Opinion
6:23-cv-01118 (DNH/TWD)
10-18-2023
WILLIE THOMAS GOSIER, Plaintiff, v. ONEIDA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants.
APPEARANCES: WILLIE THOMAS GOSIER Plaintiff, pro se
APPEARANCES:
WILLIE THOMAS GOSIER
Plaintiff, pro se
ORDER
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a pro se civil rights complaint filed by Willie Thomas Gosier (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Oneida County District Attorney's Office and District Attorneys Scott D. McNamara, Grant Garramone, and Todd Carville (together, “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff, who is presently confined at the Oneida County Correctional Facility, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 4.)
The Court takes judicial notice Scott D. McNamara, Esq., is the Oneida County District Attorney; Grant Garramone, Esq., is the Chief Assistant District Attorney; and Todd Carville, Esq., is the Executive Administrative Assistant District Attorney. For ease of reference, the Court refers to the individual Defendants collectively as the “District Attorneys” throughout the decision.
On September 5, 2023, Plaintiff's first IFP application was denied and this action was administratively closed. (Dkt. No. 3.) The case was reopened on September 18, 2023, upon receipt of the required filing. (Dkt. Nos. 4, 5, and 6.)
“28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged.” Cash v. Bernstein, No. 09-CV-1922, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010). “Although an indigent, incarcerated individual need not prepay the filing fee at the time of filing, he must subsequently pay the fee, to the extent he is able to do so, through periodic withdrawals from his inmate accounts.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Section 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding IFP where, absent a showing of “imminent danger of serious physical injury,” a prisoner has filed three or more actions that were subsequently dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's litigation history on the Federal Judiciary's Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) Service. See http://pacer.uspci.uscourts.gov. It does not appear from that review Plaintiff had accumulated three strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) as of the date this action was commenced.
Upon review of Plaintiff's IFP application, the Court finds he has demonstrated sufficient economic need. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Plaintiff has also filed the inmate authorization form required in this District. (Dkt. No. 5.) Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's IFP application. (Dkt. No. 4.)
Plaintiff is advised that although he has been granted IFP status, he is still required to pay any fees and costs he may incur in this action.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
A. Standard of Review
Having found Plaintiff meets the financial criteria for commencing this action IFP, and because Plaintiff seeks relief from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, the Court must consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Section 1915(e) of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that - . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (noting Section 1915A applies to all actions brought by prisoners against government officials even when plaintiff paid the filing fee). The term “prisoner” includes pretrial detainees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c) (2006).
Additionally, when reviewing a complaint, the Court looks to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Hudson v. Artuz, No. 95 Civ. 4768, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, No. 95-CV-0063 (TJM), 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. June 23, 1995)) (other citations omitted).
A court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. Thus, a pleading that contains only allegations which “are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them” is subject to dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Court will construe the allegations in the complaint with the utmost leniency. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding a pro se litigant's complaint is to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”).
B. Summary of Complaint
Utilizing a form civil rights complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right by using “deliberately fabricated evidence” to “build a case” and “frame” him for second degree criminal possession of a weapon and “other” charges. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-7, 9.) Plaintiff claims the District Attorneys “continued prosecuting [him] despite the fact they knew [he] was innocent.” Id. at 9. They also “worked with” and “pressured” Utica Police Department officers and investigators to use “extremely aggressive interview techniques when questioning witnesses, thus generating a false statement and false evidence against [him].” Id. Defendants “knew or should have known” the “investigative techniques” were “so coercive and abusive” it “would yield false information, misconduct, and fabricated evidence.” Id.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from all Defendants in the amount of $550,000 and “dismissal” of “charges filed against him” including the second degree criminal possession of a weapon charge. Id. at 4, 11. He also asks, “for a full investigation into police misconduct at Utica Police Department.” Id. at 4.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which establishes a cause of action for ‘“the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (citations omitted); see also Myers v. Wollowitz, No. 95-CV-0272, 1995 WL 236245, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1995) (finding that “§ 1983 is the vehicle by which individuals may seek redress for alleged violations of their constitutional rights”). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights, [but] . . . only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that defendants violated plaintiff's federal rights while acting under color of state law.” McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
A. Oneida County District Attorney's Office
New York State is immune from suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking either legal or equitable relief, under the Eleventh Amendment. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to local governments and to a district attorney's office exercising its prosecutorial functions. See, e.g., Altman v. Nassau Cty. Dist. Attorney's Off., No. 22-CV-0987, 2022 WL 767654, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022) (“Defendant Nassau County District Attorney's Office . . . is immune from suit.”); Baskerville v. Richmond Cty., No. 19-CV-2 (AMD), 2019 WL 2162595, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2019) (holding the “plaintiff's claims against the Office of the Richmond County District Attorney concern[ed] its prosecution of the plaintiff” and thus that “the plaintiff's claims [were] barred by the Eleventh Amendment”); White v. Vance, No. 10-CV-6142 (NRB), 2011 WL 2565476, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011) (“[B]ecause plaintiff asserts claims for monetary relief, any claims against the [New York County District Attorney's] Office are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against the Oneida County District Attorney's Office be dismissed.
