Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-2199, Section "I" (5)
June 24, 2002
MINUTE ENTRY
This matter is before the Court pursuant to a motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of defendant, Christian Health Ministries ("Christian Health"). Plaintiff, Dr. Valeria Granger, brought this action alleging discrimination in her employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
This motion was originally filed on behalf of defendants, Christian Health Ministries, Christian Health Ministries Foundation, and Baptist Community Ministries. [R. Doc. No. 28.] Since the filing of this motion, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims against all defendants except Christian Health Ministries. [R. Doc. No. 40.]
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Dr. Valeria Granger, is an African-American female. The defendant, Christian Health, is a non-profit corporation that does business under the name of the McFarland Institute ("Institute"). [R. Doc. No. 28, Ex. 1, Affidavit of Rev. Eugene W. Huffstutler, Jr. ("Aff. Huff."), ¶ 2.]
Pursuant to Local Rule 56.2, "each copy of the papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to which there exists a genuine issue to be tried." That rule further provides that all facts set forth by the moving party in its statement will be deemed admitted unless otherwise contested. Local Rules of Court 56.2. In this case, plaintiff has not filed a statement of contested material facts as required by Local Rule 56.2 and, therefore, plaintiff is deemed to have admitted the facts set forth in defendant's statement. Harris v. Advance Transformer Co. 2000 WL 726889, *2 (E.D.La. 6/6/00); Smith v. Compass Rose Services, Inc., 1998 WL 24426, *1 (E.D.La. 1/22/98); Wache v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 1997 WL 599308, n. 1 (E.D.La. 9/25/97); Keller v. Neico Corp., 1987 WL 15648, *1 (E.D.La. 8/13/87); Touchstone v. GB.Q. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 805, 813 (E.D.La. 10/19/84).
At all times relevant to plaintiffs claims, the McFarland Institute was divided into two primary divisions: the Clinical Pastoral Education Division and the Pastoral Counseling Division. Id. at ¶ 7. The Congregational Wellness Program (the "Program") of the McFarland Institute was not a separate division. Id. Rather, it was an ancillary, start-up program operated by the Institute. Id. The Program is a non-denominational, volunteer, church-based program that provides funds for medical equipment to congregations in need and assists with the training of volunteer nurses. Id. at ¶ 8. The nurses provide health and wellness education to the congregants with an emphasis on prevention. Id.
Dr. Granger began her employment with Christian Health on October 8, 1997, as Director of the Congregational Wellness Program. Id. at ¶ 5. Her direct supervisor was Reverend Eugene W. Huffstutler, Jr. ("Rev. Huffstutler"), who, at the time of plaintiffs employment, was Executive Director of the McFarland Institute. Id. at ¶ 6. Rev. Huffstutler is Caucasian and he was responsible for the hiring, managing, and firing of personnel, including Dr. Granger. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.
Rev. Huffstutler is now the President of the McFarland Institute. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 2.]
As Director of the Congregational Wellness Program, plaintiff's main priority was securing funding for the new program. Id. at ¶ 10. The Congregational Wellness Program had been created following a one-time grant. Id. at ¶ 9. However, that grant was insufficient to maintain the program on a permanent basis. Id. Instead, the Program required a more consistent stream of funding to maintain its operations. Id. at ¶ 10. Thus, from the beginning of her employment, the importance of plaintiffs ability to work together with other members of the Program to secure funding was essential. Id.
Although plaintiff's job performance was satisfactory in some aspects of her employment, her work history, as documented by the defendant, reflects repeated problems with the management and supervision of subordinates, failure to follow instructions from supervisory personnel, and failure to abide by company policy and procedures. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 40; R. Doc. No. 36, p. 4.] There were also complaints about plaintiffs work in the Program, misrepresentations, poor judgment, and acts of direct insubordination. Id.
Defendant also contends that Dr. Granger mistreated her assistants because she required them to work on plaintiff's personal business on company time and she required them to carry her materials. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 12.] Plaintiff isolated her subordinates from other staff members, outwardly resisted their efforts to relieve the front desk employee, and assigned them overtime work without prior approval. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 12; Ex. 2, Affidavit of Jo Laxton ("Aff. Laxton"), ¶ 8.]
Jo Laxton was the Human Resources Manager at Christian Health at the time that plaintiff was employed as Director of Congregational Wellness Program. As Human Resources Manager, Ms. Laxton often had to address problems relating to Dr. Granger's compliance with company rules regarding overtime, vacation time, and improper scheduling of hours for subordinate employees. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Laxton, ¶¶ 3-4.]
