Opinion
C. A. PC-2019-4844
08-05-2020
ADELE GOSS, Appellant, v. FRANK J. KARPINSKI, in His Official Capacity as Executive Director of the EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND, Appellee.
For Plaintiff: Mark P. Gagliardi, Esq. For Defendant: Michael P. Robinson, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Mark P. Gagliardi, Esq.
For Defendant: Michael P. Robinson, Esq.
DECISION
MONTALBANO, J.
This matter is before the Court on appeal from a March 18, 2019 decision (Decision) of the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI or the Board) denying the application of Adele Goss (Appellant or Ms. Goss) for accidental disability benefits under G.L. 1956 § 16-16-16 (Application). Ms. Goss worked as a teacher for the City of Providence School Department for approximately twenty-five (25) years. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15.
I Facts and Travel
On August 1, 2014, Ms. Goss filed an application for accidental disability benefits with ERSRI claiming an injury as the result of an alleged accident on February 6, 2014. Appendix Record (R.) at 00659. Ms. Goss asserted that her injuries consisted of slurred speech, rapid heartbeat, hyperventilation, confusion, disorientation, and inability to focus. Id. At the time of her Application, Ms. Goss was a sixty-one-year old female who had been employed as a teacher in the City of Providence School Department for approximately twenty-five years. Id.
The Record before the Court was submitted in an appendix form. However, the parties have stipulated that this appendix contains the entire record. Instead of referring to specific exhibits in the record, the Court will refer to the Bates-stamped page numbers.
Along with her Application Ms. Goss submitted an Employer's Disability Statement dated June 18, 2015. R. at 00551-00553. The document is signed by both D. Johnson and Jennifer Lepre on behalf of the Providence School Department. Id. at 00552. In response to the question, "In your opinion, is the member physically or mentally incapacitated from continuing in his/her present position"? D. Johnson wrote, "I don't know." In response to the question, "In your opinion, is the member's disability the natural and proximate result of an accident that allegedly/reportedly occurred during the performance of his/her duties"? D. Johnson wrote, "I don't know." Id. at 00552. The Employer's Disability Statement indicates that Ms. Goss began receiving retirement benefits only as of August 2, 2014. Id. at 00553.
Ms. Goss further supplemented her Application with physicians' statements for accidental disability forms from her psychiatrist, C. Brandon Qualls, M.D. (Dr. Qualls), her primary care physician, Michael Rosenberg, D.O. (Dr. Rosenberg), and her mental health therapist, Nelson D. Martins, Ph.D. (Dr. Martins). R. at 003-004, 006, 001042; R. at 00128-00130, 00146; R. at 0093-0097. Each doctor opined that Ms. Goss was disabled as the natural and proximate result of the February 6, 2014 on the job accident, that her disability was not the result of age or length of service, that she had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI), and that she was permanently and totally disabled from service as a schoolteacher as well as from any employment. Id.
Ronald M. Stewart, M.D. (Dr. Stewart) performed an independent medical examination (IME) of Ms. Goss on September 22, 2016. R. at 00890-00894. Dr. Stewart opined that Ms. Goss was disabled from her current employment as well as from any employment, and that her disability was a result of the reported accident sustained in the performance of the applicant's job and not the result of age or length of service, and that she had reached MMI. Id.
Naureen Attiullah, M.D. (Dr. Attiullah) performed an IME of Ms. Goss on October 6, 2016. R. at 00871-00886. Dr. Attiullah opined that Ms. Goss was disabled from her current employment as a teacher, but was not disabled from any employment, and further felt that her disability was not the result of the reported accident sustained in the performance of the applicant's job. Id. at 00881. Dr. Attiullah further opined that Ms. Goss had reached MMI. Id. at 872.
