Opinion
23 Civ. 3948 (DEH)
07-25-2024
G.R., et al., Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
DALE E. HO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff G.R.'s fee application. See ECF No. 19. For the reasons set forth below, G.R.'s fee application is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) is ordered to pay to G.R. $15,925.75, plus post-judgment interest at the applicable statutory rate, in attorney's fees and costs.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the background facts of this case. As relevant here, G.R. brought suit against the DOE on behalf of her minor son, J.R., a child who has been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and a language impairment. Mendillo Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 23. G.R. first contacted the Cuddy Law Firm (“the Firm”) in May 2021 for purposes of a consultation. Id. ¶ 10. The Firm began reviewing J.R.'s educational records in July 2021. See id. ¶ 12.
1. The Underlying Administrative Action
In November 2021, the Firm began drafting a due process complaint (“DPC”) against the DOE. See id. ¶ 16. On February 8, 2022, G.R., on behalf of her minor son, J.R., by and through counsel at the Cuddy Law Firm, filed the DPC. Mendillo Decl., Ex. 1 (hereinafter, “DPC”), ECF No. 23-1. The DPC alleged that the DOE failed to provide J.R. with a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) during the 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 school years. See generally DPC.
In February 2022, the Firm developed a trial plan in preparation for an eventual impartial due process hearing. Mendillo Decl. ¶ 21.
On March 11, 2022, the Department held a mandated resolution meeting, during which the DOE offered Plaintiffs partial relief. Id. ¶ 22.
On May 12, 2022, the DOE appointed an Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) to oversee the administrative action. Id. ¶ 24. On or about May 19, 2022, the IHO scheduled a hearing to take place on July 1, 2022. Id. ¶ 25. The Firm began preparing for the hearing in June 2022. See id. ¶ 26.
At the July 1, 2022, hearing, the DOE indicated that it took no position in the case, including the relief sought by the parent, to which the IHO responded, “Well, that makes my job a lot easier then.” Id. ¶ 31. The same day, the IHO issued his findings of fact and decision (“FOFD”). See Mendillo Decl. Ex. 2 (hereinafter, “FOFD”), ECF No. 23-2. The IHO found that the Department failed to provide J.R. with a FAPE and ordered the DOE to fund a total of 700 hours of one-on-one multisensory tutoring as compensatory education, by a provider of Plaintiffs' choosing, up to a rate of $140 per hour. See id. The IHO further ordered the DOE to place J.R. in an appropriate nonpublic school. See id. at 3. The Firm reviewed the order to ensure there were no issues for appeal. Mendillo Decl. ¶ 34.
On November 3, 2022, Plaintiff, through her legal counsel, submitted a demand for attorney's fees to the DOE's Office of Legal Services, for all fees and expenses incurred in the administrative proceeding. Id. ¶ 38; Cuddy Decl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 24. By May 2023, no offer had been presented by Defendant in response to the Firm's fee demand. Mendillo Decl. ¶ 40; Cuddy Decl. ¶ 25.
2. District Court Proceedings
On May 11, 2023, Plaintiffs filed suit, seeking reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). See ECF No. 1. On or about May 30, 2023, the Firm provided Defendant's counsel with billing records for both the administrative and federal actions. Mendillo Decl. ¶ 44. The Firm attached an additional billing record for the federal action to its reply brief. See ECF No. 34-2.
Between July and August 2023, the parties engaged in settlement discussions in an effort to resolve the fee demand. Mendillo Decl. ¶¶ 43-44. On October 3, 2023, Defendant presented Plaintiffs' counsel with a final written offer of settlement, which Defendant rejected. See Nov. 7, 2023, Joint Status Letter, ECF No. 16. That offer was for $17,500.00. See Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Fees (“Opp'n”), ECF No. 32. Plaintiffs' fees motion is fully briefed before the Court.
This case was reassigned to the undersigned on October 12, 2023. See Oct. 12, 2023, Min. Entry.