In addition to the above, Ms. Vogel Newsome, then Dr. Granger's assistant, complained that Dr. Granger was forcing her to participate in daily devotional sessions during work hours in their joint office, said devotionals lasting as long as one and a half hours. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff, ¶ 13; Aff. Laxton, ¶ 9.] After Rev. Huffstutler instructed plaintiff to cease requiring Ms. Newsome to participate in these devotionals, Ms. Newsome complained that Dr. Granger became hostile toward her by raising her voice, pointing her finger at Ms. Newsome, and physically pounding on Ms. Newsome's desk. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Laxton, ¶ 10.] Additionally, Ms. Newsome complained that Dr. Granger, despite Rev. Huffstutler's mandate, persisted in conducting lengthy devotionals out loud in their shared office. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff, ¶ 14.] Although Rev. Huffstutler considered terminating Dr. Granger for insubordination, he decided to instead place her on a 90-day probation effective January 28, 2000. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff Huff., ¶¶ 17-18.]
Ms. Newsome was subsequently discharged for work performance issues at the behest of Dr. Granger. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff, ¶ 15.] Ms. Newsome then filed a written complaint of religious harassment with Christian Health against Dr. Granger, claiming that her termination was the result of her refusal to participate in Dr. Granger's devotionals. Id. Although an investigation into that complaint did not reveal any "clear evidence of religious harassment," the report nevertheless found that Dr. Granger's out-loud devotionals were disruptive to the work atmosphere at Christian Health and that such devotionals should only be permitted when they were strictly voluntary, beyond the hearing of employees who chose not to participate, and brief. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 16; Ex. E, Management Executive Committee's Summary of Investigation, p. 2.] Ms. Newsome also brought a claim of religious discrimination, alleging similar grounds against Christian Health with the EEOC. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 15; Ex. D, Charge of Discrimination dated 4/13/00.]
In addition to problems regarding the treatment of her assistants, Dr. Granger's work history was replete with examples of poor judgment, misrepresentations, and acts of direct insubordination. [R. Doc. No. 28, p. 4.] One such instance occurred when a grant proposal was being prepared for submission to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 10.] Rev. Huffstutler repeatedly instructed plaintiff to allow him to review the proposal prior to its submission. Id. However, despite his requests, a copy was not provided to him until after the submission was made, at which time Rev. Huffstutler realized, albeit too late, that the proposal had been submitted with several grammatical and spelling mistakes. Id.
Rev. Huffstutler also learned that Dr. Granger improperly directed funding for church-based nursing programs to congregations that were not in need of such funding. Id. at ¶ 32. Specifically, she directed money to her own congregation despite the fact that it was not in financial need. Id. Rev. Huffstutler received complaints from at least two church ministers regarding problems with Dr. Granger's administration and teaching of the nurse wellness program at their churches. Id. at ¶ 33.
Throughout her employment, Dr. Granger often refused to follow basic internal procedures of Christian Health and failed to abide by company policy. Id. at ¶ 19. In August 1999, Rev. Huffstutler had to counsel Dr. Granger about discrepancies between submitted time sheets and her actual days worked, as well as her inability to follow proper procedures regarding the use of vacation days. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff, ¶ 19; Ex. F, Mem. of Rev. Huffstutler to Dr. Granger, dated 8/11/99; Aff. Laxton, ¶ 4.] Similarly, in August 2000, Rev. Huffstutler had to warn Dr. Granger about violations of company policy with respect to her business travels. [R. Doc. No. 28, Huff Aff., ¶ 20.] Prior to that, Dr. Granger was caught violating Christian Health's strict anti-nepotism policy, a copy of which plaintiff acknowledged receiving, when she recommended her daughter for the administrative assistant position without first disclosing the relationship. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff Laxton, ¶ 6.]
In July 2000, Dr. Granger was asked to handle the hiring of a nurse coordinator and a receptionist for the Congregational Wellness Program. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff Huff, ¶¶ 22-23.] Dr. Granger recommended and subsequently made an offer to Ms. Letitia Dumas, a friend and fellow church member, who, according to plaintiff, met the requirements for the position. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 23; Aff. Laxton, ¶ 16.] Following the hiring of Ms. Dumas, however, it became evident that Ms. Dumas was in fact not qualified for the position of nurse coordinator. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 24.] Christian Health had no choice but to terminate her employment. Id. at ¶ 25. Thereafter, Ms. Dumas filed a lawsuit in state court alleging that her termination was the result of employment discrimination by Christian Health. Id. at ¶ 26. That case is still pending. Id.
