Opinion
Case Nos. 1:02-CV-420, 1:03-CV-95.
June 15, 2004
FINAL JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Opinion filed this date,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Grand Haven Stamped Products Company's Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement (Dkt. No. 75) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Dura Automotive Systems, Inc.'s Renewed Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion on Claim Interpretation (contained within Dkt. No. 76) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Grand Haven Stamped Products Company's claims seeking to invalidate and/or hold unenforceable the patent asserted in this litigation are dismissed without prejudice, as moot.
OPINION
I. FactsGrand Haven Stamped Products Company ("GHSP"), a division of JSJ Corp. having its principal place of business in Grand Haven, Michigan, manufactures and markets automatic transmission shifters. Dura Automotive System, Inc. ("Dura"), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware and having a place of business in Rochester Hills, Michigan, also manufactures and sells automatic transmission shifters. Dura is the assignee of U.S. Patent No. 5,309,783 (issued May 10, 1994) ("'783 patent") and holds all rights, title, and interest in the '783 patent. The '783 patent describes particular kinds of automobile automatic transmission shifters and shifter housings.
This matter is before the Court to consider GHSP's Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement in two consolidated cases — Case No. 1:02-CV-420 and Case No. 1:03-CV-95. The first case was filed in this Court on June 10, 2002. The latter case was filed in the Eastern District of Michigan on or about late October 2002 and was transferred to this District by Order of February 6, 2003. The two cases were then consolidated by Order of March 13, 2003. In the lead case, Plaintiff GHSP has sued Defendant Dura for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement regarding Defendant's '783 patent. Defendant has counter-claimed for infringement in the lead case and sued for infringement in the consolidated case. Plaintiff has also counter-claimed for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement in the consolidated case. The claims at issue are Claims 1, 2, and 8 of the '783 patent.
Actually, the Plaintiff in the second suit (Dura Operating Corp.) is the subsidiary of Defendant Dura Automotive System, Inc. (the Defendant in the first suit); nevertheless, they represent the same legal interests as to the patent.
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment in view of this Court's Opinion entered February 12, 2004 regarding the legal claim construction of the '783 patent claims at issue. Defendant sought reconsideration of this Opinion, which the Court denied on March 9, 2004. In Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant filed a Renewed Motion for Reconsideration of the February 12, 2004 claim construction Opinion.
II. Defendant's Renewed Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion on Claim Interpretation
According to this Court's Local Civil Rules, reconsideration is mandated only in those instances where the movant has demonstrated both "a palpable defect by which the Court and the parties have been mislead [ sic]" and "that a different disposition of the case must result from a correction thereof." W.D. Mich. L. Civ. R. 7.4(a). A motion for reconsideration that "merely present[s] the same issues ruled upon by the Court" will not be granted. L. Civ. R. 7.4(a). Repetitious arguments may not be decided differently by reconsideration. See United States, ex rel. Health Outcome Techs. v. Pennock Hosp., No. 1:01-CV-292, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 937, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan 21, 2003). Defendant has not fulfilled this standard for reconsideration.
Defendant's Renewed Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion on Claim Interpretation fails to raise new issues not previously presented and considered at the time the original reconsideration motion was decided. The Renewed Motion merely emphasizes the same arguments and points of law set forth in the original motion: that the Court erred in its construction of the claim terms "position control means defining a plurality of discrete transmission control positions" ("Claim Term H") and "formed on the interior surface of the housing" ("Claim Term I") found in Claim 1 of the '783 patent (and also implicated in the construction of dependant Claims 2 and 8 which incorporate the elements of Claim 1). After further review, the Court remains convinced that its construction of the '783 patent claims at issue is not erroneous, and that there is no palpable defect in Plaintiff's Claim Interpretation Brief by which the Court and the parties have been misled.
Defendant's argument that Claim Term H cannot be defined to exclude a control plate "tooled through the exterior wall of the housing" fails to address the conclusion reached by the Court that since the claim language was found to not recite a sufficiently definite structure, the term "means," by creating a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies, is thus limited to the disclosed structures in the specification and their equivalents. Only use of simple bottom and top tool dies is necessary to the form the invention's intended unitary housing, and neither additional tooling for the control means nor control plates tooled through the exterior wall of the housing are depicted in the specification. Therefore, this claim limitation was not imported improperly from the specification into the '783 patent claims.