John Ruggiano, M.D. (Dr. Ruggiano) performed an IME of Ms. Goss on October 4, 2016 and October 12, 2016. R. at 00864-00866. Dr. Ruggiano opined that Ms. Goss was disabled from her current employment as well as from any employment, but that her disability was not the result of the reported accident sustained in the performance of the applicant's job. Id. Dr. Ruggiano further opined that Ms. Goss had reached MMI. Id. at 865.
The ERSRI Disability Subcommittee (the Subcommittee) first considered Appellant's Application for accidental disability retirement on January 6, 2017. On that date, the Subcommittee issued its decision recommending denial of Ms. Goss' Application. R. at 00917-00920. Specifically, the Subcommittee found, after reviewing the evidence and reviewing the requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-16-16 as well as the ERSRI uniform eligibility requirements, standards and criteria for accidental disability benefits set forth in R.I. Admin. Code 29-1-4:9-4 (2013), that Ms. Goss was not physically or mentally incapacitated as a natural and proximate result of an accident while in the performance of duty. Id. at 00920. The Subcommittee was persuaded by the conclusions of Dr. Attiullah and Dr. Ruggiano, each concluding that Ms. Goss was not disabled as the result of a workplace accident. Id. The Subcommittee also placed great emphasis on the fact that Ms. Goss had a history of anxiety and depression dating back to her high school days. Id. Finally, the Subcommittee concluded that Appellant's disability was not a natural and proximate result of an accident in the workplace. Id. On January 11, 2017, the Board voted to accept the recommendation of the Subcommittee to deny Ms. Goss' application for an accidental disability pension. R. at 00914. Ms. Goss was notified of the Board's initial denial by letter dated February 21, 2017. Id.
Ms. Goss appealed the Board's first denial and on March 17, 2017, Ms. Goss requested a hearing before the Subcommittee in order to present additional evidence in support of her appeal. See R.I. Admin. Code 29-1-4:9-6 (2013). The request was granted by the Subcommittee, and on June 8, 2018, Ms. Goss was permitted to present additional evidence to the Subcommittee, including the testimony of Forensic Psychiatrist Barry Wall, M.D. (Dr. Wall). R. at 001217-001254. Dr. Wall testified that Ms. Goss is disabled from the position of teacher, suffering from unspecified trauma disorder, anxiety disorder and recurrent major depressive disorder. R. at 001234. Dr. Wall opined that her disability was likely caused by a workplace accident consisting of a series of events during the 2013-2014 school year at Harry Kizirian School, which lasted until February 6, 2014. Id. Dr. Wall further testified that Ms. Goss' disability was not the result of age or length of service. Id. He opined that she had reached MMI. R. at 001235. He testified that his opinions were to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Id.
At the June 8, 2018 hearing before the Subcommittee, Ms. Goss, through her attorney, clarified that the workplace accident on which she based her claim for accidental disability was not limited to the events at school on February 6, 2014 but rather, that there were a series of incidents which culminated on February 6, 2014 when she could no longer work. Ms. Goss cites medical records, police reports, and incident reports describing these incidents, all of which were included in the record before the Subcommittee. R. at 001222-001223.
The Subcommittee issued its second decision on June 8, 2018. R. at 001121-001125. The Subcommittee emphasized once again that Ms. Goss did not describe a specific accident. Id. at 001121. After considering the additional evidence submitted by Ms. Goss in support of her Application, the Subcommittee once again recommended denial of Ms. Goss' Application for an accidental disability retirement. Id. at 001125. The Subcommittee incorporated the Findings of Fact from its January 6, 2017 decision and found there was no new evidence of a qualifying accident or accidents (emphasis added) submitted to justify altering its first decision to recommend denial of Ms. Goss' Application. Id. at 001124. The Subcommittee further found that based on the record, Ms. Goss' disability was not the natural and proximate result of an accident or series of accidents (emphasis added) which would justify awarding her an accidental disability pension. Id. at 001125.
