Opinion
C/A 2:22-cv-02322-RMG-MHC
07-25-2024
Candise Gore, Plaintiff, v. Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, Carol Brown, Kiesha Baldwin, Sheriff L.C. Knight, Richard Darling, Sharon Branch, and Wanda Taylor, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court are three Motions for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: one filed by Defendants Carol Brown and Kiesha Baldwin, ECF No. 78); one filed by Defendants Sheriff L.C. Knight, Richard Darling, Wanda Taylor, and Sharon Branch (ECF No. 79); and one filed by Defendant Dorchester County Sheriff's Office (“DCSO”), ECF No. 80. Plaintiff Candise Gore (“Plaintiff”) filed Responses in Opposition to those Motions. ECF Nos. 81, 82, 83. Defendants filed Replies. ECF Nos. 85, 86, 87. The Motions are ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.). Because the Motions are dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's litigation stems from allegedly unconstitutional procedures and practices at the Dorchester County Detention Center, to which Plaintiff was subjected while she was an arrestee at the detention center. Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.
A. Plaintiff's arrest and strip search
On June 18, 2020, Plaintiff was arrested by the Summerville Police Department for Domestic Violence. The Domestic Violence charge did not involve weapons or drugs. After her arrest, she was transported to the Dorchester County Detention Center for booking. Defendant Baldwin was the booking officer at the detention center who conducted Plaintiff's initial booking. ECF No. 78-1 at 8. Once she arrived at the detention center, Plaintiff was allowed to stay in her own clothes while she sat on a bench, handcuffed, for more than thirty minutes without being pat searched. ECF No. 81-6 at 1:42:39-2:14:13 (body worn camera of arresting officer). While sitting on the bench, Plaintiff was told by her arresting officer that she would go before a magistrate judge and get a bond. ECF No. 81-6 at 2:11:40-2:13:42.
Plaintiff contends that the Domestic Violence charge she received was classified as non-violent under the South Carolina Code. ECF No. 81 at 5 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-60). Defendants appear to consider the charge a violent crime. See ECF No. 80-1 at 5. In any event, Plaintiff maintains, and Defendants do not dispute, that the Domestic Violence charge was not one which involved weapons or drugs. See ECF No. 81 at 5.
Subsequently, Defendant Brown told Plaintiff that Brown was “going to do a complete strip search, as required of everybody who comes in the jail.” ECF No. 81-6 at 2:14:05. Plaintiff was taken into a room that has a window with a shade accessible from the outside of the room. ECF No. 81-8. This room was one of two vacant holding cells that were in the intake area where Plaintiff had been sitting for thirty minutes. See ECF No. 78-4 at 5; ECF No. 81-7 at 2; ECF No. 78-9 at 2. The pre-search video showed that, in addition to the arresting officer and Defendant Brown's presence in the intake area, there were at least three other law enforcement officers in the vicinity of the intake area holding cells. See ECF No. 81-6 at 1:58:03, 1:59:17, and 1:59:35; see also ECF No. 81-10 at 2 (photo of guard in intake area).
The parties dispute in which cell Plaintiff was searched. Compare ECF No. 81 at 6 n.3 with ECF No. 86 at 5. Plaintiff notes that Defendant Brown asked Defendant Baldwin to “let me get [cell] 102, [cell] 103 I meant,” when preparing to take Plaintiff to be strip searched. ECF No. 81-6 at 2:13:40-2:13:48. It appears cell 103 is the cell indicated by Plaintiff. Compare ECF No. 81-6 at 1:42:20-1:42:29 (body worn camera footage of the cell numbers as Plaintiff entered the facility)
Before entering the holding cell, Plaintiff's handcuffs were taken off. ECF No. 81-1 at 3. The holding cell contained a bench on the back wall and a toilet. ECF No. 81-1 at 3; ECF No. 817 at 2; ECF No. 78-9 at 2. Once they entered the room, Defendant Brown stood in front of the toilet while Plaintiff was instructed to stand and face the back left wall of the room. ECF No. 811 at 3. The arresting officer stood by the door. ECF No. 81-1 at 3. Plaintiff then turned around and Defendant Brown instructed Plaintiff to get undressed. ECF No. 81-1 at 3-4. Plaintiff then removed all her clothing except for her bra and underwear. ECF No. 81-1 at 3-4. Plaintiff testified that she either put her disrobed clothing beside her or she handed them to Defendant Brown. ECF No. 81-1 at 4. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Brown then commented to Plaintiff “your bra, it's one of the good ones.” ECF No. 81-1 at 4. Defendant Brown then told Plaintiff she would have to remove her bra and underwear as well. ECF No. 81-1 at 4. Plaintiff complied and got completely naked.
Defendant Brown denies that she made a comment on Plaintiff's bra. ECF No. 78-7 at 5-6. Defendant Brown also testified that she did not have an independent recollection of Plaintiff's search. ECF No. 78-7 at 5-6. Defendant Brown testified that she would have asked a question about whether the bra was wired or plastic for purposes of determining whether it could be “considered as contraband and a weapon.” ECF No. 78-7 at 6.
Defendant Brown then told Plaintiff to bend forward and shake her hair out. ECF No. 811 at 5. Plaintiff complied, but she testified that she “didn't do a great job of it, apparently” because with ECF No. 81-7 at 2; ECF No. 78-9 at 2. Defendants assert that cell 103 is “used for males to be strip searched,” but does not cite to testimony or evidence which supports their assertion those two holding cells are sex specific. See ECF No. 86 at 5. Defendant Brown stepped forward and had Plaintiff bend over while Defendant Brown put her hands in Plaintiff's hair and shook it out. ECF No. 81-1 at 5.
Defendant Brown testified that she has never touched an arrestee's hair while searching them; rather, the arrestee does it themselves “because of sanitary issues.” ECF No. 78-7 at 3.
Defendant Brown then directed Plaintiff to turn around and bend her torso. ECF No. 81-1 at 5. Defendant Brown then commented “you have a tampon in,” and asked, “You're on your period?” ECF No. 81-1 at 5. Plaintiff replied “yes.” ECF No. 81-1 at 5. Defendant Brown stated that Plaintiff would need to take the tampon out. ECF No. 81-1 at 5-6. Plaintiff testified:
I looked at her and I said, no. And she said, you don't have a choice, you have to.
And I looked at [the arresting officer] and I said, are you fucking kidding me? And
I started crying. And she said the same thing that [Defendant Brown] said.
[Defendant Brown] told me to go and sit down on the toilet in front of them and remove my tampon, while they watched.
So I walked over to the toilet crying, sat down and spread my legs in front of two officers who were staring at me and forced me to remove a bloody tampon, at which point I'm holding it and the officer said, throw it in the trash, so I did. I stood up. She said wash your hands. I said, I need soap. She said, you don't, use the water.ECF No. 81-1 at 6.