The parties dispute whether plaintiff obtained proper approval prior to the hiring of Ms. Dumas. On the one hand, defendant contends that Dr. Granger made an offer to Ms. Dumas without first discussing the matter with Human Resources Manager, Jo Laxton. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Laxton, ¶ 16.] Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that Dr. Granger discussed the matter with Rev. Huffstutler who approved the hiring. [R. Doc. No. 29, p. 8.]
Specifically, in October 2000, two consultants to Congregational Wellness determined that Ms. Dumas was not qualified for the position as she lacked experience, an advanced degree, or certification in a specialty. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff Huff., ¶ 24.] However, Ms. Dumas was not terminated immediately. Id. Only after work performance reviews by her supervisors confirmed that she was too inexperienced for the job, did Christian Health explain the situation to her and dismiss her. Id. ¶ 25.
In September 2000, Rev. Huffstutler authorized Dr. Granger to begin the search for a receptionist/secretary for the Program. Id. at ¶ 27. Due to Dr. Granger's previous problems and to ensure that proper procedures were followed, Rev. Huffstutler specifically instructed Dr. Granger to work closely with Jo Laxton, Christian Health's Manager of Human Resources. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 27; Aff. Laxton, ¶ 18.] Despite her repeated assurances to Rev. Huffstutler that she was abiding by his instructions, Dr. Granger hired Rachel Woods, another friend and fellow church member, without the prior knowledge or approval of Ms. Laxton. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff, ¶ 30; Aff. Laxton, ¶¶ 20-26.] Most significantly, Dr. Granger's hiring of Ms. Woods was in direct contravention of Ms. Laxton's request that no offer be made until the position was properly advertised in accordance with company policy and other interviews were conducted. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Laxton, ¶¶ 20-25; Aff. Huff. ¶ 30.]
Although plaintiff argues that the hiring of Rachel Woods was approved by Rev. Huffstutler, Rev. Huffstutler's affidavit establishes that his consent was based solely on plaintiff's assurance that Ms. Laxton had approved the hiring. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff. ¶ 28.]
As a result of plaintiff's complete disregard for company policy, failure to follow instructions, and misrepresentations, Rev. Huffstutler demoted plaintiff to the position of Nurse Coordinator on October 3, 2000. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 31; Ex. H, Mem. from Rev. Huffstutler to Dr. Granger dated, 10/3/00.] Plaintiff's insubordination problems, however, continued. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff, ¶ 34.] On October 4, 2000, Dr. Granger was found misrepresenting the truth to Rev. Huffstutler regarding her whereabouts during office hours the day before. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36. In an effort to avoid any future problems of that type, on October 10, 2000, Rev. Huffstutler requested that Dr. Granger provide him with copies of her schedule. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff Huff., ¶ 37; Ex. I, Mem. from Rev. Huffstutler to Dr. Granger, dated 10/10/00.] As of Friday, October 13, 2000, plaintiff had failed to comply with Rev. Huffstutler's request. [R. Doc. No. 28, ¶ 39.] That same day, Dr. Granger's employment with Christian Health was terminated. Id. She was subsequently replaced by two part-time employees, both of whom are Caucasians. Id. at ¶ 41.
Plaintiff did not sustain any loss in pay and her duties remained the same. Id. at ¶ 31. In her new position, all of plaintiff's decisions regarding the Congregational Wellness Program were to be directly supervised by Rev. Huffstutler. Id.
It had come to Rev. Huffstutler's attention that Dr. Granger had been performing work for other personal businesses during her employment at Christian Health. Id. at ¶ 38.