On September 12, 2018, the full Board voted to accept the Subcommittee's second recommendation of denial of Ms. Goss' Application. R. at 001129. Ms. Goss was notified of the Board's second denial by letter dated September 27, 2018. Id. Ms. Goss once again timely appealed the Retirement Board's decision on October 16, 2018, pursuant to R.I. Admin. Code 29-1-4:9-11 (2013) (R. at 001136). The Board held a hearing on Ms. Goss' appeal on March 18, 2019. R. at 001340-001360. After considering the full record and any additional arguments raised at that hearing, the Board voted to deny Ms. Goss' Application. Id. at 001350-001351. On April 16, 2019, Ms. Goss filed a timely appeal of the Board's decision to this Court.
II Standard of Review
Pursuant to § 42-35-15, the Superior Court has jurisdiction to review appeals of ERSRI decisions. Specifically, § 42-35-15(g) provides:
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
"(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
"(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
"(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
"(4) Affected by other error of law;
"(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
"(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
When reviewing an ERSRI decision, this Court is limited to an examination of the record in deciding whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I. 1998) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 424 A.2d 646, 647 (R.I. 1981) (citing Apostolou v. Genovesi, 120 R.I. 501, 508, 388 A.2d 821, 824-25 (1978)).
This Court '"must not substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, "' and will defer to an agency's findings as long as they are supported by legally competent evidence. Endoscopy Associates, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Health, 183 A.3d 528, 532 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Interstate Navigation Co. v. Division of Public Utilities and Carriers of Rhode Island, 824 A.2d 1282, 1286 (R.I. 2003)). "Legally competent evidence" is defined as '"such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance."' Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Training, Board of Review, 749 A.2d 1121, 1125 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc., 710 A.2d at 684) (internal quotation omitted). "[I]f 'competent evidence exists in the record, the Superior Court is required to uphold the agency's conclusions.'" Auto Body Association of Rhode Island v. State Department of Business Regulation, 996 A.2d 91, 95 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 650 A.2d 479, 485 (R.I. 1994)). Therefore, this Court will '"reverse factual conclusions of administrative agencies only when they are totally devoid of competent evidentiary support in the record."' Kachanis v. Board of Review, Department of Employment & Training, 638 A.2d 553, 556 (R.I. 1994) (quoting Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council of Rhode Island, 434 A.2d 266, 272 (R.I. 1981)).
An agency's interpretations of law, on the other hand, "are not binding on the reviewing court." Pawtucket Transfer Operations, LLC v. City of Pawtucket, 944 A.2d 855, 859 (R.I. 2008). This Court reviews an agency's determinations of law de novo "to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts." Id. The agency's construction of a statute "will not be considered controlling by reviewing courts if the construction is clearly erroneous or unauthorized." See Flather v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 276, 283 n.3, 377 A.2d 225, 229 (1977). If the statute in question is ambiguous, the Court will give deference to an agency's reasonable construction where the agency has been entrusted with its administration and enforcement. Labor Ready Northeast, Inc. v. McConaghy, 849 A.2d 340, 345-46 (R.I. 2004). If, however, the statute is not susceptible to different reasonable meanings, no deference will be given to the agency's construction. See Unistrut Corp. v. State Department of Labor and Training, 922 A.2d 93, 101 (R.I. 2007).
III
Analysis
Section 16-16-16 of the Rhode Island General Laws sets forth the requirements for granting a teacher an accidental disability retirement. That statute provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) Medical examination of an active teacher for accidental disability, and investigation of all statements and certificates by him or her or in his or her behalf in connection with the accidental disability, shall be made upon the application of . . . the teacher . . . stating that the teacher is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of service as a natural and proximate result of an accident, while in the performance of duty, and certify the definite time, place, and conditions of the duty performed by the teacher resulting in the alleged disability, and that the alleged disability is not the result of willful negligence or misconduct on the part of the teacher, and is not the result of age or length of service, and that the teacher should, therefore, be retired.