3. Overview of G.R.'s Fee and Cost Requests
G.R. seeks compensation for work performed before the IHO, and for work in this follow-on fees litigation in federal court. See Cuddy Decl. ¶ 36. First, Plaintiffs request $26,167.86 as recompense for the underlying administrative proceedings. Id. Specifically, G.R. seeks fees for hours worked by two attorneys (Andrew Cuddy and Kevin Mendillo) and three paralegals (Shobna Cuddy, Cailin O'Donnell, and ChinaAnn Reeve) in the underlying administrative proceedings. Those fees are summarized below:
Table 1: Requested Attorney and Paralegal Fees - Underlying Administrative Proceedings
See id. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for the following costs associated with the underlying administrative action, as summarized below:
Name
Fee
Time spent
Cost
Andrew Cuddy
$550
2.1
$1,155.00
$600
0.3
$180.00
Kevin Mendillo
$450
42.4
$19,080.00
$500
0.3
$150.00
China Ann Reeve
$225
8.1
$1,822.50
Cailin O'Donnell
$225
13.7
$3,082.50
Shobna Cuddy
$225
2.8
$630.00
Total
$26,100.00
Table 1.a: Requested Costs - Underlying Administrative Proceedings
See id.
Item
Cost
Fax
$46.00
Postage
$6.36
Printing
$15.50
Total
$67.86
As to this federal action, G.R. seeks a total of $14,149.50. First, G.R. seeks fees for hours worked by three attorneys (Andrew Cuddy, Kevin Mendillo, and Kenneth Bush) and the same three paralegals who assisted in the administrative action (Shobna Cuddy, Cailin O'Donnell, and ChinaAnn Reeve). Those fees are summarized below:
Table 2: Requested Attorney and Paralegal Fees - District Court Action
See id. Additionally, G.R. requests recompense for the federal filing fee of $402.00. Id.
Name
Fee
Time spent
Cost
Andrew Cuddy
$600
2.2
$1,320.00
Kevin Mendillo
$500
21.5
$10,750.00
$225
1.2
$270.00
Kenneth Bush
$425
1.3
$552.50
ChinaAnn Reeve
$225
0.4
$90.00
Cailin O'Donnell
$225
2
$450.00
Shobna Cuddy
$225
1.4
$315.00
Total
$13,747.50
In sum, G.R. seeks a total of $40,317.36 in fees, costs, and interest associated with the underlying administrative proceedings and the instant action. Id.
LEGAL STANDARDS
“The IDEA aims ‘to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.'” A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). It further provides that “the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). It specifies that the reasonable fees awarded “shall be based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(C). The “Court may take judicial notice of the rates awarded in prior cases and the court's own familiarity with the rates prevailing in the district.” Errant Gene Therapeutics, LLC v. Sloan-Kettering Inst. for Cancer Rsch, 286 F.Supp.3d 585, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3094913 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2018), aff'd, 768 Fed.Appx. 141 (2d Cir. 2019). The award may cover work performed in the underlying administrative action as well as in federal court. See R.V., 407 F.3d at 84 (affirming award of fees incurred during IHO proceedings and before the district court).
All references to Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In all quotations from cases, the Court omits citations, alterations, emphases, internal quotation marks, and ellipses, unless otherwise indicated.
While IDEA attorneys “must be adequately compensated for their time,” fee-shifting statutes like the IDEA do not provide “a license to soak one's opponent or to engage in a highly inefficient practice of law.” L.J. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 20 Civ. 10672, 2023 WL 5747465, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2023). “The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). Accordingly, in determining the appropriate fees and costs, “trial courts need not, and should not, become green-eyeshade accountants.” Id. Instead, “a court may use a percentage reduction as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.” O.R. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 340 F.Supp.3d 357, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
1. Fees
“To determine the award and the amount of fees, the court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the party seeking to enforce the fee-shifting provision is the ‘prevailing party.'” J.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 23 Civ. 959, 2024 WL 728626, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2024) (citing Mr. L. v. Sloan, 449 F.3d 405, 405-07 (2d Cir. 2006)). “If so, in calculating fees, the court examines whether the fees are reasonable in light of the litigation” and administrative proceedings. See id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The starting point for determining the reasonable fee award is the “lodestar” amount, which is “the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case.” See Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011). The lodestar is not “conclusive in all circumstances,” and it may be adjusted when it fails to “adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Id. at 167. Guidelines for determining each element of the lodestar amount follow.
A. Reasonable Hourly Rates
A reasonable hourly rate is one a reasonable, paying-per-hour client would pay for the same services rendered. K.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 10 Civ. 5465, 2011 WL 3586142, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011) (citing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008)). Reasonable fees compensate counsel only for “hours reasonably expended on the litigation” and administrative proceedings, and not for “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. Courts consider “case-specific variables . . . including the Johnson factors-in setting a reasonable hourly rate.” Torres v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 519 Fed.Appx. 1, 4 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)). The Johnson factors are:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney's customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability' of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.G.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 894 F.Supp.2d 415, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). “A district court need not recite and make separate findings as to all twelve Johnson factors, provided that it takes each into account in setting the attorneys' fee award.” E.F. ex rel. N.R. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 11 Civ. 5243, 2014 WL 1092847, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014).
