Opinion
2:20-cv-00949-MGL-MGB
01-07-2022
Darrell L. Goss, #305517, Plaintiff, v. Albert L. Mack; Travis Guess; Mr. Allen; Brian Kendell; Carol Holmes; Shonda Robinson; and Larry Turner, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges Defendants have been denying him exercise, fresh air, sunlight exposure, and adequate footwear in violation of his constitutional rights. Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 94.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
In his Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that since May 9, 2019 and continuing to the present date, Defendants Warden Brian Kendell, Major Carol Holmes, Captain Albert Mack, Lieutenant Travis Guess and Lieutenant Shonda Robinson have been denying Plaintiff adequate indoor and outdoor recreation, exercise, fresh air, and direct sunlight exposure. (Dkt. No. 58 at 8.) According to Plaintiff, such conduct violates his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that since May 9, 2019 and continuing to the present date, Defendants Commissary Manager Mr. Allen and Commissary Branch Chief Larry Turner have failed to provide him adequate footwear in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 7, 9- 10.)
On May 5, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Official Capacity Claims, seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them in their official capacities. (Dkt. No. 70.) On May 25, 2021, the undersigned recommended that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed and that any § 1983 claims for injunctive relief be dismissed against all Defendants, except Defendant Kendall. (Dkt. No. 81.) The Court adopted the undersigned's Report and Recommendation on July 13, 2021. (Dkt. No. 86.)
On August 19, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's remaining claims in full. (Dkt. No. 94.) Plaintiff responded to Defendants' motion on September 30, 2021. (Dkt. No. 113; Dkt. No. 117.) Defendants replied to Plaintiff's response on October 12, 2021. (Dkt. No. 121.) As such, the motion before the Court is ripe and ready for disposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” News & Observer Pub'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When a court considers the motion, “‘the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).
Because Plaintiff is representing himself, these standards must be applied while liberally construing his filings in this case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1983 Claims
As noted above, Plaintiff originally sued Defendants in both their official and individual capacities for violations of his constitutional rights under § 1983. (See generally Dkt. No. 58.) The Court has since dismissed Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendants in their official capacities, except for Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief against Defendant Kendall. (Dkt. No. 81; Dkt. No. 86.) Thus, Plaintiff's only remaining claims are his § 1983 claims against Defendants in their individual capacities and his § 1983 claim for injunctive relief against Defendant Kendall. (Dkt. No. 58; Dkt. No. 81; Dkt. No. 86.) Defendants move for summary judgment on these remaining claims. (See generally Dkt. No. 94.) Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiff cannot prove a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; (2) Plaintiff cannot prove a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause; (3) Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his footwear claims; (4) Plaintiff's footwear claims are without merit; and (5) Plaintiff has not proven that he is entitled to injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 94-1 at 9-26.) The undersigned considers these arguments, below.
A. Individual Capacity Claims
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
As a threshold issue, the undersigned considers Defendants' argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claims that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with adequate footwear. (Dkt. No. 94-1 at 20.) Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Through the enactment of this statute, “Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
Exhaustion is defined by each prison's grievance procedure, not the PLRA; a prisoner must comply with his prison's grievance procedure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). An inmate's failure to “properly take each step within the administrative process . . . bars, and does not just postpone, suit under § 1983.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002); see also White v. McGinnis, 131 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding dismissal of an inmate's complaint because the inmate failed to proceed beyond the first step in the administrative grievance process).
The SCDC grievance procedure is outlined in SCDC Policy GA-01.12 (“Inmate Grievance System”). See http://www.doc.sc.gov/policy/GA-01-12.htm.pdf. Subject to certain exceptions, the Inmate Grievance System requires that inmates initially attempt to resolve grievances informally by “submitting a Request to Staff Member Form to the appropriate supervisor/staff within eight (8) working days of the incident.” Id. ¶ 13.2. Informal resolution is not required, however, when “the matter involves allegations of criminal activity.” Id. “If informal resolution is not possible, the grievant will complete Form 10-5, Step 1, . . . and will place the form in a designated grievance drop box within five (5) working days of the alleged incident.” Id.