"(b) The application shall be made within five (5) years of the alleged accident from which the injury has resulted in the teacher's present disability, and shall be accompanied by an accident report and a physician's report certifying to the disability; . . .
"(c) If a medical examination conducted by three (3) physicians engaged by the retirement board, and any investigation that the retirement board may desire to make, shall show that the teacher is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of service as a natural and proximate result of an accident, while in the performance of duty, and that the disability is not the result of willful negligence or misconduct on the part of the teacher, and is not the result of age or length of service, and that the teacher has not attained the age of sixty-five (65) years, and that the teacher should be retired, the physicians who conducted the examination shall so certify to the retirement board stating the time, place, and conditions of service performed by the teacher resulting in the disability, and the retirement board may grant the teacher an accidental disability benefit." Section 16-16-16 (emphasis added).
Section 16-16-16(d) authorized ERSRI to establish eligibility requirements, standards, and criteria for accidental disability benefits. Pursuant to that authority, ERSRI established the regulatory standards applicable to accidental disability requirements under § 16-16-16. See R.I. Admin. Code 29-1-4:9-4 (2013) which provides, in pertinent part:
"1. Upon review of the reports of the medical examinations of the physicians engaged by the Retirement Board, the Retirement Board may grant the member an . . . Accidental Disability Pension.
"3. For a . . . teacher . . . to receive an Accidental Disability Pension, the Retirement Board must make a determination that the applicant has reached maximum medical improvement, and is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of service as a natural and proximate result of an accident sustained while in the performance of duty, that the disability is not the result of willful negligence or misconduct of the member, and is not the result of age or length of service, and that the member has not yet attained the age of 65. The applicant must certify to the Retirement Board the definite time, place, and conditions of the duty performed by the member and the incident resulting in the alleged disability for the member to be eligible for an accidental disability pension." R.I. Admin. Code 29-1-4:9-4 (2013) (emphasis added).
Our Supreme Court has held that the Legislature intended that the requirements for accidental disability retirement be stringent. See Rossi v. Employees' Retirement System, 895 A.2d 106, 112 (R.I. 2006).
It is undisputed that Ms. Goss meets several of the requirements set forth in § 16-16-16 for accidental disability benefits. Her Application was made within five years of the alleged accident from which her injury resulted in her present disability. R. at 00659. Her Application was supplemented by three physicians' reports certifying to the disability. R. at 003-004, 006, 001042; R. at 00128-00130, 00146; R. at 0093-0097. Her Application was supplemented by the required Accident Report form. R. at 00666-00700. Her Application was accompanied by the required employer's disability statement. R. at 00551-00553. Ms. Goss had not attained the age of sixty-five years. R. at 00917. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Goss' disability is the result of willful negligence or misconduct on her part. All seven professionals who examined her opined that Ms. Goss is physically or mentally incapacitated for the performance of service as a teacher. All of the physicians agreed that Ms. Goss had reached MMI. Where the parties disagree, however, is whether Ms. Goss' disability was the result of the reported accident or accidents sustained in the performance of her job and not the result of age or length of service, and whether her disability was a natural and proximate result of that accident or accidents.
With respect to applications for accidental disability pensions, ERSRI employs a two-tiered system for review. The Board's Disability Subcommittee performs the first level of review by considering the documentary evidence and interviewing the applicant. See R.I. Admin. Code 29-1-4:9-5.00 (2013) and 29-1-4:9-6.00 (2013). If the applicant chooses to appeal a final decision of the Disability Subcommittee, the Board will render a decision based on the evidence in the record but will also consider any legal memoranda. R.I. Admin. Code 29-1-4:9-11.00 (2013). The applicant will receive notice of the Board's final decision within ten days of the hearing. Id. If the Board denies the application, the notice of final decision will constitute a final administrative action. Id. Importantly, the Board "affords deference to the conclusions of [the] Disability Subcommittee on factual determinations and questions of credibility and will not overturn those determinations and assessments unless they are found to be clearly wrong." Id.