B. Reasonable Hours
“Once a reasonable rate of pay has been calculated, it is multiplied by a reasonable number of hours expended to determine the award amount.” T.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 22 Civ. 9413, 2024 WL 986587, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2024). “If the number of hours recorded by counsel is disproportionate to the work performed, the Court should reduce the stated hours in making its fee award.” Errant Gene Therapeutic, 286 F.Supp.3d at 588; see also Hernandez v. Berlin Newington Assocs., LLC, 699 Fed.Appx. 96, 97 (2d Cir. 2017) (stating that courts “must exclude ‘[h]ours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary”); Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2009) (same).
Under the IDEA, courts may “cap” an award of fees to award only those fees incurred before a rejected settlement offer that would have been more favorable than the relief finally obtained. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i).
2. Costs
A district court may also award reasonable costs to the prevailing party. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). The term “costs” includes costs incurred in connection with work yielding fees covered by a fee award, as well as the specific types of costs set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the general provision governing the taxation of costs in federal court. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297-98 (2006). Commonly compensable costs include reasonable filing and process server costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920; G.B., 894 F.Supp.2d at 443.
DISCUSSION
It is undisputed that G.R. prevailed in the underlying administrative proceeding. The sole issue here is whether the fees and costs G.R. has requested (in the amount of $40,317.36) are reasonable. For the reasons discussed herein, the Court concludes that they are not. Accordingly, the Court has within its discretion determined the reasonable fee amount in this case and awards G.R. $15,925.75.
1. Reasonable Rates
The Court has considered all Johnson factors in making the determinations below. The reasonable rates apply to both the underlying administrative proceedings and this federal court action.
A. Andrew Cuddy
Attorney Andrew Cuddy was admitted to practice in New York in 1996 and, since 2001, has litigated hundreds of special education matters. Cuddy Decl. ¶ 16. Cuddy is the president and managing attorney of the Cuddy Law Firm, which he founded in 1996, and which has now become “one of the largest private special education law firms in the country.” Id. ¶¶ 14-16. As discussed, G.R. seeks an hourly rate of $550 for Cuddy, with a $50 rate increase for work billed this year. The DOE argues that Cuddy's hourly rate should be $375. Opp'n 6.
Courts in this district have recently issued awards assigning Cuddy an hourly rate between $375 and $425 per hour. See, e.g., T.P., 2024 WL 986587, at *7 (awarding rate of $400); N.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 8488, 2024 WL 133615, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2024) (awarding rate of $425); V.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 6495, 2023 WL 2609358, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2023) (same); L.J., 2023 WL 5747465, at *9 (awarding rate of $400). In IDEA cases where liability is uncontested, as here, rates tend to be on the lower end of this range. See, e.g., E.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 11208, 2023 WL 3138022, at *5 (finding a rate of $375 appropriate where the DOE did not present evidence or call witnesses); T.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 7104, 2022 WL 3577885, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2022) (same); F.N. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 3379, 2022 WL 3544128, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2022) (same).
“In light of some minimal inflation since [several of the cases described above], the Court concludes that $400 is an appropriate hourly rate for Cuddy.” T.P., 2024 WL 986587, at *7.
B. Kevin Mendillo
Attorney Kevin Mendillo was admitted to practice law in New York in 2011 and has been litigating special education matters since 2014. Cuddy Decl. ¶ 17. Since then, Mendillo has represented parents in more than 100 due process hearings. Id. He serves as a supervising attorney in the Firm's Auburn, New York office, and managing attorney in its Ohio office. Id. As discussed, G.R. seeks an hourly rate of $450 for Mendillo, with a $50 rate increase for work billed this year. The DOE argues that the hourly rate for Mendillo should be $300. Opp'n 6.
As with Cuddy, recent awards by courts in this district have assigned Mendillo a lower rate than that requested here. These past cases have awarded Mendillo an hourly rate between $300 and $325 per hour. See, e.g., T.P., 2024 WL 986587, at *7 (awarding rate of $310); N.G., 2024 WL 133615, at *4 (awarding rate of $300); L.J., 2023 WL 5747465 at *9 (same); H.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 8604, 2023 WL 5529932, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2023) (same); M.D. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 9180, 2023 WL 2557408, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2023) (awarding hourly rate of $325); H.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 20 Civ. 844, 2021 WL 2471195, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2021), aff'd, 71 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2023) (awarding rate of $300).