Defendants have not attached the Inmate Grievance System policy to their Motion. However, the policy is available at: http://www.doc.sc.gov/policy/GA-01-12.htm.pdf. A federal court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on governmental websites in the United States. See Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[A] court may properly take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record.'” (quoting Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009))); see also Mitchell v. Newsom, No. 3:11-cv-869-CMC-PJG, 2011 WL 2162723, at *3 n.1 (D.S.C. May 10, 2011) (collecting cases), adopted, 2011 WL 2162184 (D.S.C. June 1, 2011). As such, the undersigned takes judicial notice of SCDC's Inmate Grievance System policy for purposes of this Report and Recommendation.
If an inmate files a Step 1 grievance that does not involve criminal activity, the Warden is required to respond in writing within 45 days and advise the inmate of his right to appeal to the next level:
The Warden will respond to the grievant in writing (in the space provided on SCDC Form 10-5, Step 1), indicating in detail the rationale for the decision rendered and any recommended remedies. The grievant will also be informed of his/her rights to appeal to the next level. The Warden will respond to the grievant no later than 45 days from the date the grievance was formally entered into the OMS system by the IGC. The response will be served by the IGC to the grievant, within ten (10) calendar days, and the grievant will sign and date the response acknowledging receipt. The IGC will maintain the original grievance for the inmate's grievance file and a copy will be given to the inmate.Id. ¶ 13.5.
The inmate may then appeal by filing a Form 10-5(a) Step 2 appeal to the Inmate Grievance Coordinator within five days of the receipt of the response. Id. ¶ 13.7. The appeal is referred to the “responsible official” who is required to make a final decision within 90 days. Id. The Inmate Grievance System provides,
As part of the Department's final answer to a grievance, the inmate will be notified that any further appeal must be initiated within 30 days after receipt of the Department's final answer. This appeal must be contained on the South Carolina Administrative Law Court “Notice of Appeal” that will be attached to the Department's final answer and must be sent to the Administrative Law Court. Instructions regarding completion of the form, and information indicating where the form must be sent, will also be provided to the inmate.Id. ¶ 13.9.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, grievances generally need only be sufficient to ‘alert the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.'” Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 167 n.4 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)). In Wilcox, the plaintiff prisoner had submitted to the district court “a copy of the Step-Three decision of the Inmate Grievance Resolution Board disposing of his grievance” objecting to the cancellation of certain religious services. 877 F.3d at 166. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff was not required to submit an additional grievance when the prison, after resolution of the initial grievance, agreed to restart the services, then made a second decision to cancel the services. Id. at 167 n.4. The court reasoned that the initial grievance provided the prison with “notice of, and an opportunity to correct, a problem, ” which “satisfied the purpose of the exhaustion requirement.” Id. (quoting Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims regarding inadequate footwear “should be summarily dismissed because those claims were filed prematurely, before Plaintiff exhausted his SCDC administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.” (Dkt. No. 94-1 at 20.) More specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to these claims because “nothing in the record of this case or within SCDC's official records indicate that Plaintiff filed any form of grievance regarding inadequate footwear or any alleged injury related to the same.” (Id. at 21.) Defendants further argue that “Plaintiff is aware of and familiar with the grievance system as he has successfully filed Step 1 and Step 2 grievances for other issues at Lieber.” (Id.) Thus, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has no excuse for his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies in this instance. (Id. at 20-22.)
Plaintiff does not respond to these arguments. (See generally Dkt. No. 117.) Accordingly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has abandoned these claims, and that such claims should therefore be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 121 at 2.) The undersigned agrees. Because Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants' arguments relating to his inadequate footwear claims, the undersigned must assume that Plaintiff has abandoned them. See Jones v. Family Health Ctr., 323 F.Supp.2d 681, 690 (D.S.C. 2003) (noting that claim not addressed in opposition memorandum had been abandoned).