After Plaintiff had discarded the tampon, Defendant Brown directed Plaintiff to go back to the corner of the room, bend over, and spread her buttocks. ECF No. 81-1 at 6. Defendant Brown told Plaintiff the purpose of this was so “she could see inside of [Plaintiff]” and that Plaintiff “need[ed] to do it more than” she was so “they could see inside [Plaintiff].” ECF No. 81-1 at 6-7. Defendant Brown then told Plaintiff to squat and cough. ECF No. 81-1 at 6-7; ECF No. 78-7 at 4. Plaintiff complied, at which point the search concluded. ECF No. 81-1 at 6. Plaintiff put her clothes back on and asked for another tampon because she was bleeding. ECF No. 81-1 at 6. Plaintiff was given a pad, and then all three women left the holding cell. ECF No. 81-1 at 6.
Defendants state Plaintiff had access to hand sanitizer after Plaintiff exited, but they fail to cite or otherwise point to evidence that supports this. See ECF No. 78-1 at 4.
After the search, Plaintiff was taken out of the holding cell where the search was conducted. As noted above, this holding cell was one of two holding cells located in the intake area of the jail, both of which were vacant at the time that Plaintiff arrived at the detention center. Plaintiff was then taken through a secure door that abutted the intake area and put in another holding cell with two other arrestees, where she awaited her bond hearing. This new holding cell was one of five holding cells that were located on the other side of a secure door from the intake area but were not in the general population of the jail. See ECF No. 78-4 at 5; See ECF No. 81-7 at 2; ECF No. 789 at 2. It is undisputed that Plaintiff never entered the general population area of the jail. It is further undisputed that the search was not initiated based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff had contraband. ECF No. 81-3 at 2-3. Plaintiff was released on her own recognizance bond several hours later.
The cited evidence is a two-page excerpt from “Defendant Dorchester County Sheriff's Office Answers to Plaintiff's Third Interrogatories.” ECF No. 81-3. Answer number two states, “The plaintiff was not searched due to probable cause to believe she had contraband.” Id. at 2-3. Answer number three states, “The plaintiff was not searched due to reasonable suspicion to believe she had contraband.” Id. at 3.
Plaintiff states she was released three hours after she was placed in a holding cell with the two other arrestees. ECF No. 81 at 8. Defendants state Plaintiff was there “for over five hours, in a cell with two other females.” ECF No. 78-1 at 11. Neither party cites to or otherwise directs the Court to anything in the record that supports (1) the overall amount of time Plaintiff spent at the detention center or (2) the amount of time Plaintiff spent at the detention center after the strip search was conducted.
B. The Detention Center
Defendants state that because more males entered the detention center than females, only one of the five holding cells was designated for women. ECF No. 78-1 at 2; see ECF No. 78-4 at 6-7. Defendant Darling (the Dorchester County Detention Center Director) testified that, because of this, if more than one female was booked into the facility, they were housed in the same holding cell until their bond hearing. ECF No. 78-1 at 2; see ECF No. 78-4 at 6-7.
Defendant Darling further testified that, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, one of those five holding cells was being used as a quarantine area for new inmates to make sure they were not sick before going back to housing units. ECF No. 78-4 at 3. Defendant Darling testified that inmates who had been denied bond/denied release were put into one of the holding cells designated as a quarantine cell. ECF No. 78-4 at 3. These inmates-who were held after being denied bond/release-“weren't supposed to be” mixed in with newly arriving arrestees who had not yet had a bond hearing. See ECF No. 78-4 at 3. Defendant Darling testified that, because of the fluctuating numbers of people entering the detention center, sometimes it was difficult to segregate those persons who had had a bond hearing and those who had not had a bond hearing. See ECF No. 78-4 at 4-5. He testified that during COVID, it was like that “basically the whole time,” so the attempt to segregate was aimed “to separate violents versus nonviolents.” ECF No. 78-4 at 5.
Defendant Darling further indicated that sometimes arrestees were not strip searched at all. See ECF No. 81-2 at 4-5. Specifically, if an arrestee was taken straight from the intake area to the bond hearing and then back, without ever entering one of the five holding cells in the secure area, the arrestee would not be required to be searched. ECF No. 81-2 at 4-5. When asked whether there was any reason the detention center staff could not use the two holding cells in the intake area to hold persons awaiting a bond hearing, Defendant Darling stated that, during the relevant time period in June 2020, he had staff shortages due to COVID-19 so he “didn't have the personnel to put out there.” ECF No. 81-2 at 7.
Plaintiff contests the articulated problems of COVID-19 and staffing shortages that Defendant Darling referenced. Regarding COVID-19, Plaintiff points to records indicating the Dorchester County Detention Center did not have any COVID-positive arrestees, detainees, or inmates at the time of Plaintiff's search. ECF No. 81 at 9. Plaintiff notes there had been no documented cases of COVID-19 at all in the detention center's population as of March 24, 2021, almost nine months after Plaintiff's search. See ECF No. 81-11 at 3 (noting “there have been no COVID-19 cases in the facility”). Plaintiff emphasizes that no staffing shortages were reported in documents prepared by a third party in March 2021 relating to the detention center's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) compliance; however, this March 2021 document does not appear to address staffing levels at all. ECF No. 81 at 6, 9; ECF No. 81-11. Plaintiff also notes that as of May 4, 2020, the strictest prohibitions of the quarantine order referenced by Defendants had been eased by Governor McMaster. ECF No. 81 at 9. Plaintiff further notes the detention center also has medical isolation cells in addition to the seven holding cells mentioned above. ECF No. 81 at 9; ECF No. 81-12.
Defendants assert that the evidence presented by Plaintiff is “misleading” and “not relevant.” ECF No. 86 at 5. Defendants offer no evidence that disputes Plaintiff's evidence or assertion about the existence of medical isolation cells in addition to the seven holding cells identified above. See ECF No. 86 at 5.
C. Search Policy
The Dorchester County Detention Center had policies and procedures for inmate intake and booking. ECF No. 81-4. The detention center's official Search Policy was No. 205.0, titled “Searches,” which was part of Section 200: Inmate Intake and Booking. ECF No. 81-4 at 2. This policy was signed and approved by Defendant Sheriff Knight in 2017. ECF No. 81-4 at 10. Plaintiff maintains, and Defendants do not dispute, that this policy was disseminated to and known by Defendant Darling (the Director of the Dorchester County Detention Center) at the time of Plaintiff's search. See ECF No. 81 at 8.
The search policy provided that “the Dorchester County Detention Center will ensure officers are trained in the efficient and legal use of search techniques to deter inmates from fabricating contraband items; introducing such items into the detention center; and/or conveying contraband items.” ECF No. 81-4 at 2. The search policy noted that searches may be used to “prevent the introduction of weapons or other dangerous contraband” into the detention center, but specifically noted that “[d]epending on the type of search, e.g., frisk search, strip, body cavity, etc., differing approval processes may need to be followed and different levels of suspicion or cause may need to be established (e.g. for body cavity searches, officers must have probable cause).” ECF No. 81-4 at 4 (emphasis added).