The Court notes that ERSRI's regulations were re-codified and adopted on March 9, 2017. Although the two-tiered review process remains the same, the above-cited R.I. Admin. Code sections are now codified as 120-RICR-00-00-1.9.
A
Accidental Disability Standard
Appellant argues that the Board's decision was affected by error of law because it required Ms. Goss to prove that her disability was the result of a single, qualifying workplace accident or incident which it required the evaluating physician to identify, and that this requirement is inconsistent with the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruling in Pierce v. Providence Retirement Board, 15 A.3d 957 (R.I. 2011). To the contrary, the Board argues that neither Dr. Attiullah nor the Board misconstrued the standard in Pierce, and that the Board did not require Ms. Goss to prove that she was disabled by a single accident.
In Pierce, a firefighter applied for accidental disability retirement benefits after he repeatedly injured his right ankle while at work. 15 A.3d at 958. Specifically, the firefighter applied for said benefits under Providence Code of Ordinances § 17-189(5). In its decision, the Supreme Court held that an accident-even if not the sole cause of a disability-could be considered as a proximate cause for purposes of determining eligibility for an accidental disability pension. See id. at 966 (stating "[a]lthough hitting an ankle against a stair arguably may not cause another firefighter to become permanently disabled, that Pierce endured this outcome does not preclude our determination that the 2006 injury was one of the proximate causes resulting in Pierce's disability"). Id. at 965 n.13. Accordingly, the terms "proximate cause" and "disability" could refer to multiple accidents and an agency may not render an applicant ineligible for accidental disability retirement simply because he or she experienced more than one work-related incident. Id. at 966.
A careful review of the Subcommittee's June 8, 2018 decision, which was adopted by the Board, reveals that Ms. Goss was not required to prove she was disabled by a single accident. The Subcommittee fully understood that Ms. Goss was claiming her disability resulted from "a series of events from 2013 to 2014" but found that those events did not constitute an accident within the meaning of the statute. R. at 001125. The Subcommittee understood that Ms. Goss' claim was predicated on perceived harassment based upon that series of events but did not consider the workplace conflict and interactions with her students and principal to be qualifying accidents under the statute, nor did the Subcommittee find that Ms. Goss' condition was the natural and probable result of a qualifying accident. Id. Thus, the Subcommittee did not recommend denial of Ms. Goss' Application because she failed to prove she was disabled by a single workplace accident but rather, because in interpreting § 16-16-16, the Subcommittee found that none of the several workplace incidents she cited, either alone or in combination, were qualifying accidents. Id. Therefore, the Board's adoption of the Subcommittee's recommendation of denial of Ms. Goss' Application was not based upon a requirement that she prove she was disabled by a single workplace accident, and consequently, was not affected by error of law.
Harassment is defined as "words, conduct, or action (usually repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose." Harassment, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Courts will generally consider whether an employee's treatment by his or her fellow co-workers exceeds "that level of stress encountered by people in the workplace every day." See Martin v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 506 A.2d 1365, 1368 (R.I. 1986). Moreover, a hostile work environment often refers to a "series of events which mount over time to create such a poisonous atmosphere as to violate the law." O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 727 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
The Subcommittee further found that there was no objective evidence confirming Ms. Goss' allegation of "systematic harassment," and once again pointed out that neither Dr. Ruggiano nor Dr. Stewart were able to identify a qualifying accident. Id. at 001125. The Subcommittee was persuaded by the opinion of Dr. Attiullah that Ms. Goss' perceived incidents of harassment "were instead instances where, when cited for deficiencies in her teaching performance by the Principal (Ms. Cerra), 'she did not respond appropriately and often responded in anger and retaliation."' Id. The Subcommittee found that the interactions between Ms. Goss and her students and her school principal did not fit the definition of accident and did not qualify as an accident or accidents (emphasis added) for purposes of eligibility for an accidental disability pension. Id. The Subcommittee further noted that Dr. Wall, during his testimony, failed to describe an accident within the meaning of the statute. Id. This Court defers to the Board's interpretation as to what qualifies as an "accident" under § 16-16-16 which would enable it to grant Ms. Goss' Application for accidental disability benefits. See Iselin v. Retirement Board of Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I. 2008). Deference is accorded to the Board's interpretation of the meaning of the word "accident" under the statute even when the Board's interpretation is not the only permissible interpretation that could be applied. Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 456-57 (R.I. 1993). Accordingly, the Board's reliance on Dr. Attiullah's opinion that Ms. Goss' interactions with her principal (Ms. Cerra) at Harry Kizirian Elementary School during the 2013-2014 school year, although perceived by her to be harassment, were in fact a series of interactions which did not constitute a qualifying accident or accidents, was not affected by error of law.