B. District Attorneys
Prosecutors enjoy “absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for those prosecutorial activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1987). The immunity covers “virtually all acts, regardless of motivation, associated with [the prosecutor's] function as an advocate.” Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995). Absolute immunity applies when a prosecutor's conduct, acting as an advocate during the judicial phase of the criminal process, involves the exercise of discretion. See Flagler v. Trainor, 663 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 2011). This includes such functions as “deciding whether to bring charges and presenting a case to a grand jury or a court, along with the tasks generally considered adjunct to those functions, such as witness preparation, witness selection, and issuing subpoenas,” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013), and whether and when to drop charges. Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981). “This immunity attaches to conduct in court, as well as conduct ‘preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.'” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33 (1976)).
“[O]nce a court determines that challenged conduct involves a function covered by absolute immunity, the actor is shielded from liability for damages regardless of the wrongfulness of his motive or the degree of injury caused.” Bernard v. Cty. of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 503 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985)). Absolute immunity extends even to a prosecutor who “conspir[es] to present false evidence at a criminal trial. The fact that such a conspiracy is certainly not something that is properly within the role of a prosecutor is immaterial, because the immunity attaches to his function, not to the manner in which he performed it.” Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). Immunity even extends to “the falsification of evidence and the coercion of witnesses,” Taylor, 640 F.2d at 452, “the knowing use of perjured testimony,” “the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34, the “making [of] false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings,” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 (1991), and “conspiring to present false evidence at a criminal trial,” Dory, 25 F.3d at 83.
Here, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against the District Attorneys for “fabricated evidence” emanates from their alleged conduct in prosecuting Plaintiff for second degree criminal possession of a weapon and “other” charges. (Dkt. No. 1 at 9-10.) Therefore, they are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Simon, 727 F.3d at 171; see, e.g., Matthews v. Cty. of Cayuga, No. 5:17-CV-1004 (MAD/TWD), 2018 WL 2926272, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018) (dismissing claims against prosecutor on initial review because of prosecutorial immunity).
Moreover, “[w]hen prosecuting a criminal matter, a district attorney in New York State, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, represents the State not the county.'” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1014 (1989)); see also Rich v. New York, No. 21-CV-3835, 2022 WL 992885, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (“[A]ny claims Plaintiff may raise against the [District Attorney] Defendants in their ‘official capacity' would be precluded by immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”); Gentry v. New York, No. 21-CV-0319 (GTS/ML), 2021 WL 3037709, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 14, 2021) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the defendant assistant district attorneys in their official capacities-which were effectively claims against the State of New York-as barred by the Eleventh Amendment), adopted by, 2021 WL 3032691 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2021).
Therefore, the Court recommends Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the District Attorneys be dismissed.
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
Ordinarily, a court “should not dismiss” a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993).
Here, because Plaintiff's Section 1983 against Defendants are barred under the doctrines of Eleventh Amendment immunity and prosecutorial immunity, leave to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court recommends the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby, ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 4) is GRANTED, and it is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with a copy of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.