The search policy further provided requirements and procedures for the different types of searches, including strip searches and body cavity searches. ECF No. 81-4 at 5-7. For strip searches, the policy provided that strip searches “may only be conducted when an officer has reasonable suspicion an inmate is concealing contraband on their person and when the search is approved, in writing, by a shift supervisor, with the following exceptions: Consistent with case law, strip searches may be conducted of all inmates upon their admission to the facility and when inmate returns from . . . outside the secure confines of the detention center.” ECF No. 814 at 5 (emphasis in original). The policy stated that reasonable suspicion is already established for those entering or returning to the facility because access to contraband/unauthorized items is readily available outside the secure confines of the detention center. ECF No. 81-4 at 5.
Strip searches involve the removal of an inmate's “clothing (to include their undergarments) so their entire body can be visually inspected for contraband.” ECF No. 81-4 at 6. Strip searches are a visual inspection from head to foot, such that officers “may require male inmates to life their genitalia and female inmates to life their breasts so that a visual inspection of the area can be made.” ECF No. 81-4 at 6. The search policy instructed officers to “ensure they take care not to physically touch the inmate during the strip search.” ECF No. 81-4 at 6.
Body cavity searches, on the other hand, “consists of a visual, manual, or instrument inspection of an inmate's anal or vaginal cavity.” ECF No. 81-4 at 6. The search policy provided that body cavity searches “can only be conducted when an officer has probable cause an inmate is concealing contraband and when a search warrant/court order has been received to conduct the search.” ECF No. 81-4 at 6 (emphasis in original).
Defendants assert that the detention center's policy, outlined above, “was drafted by a third party” and it “does not fully match the training received by officers.” ECF No. 78-1 at 5. Defendants provide four pages from something titled “Basic Detention Manual” that Defendants maintain is the “proper search technique.” ECF No. 78-1 at 5; ECF No. 78-5 at 1. Defendants “assert that as the [search] policy itself references the training that officers are to be provided by the state at the Criminal Justice Academy, which is uniform for all detention officers throughout the state and complies with all necessary standards, that such training and description of visual body cavity search is the standard to which the officers are to be held.” ECF No. 78-1 at 5.
Defendants do not cite to any testimony or any other evidence that supports this assertion. Rather, Defendants appear to point to the detention center's search policy itself, which states that all “officers will be trained in proper search techniques during their Basic Jail Operations Training,” (ECF No. 81-4 at 3) and assert-again, with no citation to testimony or evidence-that this “search method is contained in [] the Basic Detention Manual.” ECF No. 78-1 at 5.
Defendants provide excerpts of deposition testimony, none of which discusses how any of the Defendants were trained or what the Criminal Justice Academy is and its relevance to the Dorchester County Detention Center's search policy signed by Defendant Knight. It is not clear if this “Basic Detention Manual” is present at the Dorchester County Detention Center or is otherwise used by the officers at the detention center instead of the detention center's written policies and procedures that were submitted into evidence.
D. Procedural History
Plaintiff originally filed this action in state court. ECF No. 1-1. Former Defendants Town of Summerville and First Class Patrol Officer Wells, with the consent of the other defendants named in the original Complaint, removed the case to this Court on July 20, 2022. ECF No. 1. Those two Defendants were dismissed with prejudice on November 30, 2022.
Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on February 16, 2023, asserting claims against the DCSO, Dorchester County, Carol Brown, Kiesha Baldwin, Luther Carl Knight, Richard Darling, Sharon Branch, Wanda Taylor, and Willis Beatty. ECF No. 40.
By Order dated June 9, 2023, the Court dismissed Defendants Beatty and Dorchester County from the action. ECF No. 57. The Court also dismissed various claims as against certain Defendants. Id.
Also on June 9, 2023, the Court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of South Carolina: “Does the bar under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act of claims of ‘intentional infliction of emotional harm,' S.C. Code § 15-78-30(f), apply to claims of reckless infliction of emotional distress?” ECF No. 58. On March 27, 2024, the Supreme Court of South Carolina provided the following answer:
Because the reckless infliction of emotional distress is a subset of the tort intentional infliction of emotional distress, the bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in section 15- 78-30(f) necessarily bars recovery for any conduct by a governmental entity that may be merely reckless, but yet satisfies the elements of the cause of action intentional infliction of emotional distress....
The bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in section 15-78-30(f) applies to the subset of claims for the reckless infliction of emotional distress.ECF No. 88 at 5.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF Nos. 78, 79, 80. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff's federal claims are against the individual Defendants, and her state law claims are against Defendant DCSO.
Following the Court's June 2023 Order on the Motions to Dismiss, the only claims remaining in this action are as follows: (1) a claim against Defendants Brown and Baldwin pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Plaintiff's Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) a claim against Defendants Brown and Baldwin pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Plaintiff's equal protection rights; (3) a claim against DCSO for negligence and gross negligence pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (4) a claim against Defendants Knight, Darling, Branch, and Taylor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for supervisory liability for equal protection and due process violations; and (5) a claim against DCSO for reckless infliction of emotional distress, pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.
Presently before the Court are three Motions for Summary Judgment: (1) a Motion filed by Defendants Baldwin and Brown, ECF No. 78; (2) a Motion filed by Defendants Branch, Darling, Knight, and Taylor, ECF No. 79; and (3) a Motion filed by Defendant DCSO, ECF No. 80. The undersigned will address each Motion in turn.
A. Motion filed by Defendants Baldwin and Brown (ECF No. 78)
Defendants Baldwin and Brown move for summary judgment on the two remaining § 1983 claims alleged against them. To establish a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001).
1. First Cause of Action
In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Brown and Baldwin violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches by subjecting her to the strip search and a body cavity search at the detention center. ECF No. 40 at ¶¶ 40-45. She further asserts that the search violated her substantive due process rights and her right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id. In her Response to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff clarifies that the right at issue in her First Cause of Action “is clearly the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure that has been incorporated to apply to state governments by the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Due Process Clause and Eighth Amendments.” ECF No. 81 at 10 (further stating that the “pre-arraignment and suspicionless body cavity search of Plaintiff is a clearly established violation of Plaintiff's civil rights”).
In their Motion, Defendants Baldwin and Brown argue that they did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. ECF No. 78-1 at 7-11, 18-20. They further argue that, even if it is found Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated, Defendant Brown is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity on the First Cause of Action. Id. at 12-20.
a. Plaintiff's claim against Brown for unreasonable search
The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the right of the people from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 884 n.5 (4th Cir. 2022). Where, as here, a search involves the “movement of clothing to facilitate the visual inspection of a person's naked body, the search qualifies as a type of sexually invasive search.” Sims v. Labowitz, 885 F.3d 254, 26061 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up) (citation omitted).
In a recent decision, the Fourth Circuit noted the general principles that guide a court's evaluation of sexually invasive searches conducted in a detention setting. Johnson v. Robinette, 105 F.4th 99, 113 (4th Cir. 2024). First, it is well-established that “maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979); Johnson, 105 F.4th at 113 (same). The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that “inmates ‘retain an interest in some degree of bodily privacy and integrity.'” Johnson, 105 F.4th at 113 (quoting King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 215 (4th Cir. 2016)). However, “when addressing these types of constitutional claims, ‘deference must be given to the officials in charge of the jail unless there is substantial evidence demonstrating their response to the situation is exaggerated.'” Id. (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 330 (2012) (cleaned up)).