The Subcommittee adopted the definition of "accident" as "an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens; an unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, unforeseen or unlooked for event, happening or occurrence . . ." Accident, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.).
Appellant further argues that the Board's decision is arbitrary or capricious because it required Ms. Goss to provide objective evidence of workplace harassment. Appellant says providing objective proof of workplace harassment is virtually impossible. However, the regulatory standards applicable to accidental disability benefits under § 16-16-16 require a teacher seeking such benefits to certify to the Board a definite time and place of the workplace incident(s) resulting in the alleged disability. R.I. Admin. Code 29-1-4:9-4(3) (2013). However difficult this requirement may seem, the burden is on Appellant to provide the certification and support it with objective evidence. The Subcommittee found that the instances of workplace interaction between Ms. Goss, her students, and her principal, perceived by Ms. Goss to be workplace harassment, were not sufficiently confirmed as such, and concluded that Ms. Goss failed to identify a qualified accident or accidents which would make her eligible for an accidental disability pension. R. at 001125.
This Court agrees with the Subcommittee's finding that Ms. Goss has failed to provide objective evidence of workplace harassment. The Board's adoption of the Subcommittee's conclusion in this regard is supported by the record which includes a memorandum from Ms. Cerra contradicting Ms. Goss' description and perception of their interactions as harassment. R. at 00668-00669. Many of the instances described by Ms. Goss involved instances of criticism of Ms. Goss' teaching performance by her principal (Ms. Cerra). See R. at 00666-00700. For example, the alleged February 6, 2014 "accident" involved two instances of criticism of Ms. Goss by the school principal: one for sending a student to the bathroom at a time when students were not permitted to use the bathroom, and another for being ill-prepared for a staff meeting. R. at 00668-00669. For a schoolteacher, these are not instances of workplace harassment but rather, examples of the types of interactions with the principal "encountered by people in the workplace every day." See Martin, 506 A.2d at 1368. This Court, therefore, finds that the Subcommittee's decision and recommendation of denial as adopted by the Board was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Appellant also argues that the Board's decision was affected by error of law because the Subcommittee required the evaluating physicians to identify a qualifying workplace accident resulting in Ms. Goss' disability. However, § 16-16-16(c) requires the examining physicians to certify to the Board "the time, place, and conditions of service performed by the teacher resulting in the disability, . . ." The Subcommittee found that Doctors Stewart, Ruggiano and Wall failed to identify a qualifying accident under the statute, and instead relied on the opinion of Dr. Attiullah that the interactions between Ms. Goss, her students, and Principal Cerra were "events occurring entirely as a result of human agency and would not be unusual or unexpected in the workplace, . . ." Consequently, the Board's conclusion that the medical examinations did not show that there was a causal connection between her teaching responsibilities and her disability-i.e., that the injury was work-related-was a sufficient reason for the Board to deny Ms. Goss' Application. See § 16-16-16(c). See also Ziadeh v. Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island Board, No. PC-2016-4629, 2017 WL 3839550 (R.I. Super. Aug. 28, 2017). Consequently, the Subcommittee's determination that the evaluating physicians failed to identify a qualifying workplace accident or accidents resulting in Ms. Goss' disability was not affected by error of law.