Even if Plaintiff has not abandoned these claims, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to demonstrate that he filed a grievance with SCDC relating to such claims. (Dkt. No. 113-1 at 23- 67; 167-86.) Thus, Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him prior to filing these claims in federal court. See Harper v. Drakeford, No. 9:15-cv-01278-RBH, 2015 WL 6735898, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 3, 2015) (citing Malik v. Ward, No. 8:08-cv-1886-RBH-BHH, 2010 WL 1010023, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 936777 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2010). (“Only after completing both Steps 1 and 2 of the SCDC grievance policy has an inmate properly exhausted his claims under § 1983.”). As such, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's inadequate footwear claims be dismissed. The undersigned further recommends that Defendants Allen and Turner should be dismissed as parties because Plaintiff brings no other claims against them. (See generally Dkt. No. 58.)
Because the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the undersigned need not address Defendants' argument that “Plaintiff's claims regarding inadequate footwear are without merit.” (Dkt. No. 94-1 at 22.) However, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff's inadequate footwear claims would likely fail on the merits for the reasons set forth in Defendants' brief. (Id.)
2. Constitutional Violations
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the undersigned finds genuine issues of material fact relating to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim, but no issues of fact relating to his Fourteenth Amendment claim. Thus, for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be denied as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim and granted as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim.
a. Eighth Amendment Violations
Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint states that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by “failing to provide Plaintiff with adequate and meaningful opportunities for indoor and outdoor recreation, fresh air, and direct sunlight exposure, while being deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm to [his] health by failing to take corrective action once they were aware or should have been aware of such risk.” (Dkt. No. 58 at 8.) Plaintiff claims he “suffered great physical, mental, and emotional pain as a direct result” of such actions. (Id. at 9.) Thus, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim appears to be based upon his conditions of confinement. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102- 05 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (“The [Eighth] Amendment . . . imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff must demonstrate the following two factors to withstand summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim: (1) that objectively the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently serious, and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (referencing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991)). A culpable state of mind is “one of ‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety.” Id. A prison official demonstrates deliberate indifference if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims should be summarily dismissed because he cannot prove that he was denied a basic human need or suffered from a serious or significant injury. (Dkt. No. 94-1 at 12-14.) The undersigned disagrees.
In a personal declaration dated September 27, 2021, Plaintiff avers that he has been in the Restorative Unit for “over 2 years now.” (Dkt. No. 113-1 at 336, 342.) Plaintiff's declaration states that Defendants afforded Restorative Unit inmates two hours of out-of-cell recreation time per day from the time that he arrived until April of 2021. (Dkt. No. 113-1 at 336-42.) Plaintiff asserts that this is significantly less time than the prison's policy mandates. (Id.; Dkt. No. 117 at 3.)
The Restorative Unit is a housing unit within the Lieber Correctional Institution. (Dkt. No. 94-1 at 3.) It “houses inmates who have either requested protective custody or have been deemed in need of protective custody for their own safety.” (Id.)
He further claims that during this limited recreation time, “[t]here [is] no exercise equipment available, ” and “no space or area available for physical exercise in the unit.” (Id. at 338.) Plaintiff avers that he cannot “do any meaningful exercise” in his cell because the air conditioning does not work properly, resulting in “extreme hot temperatures” that make it dangerous for him to exercise. (Id. at 339.)
Plaintiff's declaration also states that “the [Restorative Unit] inmates are suppose[d] to be allowed onto the outside recreational field, but [Defendants] would fail to open the rec field or fail to order that the rec field be opened.” (Id. at 338.) Plaintiff states that “[b]ecause the officers do not open the outside rec field when [they are supposed to], this results in [him] not receiving adequate sunlight exposure.” (Id. at 339.)