A second general principle that “can hardly be questioned [is] that sexually invasive searches of inmates present special considerations . . . because ‘a sexually invasive search constitutes an extreme intrusion upon personal privacy, as well as an offense to the dignity of the individual.'” Id. (quoting Sims, 885 F.3d at 261 (cleaned up)). Thus, “[w]hen the scope of a search exceeds a visual inspection of an individual's naked body, the magnitude of the intrusion is even greater.” Sims, 885 F.3d at 261.
To determine whether a sexually invasive search was constitutionally unreasonable, courts employ the balancing test announced in Bell. Johnson, 105 F.4th at 114. “The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. Courts must examine the search in its complete context and consider the following factors: (1) the scope of the particular intrusion; (2) the manner in which the search was conducted; (3) the place in which the search was performed; and (4) the justification for initiating the search. Id.; Johnson, 105 F.4th at 114. Applying this balancing test in the prison context, the Supreme Court in Bell held that a prison policy requiring all inmates and pretrial detainees to submit to visual body cavity searches following contact visits did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 441 U.S. at 558-60; see Calloway v. Lokey, 948 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2020) (“While the [Bell] Court recognized that [visual body cavity] searches were invasive, it reasoned that they were nonetheless reasonable even absent individualized suspicion in light of the prison officials' significant and legitimate security interests”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
i. Scope of the intrusion and manner in which the search was conducted
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that the first two Bell factors-the scope of the particular intrusion and the manner in which the search was conducted-may involve overlapping inquiries in some cases, such that these two factors may be considered together. See Johnson, 105 F.4th at 116-17. The undersigned finds it appropriate to consider these two factors in conjunction.
Plaintiff contends that the first Bell factor weighs in favor of unreasonableness because “the particular intrusion delved beyond the surface of the Plaintiff's body beneath the skin into a sensitive private body part, as she was commanded to remove a feminine hygiene product from her vagina with her legs spread naked while sitting on a toilet.” ECF No. 81 at 12 (citing Sims, 885 F.3d at 261; King, 825 F.3d at 216; Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2001)). Regarding the second factor, Plaintiff contends that the manner of the search was unreasonable because it did not comply with the detention center's written policies, and she should have been permitted to wash her hands before and after taking out her tampon and been permitted to remove it in private-not in front of two female officers. Id. at 13.
Defendants argue that the first two factors weigh in favor of reasonableness, noting that “the insertion and removal of tampons by menstruating women in the United States is commonplace.” ECF No. 86 at 3. Regarding the manner of the search, they argue that the contraband tampon was seized without risk of harm to Plaintiff, who “herself removed the tampon in a manner in which she likely always removes her tampons.” Id.
As an initial matter, whether a search was conducted in compliance with an institution's policy does not have any bearing on the question of whether the search was conducted in a constitutionally reasonable manner. See Johnson, 105 F.4th at 117 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the court can infer the strip searches were unreasonable because the prison's policy requires that strip searches be conducted in a strip cage, instead of in a private cell); Leverette v. Bell, 247 F.3d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 2001) (“That the search deviated from SCDC's formal policies and procedures does not render it unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Even if SCDC's policy against conducting body cavity searches on employees was violated here, such a violation does not in itself rise to constitutional dimensions.”).
Moreover, upon review, the undersigned does not find the scope of Plaintiff's search to be anywhere near as intrusive as the ones in the cases cited by Plaintiff. In Sims, the Fourth Circuit found that “[a]lthough the intrusion suffered by [the 17-year-old detainee] was neither physically invasive nor put him at risk of direct physical harm, the search nonetheless was exceptionally intrusive” where an officer “attempted to photograph Sims' penis in a sexually aroused state” and “order[ed] Sims to masturbate [in front of three armed officers] to obtain an erection.” 885 F.3d at 261. In King, where prison officials performed surgery on an inmate's penis to remove implanted marbles, the Fourth Circuit found the scope of the intrusion weighed in favor of unreasonableness because “the surgery was beneath the skin into a sensitive, private body part,” was not “commonplace,” and “involved ‘risk, trauma, and pain.'” 825 F.3d at 215. In Amaechi, the Fourth Circuit considered a search where an officer “physically touched and penetrated [the arrestee's] genitalia and kneaded her buttocks with his bare hand” in her front lawn, and it explained that “[p]ublic exposure of the genitalia accompanied by physical touching is far more intrusive than directing an arrestee to remove her clothing in private for the purpose of ‘visually inspecting' the arrestee's genitalia.” 237 F.3d at 363.
The search of Plaintiff was more similar to the search conducted in Calloway v. Lokey, 948 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2020), than to the cases cited by Plaintiff. In Calloway, two female officers strip searched a prison visitor in a woman's restroom. After the visitor removed all her clothes, “she complied with [an officer's] directions to lift her arms and breasts, open her mouth, and lean over and shake her hair.” Id. at 199. The officer also put her hands through the visitor's hair to check it for hidden contraband. Id. At the officer's direction, the visitor “next went into the bathroom stall and removed her tampon, which [the officer] inspected before disposing of it.” Id. The visitor “then twice performed the ‘squat and cough' maneuver, and . . . she also spread her buttocks for the officers' inspection.” Id. After the search, the visitor was offered another tampon, but she stated that she did not need one. Id. The Fourth Circuit found no merit to the claim that the search violated the Fourth Circuit, specifically concluding that the “search was conducted professionally and in an appropriate setting.” Id. at 205.
In Plaintiff's case, the scope of the intrusion was relatively limited, as there is no evidence that an officer touched or penetrated Plaintiff's genitals, forced her to perform sexual acts in front of officers or a camera, or made her undergo a painful medical procedure. To be sure, Defendant Brown commented on the quality of Plaintiff's bra and touched Plaintiff's hair briefly when she shook it out. However, there is no evidence that Defendant Brown made any sexual comments or touched Plaintiff at any other time during the search, including after Defendant Brown spotted the tampon string and instructed Plaintiff to remove the tampon. “[T]he fact that an inmate is momentarily, incidentally, or accidentally touched during a strip search does not alone render the search unreasonable.” Johnson, 105 F.4th at 117 (finding strip searches reasonable where officer briefly touched inmate's buttocks and genitalia but did not make any sexual comments or fondle the inmate). “By definition, a strip search ‘includes the exposure of a person's naked body for the purpose of a visual or physical examination,' and these searches may include the ‘movement of clothing to facilitate the visual inspection of a suspect's naked body.'” Id. at 117 (quoting U.S. v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 882 (4th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up)). “Accordingly, some physical contact is permissible, and indeed may be unavoidable.” Id. at 118 (citation and internal quotation marked omitted). Here, it is undisputed that no officer touched Plaintiff's genitalia or buttocks, and the fact that Defendant Brown briefly shook out Plaintiff's hair did not render the search unreasonable. See Id. at 117; Calloway, 948 F.3d at 199, 205.
