Opinion
NO. 00-3465.
March 12, 2001.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions: (1) Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of the Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, d/b/a Tulane University; and (2) Plaintiff Lisa S. Grant's Motion to Remand. Both motions require the Court to consider whether, as a federal work-study program participant, the Plaintiff was an employee of Tulane University. Because the Court finds that genuine issues exist as to Ms. Grant's status, Tulane's Motion is DENIED, and Ms. Grant's Motion is GRANTED.
A. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lisa S. Grant allegedly suffers from progressive heavy metal poisoning as a result of her college work-study activities in Tulane University's Chemical Engineering Department.
While attending Tulane University, Ms. Grant received various forms of financial assistance, including funds from the federal work-study program. "In accordance with federal financial assistance guidelines, plaintiff, as a Federal Work Study recipient, was employed by the [Tulane] Chemical Engineering Department as a lab and/or research assistant" between 1992 and 1994. Petition ¶¶ ¶¶ IV and VI. "Plaintiff was assigned to a lab project that was run in conjunction with Tulane University and Coastal Catalyst Oil Company . . . wherein she was to remove metal deposits from a spent catalyst, which had been used in cracking units to break down crude oil into shorter hydrocarbon chains, a process which entails passing Hydrogen Sulfide and Chlorine gas through a reactor at very high temperatures, about 1500 degrees Fahrenheit, wherein a reaction occurs turning the metals into salt compounds, which are soluble in water, and then washed out of the catalyst." Id. ¶¶ V. Ms. Grant alleges that, while working on this project, she was improperly exposed to a wide variety of toxic chemicals but did not learn of the exposure until the fall of 1999 following a series of medical tests. On October 17, 2000, she filed suit against Tulane and Coastal in Louisiana state court.
On November 22, 2000, Coastal removed the suit to this Court on diversity grounds. Even though Tulane and Ms. Grant are both citizens of Louisiana, Coastal argues that Tulane was fraudulently joined since Ms. Grant's exclusive remedy against her work-study "employer" is workers' compensation. Tulane formally acquiesced in the removal and now moves for summary judgment on the workers' compensation theory. Ms. Grant opposes both Tulane's motion and the removal on the grounds that she was a student — not an "employee" — of Tulane when she worked in the Tulane lab, and, therefore, that she may pursue a tort action against Tulane in state court. Ms. Grant has filed a motion to remand on those grounds.
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS
In Louisiana, as in most states, workers' compensation generally is the exclusive remedy for a workplace injury. See LA. R.S. 23:1032(A)(1)(a) and (B); Dustin v. DHCI Home Health Servs., 673 So.2d 356, 358 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1996). A prerequisite to any action arising under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act, however, is the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Id. at 359; Hillman v. Comm-Care. Inc., 732 So.2d 841, 843 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1999). The principal factors used to evaluate whether an employer-employee relationship exists are (1) selection and engagement; (2) payment of wages; (3) power of dismissal; and (4) power of control. Gotto v. ARA Living Ctr,. 570 So.2d 1172, 1175 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1990). Under LA. R.S. 23:1044, "[a] person rendering service for another in any trades, businesses or occupations covered by this Chapter is presumed to be an employee" for workers' compensation purposes. This presumption may be rebutted by proof that there was no contract of employment, either express or implied, between the alleged employee and alleged employer. Dustin, 673 So.2d at 359.
This statute provides in pertinent part: Except for intentional acts . . ., the rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of an injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights, remedies, and claims for damages, . . . as against his employer, or any . . . employee of such employer . . ., for said injury, or compensable sickness or disease. . . .
This exclusive remedy is exclusive of all claims, including any claims that might arise against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal under any dual capacity theory or doctrine.
Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer, or any . . . employee of such employer . . . to a fine or penalty under any other statute or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act.