Having considered the Johnson factors, the Court determines that an hourly rate of $325 for Mendillo is reasonable. See M.D., 2023 WL 2557408, at *3.
G.R. also proposes an hourly rate of $225 for 1.2 hours of work completed by Mendillo, as a “discretionary reduction to [the] paralegal rate.” See Ex. V. at 3, 6, 7, ECF No. 34-2; see also Cuddy Decl. ¶ 36. Below, the Court reduces the paralegal hourly rate. See infra. Correspondingly, the Court reduces fees awarded for any paralegal work completed by Mendillo after October 3, 2023.
C. Kenneth Bush
Attorney Kenneth Bush is a 2016 law school graduate who has been litigating special education matters since 2016. Cuddy Decl. ¶ 18. As discussed, G.R. seeks an hourly rate of $425 for Bush. The DOE proposes an hourly rate of $275 for Bush. Opp'n 6.
Courts in this District have assigned Bush an hourly rate between $225 and $250. See, e.g., S.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 23 Civ. 3961, 2024 WL 1406559, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2024) (awarding rate of $225); K.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 20 Civ. 10277, 2022 WL 1689760, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2022) (awarding rate of $250); N.G.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 20 Civ. 6571, 2022 WL 800855, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2022) (awarding rate of $225); S.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 4967, 2022 WL 254070, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022) (awarding rate of $250). Bush played no role in the administrative action, had a very limited role in the instant action, and has significantly less experience than Cuddy and Mendillo.
Having considered the Johnson factors, the Court concludes that the DOE's requested hourly rate of $275 is appropriate for Bush. See S.B., 2024 WL 1406559, at *7.
D. Paralegals
Three paralegals worked on this case. Shobna Cuddy has worked as a paralegal and office manager at the Firm since 2007. Cuddy Decl. ¶ 20. O'Donnell worked as a paralegal at the Firm's Auburn office from 2019 to 2022. Id. ¶ 21. Reeve has worked with the Firm since 2021. Id. ¶ 22. As discussed, G.R. seeks an hourly rate of $225 for paralegals Shobna Cuddy, Cailin O'Donnell, and ChinaAnn Reeve. The DOE seeks a reduction of the hourly rate to $100. Opp'n 6.
G.R.'s proposed hourly rate for the paralegals far exceeds the prevailing rate in this district, as reflected in many recent decisions. Those courts approved hourly rates of $100 to $125 for paralegal work. See, e.g., S.B., 2024 WL 1406559, at *8 (awarding rate of $125); N.G., 2024 WL 133615, at *4 (awarding rates between $100 to $125, depending on each paralegal's experience); M.Z. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 9451, 2023 WL 2499964, at *5 (awarding rate of $125); M.D. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 9180, 2022 WL 19406557, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2022) (same), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2557408 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2023); V.W. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 6495, 2023 WL 2609358, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2023) (awarding rate of $125).
Having considered the Johnson factors, the Court concludes that a rate of $125 per hour is appropriate for Cuddy, O'Donnell, and Reeve's work.
2. Reasonable Hours
The Court next considers the number of “hours reasonably expended” in this case. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. To arrive at that number, it looks to the “contemporaneously created time records that specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.” Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998). As discussed, the Court then excludes “[h]ours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,” and it reduces the number of compensable hours “for vagueness, inconsistencies, and other deficiencies in the billing records.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A. Administrative Proceedings
The Court begins with the hours attributable to the administrative proceedings before the IHO. The DOE seeks a 30% reduction for administrative work, arguing that the Firm billed excessively for the work produced. Opp'n 6, 17. The Court agrees that a reduction is warranted, although slightly less than the amount proposed by the DOE.