“The manner in which contraband is removed from a suspect during a sexually intrusive search, no less than the manner in which the contraband initially is discovered, must be considered in determining under the Bell analysis whether the search was reasonable.” Edwards, 666 F.3d at 884 (citations omitted). “[T]he reasonableness of a sexually intrusive search depends in part on the manner in which the search was conducted and the consideration given to the privacy interests of the suspect.” Id. The safety of the subject should be considered. Id. Thus, “[s]trip searches should be hygienic, and should not be performed in degrading, humiliating, or abusive fashion,” Johnson, 105 F.4th at 118, or in a way that instills fear, Edwards, 666 F.3d at 885 (citations omitted). Accordingly, “once contraband is discovered in the course of a sexually invasive search, the contraband may not be seized in a manner that poses an unnecessary risk of harm to the person being searched.” Id.
Based on the evidence before the Court, it appears that the scope of the strip search expanded to include a visual cavity search only after Defendant Brown observed a string protruding from Plaintiff. Indeed, it was not until after Defendant Brown spotted the tampon string that she instructed Plaintiff to sit on the toilet and take out the tampon. ECF No. 81-1 at 5-6. Defendant Brown did not attempt to take the tampon out herself or otherwise touch Plaintiff at this point. Rather, Plaintiff sat down on the toilet, spread her legs in front of the two female officers, and removed her tampon while the two officers watched. Id. Defendant Brown instructed her to throw the tampon in the trash and wash her hands. Id. When Plaintiff said she needed soap, Defendant Brown told her that she did not and to use the water. Id. After the search, Plaintiff put her clothes back on and Defendant Brown gave her a sanitary pad to wear. Id.
Although it may have been more hygienic if Plaintiff had been provided soap, she was provided water and a replacement sanitary napkin. Moreover, the tampon was not seized in a manner that posed an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff; to the contrary, Plaintiff removed the tampon herself. See Calloway, 948 F.3d at 199, 205 (finding search of prison visitor was conducted in a reasonable manner where officer instructed visitor to remove her tampon and where replacement tampon was offered after search was complete); cf. Edwards, 666 F.3d at 885 (concluding that the officer's “use of a knife in cutting the sandwich baggie off Edwards' penis posed a significant and an unnecessary risk of injury to Edwards, transgressing well-settled standards of reasonableness”).
On this record, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned concludes that the scope and manner in which the search was conducted weigh in favor of finding reasonableness. See Johnson, 105 F.4th at 118 (finding that “relatively minor extension of the visual strip search into a momentary and incidental touching to remove suspected contraband did not render the officer's actions constitutionally unreasonable”); Calloway, 948 F.3d at 199, 205; see also United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding extension of strip search to a visual cavity search reasonable where a double string protruding from the smuggling suspect's vagina “was plainly visible during the strip search”).
ii. Where the search took place
The next Bell factor, the place where the search was performed, weighs in favor of finding reasonableness. “The question whether a sexually invasive search is conducted in a private or a public setting is especially relevant to this Court's determination of reasonableness.” Edwards, 666 F.3d 883 (cleaned up). The Fourth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of conducting a strip search in private. Id. “While every strip search need not be conducted in a private holding cell to adequately safeguard [a detainee's] privacy interests, [courts] consider whether a sexually invasive search could have been viewed by others, and whether it was in fact viewed by others, in [the] analysis of the reasonableness of the search.” Id. (noting that “ the strip search of Edwards [was] in the middle of a public, residential street, the search could have been viewed by others and, thus, was not conducted in a private setting”); see Johnson, 105 F.4th at 116 (finding that this factor weighed heavily in favor of reasonableness where “every strip search was conducted in the privacy of his cell, by a member of the same sex (Officer Zimmerman), and outside the view of any other persons”).
Here, it is undisputed that the search took place behind a closed door in a private holding cell in the intake area, and that the only people in the room were the female arresting officer, Defendant Brown, and Plaintiff. As Plaintiff argues in her brief, there was a window on the door with a shade accessible from the outside of the cell, such that the search could have been viewed by others had anyone pulled the shade up. ECF No. 81 at 14; ECF No. 81-8. However, there is no allegation or evidence that anyone other than the arresting officer and Defendant Brown witnessed the strip search or that anyone attempted to pull the shade of the holding cell during the search. On this record, the undersigned finds that this factor weighs slightly in favor of finding reasonableness. See Calloway, 948 F.3d at 199, 205 (finding strip search of female prison visitor was conducted in a reasonable manner where it was conducted by two female officers in a restroom; although the restroom door did not have a lock on the door, one of the officers ensured no one entered).
iii. Justification for the search
Plaintiff contends that this final factor weighs heavily in favor of unreasonableness because there was no particularized justification for the search that went “beyond the body's surface.” ECF No. 81 at 13-14. She argues that “body cavity searches have always required some particularized justification for the search,” and she maintains that there was no such justification here. Id. She also contends that instead of being placed in a cell with two other women, she should have been housed in one of the two holding cells in the intake area (such as the one where the search took place) without undergoing a strip search or body cavity search of any kind. Id. at 15-16. She notes that she was at the detention center “without as much as a pat search for over 30 minutes.” Id. at 16. Plaintiff maintains that under the circumstances of her case, a pre-arraignment visual body cavity search was unconstitutional. Id.
Defendants argue the justification for initiating the search was to prevent contraband from entering the facility. ECF No. 86 at 3. They contend that tampons “are considered contraband inside the facility” and maintain “there is no evidence that any other female inmate was permitted to keep a tampon inserted upon admission to the detention center.” Id. Further, Defendants generally argue that the detention center has a clear interest in preventing drugs and other contraband items from getting inside and that the safety and security of the facility and its inmates are put at risk otherwise. Id. at 10-11; ECF No. 78-1 at 10. They note that Plaintiff “was strip searched before being placed into a holding cell that already held two other women and could hold several additional women,” and that Plaintiff was there for several hours. ECF No. 78-1 at 11.
Plaintiff maintains, and Defendants do not dispute, that the Domestic Violence charge Plaintiff was brought in on was not one that involved weapons or drugs. See No. 81 at 5. Moreover, it is undisputed that Defendant Brown did not initiate the search of Plaintiff based upon any reasonable suspicion or probable cause particular to Plaintiff. See ECF No. 81-3 (Defendant DCSO's interrogatory answers stating that the search was not carried out based on any probable cause or reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff had contraband). Rather, it appears to be undisputed that Plaintiff was strip searched pursuant to a detention center policy requiring that all persons admitted to the facility be strip searched.
The detention center's Search Policy provides that “strip searches may be conducted of all inmates upon their admission to the facility. . . . In these instances, approval by a shift supervisor is not necessary because reasonable suspicion has already been established due to the fact that the inmate was outside the secure confines of the facility where access to contraband/unauthorized items is readily available.” ECF No. 78-8 at 5.