Plaintiff avers that restrictions to his out of cell time changed when the prison implemented a “tier restriction” for the Restorative Unit in April of 2021. (Id. at 338-40.) Under this restriction, “one tier level of inmates [is] allowed to come out of their cells for recreation and showers while the other tier level of inmates [is on] lockdown in their cells for the entire day.” (Id. at 339.) The two “tier levels of inmates” switch off each day, meaning that “one tier level of inmates will receive three (3) out-of-cell recreation periods (i.e., Monday, Wednesday, and Friday), while the other tier level of inmates receives only two (2) out-of-cell recreation periods (i.e., Tuesday and Thursday).” (Id. at 339-40.) Plaintiff claims that, under this new tier system, “Restorative inmates have been limited to just 2-3 out-of-cell recreational periods per week.” (Id. at 340.) He notes, however, that the inmates are afforded five hours of out-of-cell recreation time in each instance under the new system. (Id.) Though these recreation periods are longer, Plaintiff claims that “now the inmates are limited to go outside every other week as opposed to every week” and that “the officers still do not open up the outside recreational field . . . as they're required to.” (Id.) Plaintiff avers that he has only been allowed outside “a few times” in the past five months. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he was informed by certain Defendants that “the Restorative Unit will be under tier restriction permanently.” (Id. at 341.) Defendants do not contest the factual allegations set forth in Plaintiff's declaration relating to his recreation periods and outdoor access. (See generally Dkt. No. 94-1; Dkt. No. 121.)
Further, Defendants provide no explanation for the restrictions on Plaintiff's ability to exercise and go outside, other than to state that these restrictions are necessary for “safety and security reasons.” (See generally Dkt. No. 94-1; Dkt. No. 121.) The undersigned notes that much of the relevant period occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic; however, Defendants do not argue that COVID-19 caused the restrictions about which Plaintiff complains. (See generally Dkt. No. 94-1; Dkt. No. 121.)
To determine whether these restrictions amount to an Eighth Amendment violation, the Court must look at the totality of the circumstances, including the “overall duration of incarceration, the length of time for which prisoners are locked in their cells each day, and the practical opportunities for the institution to provide prisoners with increased exercise opportunities.” See Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 1992) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he was confined to his cell for twenty-two hours a day for at least a year and a half. (Dkt. No. 113-1 at 336-42.) Further, he may have been unable to perform meaningful exercise during his limited recreation periods due to insufficient space. (Id.) Additionally, the record is unclear as to whether Plaintiff could exercise while confined to his cell. (Id. at 339, explaining that the “extreme hot temperatures” in his cell made exercise impossible; Dkt. No. 94-14 at 78, 123-24, noting that Plaintiff “exercises daily.”) Based on the current record, the undersigned cannot conclude that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Rather, the conditions of confinement reflected in the record may be sufficiently restrictive to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See Lyles v. Stirling, 844 Fed.Appx. 651, 654 (4th Cir. 2021) (finding a genuine issue of fact where plaintiff was denied out-of-cell exercise for more than ten months); Rivera v. Mathena, 795 Fed.Appx. 169, 175 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding genuine issues of fact where plaintiff suffered injuries from not showering for eight weeks, not exercising for two months, and, at one point, “receiving one or two showers per week and zero, one, or two exercise opportunities per week”); Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 191 (“[C]omplete deprivation of exercise for an extended period of time violates Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.”).
Further, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is given meaningful opportunities to exercise and/or sufficient sunlight exposure under the new “tier system.” (Dkt. No. 113-1 at 336-42.) Plaintiff alleges that he now receives only two to three opportunities for recreation each week and that Defendants do not provide access to exercise and sunlight as required under the “tier system” policies. (Id.) Indeed, Plaintiff claims that he has only been outside “a few times” in the past five months. (Id.) He contends that these “tier system” restrictions will remain indefinitely, (id.), and Defendants do not contest these assertions (see generally Dkt. No. 94; Dkt. No. 121). Again, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is at least a question of fact as to whether Plaintiff's new conditions of confinement could constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See Rivera, 795 Fed.Appx. at 175 (referencing Sweet, 529 F.2d at 866) (explaining that a restriction to two exercise periods per week may not violate the Eighth Amendment if confined to a short period but may violate the Eighth Amendment if extended over a period of years).
