Opinion
No. 76-166
Decided November 12, 1976.
Finding that unemployment compensation claimant had earned less during her base period than she would be entitled to in benefits, Industrial Commission found her ineligible for such benefits. Claimant sought review.
Order Affirmed
1. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION — Benefits Computation — Based on Wages Paid — — Not Wages Earned. The statutory formula for computing the amount of weekly unemployment compensation benefits is based on wages paid for insured work during base period, and an unemployed individual is eligible for benefits only if he has during his base period been paid wages for insured work equal to not less than thirty times his weekly benefit amount; accordingly, where the Industrial Commission found that total wages paid to a claimant during her base period were less than her weekly benefit amount multiplied by thirty, the Commission properly determined her to be ineligible for benefits, even though total wages earned by claimant did exceed the benefit amount multiplied by thirty.
2. Legislative and Judicial Requirements — For Liberal Construction — Do Not Permit — Disregard of Plain Meaning. Legislative and judicial requirements for liberal construction of the unemployment compensation act neither mandate nor permit the Court of Appeals to change the plain meaning of a statute.
Review of Order from the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado
Penfield W. Tate, II, for petitioner.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Attorney General, Edward G. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, Louis L. Kelley, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Contending that the respondent, Industrial Commission of Colorado, misinterpreted provisions of the Colorado Employment Security Act, §§ 8-73-102(1) and 107-(1)(e), C.R.S. 1973, pertaining to the determination of the weekly benefit amount, claimant, Michele A. Grams, seeks review of the Commission's decision denying her unemployment compensation benefits. We conclude that the Commission's computations and statutory interpretations are correct and therefore affirm.
During two calendar quarters of claimant's base period, she was paid a total of $1,668. In the spring quarter she earned $632.47 but was paid $475.50. The $156.97 balance of her spring quarter earnings, together with $1,035.53 earned in the summer quarter, a total of $1,192.50, was paid to her in that summer quarter. She had no earnings during the other two quarters of her base period.
[1] Section 8-73-102(1), C.R.S. 1973, provides the formula for computing the amount of the weekly unemployment benefit:
"Sixty percent of one-thirteenth of the wages paid for insured work during the quarter in his base period in which such total wages were highest computed to the next higher multiple of one dollar . . . ." (emphasis added)
The Commission used as its base figure the $1,192 paid in the summer quarter. One-thirteenth of that amount is $91.73. Sixty percent of that is $55.04. The Commission then rounded off the $55.04 to the next higher dollar to arrive at $56 as the amount of her weekly benefit.
Section 8-73-107, C.R.S. 1973, dealing with eligibility conditions, provides:
"(1) Any unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the division finds that:
. . . .
"(e) He has during his base period been paid wages for insured worked equal to not less than thirty times his weekly benefit amount." (emphasis added)
Pursuant to this section of the Act, the Commission multiplied $56, determined by it to be the weekly benefit amount, by 30. This resulted in a figure of $1,680. Since the total wages paid to claimant during the base period, $1,668, was less than the $1,680, she was determined to be ineligible and was denied benefits.
Claimant admits that the summer quarter was the appropriate one to be used for computation of benefits, but she contends that for formula purposes the amount of wages for that quarter should be those earned rather than paid. By that interpretation, she would be eligible for benefits. However, since § 8-73-102(1), C.R.S. 1973, refers to "wages paid," the Commission had no choice but to follow the plain wording of the statute.
She then asserts that even if the amount of the benefit is based on wages paid rather than earned, the computation "to the next higher multiple of one dollar" should be applied to the "total wages" paid during the quarter, raising the $1,192.50 to $1,193. One-thirteenth of $1,193 times 60% times 30 equals $1,651.85. In the alternative, she suggests the rounding out to the next higher dollar should be applied to the ultimate product of $1,192.50 times one-thirteenth times 60% times 30 or $1,651.20, rounding that out to $1,652. Either interpretation would result in her being eligible for compensation.
We do not agree with either proposal. The latter suggestion ignores the fact that the dollar rounding provision is in § 102(1) and the weekly benefit must have already been determined before the computations called for in § 107(1)(e) are made. The first proposal strains to produce a favorable result at the cost of disregarding the plain meaning of the statutory words as applied by the Commission. Section 102(1) requires the Commission in its computations to compute the weekly benefit "at the rate of sixty percent of one-thirteenth of the wages paid for insured work" during the highest quarter in the base period, and to round off the figure so obtained to "the next higher multiple of one dollar."
[2] We are not unmindful of the language of § 8-73-108(1), C.R.S. 1973, that "it is the intent of the General Assembly that the division at all times be guided by the tenet that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own," as well as the dictate of Andersen v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 281, 447 P.2d 221, that "unemployment compensation acts are to be liberally construed to further their remedial and beneficent purposes." However, these legislative and judicial requirements for liberal construction neither mandate nor permit us to change the plain meaning of a statute. See Montano v. Industrial Commission, 171 Colo. 92, 464 P.2d 518.
Petitioner's other contention of error is without merit.
Order affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE SILVERSTEIN and JUDGE STERNBERG concur.