Defendant's arguments that Claim Term I can be interpreted to include a control plate formed through or within the surface of the housing is likewise unconvincing. To allow the claims over prior art, Defendant distinguished its invention by describing its shifter as moving unilaterally and controlled by a control means located on the interior surface of the housing. (Dkt. No. 46, Ex. H at 3-4). Defendant's expounded argument that there is no relevant distinction between a means formed "on" the interior surface of the housing and a control means "in" the interior surface or "extending into the wall of housing" is not persuasive. A control means extending through the wall of the housing cannot be viewed as an equivalent to a control means on the interior surface of the housing.
Furthermore, Defendant has failed to demonstrate a different disposition of the case must result from a correction thereof. Defendant has merely provided unsupported conclusory statements that, under its urged claim construction, Defendant would be entitled to a grant of summary judgment for infringement.
Because Defendant is unable to demonstrate a palpable defect, its Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
III. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is proper if the record reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. There is no requirement that the trial judge make findings of fact; the inquiry to be made is whether the evidence presents a disagreement sufficient to require a submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); EEOC v. Prevo's Family Mkt., 135 F.3d 1089, 1093 (6th Cir. 1998). The moving party may discharge this burden by informing the court of the basis for its motion. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MFS Intelenet of Mich., Inc., 339 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2003). When a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion and requires that party to produce evidentiary materials that demonstrate the existence of a "genuine issue" for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
Plaintiff has moved for a judgment of non-infringement of the '783 patent as a matter of law on the basis that there is no genuine issue of material fact that would support a finding of infringement, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. To establish literal infringement, every limitation of Defendant's patent claims must be found in Plaintiff's accused product. See Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 205 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Any deviation from the claim precludes a finding of literal infringement. See Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 547 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Under the doctrine of equivalents, when an accused product does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim, infringement may still be found when the product includes an equivalent for each literally absent claim limitation. Shane Group v. Bci Burke Co., No. 1:02-CV-58, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25955, at *13-14 (W.D. Mich. Aug 12, 2002). Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents may only arise when the equivalent structure or technology was not available before the time of patent issuance. See Ishida Co. v. Taylor, 221 F.3d 1310, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
The Court determined in its February 12, 2004 claim construction Opinion that, as a matter of law, the "position control means" of Claim 1 of the '783 patent, also required of Claims 2 and 8, must be formed on the interior wall of the housing and does not include control plates tooled through the exterior of the wall. This conclusion forms the basis for Plaintiff's argument that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to infringement. Plaintiff asserts that, since each of its accused shifters has transmission detent patterns or notches that are tooled through the exterior of the structure of the shifter base, these products lack the "position control means" element of the '783 patent claims, and thus, literal infringement is not present. Plaintiff further asserts that, since the use of tooling to form control plates through the side walls of the shifter predates the '783 patent, its shifters do not employ technology developed after the time of patent issuance, and thus, forecloses infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Although normally a factual inquiry, summary judgment regarding an infringement claim may be appropriate in patent cases. Am. Seating Co. v. Transp. Seating, Inc., No. 1:00-CV-322, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12068, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2001). Summary judgment may be entered when the structure of the allegedly infringing product is undisputed. Id. at *10. In Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion, Defendant consents to an entry of summary judgment as to both literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents upon a denial of its Renewed Motion for Reconsideration. Defendant concedes that the limitations of the '783 patent claims, as determined by the Court's February 12, 2004 claim construction Opinion, cannot reasonably be construed to cover Plaintiff's accused products. Since, as discussed above, Defendant's Renewed Motion is denied, on the basis of Plaintiff's assertions and Defendant's consent, the Court finds no genuine issue of material fact present and grants Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement.
IV. Dismissal of Plaintiff's Counterclaims
Parties may only appeal a "final decision of a district court" in patent disputes. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). A final judgment is a decision that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc., 339 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Section 1295 requires parties to "raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits" and "forbids piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy. . . ." Id. If a case is not fully adjudicated as to all claims for all parties and there is no express determination that there is no just reason for delay or express direction for entry of judgment as to fewer than all of the parties or claims, there is no "final decision" under § 1295(a)(1) and therefore no jurisdiction for an appeal. Id.
In consenting to an entry of summary judgment, Defendant has expressed a desire to preserve its right to appeal non-infringement and the Court's claim construction to the Federal Circuit. Plaintiff has, however, also alleged in its declaratory judgment action that Defendant's '783 patent is invalid and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that "a district court has discretion to dismiss a counterclaim alleging that a patent is invalid as moot where it finds no infringement." Id. at 1351. Upon entry of summary judgment of non-infringement, Plaintiff has agreed to submit to dismissal, without prejudice, of its claims of invalidity and unenforceability as moot, and Defendant has approved of such dismissal. Accordingly, the Court dismisses as moot Plaintiff's remaining claims without prejudice and enters a Final Judgment in this action.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, Final Judgment shall issue consistent with this Opinion.