In several respects, the Firm's fee request reflects excessive or unjustified billing. In total, it billed 45.1 attorney hours and 24.6 paralegal hours on an uncontested administrative proceeding with one substantive hearing that lasted five minutes. See Cuddy Decl. ¶ 36; Cassuto Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 28. To cite a more concrete example, the DPC consisted of only eight pages, relied heavily on boilerplate language, and largely constituted a chronological recitation of G.R.'s educational history. See generally DPC. Yet G.R.'s attorneys billed more than 20 hours to reviewing records and drafting it, see Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. for Fees (“Pl.'s Br.”) 20, ECF No. 25, a significant amount of time for a “relatively rote task.” T.P., 2024 WL 986587, at *9. The Court therefore joins other courts in this district that have awarded the Firm reduced hours for drafting routine DPCs. See, e.g., L.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 20 Civ. 2515, 2022 WL 392912, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2022), aff'd sub nom. H.C., 71 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2023) (reducing Cuddy Law Firm's time working on a nine-page DPC from 25 hours to 9 hours); R.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 18 Civ. 6851, 2019 WL 4735050, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2019) (reducing Cuddy Law Firm's time spent on drafting a three-page DPC from 4.2 hours to 1.5 hours).
As the Opposition notes, the DPC is nearly identical to numerous opening papers filed by the Firm. See Opp'n 19 (citing cases).
The Firm also billed excessively to perform simple administrative tasks. For example, to produce a 27-page billing statement for the administrative proceeding, the Firm billed 4.2 hours, for a total of $1,418.00. See Howland Decl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 29. Courts have determined that administrative clean-up of attorney billing records, while necessary, should not be billed to the client. See N.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 2024 WL 133615, at * 8 (noting that “a reasonable, paying client would likely be incensed if her lawyers spent nearly a dozen hours tidying up and defending their own sloppy bookkeeping”).
Given the foregoing, the Court determines that a percentage reduction is appropriate “as a practical means of trimming fat.” McDonald v. Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Tr. Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2006). The Court concludes that a 25% reduction is appropriate, based on its review of recent cases of comparable complexity brought by the Firm in this District. See, e.g., T.P., 2024 WL 986587, at *10 (ordering 25% reduction in hours); L.L., 2022 WL 392912, at *5 (ordering 50% reduction in hours for hearing preparation and approximately 30% reduction for remaining hours); M.D., 2022 WL 19406557, at *8 (ordering approximately 25% reduction in total hours); A.D. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 18 Civ. 3347, 2019 WL 1292432, at *5-*9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2019) (ordering approximately 45% reduction in total hours).
Multiplying the reduced hourly rate by the reduced hours, the amount owed to Plaintiffs for the underlying administrative action is summarized below:
Table 3: Reduced Attorney and Paralegal Fees - Underlying Administrative Proceedings
Name
Reduced Hourly Rate
Reduced Time
Total Reduced Cost
Andrew Cuddy
$400
1.575
$630.00
$400
0.225
$90.00
Kevin Mendillo
$325
31.8
$10,335.00
$325
0.225
$73.13
ChinaAnn Reeve
$125
6.075
$759.38
Cailin O'Donnell
$125
10.275
$1,284.38
Shobna Cuddy
$125
2.1
$262.50
Total
$13,434.39
Finally, G.R. also seeks $67.86 for the following expenses: fax ($46.00); postage ($6.36); and printing ($15.50). The Court determines, in line with other courts in this District, that no costs should be awarded for faxes, given that the Firm has “made no showing why communicating via fax is necessary or appropriate” in this day and age. R.G., 2019 WL 4735050, at *6. Subtracting the cost of fax, the amount of expenses G.R. may recuperate is $21.86. Accordingly, the total fees and costs for the administrative proceeding owed to Plaintiffs is $13,456.25.
B. District Court Proceedings
The Firm spent 30 hours on the fee application. The DOE argues that the Firm should receive no recovery, or that an 80% reduction should apply, given the Firm's failure to demonstrate that any issue presented was “novel and complex.” Opp'n 20. The DOE also argues that the IDEA fee cap applies to this case-which, as explained below, would preclude recovery for time spent on the fee application. The Court agrees with the latter argument.
The IDEA prohibits all awards for services rendered after a written offer of settlement is made to a parent if: (1) “the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [i.e., at least “14 days before the date set for trial”]”; (2) “the offer is not accepted within 10 days”; and (3) “the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of settlement.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i); see also S.M. v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 11 Civ. 1085, 2013 WL 1180860, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2013).
Here, the DOE argues that the statutory fee cap applies, provided that the Court finds an aggregate award of less than $17,500.00 warranted for the work performed through October 3, 2023, the date on which the DOE offered to settle the case for $17,500.00-which G.R. did not accept. As explained further below, the Court determines that as of October 3, 2023, G.R. was entitled to a fee-and-cost award below the $17,500.00 offered by the DOE. The Court is therefore obliged to cap the award so as not to award G.R. fees and costs that accrued after October 3, 2023.