Defendant Brown testified that at the time of Plaintiff's search, every arrestee who was brought to the Dorchester County Detention Center was strip searched. ECF No. 86-1, Brown Dep. 17:2-18:25. She further testified that if an arrestee was wearing a tampon, she would be instructed to remove it. Id.; ECF No. 78-7, Pl. Dep. 19:1-20:2. She testified that she did not personally make a decision about whether to ask a female inmate to remove a tampon; rather, it was just “standard policy” and what she was trained to do so because of safety. ECF No. 78-7, Pl. Dep. 52:22-53:7. She testified that officers are taught that if in the process of a strip search an object, string, bag, or other item is found to be protruding from the vagina or anus, the officer is to ask the person to remove it. Id. at 53:23-54:9. She further testified that if an inmate has drugs on their person but goes into a cell with other people without being properly searched, it could be dangerous and could result in an overdose. Id. at 53:8-15.
There is evidence in the record suggesting that there have been times where detainees have been held in the intake area while awaiting a bond hearing, as opposed to being held in one of the five holding cells in the secure area, in which case they would not be strip searched. ECF No. 812 at 4-5. However, Defendant Darling, the Director of the detention center, testified that in June 2020, the two intake holding cells could not be used to hold persons awaiting a bond because he did not have personnel to put out there due to COVID-related staffing shortages. Id. at 7. Rather, all pre-arraignment and post-arraignment detainees were being held in the five cells in a secure portion of the facility. Id. at 3-4; ECF No. 78-4 at 3-5. He also testified that it is dangerous to have multiple detainees in a cell together prior to them being strip searched because they could have weapons or drugs in their possession. ECF No. 81-2 at 3-4.
Plaintiff questions Defendant Darling's assertion that the detention center did not have sufficient personnel in June 2020 to permit a pre-arraignment arrestee to be held alone in one of the two intake holding cells, pointing to video evidence showing at least three employees in the intake area at the time of her booking, and citing to a report submitted by a third party to ICE in March 2021 that did not address staffing levels at all. ECF No. 81 at 6, 15.
In their Reply, Defendants contend that the “mere fact that there were multiple officers in an area at a specific time does not mean that the facility is not understaffed. Additionally, while they may have not been formally understaffed, as in, not enough people hired, there were quarantines in place during June, 2020, and a person did not have to actually have COVID in June, 2020, to be required to quarantine for up to two weeks after an exposure.” ECF No. 86 at 5 (emphasis in original). Defendants appear to cite to testimony from Defendant Darling for this proposition; however, Defendants do not attach or otherwise provide this deposition testimony to the Court. See ECF No. 86 at 5; ECF No. 86-1; ECF No. 78-4.
Upon review, the undersigned finds this factor to be a close call, but ultimately finds it weighs slightly in favor of reasonableness. Specifically, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was placed into a holding cell with two other female detainees and was detained for several hours, such that she had substantial contact with other inmates. There also is undisputed evidence that the detention center has legitimate safety concerns about the impact contraband can have on the facility when non-searched detainees are housed together in cells.
These safety concerns are not unique to the Dorchester County Detention Center. “The Supreme Court has long recognized the need to ‘guarantee the safety' of the prison community, administrators, inmates, and visitors alike.” King, 825 F.3d at 216 (citation omitted). “Correctional officials have a legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less secure by reason of what new detainees may carry in on their bodies.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 322. The Supreme Court has observed that “[w]eapons, drugs, and alcohol all disrupt the safe operation of a jail,” Id. at 332, and the “[s]muggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too common an occurrence,” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
“Moreover, concealing such contraband often takes little time and effort. Something small might be tucked or taped under an armpit, behind an ear, between the buttocks, in the instep of a foot, or inside the mouth or some other body cavity.” Johnson, 105 F.4th at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Florence, 566 U.S. at 333; Bell, 441 U.S. at 559); see Florence, 566 U.S. at 335, (noting that in one instance, a detainee had “2 dime bags of weed, 1 pack of rolling papers, 20 matches and 5 sleeping pills taped under his scrotum”) (cleaned up); Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (noting documented instances of “inmate attempts to secrete these items into [a] facility by concealing them in body cavities”); see also Mastberg, 503 F.2d at 466-67 (although suspect originally told border officer she was wearing a tampon because she was menstruating, officer asked suspect to remove the tampon, and the suspect pulled the string and “removed a prophylactic with three balloons inside, each containing heroin”). Because of this, “courts must defer to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 322-23.
Plaintiff contends that she could have, and should have, been detained in one of the two holding cells in the intake area, as opposed to placed in a cell with two other women, so that she would not have been strip searched. However, Defendant Darling testified that, due to COVID-19-related issues, use of those two cells for detention was not an option at the time Plaintiff was arrested, and there is not “substantial evidence” in the record suggesting that these detention decisions were “unnecessary or unjustified.” See id. Mindful that “deference must be given to the officials in charge of the jail unless there is substantial evidence demonstrating their response to the situation is exaggerated,” see Florence, 566 U.S. at 330; Johnson, 105 F.4th at 113, and finding no such “substantial evidence,” the undersigned is not persuaded that the evidence supports a finding that Plaintiff should not have been placed in a holding cell with two other women in the first place.
“Sexually invasive searches require that the search bear some discernible relationship with safety concerns, suspected hidden contraband, or evidentiary need.” Sims, 885 F.3d at 262. Because Plaintiff was detained for several hours in a cell with at least two other people, the undersigned finds that she had “substantial contact” with other detainees, such that the initial decision to strip search Plaintiff was justified by safety concerns. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 33839 (citing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), and suggesting that a detainee would have no “substantial contact” with other detainees where a detainee was placed, alone, in a jail cell for about one hour before she was taken before a magistrate and released on bond). Moreover, because Defendant Brown saw a string protruding from Plaintiff, such that she had reason to suspect contraband in Plaintiff's vagina, the undersigned finds that Defendant Brown was justified in conducting a visual body cavity search. See Calloway, 948 F.3d at 199, 205; see also Mastberg, 503 F.2d at 466-67, 471. Taking all of the above into consideration, Defendants' justification for strip searching Plaintiff weighs in favor of finding the search reasonable.
In sum, taking all the Bell factors into consideration and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that the balance between the need for this particular search against the invasion of personal rights tips in favor of reasonableness. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (noting each case “requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails”). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish her Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Brown.
b. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his or her individual capacity, as is the case with Defendant Brown here. The Supreme Court has held that “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether a plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a clear constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). If a violation of a constitutional right in fact exists, qualified immunity nonetheless shields a prison official from liability, unless the violation was of a “clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Consequently, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment if either (1) “the facts do not make out a violation of a constitutional right” or (2) “if the law was not ‘clearly established' at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.” Cantley v. W. Virginia Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth., 771 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Courts may address either prong of this analysis first. Id.
As stated above, the undersigned finds the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, is not sufficient to make out a violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. However, because this case is a close call, the undersigned will also consider Defendant's argument that even if the evidence were sufficient to establish a Fourth Amendment violation, the law was not clearly established at the time of the search, such that Defendant Brown should nonetheless be granted summary judgment as to the claim because she is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 78-1 at 12-18; ECF No. 86 at 10-11. As explained below, the undersigned agrees.