Appellant further argues that the Board improperly concluded that the so-called workplace harassment experienced by Goss was not sufficiently severe enough to rise to the level of accidental disability under § 16-16-16. The Board counters that, based on Dr. Attiullah's conclusion, what Ms. Goss perceived as harassment was actually a case of her principal reprimanding her for deficiencies in her teaching performance. Clearly, the Subcommittee's recommendation of denial of Ms. Goss' Application was based upon its conclusion that she was not physically or mentally incapacitated as a natural and proximate result of an accident while in the performance of duty. R. at 001125. The Subcommittee did not assess the severity of the identified workplace accident or accidents, but rather found that Ms. Goss and her physicians failed to identify any qualifying workplace accident or accidents. Id. Consequently, the Board's adoption of the Subcommittee's decision and recommendation of denial was not affected by error of law in this context.
Next Appellant argues that it was error of law for the Board to base its decision, in part, on the fact that Ms. Goss had pre-existing mental health issues. There is no question that the record before the Board, including, inter alia, medical records from treatment by Dr. Qualls, Dr. Rosenberg and Dr. Martins, clearly establishes that Ms. Goss had pre-existing mental health issues dating back to her high school days. R. at 00920. However, a careful review of the Subcommittee's June 8, 2018 decision, which was adopted by the Board, reveals that the Subcommittee's decision was not based upon the fact that Ms. Goss had pre-existing mental health issues which caused her disability, but rather because the Subcommittee did not find that the events identified by Ms. Goss as the accident or accidents causing her disability "constitute a qualifying accident or accidents for purposes of eligibility for an accidental disability pension." R. at 001125. The Subcommittee went on to conclude that Ms. Goss' disability from teaching was not the natural and proximate result of an accident or accidents justifying the award of an accidental disability pension. Id. The fact that Ms. Goss had pre-existing mental health issues was not the basis for the Subcommittee's decision. Consequently, the Board's adoption of the Subcommittee's decision and recommendation of denial was not affected by error of law in this context.
B
Reliable, Probative, and Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record
Appellant argues that the Board's decision is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record because it gave greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Attiullah than to the opinions of the other physicians without explaining why. Several of the examining physicians in this case, including one of ERSRI's own medical examiners, concluded that, in their opinion, Ms. Goss' disability was the natural and proximate result of an injury while she was teaching.
Dr. Qualls, Ms. Goss' psychiatrist, opined that Ms. Goss suffered severe stress because of her interactions with her school principal (Ms. Cerra). Dr. Qualls describes these interactions as traumatic for Ms. Goss and states that the anxiety associated with that trauma caused deterioration in her [teaching] performance to the point where she was no longer able to teach. R. at 003-004, 006.
Dr. Martins, Ms. Goss' mental health therapist, noted it was remarkable that after so many years as an effective, successful teacher, Ms. Goss' teaching career was ended by her terrible experience in her last year in the Providence School Department. He opined that Ms. Goss' encounter with conflict and harassment in her last school setting aggravated her anxiety condition to the extent that she was no longer able to work. R. at 0093-0097.
Dr. Rosenberg, Ms. Goss' primary care provider, opined that her depression and anxiety disorder were related to trauma at work, concluding that Ms. Goss was not capable of being in a classroom situation any longer. R. at 00128-00130.
Dr. Stewart, one of the examining physicians chosen by ERSRI to perform an IME in this case, opined that Ms. Goss had been placed inappropriately in a position for which she was not trained and subsequently was subjected to harsh and unprofessional dealings with the principal which exacerbated her pre-existing conditions to the point where she could no longer teach. R. at 00890-00894.