Plaintiffs argue that they were substantially justified in rejecting the DOE's settlement offer, such that the fee cap should not apply, calling it a “lowball” offer. See Pl.'s Reply at 10, ECF No. 35. Apparently in support of their argument, Plaintiffs inexplicably cite H.C. v. New York City Department of Education, a case in which the Second Circuit heard 14 appeals by the Firm and affirmed district courts' decisions to award the Firm recovery of between 28% to 45.3% of the Firm's requested rewards. 71 F.4th 120, 130, cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 490 (2023); see also Opp'n 2 n.2 (summarizing the district court determinations that were affirmed). The Court has determined that Plaintiffs' argument fails, and the fee cap applies.
In further support of reducing the fee owed to the Firm, the Court notes that certain line items in the Firm's billing raise cause for concern, in particular the abundance of 0.10-hour (six-minute) time entries. See generally ECF No. 24-19; see Andert v. Allied Interstate, LLC, No. 12 Civ. 7010, 2013 WL 3833077, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013) (ordering a 70% reduction in the attorney's fees, to account for the inflation of time caused by numerous 0.1 hour entries). Here, attorneys billed 0.10 hours for exceedingly simple tasks, such as reviewing emails, receiving instructions, and discussing updates. See generally ECF No. 24-19. For example, on June 13, 2023, September 5, 2023, September 12, 2023, and October 10, 2023, Mendillo billed six minutes each time to reviewing ECF notifications. See Moraru Decl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 30. As another example, on October 12, 2023, Mendillo billed six minutes to “review[ing] email from court regarding reassignment of case to new judge.” Id. By their nature, such tasks “could likely have been discharged in seconds,” rather than taking six minutes each, and “a reasonable paying client would expect a timekeeper to consolidate such tasks into a single time entry, rather than paying for a series of 0.10-hour time entries.” H.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 20 Civ. 10785, 2022 WL 580772, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2022).
Given the foregoing, the Court awards the following as recompense for the Firm's work in the instant action (eliminating hours billed after the rejected settlement offer):
Name
Requested Hourly Rate
Reduced Hourly Rate
Billed Time
Hours of Work Completed after 10/3
Total Reduced Time
Total Reduced Cost
Andrew Cuddy
$600
$400
2.2
2
0.2
$80.00
Kevin Mendillo
$500
$325
21.5
17.6
3.9
$1,267.50
$225
$125
1.2
0.7
0.5
$62.50
Kenneth Bush
$425
$275
1.3
0
1.3
$357.50
ChinaAnn Reeve
$225
$125
0.4
0.4
0
$0.00
Cailin O'Donnell
$225
$125
2
0
2
$250.00
Shobna Cuddy
$225
$125
1.4
1
0.4
$50.00
Total
$2,067.50
Adding the reduced fee amount to the cost of filing in federal court ($402.00), the total federal action fee owed to Plaintiffs is $2,469.50. This is in line with what other courts in this district have awarded the Firm for their fee applications in federal court under similar circumstances. See, e.g., N.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 2643, 2022 WL 17581774, at *2, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2022) (awarding $1,217.50 in attorney's fees for the federal action, with an additional $612.55 in costs, where plaintiff sought $94,846.83 in total); T.A., 2022 WL 3577885, at *1, *8 (awarding $2,184.50 in attorney's fees and costs for the federal action, where plaintiff sought $48,158.25 in total).
Adding the fees owed for the federal court action to the compensable fees and costs from the administrative proceeding, yields an award of $15,925.75. Because that figure is below the DOE's unaccepted settlement offer of $17,500, the Court must apply the statutory cap. See, e.g., R.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 4054, 2022 WL 1239860, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2022) (holding that “no fees should be awarded for costs or work performed after July 7, 2021, when the DOE made a written offer of settlement” because total fees and costs to which plaintiff was entitled as of that date was lower than DOE's settlement offer); H.C., 2021 WL 2471195, at *10-11 (declining to award fees or costs incurred after date of DOE's written offer because the plaintiffs were entitled to less in fees and costs); O.R., 340 F.Supp.3d at 371 (same).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants G.R.'s motion for an award of fees and costs, but in an amount below that sought. G.R. is awarded a total of $15,925.75, plus postjudgment interest at the applicable statutory rate.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate ECF No. 19 and to close the case.
SO ORDERED.