On November 8, 2000, Dr. Granger filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which issued a notice of right to sue. [R. Doc. No. 5, pp. 1-2.] Thereafter, on June 11, 2001, Dr. Granger filed a lawsuit in state court against Christian Health, Christian Health Ministries Foundation ("CHM Foundation"), Baptist Community Ministries ("Baptist"), the McFarland Institute, the management executive committee, Byron Harrell, Rev. Eugene Huffstutler, and Jo Laxton, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of race, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. [R. Doc. No. 1.] Following removal to this Court, on October 10, 2001, this Court dismissed several of plaintiff's claims, including those for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and claims against the management committee and its members, Byron Harrell, Eugene Huffstutler, and Jo Laxton. [R. Doc. No. 12.] The Court did, however, provide plaintiff with the opportunity to amend her petition in order to state valid claims against any of the dismissed parties. Id. Following an amended complaint which attempted to do just that, [R. Doc. No. 14], defendants answered the amended complaint and filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all claims found in that amended complaint. [R. Doc. No. 17.]
Christian Health Ministries Foundation is a separate entity whose purpose is to raise funding for Christian Health. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff., ¶ 3.] Baptist Community Ministries is a private grant-making foundation that provides some funding to the McFarland Institute. Id. at ¶ 4.
On February 4, 2002, this Court entered an order granting defendants' motion in its entirety and dismissing all of plaintiff's claims, except those for employment discrimination under state and federal law, against Christian Health, the CHM Foundation, and Baptist. [R. Doc. No. 23.] Thereafter, by stipulation, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims against CHM Foundation and Baptist, and plaintiff further agreed to limit her claim against Christian Health, the only remaining defendant, to a claim alleging disparate treatment pursuant to Title VII. [R. Doc. No. 40.] Accordingly, the only claim presently before this Court is plaintiff's allegation that Christian Health's termination of her employment was a result of racial discrimination based on disparate treatment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17.
Although the parties initially disputed which of these entities employed the plaintiff, defendants stipulated that Christian Ministries was plaintiffs only employer and that it would respond to any judgment that may be rendered in this action. [R. Doc. No. 40.] Based upon that representation, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against Baptist Community Ministries and Christian Health Foundation. Id.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(c). Once the moving party carries its burden of proving that there is no material factual dispute, the burden shifts to the nonmovant "to show that summary judgment should not lie." Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1994). While the court must consider the evidence with all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Associates of North Texas, 1998 WL 175313, *2 (5th Cir. 1998). This requires the nonmoving party to do "more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. The nonrnoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Auguster v. Vermillion Parish School Board, 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 2001). In this case, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the Court finds that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In accordance with Local Rule 56.1, defendant submitted a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in conjunction with its motion. [R. Doc. No. 28.] That statement represents, among other facts, that Dr. Granger's employment at Christian Health was terminated for performance-related reasons as expressed above, that no evidence exists to support an allegation that defendant's proffered reasons for termination are pretextual or that Dr. Granger was treated differently than similarly situated employees, and that Dr. Granger's race did not play any role in Christian Health's decision to terminate her. [R. Doc. No. 28, Def's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, ¶¶ 3, 4, 6, 7, 8.] As stated previously, plaintiff did not file a statement of uncontested facts and plaintiff is, therefore, deemed to have admitted the facts set forth by defendant in its statement.
Defendant seeks summary judgment, dismissing plaintiffs Title VII claims for discrimination. First, defendant argues that plaintiff cannot prove a prima facie case of discrimination against Christian Health because she cannot show that she was qualified for the position or that she was treated less favorably than employees outside her protected class. Defendant also argues that plaintiff's replacements, although Caucasians, were selected by a racially-mixed group of local leaders unaffiliated with Christian Health. Second, defendant avers that even if plaintiff could establish a prima fade case, which is denied, defendant had legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging plaintiff.
Plaintiff disputes that she is unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. [R. Doc. No. 29, p. 7.] She further contends that defendant's proffered reasons for discharging her are pretextual and unworthy of credence. Id. at 8-10. Finally, plaintiff argues that she was the victim of disparate treatment in that similarly situated white employees were never disciplined to the same degree as Dr. Granger. Id. at 10-11.
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race . . ."42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
To prove a violation of section 703(a)(1), the plaintiff in a Title VII case must follow the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Pursuant to that framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 801-03, 93 S.Ct. at 1823-25.
A prima facie case in a Title VII claim alleging disparate treatment is established by proving: (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was at all times qualified for the position at issue; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that others similarly situated were treated more favorably. Okoye v. The University of Texas Houston Health Science Center, 245 F.3d 507, 512-13 (5th Cir. 2001); Rutherford v. Harris County, Texas, 197 F.3d 173, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1999). Establishment of a prima facie case gives rise to an inference of discrimination which shifts the burden to the employer to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Once a prima facie case has been established, the employer has the burden of production and not the burden of persuasion. Id. The employer must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reason for the adverse employment decision. Id.