“‘Clearly established' means that, at the time of the officer's conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” Johnson, 105 F.4th at 120 (quoting District of Columbia. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (cleaned up)). “To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficient clear foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be settled law, which means it is dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” Id.
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the officer's conduct in the particular circumstances before [her]. The rule's contours must be so well defined that it is clear to a reasonable officer that [her] conduct was unlawful in the situation [she] confronted. This requires a high degree of specificity. [The Supreme Court has] repeatedly stressed that courts must not define clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced. A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct does not follow immediately from the conclusion that the rule was firmly established.Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63-64 (cleaned up); see also Johnson, 105 F.4th at 120; Sims, 885 F.3d at 262. For purposes of this analysis, the court first looks to cases from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, or the highest court of the state in which the action arose. Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 2020). “Although the law does not require that there be a prior case identical to the case at bar for the law to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Cantley, 771 F.3d at 205-06 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Under this second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the Court must determine whether the preexisting law was so clear that every reasonable official would understand that it violated a pre-arraignment arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights to conduct a visual strip search, including the observed removal of a tampon from the arrestee's vagina, before the arrestee was placed in a holding cell with at least two other detainees. The undersigned concludes it was not.
Defendants point to Florence and Cantley to argue that it was not clearly established that the search of Plaintiff violated the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff points to Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981), as well as Sims and King, to argue that the law was clearly established.
In Florence, the Supreme Court upheld a policy of strip searching all pretrial detainees before their transfer to a jail's general population. The plaintiff was arrested on a bench warrant stemming from his failure to appear at a hearing to enforce a fine. Florence, 566 U.S. at 323. During intake processing, “prior to [his] admission to the general population” in two different facilities, he was subjected to searches that required him to, inter alia, “lift his genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position.” Id. at 324-25. “This policy applied regardless of the circumstances of the arrest, the suspected offense, or the detainee's behavior, demeanor, or criminal history.” Id. at 324. After the strip search at the second facility, the plaintiff was admitted to the general population and “released the next day, when the charges against him were dismissed.” Id. The Supreme Court held that the jails' policies, which permitted strip searches during the intake process-even without reasonable suspicion of concealed contraband-did not violate inmates' constitutional rights. Id. at 339.
A plurality of the Florence Court noted that there may be circumstances in which the strip search policies upheld in Florence would be unreasonable, such as where a detainee will be held without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees. Id. at 338-39 (plurality portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion); see id. at 340 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 341 (Alito, J., concurring). However, the Court did not decide those issues. Thus, while the Supreme Court held that “every detainee who will be admitted to the general population may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while undressed,” its holding did not reach detainees not held in general population. See Id. at 322; see also Jones v. Murphy, No. CIV. CCB-05-1287, 2013 WL 822372, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 5, 2013) (finding that “Florence erased any bright lines that previously existed in this area of Fourth Amendment law regarding searches in a detention facility.”), aff'd sub nom. West v. Murphy, 771 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2014).
In Cantley, the Fourth Circuit considered a strip search of a pre-arraignment arrestee based on a blanket policy wherein a jail “conducted strip searches of every arrestee who came in, regardless of arraignment status or seriousness of the charge.” 771 F.3d at 205. In that case, the plaintiff was arrested for obstructing an officer and putting debris in the road. Id. at 204. Upon arrival at the jail, he was escorted to a shower room, where he was strip-searched and deloused by a single male officer before being placed in a holding cell outside of general population with one other arrestee. Id. The next morning, the plaintiff was escorted through general population to a videoconference room, where he appeared before a magistrate judge, who ordered plaintiff be released on bond. Id. at 204-05.
The plaintiff in Cantley argued that Logan clearly established “that the strip search of a prearraignment arrestee without individualized suspicion is unconstitutional.” Id. at 206. The Fourth Circuit disagreed:
But this case is quite different from Logan. Teter was strip-searched in a private room in the presence of one officer. Logan was strip-searched in a holding room with a transparent window; she was “exposed to the general view of persons known to be in the vicinity.” Logan, 660 F.2d at 1014. The district court recognized that there were significant security justifications for searching Teter and similar arrestees. Cantley, 2013 WL 5531855, at *7, *9-*10. In Logan, there was no credible justification for the strip search. Teter was strip-searched prior to being placed in a holding cell, where he might interact with up to fifteen other arrestees, and led through the housing unit to the videoconferencing room. He ultimately spent almost eleven hours in Tygart Valley. Logan, on the other hand, was strip-
searched when she was soon to leave the facility, and there is no mention of her interacting with other arrestees. Logan, 660 F.2d at 1010. She spent a little more than two-and-a-half hours in total at the detention facility. Id. at 1009-10.
Logan did not clearly establish that it was unconstitutional for a correctional officer to conduct a visual strip search in a private room of an arrestee, who was to be held until the next morning in a holding cell with possibly a dozen or more other arrestees. Because the law was not clearly established, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the strip search of Teter.Id.
The same day the Fourth Circuit issued the Cantley decision, the court also issued a decision in West v. Murphy, 771 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2014). In that case, the Fourth Circuit considered class-action claims alleging that all arrestees were strip searched shortly after arriving at a jail and that Logan clearly established that the searches were unconstitutional. The Court upheld the district court's finding of qualified immunity:
Logan had been arrested for driving while intoxicated and brought before a magistrate, who issued an arrest warrant and ordered her released on her own recognizance after a period of four hours (so she could sober up) or as soon as someone could pick her up. 660 F.2d at 1009-10. A sheriff's deputy, however, refused to let her call a friend until she had been strip-searched. Id. at 1010. That search took place in a holding room with a window with the blinds raised, such that her naked body was “exposed to the general view of persons known to be in the vicinity.” Id. at 1014.
The court held that the search was unconstitutional, reasoning:
On the undisputed and stipulated evidence, Logan's strip search bore no such discernible relationship to security needs at the Detention Center that, when balanced against the ultimate invasion of personal rights involved, it could reasonably be thought justified. At no time would Logan or similar detainees be intermingled with the general jail population; her offense, though not a minor traffic offense, was nevertheless one not commonly associated by its very nature with the possession of weapons or contraband; there was no cause in her specific case to believe that she might possess either; and when strip-searched, she had been at the Detention Center for one and one-half hours without even a pat-down search.Id. at 1013. The court emphasized the lack of privacy in the location where the search was performed. Id. at 1014.
Logan is a far cry from this case. Unlike in Logan, Central Booking officers conduct the thorough searches in a dedicated search room, not a holding room with a transparent window. Moreover, defendants here have pointed to, and the district court has recognized, Jones v. Murphy, 2013 WL 822372, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 5, 2013), significant security justifications for the searches allegedly conducted. Preventing the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and other contraband into a detention facility is a legitimate justification, especially where arrestees such as the plaintiffs mingle with dozens of other arrestees for up to 24 hours. There was no comparable security justification-indeed no credible justification at all-advanced in Logan's case. She was set to leave the jail shortly, and presumably without interacting with other arrestees. In analyzing qualified immunity we are required to define the right in question “at a high level of particularity,” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999), and be mindful of the “specific context of the case,” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In the context of Central Booking, it was not “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing” failed the Bell test and contravened Logan. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (citation, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).West, 771 F.3d at 215-16 (cleaned up).
