Opinion
No. 79-751.
Argued April 30, 1980.
Decided October 8, 1980.
Appeal from the Rental Accommodations Commission.
John Evans, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Richard B. Nettler, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., with whom Judith W. Rogers, Corp. Counsel and Richard W. Barton, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for respondent.
Before NEBEKER, MACK and PRYOR, Associate Judges.
This is an appeal from a decision by the District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission (the Commission) ruling that furnished units, inclusive of transient units, in petitioner's housing accommodations, were subject to rent control. Petitioner raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the Commission erred when it ruled that all furnished units, inclusive of transient units, in petitioner's housing accommodations were subject to rent control; (2) whether the Commission erred in expanding the subordinate Rent Administrator's decision to include persons who were not included in the Rent Administrator's decision; (3) whether the Commission erred in ruling that the rent control ceiling for furnished "transient units" should be the rent control ceiling applicable to unfurnished rental units; and (4) whether the Rent Administrator had the power to delegate to the Rental Accommodations Office hearing examiner the authority to conduct a hearing in one case and to render decisions in others. We find petitioner's arguments are without merit and affirm.
This matter was previously before this court on a petition for review brought by petitioner contesting the Commission's decision of September 6, 1978, that certain units were not exempt from rent control pursuant to the Rental Accommodations Act of 1975, D.C. Code 1978 Supp., § 45-1631 et seq. In the previous matter, the court affirmed the decision of the Commission in Granite State Limited Partnership v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission, D.C.App., 403 A.2d 1157 (1979). In its opinion however, the court noted that "the Commission properly remanded the tenant's complaint [the complaint of Vincent Gilmore] to the hearing examiner for a determination of the effect of the Rental Housing Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-54, D.C. Reg. 5334, on the status of petitioner's building, especially in light of the Act's definition of 'transient occupancy.' " Id. at 1158 n. 1.
On remand to the Rental Accommodations Office (RAO), the hearing examiner, because the two matters involved the same issue, consolidated for final disposition tenant complaint T/P 2166 filed June 21, 1978, by Sarah L. Morrison, with tenant complaint T/P 1319 filed October 25, 1977, by Vincent Gilmore; the latter being the subject of the court's earlier decision in Granite. The tenant complaint filed October 25, 1977, by Vincent Gilmore alleged that the monthly rent being charged by petitioner was in excess of the amount permitted by D.C. Code 1978 Supp., § 45-1644, since petitioner had not properly registered the rental unit. Gilmore, who had begun his tenancy on August 22, 1977, was still occupying the same rental unit at the time of the RAO's decision of November 13, 1978. Morrison, who also lived in a "transient" unit at the subject property, began her tenancy on June 1, 1977. She was still residing at the same place at the time of the RAO's decision, and she considered herself a permanent tenant.
The RAO hearing examiner determined that there was no clear evidence that petitioner qualified for exemption status. She also concluded that the property was not exempt from rent control and that Morrison was entitled to the same relief as Gilmore. Petitioner appealed this decision to the Commission.
While awaiting a decision by the Commission on his complaint filed on October 25, 1977, Gilmore, on behalf of himself and thirty-one other tenants, filed on July 26, 1978, another tenant complaint, T/P 2273, asserting that the rent being charged was higher than the law allows because petitioner had not properly registered the rental units. A hearing was held and a decision rendered on January 4, 1979. The hearing examiner found that petitioner had not registered the furnished units of the subject premises with the RAO pursuant to D.C. Code 1978 Supp., § 45-1689(d), that substantial housing code violations existed on the premises and that petitioner was not exempt from registering under § 45-1686(d). Petitioner was ordered to refund all rent increases to the tenants of the furnished rental units, to register the subject rental units, and to submit to the RAO evidence of the current rents being charged to enable the RAO to ascertain whether further refunds are due. This decision was also appealed to the Commission. In May of 1979, the Commission heard petitioner's appeals in T/P 2273, T/P 1319, and T/P 2166. The issue was whether the furnished units at the property were exempt from the Rental Housing Act of 1977.