Moreover, the record contains conflicting evidence with respect to the injuries Plaintiff purportedly sustained as a result of lack of exercise and exposure to sunlight, including, inter alia, vitamin D deficiency, numbness and tingling in his extremities, back and neck pain, anxiety, depression, irritability, and loss of sleep. (Dkt. No. 94-114 at 37, 44, 45, 47, 59, 62, 69, 72, 78, 96, 123-24; Dkt. No. 117 at 13.) While Defendants argue that Plaintiff's purported injuries were not caused by lack of exercise and/or limited exposure to sunlight, the record does not clearly demonstrate the cause of Plaintiff's injuries. (Id.) Further, the undersigned cannot agree with Defendants' argument that these injuries are not sufficiently serious. (Dkt. No. 94 at 10-12.) The Fourth Circuit has previously found injuries of similar severity sufficient for purposes of Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims. See, e.g., Lyles, 844 Fed.Appx. at 654 (remanding where the plaintiff suffered weight gain, increased cholesterol, and diabetes after being denied opportunities for out-of-cell exercise); Rivera, 795 Fed.Appx. at 175 (“Rivera has produced evidence that he suffered emotional and mental deterioration, depression, low energy, difficulty sleeping, headaches, and loss of appetite. . . . These injuries are similar to what we have previously determined to be sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim.”); Putney v. Likin, 656 Fed.Appx. 632, 635 (4th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (remanding where an inmate alleged lack of sleep, confusion, headaches, and backaches to be considered along with the inmate's substantial risks of harm).
Finally, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff has not alleged or proven that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference.” (Dkt. No. 94 at 14-15.) However, “it is well-understood that ‘some form of regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the psychological and physical well being of . . . inmates.'” Lyles, 844 Fed.Appx. at 654-55 (quoting Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2018)). Further, Plaintiff filed multiple grievances complaining about his inability to exercise and his lack of sunlight exposure. (Dkt. No. 113-1 at 24-93.) Thus, there is at least a question of fact as whether and to what extent Defendants were aware of a substantial risk of serious harm resulting from Plaintiff's conditions of confinement. See Lyles, 844 Fed.Appx. at 654-55; see also Rivera, 795 Fed.Appx. at 176.
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that various issues of material fact exist with respect to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim and therefore recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement be denied as to such claim.
b. Fourteenth Amendment Violations
Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint also states that Defendants:
have violated [Plaintiff's] Fourteenth Amendment U.S. Constitutional right to equal protection of law, while acting under color of state law as prison officials, by intentionally discriminating against him in failing to provide him with adequate and meaningful opportunities for indoor and outdoor recreation, exercise, fresh air, and direct sunlight exposure, while providing other similarly situated inmates with adequate and meaningful opportunities for indoor and outdoor recreation, exercise, fresh air, and direct sunlight exposure.(Dkt. No. 58 at 8-9.) Plaintiff again states that he suffered physical, mental, and emotional pain as a direct result of Defendants' actions. (Id. at 9.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot show that he is treated differently than the other inmates who are similarly situated to him. (Dkt. No. 94-1 at 19.) Defendants further argue that “Plaintiff has not brought forward any evidence to prove the alleged unequal treatment resulted from either intentional or purposeful discrimination on behalf of the defendants.” (Id.) The undersigned agrees.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause thus directs that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1982). To establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff “must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination”; once this showing is made, “the court proceeds to determine whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730-31 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001)); see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (asserting that strict scrutiny, not the Turner factors, is the proper standard of review for equal protection challenges to a state prison's policy of racially segregating prisoners for an introductory period following entrance to a new correctional facility). To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must set forth “specific, non-conclusory factual allegations that establish improper motive.” Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 584 (4th Cir. 2003). “[M]ere conclusory assertions” of discriminatory intent are insufficient. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated, and that the alleged unequal treatment was the result of intentional discrimination. See Veney, 293 F.3d at 730-31 (equal protection violation requires showing that plaintiff “has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated, and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination”). Rather, Plaintiff alleges that all inmates to whom he is similarly situated (inmates in his unit) received the same treatment. (Dkt. No. 117 at 23.) As for Plaintiff's argument that the treatment at issue was the result of intentional discrimination, Plaintiff states that “Defendants knew beforehand that general population had exercise equipment[] available to them, and likewise, they knew that the Restorative Unit would not. Yet they still decided to go forward . . . without any alternative ideas about how they were going to provide exercise equipment[] to the inmates in the Restorative Unit.” (Id. at 26.) These allegations do not explain how Plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated inmates, nor do they suggest an improper motive. Thus, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to establish discriminatory intent. See Williams, 326 F.3d at 584 (explaining that a plaintiff must set forth “specific, non-conclusory factual allegations that establish improper motive” to succeed on an equal protection claim). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims.