Because the only claim presently before this Court is plaintiff's allegation of race discrimination based on disparate treatment, the Court will apply the test relevant to disparate treatment cases in determining whether plaintiff has met a prima facie case of discrimination.
If the employer satisfies the burden of production, the presumption of discrimination disappears. Id. The case then proceeds to the third phase which requires the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate non-discriminatory reason proffered by the employer was not the true reason for the adverse employment decision. Id. "[An employer's] reason cannot be proved to be a 'pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that the discrimination was the real reason." St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. at 2752 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981)) (emphasis in original); EEOC v. Louisiana Office of Community Services, 47 F.3d 1438, 1443 (5th Cir. 1995). Significantly, "it is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the fact finder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination." St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 519, 113 S.Ct. at 2754 (emphasis in original).
In this case, Christian Health concedes that plaintiff satisfies the first and third prongs of her prima facie case as plaintiff is African-American and she was terminated from her employment. However, whether Dr. Granger meets the remaining second and fourth prongs, i.e. that plaintiff was at all times qualified for the position from which she was discharged and that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees, is disputed.
With regard to the second prong, plaintiff submits that "neither party disputes that she was qualified for the job when first hired." [Rec. Doc. No. 29, p. 7.] Christian Health denies plaintiff's contention and argues that an employee, such as Dr. Granger, who fails to comply, after reasonable notice and warning, with the company's internal procedures, repeatedly refuses to comply with instructions, and exposes the company to a liability risk on several occasions, is not qualified for continued employment. [R. Doc. No. 28, n. 20.]
Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case with respect to the qualification prong by demonstrating that she continued to possess the necessary qualifications for her job at the time she was terminated. Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1506 (5th Cir. 1988). With respect to the qualification prong, the Fifth Circuit has looked to whether the plaintiff "'suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered [the plaintiff] unfit for the position for which [the plaintiff] was hired,' leaving the remaining question of what role the plaintiffs alleged poor performance played in the termination decision to the employer's legitimate non-discriminatory reason and whether that reason is pretext for discrimination." Kesterson v. R.R. Donnelley Sons Co., 2002 WL 923921, *3 (N.D.Tex. 5/6/02) (quoting Bienkowski, 851 F.2d at 1505-6 and n. 3.)
Dr. Granger was hired initially and remained employed in her position for almost three years. There is no evidence that Dr. Granger lost any professional license or had a disability that rendered her unfit for the job. The Court finds that this evidence is at least sufficient enough to satisfy prong two of plaintiff's prima facie case.
With respect to the fourth prong, which involves a consideration of whether similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than Dr. Granger, Christian Health contends that there is no evidence that similarly situated white employees were treated more favorably. [R. Doc. No. 28, p. 22-23.] Plaintiff, however, cites to Barnes v. Yellow Freight Systems, 778 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) in support of her position. Barnes holds that "[w]hen a supervisor of one race treats employees of the same race more favorably than similarly situated employees of another race under circumstances that are essentially identical, a presumption of discriminatory intent is raised." Id. (emphasis added). As the Fifth Circuit has made clear, to be even relevant, the similarly situated employee must have been engaged in the same or similar conduct as that which formed the basis of the disciplinary action taken against the plaintiff. Fierros v. Texas Dept. of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 196 (5th Cir. 2001); Green v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 612 F.2d 967, 968 (5th Cir. 1980).
Defendant submits the affidavit and deposition testimony of Rev. Huffstutler which establish that no other employee ever presented Christian Health with the type of problems that Dr. Granger did. [R. Doc. No. 28, Aff. Huff. ¶ 43; Ex. 3, Huffstutler Depo., p. 40.] As such, defendant argues that it no occasion to discipline any employee in the manner in which it did plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff offers no evidence whatsoever that other similarly situated non-minority employees engaged in similar acts or misconduct and that they were not similarly discharged. Absent such evidence, this Court finds that plaintiff cannot meet the fourth and final prong of her prima facie case and, therefore, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Plaintiff's inability to establish a prima facie case notwithstanding, this Court finds that summary judgment is nevertheless appropriate. Plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Christian Health's proffered reasons for terminating plaintiffs employment were false or that plaintiff's race was the determining factor in defendant's decision to discharge her.