Dr. Wall, a forensic psychiatrist who testified before the Subcommittee on June 8, 2018, opined that Ms. Goss was disabled from teaching and that her disability was likely caused by a workplace accident consisting of a series of events during the 2013-2014 school year. R. at 001234. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that even though hearing officers may make credibility determinations, they may not ignore uncontroverted medical reports. Suarez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 740 F.2d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The medical opinions cited above, however, were not uncontroverted. Dr. Attiullah and Dr. Ruggiano were both of the opinion that Ms. Goss was not disabled as the result of a workplace accident. R. at 00881; R. at 00864-00866. Appellant contends that Dr. Attiullah erroneously concluded that Ms. Goss' preexisting anxiety, depression, and personality disorder precluded a finding that her injury was work-related, and that the Board erred by discrediting Dr. Wall's medical opinion. The Board counters that it properly relied upon the Subcommittee's reasoning for giving little weight to Dr. Wall's testimony.
In a case of first impression, our Supreme Court determined that in order for an employee to prevail on a claim for an accidental disability retirement he or she was not required to show that all three independent medical examiners agreed that he or she was permanently disabled as a result of a work-related injury. Morse v. Employees Retirement System of City of Providence, 139 A.3d 385, 393-94 (R.I. 2016). In Morse, the Supreme Court interpreted the Providence Code of Ordinances § 17-189(6) in the case of a City of Providence fire-rescue captain seeking an accidental disability retirement. The Court specifically found that:
"The determination of whether the evidence shows incapacity is within the discretion of the board. If two independent medical examiners, plus the member's treating physicians, opine that the member is disabled, and one physician disagrees, it is certainly reasonable to conclude that the evidence is that the member is disabled. Of course, the board has the authority, indeed the obligation, to review the opinions of each of those physicians and determine why there is a disagreement. The board certainly has the ability to determine that the one dissenting physician is more persuasive than the others, but that decision must be based on a reasoned analysis of the evidence before the board." Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
While Ms. Goss applied for a teacher's accidental disability retirement under § 16-16-16, the language in that statute is almost identical to the language in the City of Providence Code of Ordinances § 17-189(6) interpreted by the Supreme Court in Morse:
"(c) If a medical examination conducted by three (3) physicians engaged by the retirement board, and any investigation that the retirement board may desire to make, shall show that the teacher is physically or mentally incapacitated . . . the retirement board may grant the teacher an accidental disability benefit." Section 16-16-16(c) (emphasis added).
Unlike in the Morse case, the Subcommittee in this case, after reviewing the opinions of the aforementioned seven (7) professionals, determined that the opinion of Dr. Attiullah and, to a lesser extent, Dr. Ruggiano, were more persuasive than the others in its decision to deny Ms. Goss' Application for accidental disability benefits. The Board's decision in this context was based on a reasoned analysis of the evidence in the whole record before it. The Subcommittee was persuaded by the opinion of Dr. Attiullah, and the Board agreed with the Subcommittee's conclusion, that Ms. Goss' perceived incidents of harassment were instead instances of a principal citing a teacher for deficiencies in her teaching performance to which she inappropriately responded in anger and retaliation. R. at 001125. Thus, the Subcommittee clearly articulated its reasons for rejecting the opinions of the several physicians who felt that Ms. Goss was disabled as the result of a workplace accident, and its factual conclusions to the contrary in this context were supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the whole record (the opinions of Dr. Attiullah and Dr. Ruggiano). Consequently, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board and defers to the Subcommittee's findings as adopted by the Board since they are supported by legally competent evidence. Endoscopy Associates, Inc., 183 A.3d at 532.
IV
Conclusion
Based on a review of the entire record, this Court concludes that ERSRI's decision to deny Ms. Goss accidental disability benefits was not in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, was not made upon unlawful procedure, was neither arbitrary nor capricious, was not affected by other error of law, and was not clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Substantial rights of the Appellant have not been prejudiced. Therefore, this Court affirms the decision of the Board.
Counsel shall prepare an appropriate order for entry.