) Enter all civil judgments, including judgments by confession.
(4) Enter all satisfactions of civil judgments.
(5) Exercise the authority of the prothonotary as an officer of the court.
(6) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may now or hereafter be vested in or imposed upon the office by law, home rule charter, order or rule of court, or ordinance of a county governed by a home rule charter or optional plan of government.
Rule 305 provides:
(a) (1) The Prothonotary shall immediately stamp all papers filed with the date and time of such filings and make an appropriate entry for each filing in the docket pursuant to applicable rules of procedure, statute or Court Order. No entries shall be made in the docket except at the direction of the Prothonotary.
(2) The Prothon[o]tary, duly authorized court personnel, and under the supervision of the Prothonotary, attorneys, pro se litigants and members of the public shall be permitted access to the files.
(3) No entries shall be made in the docket except at the direction of the Prothonotary.
(b) The Prothonotary shall be responsible for the safekeeping of all records and papers belonging to that office. The Prothonotary shall permit no papers to be taken from the office without order of Court except for temporary removal by an attorney for the purpose of conducting an arbitration, for copying within the Court House or other recognized Court purpose. Those removing papers from the file of the Court shall sign them out on a form used for that purpose and shall be responsible for damages arising from any loss.
(c) The Prothonotary shall not accept for filing any paper filed by a person which shall not have endorsed thereon the address and telephone number of the person filing the paper. The Prothonotary shall consecutively number the cases each year.
(d) In the litigation involving the validity of a municipal lien, upon motion of either party, the matter shall be transferred, from the municipal liens docket to the appearance docket and given a term and number by the Prothonotary.
(e) In all appeals to the Court from a municipal zoning board or municipalities, when said appeal has been returned to said board or municipality by the Court, should the matter then be returned to Court, it will retain the same docket number as it had on the original appeal.
b. Qualified immunity
Qualified immunity shields the Defendants from suit unless they “violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “Clearly established means that, at the time of the officer's conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby,__U.S.__, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The Supreme Court has instructed that courts “must focus on whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (emphasis in original). Thus, “the ultimate question” is whether the existing law gave the officials “fair warning” that their particular conduct was unlawful. Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313,329 (3d Cir. 2011).
“For qualified-immunity purposes, ‘clearly established rights are derived either from binding Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent or from a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals.'” James v. New Jersey State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2018)) (citation omitted); Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 589-90 (“To be clearly established, a legal principle must ... [be] dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority[.]” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court is to “first look to factually analogous precedents of the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit.” Id. (citing L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2016)). “Then, we examine persuasive authorities, such as our nonprecedential opinions and decisions from other Courts of Appeals.” Id.
Defendants assert that they duly executed the ministerial duties of the office of the Prothonotary by docketing, certifying, and returning to Plaintiff the certified and time-stamped copies of the DOC complaint and the court order granting him in forma pauperis status, and thereby guaranteed Plaintiffs constitutional right to access the courts. ECF No. 22 at 7 (citing Erie L.R. 305). Because they had no other duties to Plaintiff, they argue, they did not violate any of Plaintiff s clearly established constitutional rights by their actions.
In response, Plaintiff offers only the most general description of the constitutional rights he claims to have been violated: “Plaintiffs 1st Amend. Right to access the court, the right to seek redress of grievances, the right to due process and equal protection of law.” ECF No. 30 at 4. As set forth above, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support how Defendants violated these rights. His unsupported belief that Defendants should have taken additional steps to aid in the prosecution of the DOC complaint is simply not sufficient. No Supreme Court or Third Circuit case or consensus of cases from other federal courts of appeals has found facts comparable or analogous to those alleged in this case to violate any federal constitutional or statutory right. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs § 1983 claim.
3. State law claims
A district court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Upon dismissal of the Section 1983 claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice to Plaintiffs right to refile them in state court.
D. Conclusion
For the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 21, be granted. It is further recommended that leave to amend the complaint in this case be denied. The legal deficiencies of Plaintiff s federal claims against the Defendants are such that amendment would be futile. Furthermore, a review of federal case law reveals that no clearly established law exists such that amendment potentially could place Plaintiffs federal claims outside of Defendants' defense of qualified immunity.
III. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).