D.C. Code 1979 Supp., § 45-1681 et seq.
The Commission found the definitions of "housing accommodations" and "rental unit," the exemption provisions of the Rental Housing Act of 1977 and the Rental Accommodations Act of 1975 to be the same. It concluded that the furnished units of the premises were not exempt from compliance with rent control. The Commission ordered appellant to make an accounting to present and former tenants. We find appellant's contention that the Commission erred in ruling that the furnished units on the premises are subject to rent control is without merit.
The definitions of "housing accommodation" and "rental unit" and the exemption provisions in D.C. Code 1978 Supp., § 45-1631 et seq., and D.C. Code 1979 Supp., § 45-1681 et seq., are the same in both laws. Section 45-1681(f) provides as follows:
The term "housing accommodations" means any structure or building in the District of Columbia containing one (1) or more rental units and the land appurtenant thereto. Such term shall not include any hotel, motel, or other structure, including any room therein, used primarily for transient occupancy and in which at least sixty percent (60%) of the rooms devoted to living quarters for tenants or guests are used for transient occupancy. For the purposes of this subchapter, a rental unit shall be deemed to be used for transient occupancy if the landlord thereof is subject to and pays the sales tax imposed by section 47-2601(14)(a)(3).
By the Commission's interpretation of § 45-1681(f), no structure or rental unit therein may be exempt unless the statute's sixty percent level of "transient occupancy" is met or surpassed. Since petitioner has less than sixty percent of its rooms licensed and occupied by transients, it failed to qualify for exemption from rent control. See Granite State Limited Partnership v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission, supra at 1158. Given the express language of § 45-1681(f), we conclude that substantial evidence exists to support a finding that the units are not exempt from rent control.
Rental Accommodations Commission Rules, 25 D.C. Reg. 2647, Sept. 22, 1978, § 102(kk) reads:
[T]ransient occupancy — the use of a rental unit for which the landlord is subject to and pays the sales tax imposed by Section 47-2601(14)(a)(3) of the District of Columbia Code.
If the Commission had applied the new definition of "transient occupancy," less than sixty percent of the units would be considered as used for transient occupancy because only 96 of the 167 units were devoted to transient occupancy and appellant would need at least 100 to reach the sixty percent level necessary for the classification.
Petitioner's contentions that the Commission erred in applying the Rent Administrator's decision in T/P 2273 to all current and former tenants of the furnished units, and in ruling that the rent ceiling for furnished units should be the rent ceiling applicable to unfurnished units are without merit.
Such actions by the Rent Administrator were within the ambience of authority given to it by D.C. Code 1979 Supp., § 45-1685(a) to carry out the rent stabilization program established under Title II of the Rental Housing Act of 1977.
Finally, petitioner contends that the Rent Administrator did not have the power to delegate to the Rental Accommodations Office hearing examiner the authority to conduct the hearing in T/P 2273 or to render decisions in T/P 1319 and T/P 2166. We disagree. The language of D.C. Code 1979 Supp., § 45-1685(d)(2) is clear and expressly gives power to the Rent Administrator to delegate authority.
The government argues that the Rent Administrator may delegate authority to employees to hear petitions, issue decisions, and render final orders. At the time the decisions of the hearing examiner were made, the Commission had promulgated emergency regulations for the delegation of authority to hearing examiners. See Emergency Regulations of May 23, 1978, 24 D.C. Reg. 1648, June 16, 1978 (expiring Sept. 23, 1978); D.C. Rental Accommodations Commission Emergency Rules, § 214(h), 24 D.C. Reg. 4789, Nov. 17, 1978 (effective Oct. 28, 1978 and expiring Feb. 28, 1979).
The Commission's interpretation of § 45-1681(f) was correct as a matter of law and its findings were based on substantial evidence. Washington Post Co. v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.App., 377 A.2d 436 (1977); Coakley v. Police and Firemen's Retirement and Relief Board, D.C.App., 370 A.2d 1345 (1977).
Affirmed.