In making his arguments that Defendants have violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, Plaintiff requests that the Court “order the Defendants to produce a ‘full view' picture” of the recreational fields available to his unit. (Dkt. No. 117 at 26.) However, this photograph is irrelevant to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim. As Defendants correctly note, Plaintiff may be properly compared only to inmates in his own unit, not to inmates in less-restrictive housing units. (Dkt. No. 94 at 17.) Plaintiff does not allege that other inmates in his unit use the recreational field at issue. (See generally Dkt. No. 117.) Thus, the fact that his entire housing unit is not permitted to use a specific recreational field cannot sustain his Fourteenth Amendment claim.
c. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also assert they are entitled to qualified immunity as to any alleged constitutional violations. (Dkt. No. 94-1 at 15.) “Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects officers from liability for “bad guesses in gray areas” and bases liability on the violation of bright-line rules. Id. (quoting Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557, 560 (4th Cir. 2011)). “Qualified immunity provides ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'” Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the court applies “a familiar two-step inquiry.” Harris v. Pittman, No. 17-7308, 2019 WL 2509240, at *10 (4th Cir. June 18, 2019) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). At step one, courts ask “whether the facts alleged or shown, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that the police officer's actions violated a constitutional right.” Id. (quoting Meyers v. Balt. Cty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013)). “At step two, the question is whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established' at the time of the officer's conduct.” Id. (quoting Meyers, 713 F.3d at 731). District court and court of appeals judges are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (2009).
As described above, questions of fact exist as to whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. (See supra at 8-13.) Thus, the undersigned cannot determine at this time whether Defendants' actions were objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Crawford v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 6:18-cv-02407-DCN-MGB, 2020 WL 7000864, at *26 (D.S.C. June 11, 2020), adopted, No. 6:18-cv-2407-DCN, 2020 WL 5835073 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2020) (denying summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds where questions of fact existed regarding whether defendants' actions were reasonable); Kane v. Beaufort Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, No. 9:14-cv-508-RMG, 2015 WL 404570, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2015) (“summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is improper as long as there remains any material factual dispute regarding the actual conduct of the defendants” (quoting Vathekan v. Prince George's Cnty., 154 F.3d 173, 180 (4th Cir. 1998)). The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent they seek summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity for Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (Defendant entitled to qualified immunity only insofar as the conduct alleged did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known); Newkirk v. Enzor, 674 F. App'x. 276 (4th Cir. 2017) (affirming denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity where facts remained in dispute).
B. Claim for Injunctive Relief
As noted, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 58 at 10.) The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “federal injunctive relief is an extreme remedy.” Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1382 (4th Cir. 1995). To obtain such an injunction, Plaintiff must show (1) irreparable injury, (2) that remedies at law “are inadequate to compensate for that injury, ” (3) “the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant” warrants a remedy, and (4) an injunction would not disserve the public interest. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156-57 (2010). Where a § 1983 plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, such relief cannot be granted absent the plaintiff's showing that there is a “real or immediate threat that [he] will be wronged again . . . in a similar way.” Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1382 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)).
Here, Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief stems from his conditions of confinement within a prison. (See generally Dkt. No. 58.) His request for injunctive relief must therefore be considered in accordance with the PLRA. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). “The PLRA provides that ‘in any civil action with respect to prison conditions . . . [t]he court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.'” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 366 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (May 6, 2019) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)). As described above, questions of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff's conditions of confinement violate his Eighth Amendment rights. (See supra at 8-13.) Given that questions of fact exist as to whether Defendants' conduct constitutes a violation of a federal right, questions of fact also exist as to whether injunctive relief is appropriate. The undersigned therefore recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be denied with respect to this issue.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 94) be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. More specifically, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 94) should be DENIED as to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim and GRANTED as to all other claims. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Defendants Allen and Turner should be DISMISSED as parties to this litigation.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).