Courts throughout the country have reached different conclusions as to whether particular work-study students were "employees" for workers' compensation purposes. For example, in Dustin v. DHCI Home Health Servs., 673 So.2d 356 (1996), the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's finding that workers' compensation was a work-study student's exclusive remedy against the hospital where he worked because he was not an "employee" of the hospital. The court held that the plaintiff, a student at a medical support personnel training school, was not an employee of the hospital because the hospital had no contract with the student, maintained no personnel file on him, paid him no compensation, did not select, hire, or engage him, and expressly assumed no responsibility over him; instead, the school itself placed the student in the hospital and maintained responsibility over him. And in Waldrep v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 21 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.App. 2000), the court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that a scholarship athlete was not an employee of his university for purposes of the Texas workers' compensation law. The Court held that, under the circumstances, "for workers' compensation purposes, a recipient of a scholarship or financial aid from a university [did not] become that university's employee by agreeing in return to participate in a university-sponsored [football] program." Id. at 697-98. See also Charlotte M. Rasche, Note, Can Universities Afford to Pay for Play? A Look at Vicarious Liability Implications of Compensating Student Athletes, 16 REV. LITIG. 219, 231-36 (1997) (reviewing cases involving workers' compensation claims by student athletes).
Coastal correctly notes that it is not unheard of for work-study students to receive workers' compensation benefits. Unfortunately, in the cases it cites, the issue of whether the worker was an "employee" for workers' compensation purposes was not squarely before the court. See Radke v. H.C. Davis Sons' Mfg. Co., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 204 (Neb. 1992); Jones v. Institute of Elec. Tech., 613 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1981); J. § G. Cabinets v. Hennington, 600 S.W.2d 916 (Ark.Ct.App. 1980). See also Leahey v. University of Rhode Island, 1985 WL 6033 (D.R.I. 1985) (plaintiff filed § 1983 action against state university officials on theory that he was denied workers' compensation benefits because of his work-study status, but state court decision established that benefits were denied for lack of causal connection).
In contrast, in Waters v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1972), the district court found that a work-study student employed at a federal installation pursuant to a contract between the installation and his school was a federal employee entitled to compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act because he worked for the federal facility and received wages. And in Smith v. City of New York, 411 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y.App.Div.3d Dep't 1978), the court found substantial evidence to support the jury determination that a work-study student was an employee of the agency that ran the work-study program for workers' compensation purposes because the agency hired, supervised and controlled the student and paid him some wages.
The appellate court noted that the student's wages were paid entirely by the federal government, albeit from different funds. See 458 F.2d at 22.
Early in its decision, the court in Smith noted that the General Electric plant where the claimant worked paid him an hourly wage and that the agency provided him with spending money. The court apparently considered the spending money an element of the claimant's wages. The court did not address whether General Electric also could have been considered the student's employer. See Williams v. National Youth Corps in Sch. Programs, 600 S.W.2d 27 (Ark.Ct.App. 1980) (school where work duty was performed and federally funded work-study program were joint employers of program participants for workers' compensation purposes).
In the Court's opinion, the lesson to be learned from the cases discussed above is that a work-study student's status as an "employee" depends on the particular facts of the case interpreted in light of the specific workers' compensation statute. Here, the Court agrees with Ms. Grant that her status as an "employee" under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act is not as clear as Tulane and Coastal believe. The Court agrees that discovery regarding her work-study placement in the Chemical Engineering Department is necessary to a proper resolution of the issue. In addition, the Court believes that detailed analyses of the federal work-study program, including the manner in which it is administered, and the Louisiana Act are required. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Tulane's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court also finds remand proper. As Ms. Grant correctly notes, under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction over the state-court suit. See Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Ind. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron § Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 42 S.Ct. 35, 66 L.Ed. 144 (1921)). "Moreover, because the effect of removal is to deprive the state court of an action properly before it, removal raises significant federalism concerns, . . . which mandate strict construction of the removal statute." Id. at 365-66 (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3233, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986); Shamrock Oil § Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107, 61 S. Ct. 868, 872, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941); andWilly v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988)). As discussed above, Defendants here have failed to establish that there is " no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court," B. Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original), and, therefore, Coastal has failed to justify removal. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (but without attorneys' fees).
C. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Plaintiff Lisa S. Grant's status as an "employee" of Tulane University under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act is unclear and, therefore, that Coastal and Tulane have failed to rule out the possibility that she will be able to establish a cause of action in tort against in-state defendant Tulane. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Tulane's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Plaintiff Lisa S. Grant's Motion to Remand is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, for further proceedings, each party to bear its own costs.