The affidavits of Rev. Huffstutler and Jo Laxton, detailing the various problems with Dr. Granger over the course of her employment, establish that the decision to terminate plainfiff was based on various legitimate, performance-related reasons. Such reasons include repeated problems with organization and time management, inability to communicate well with others, especially subordinates, poor judgment, misrepresentations, failure to follow company policy and procedures, complaints about her work, failure to comply with instructions from supervisory personnel, and acts of direct insubordination. This Court finds that defendant has met its burden of showing that there were serious problems with plaintiff during her employment relationship, all of which constituted legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for dismissing plaintiff.
Having proffered legitimate reasons for terminating plaintiff's employment, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that the defendant's reasons for her discharge were a pretext and that the real basis for her termination was racial animus. Because this Court is reviewing a summary judgment motion, it need not determine whether plaintiff can actually prove that Christian Health's reasons are pretextual. In the context of a summary judgment proceeding, the question is not whether the plaintiff proves pretext, but rather whether the plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext. Hall v. Gillman, Inc., 81 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1996), Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 646 (5th Cir. 1985). Therefore, a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment by presenting evidence which, taken as a whole, (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons were what actually motivated the employer, and (2) creates a reasonable inference that race was a determinative factor in the actions of which the plaintiff complains. Hall, 81 F.3d at 37 (emphasis added); Wyvill v. United Companies Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff argues that the evidence she produced is sufficient for summary judgment purposes. The Court disagrees.
In order to survive summary judgment, the law is clear that plaintiff must present facts to rebut each and every legitimate non-discriminatory reason proffered by the employer. Rutherford v. Harris County. Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 183 (5th Cir. 1999); Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 1998).
Opposing defendant's motion, plaintiff offers no evidence other than her own assertions to demonstrate that defendant's detailed and well supported reasons for firing her were false and that Christian Health was actually motivated by plaintiff's race to discharge her. The unauthenticated and unsworn documents provided by the plaintiff are not proper summary judgment evidence. Rule 56 requires the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). Conclusory rebuttals and plaintiffs subjective beliefs are insufficient to avoid the summary judgment requested by the defendant. The documents submitted by the plaintiff fall woefully short of the standard articulated in Rule 56 and, in light of defendant's challenge to them [R. Doc. No. 33, pp. 9-10], may not be considered by this Court.
Plaintiff also attaches short excerpts of Rev. Huffstutler's deposition testimony. However, this Court has difficulty making sense of these excerpts as none of them are relevant to any of the arguments made by plaintiff in opposition. [R. Doc. No. 29, Ex. B.]
See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Michaels v. Avitech, Inc., 202 F.3d 746, 754-55 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that inferences are insufficient to avoid summary judgment); Wilson Industries, Inc. v. Aviva America, Inc., 185 F.3d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the non-movant cannot satisfy his summary judgment burden with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence); Krim v. Banc Texas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1449 (5th Cir. 1993) (summary judgment is appropriate if "nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation").
See Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distributor, Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Oglesby v. Terminal Transport Co., 543 F.2d 1111, 1112 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that unsworn documents are not appropriate evidence for consideration) Dabon v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 2002 WL 461518, *1 (E.D.La. 3/25/02) ("Unauthenticated documents, once challenged, cannot be considered by a court in determining a summary judgment motion"); Central Finance Control v. Roberts, 1991 WL 162118, *3 (E.D.La. 8/9/91) (quoting Canada v. Blain's Helicopter Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987)) ("[I]t is well established that 'unauthenticated documents cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment. In order to be considered by the court, 'documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 5(e) and the affiant must be a person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence'").
In this case, defendant has come forward with affirmative evidence that Dr. Granger's employment was terminated for numerous, specific, performance-related reasons unrelated to her race. Defendant did so by attaching sworn affidavits from plaintiff's supervisor and the manager of human resources, each of which sets forth specific and detailed accounts of the incidents which led to plaintiff's firing. These affidavits are further supported by extensive authenticated documentary evidence. In response, plaintiff offers mere conclusions and unsupported inferences. Even in her memorandum, plaintiff does not refute many of the allegations supported by defendant's proper summary judgment evidence. Plaintiff's self-serving speculation is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1449 (5th Cir. 1993); Aguilar v. Lundy Enterprises, Inc., 1997 WL 187381, *4 (E.D.La. 4/16/97).
There being no genuine dispute as to any material fact, the Court finds that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of defendant, Christian Health Ministries, for summary judgment is GRANTED.