Upon review of the above authorities, the undersigned concludes that at the time of Plaintiff's search, it was not sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what she was doing failed the Bell test. Unlike in Logan--where the plaintiff was searched in a room with an open window, the search was conducted only after she had been ordered released by a magistrate and it was known that she would be leaving the facility shortly, and there was no evidence that the plaintiff was held in a cell with any other people--the Plaintiff in the instant case was searched in a private room with a covered window, the search took place before she was arraigned and it was not known how long she would be in the facility, and Plaintiff was held for several hours in a cell with at least two other women. Moreover, there is evidence in the case documenting the detention center's legitimate safety concerns about hidden contraband. Logan did not clearly establish that it was unconstitutional for a detention officer to conduct a visual strip search in a private room of an arrestee, who was to be held for hours in a holding cell with multiple other arrestees. See West, 771 F.3d at 215-16; Cantley, 771 F.3d at 206.
The undersigned also does not find that Sims or King clearly established that Defendant Brown's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. In Sims, the Court reversed a grant of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, finding that “there was neither an evidentiary justification for the alleged search to obtain a photograph of [the minor suspect's] erect penis, nor could there have been a valid reason for demanding that [the minor] masturbate in the presence of others.” 885 F.3d at 263. Not only are the facts of this case distinguishable from Sims, but there also is evidence in the record that the detention center had legitimate safety concerns related to keeping hidden contraband out of cells housing multiple detainees.
In King, the case involving the surgical removal of marbles that had been implanted inside an inmate's penis, the Fourth Circuit found that it could not conclude, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, “that a right to be free from an egregiously sexually invasive, unjustified, compelled surgery was not clearly established under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” 825 F.3d at 222. The undersigned finds that the facts of the King case did not clearly establish that Defendant Brown's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff suggests that the removal of her own tampon violated clearly established law, the undersigned is not persuaded and notes that Calloway-where a prison visitor was instructed to remove her own tampon during a strip search-was decided at least five months before Plaintiff's search and held that the search was reasonable. 948 F.3d at 199, 205.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff's argument is premised on her contention that she should have been held, alone, in one of the two holding cells in the intake area, such that she would not have been subjected to a search, no party has identified any controlling case law to support this contention. Thus, the undersigned cannot conclude it was clearly established that the decision to hold Plaintiff in a holding cell with two other people-as opposed to in the intake area-violated her constitutional rights.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that Defendant Brown is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim.
c. Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Claim against Defendant Baldwin
Defendants argue that Defendant Baldwin should be granted summary judgment for her lack of involvement in the search. ECF No. 78-1 at 8-10. Plaintiff contends that Baldwin is liable based on the doctrine of bystander liability based on the following facts:
The body camera footage shows the preamble to Plaintiff's search wherein Defendant Brown tells the Plaintiff she is to be strip searched. At this time, Defendant Baldwin is witnessing this event and Defendant Brown calls out to Baldwin “I need 103” (Ex. F, 2:13:42) as she opens the door to the holding cell where Plaintiff is to be searched. This holding cell, along with another holding cell, is empty and available to hold the Plaintiff until her bond hearing, yet Baldwin does and says nothing as Defendant Brown enters the holding cell with Plaintiff and the search is commenced.ECF No. 81 at 3, 10-11.
“Bystander liability is premised on an officer's affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers.” Johnson v. Robinette, 105 F.4th 99, 123-24 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Randall v. Prince George's Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 203 (4th Cir. 2002)). “An officer may be liable under § 1983, on a theory of bystander liability, if [s]he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.” Id. at 124 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The bystanding officer must know of h[er] fellow officer's misconduct. If the bystander lacks such specific knowledge, [s]he cannot be a participant in the unlawful acts, and the imposition of personal liability is impermissible.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Upon review, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff's evidence falls short of that necessary to establish bystander liability against Defendant Baldwin. Plaintiff failed to forecast evidence sufficient to prove Defendant Baldwin knew or should have known that Defendant Brown was engaged in unconstitutional searches. At most, Plaintiff has shown that Defendant Baldwin was in the intake area at the time Defendant Brown informed Plaintiff that she was going to be strip searched and, therefore, should have known that Defendant Brown was strip searching Plaintiff. But, at no point was Defendant Baldwin present in the cell during the search, and the evidence shows that the search was not visible from outside the room.
Even if the video evidence is sufficient to establish that Defendant Baldwin was or should have been aware that Defendant Brown was conducting a strip search of Plaintiff, the evidence wholly fails to support a finding that Defendant Baldwin was aware of a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to Plaintiff, that she knew or should have known that Defendant Brown's contact with Plaintiff at any point exceeded the proper performance of Defendant Brown's official duties, that she knew or should have known that the scope of the search expanded to include a visual body cavity search, or that she had a reasonable opportunity to prevent Defendant Brown from harming Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish a bystander liability claim against Defendant Baldwin, summary judgment for Defendant Baldwin on the Fourth Amendment claim is appropriate. See Johnson, 105 F.4th 123-24 (affirming summary judgment on bystander liability claim where bystander observed other officer ordering inmate to go into the cell with him for the purpose of performing a strip search but there was no evidence that bystander was present in the cell during any of the strip searches nor had any knowledge about the conduct of any particular strip search).
2. Equal Protection
In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that the strip search violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because she “believe[s] that men are not routinely strip searched nor forced to undergo visual or actual body cavity searches in the same manner that women are.” ECF No. 40 at ¶¶ 46-54. In their Motion, Defendants Baldwin and Brown argue that they did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. ECF No. 78-1 at 7-11, 18-20.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Fisher v. King, 232 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show two things. First, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that [s]he has been treated differently from others with whom [s]he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” King, 825 F.3d at 220 (quoting Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001)). Second, if the plaintiff makes that showing, the court then determines “whether the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654).
Defendants argue that there is “no evidence that men who are strip searched are treated differently than women who are strip searched” at the detention center. ECF No. 78-1 at 18-19. Defendants point to Defendant Brown's testimony, where she stated that all people who are being strip searched are treated the same, such that if an officer sees “an object, a string, a bag, or any item” protruding from “any sexual orifice, the vagina or the anus,” then the officer asks the arrestee to remove that object. ECF No. 78-1 at 19.
In response, Plaintiff maintains that Brown and Baldwin violated the Equal Protection Clause. ECF No. 81 at 19-20. Specifically, she argues that
Defendants['] practice of providing women with only one holding cell when there are two unused additional cells violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, as it subjects menstruating women to an overwhelming likelihood of being forced to undergo a body cavity search, whereas similarly situated men are both statistically less likely to have objects inserted in their penile or anal body cavity that they would be forced to remove and, moreover; they are provided with extra holding cells, lessening their chances of having to undergo an intrusive visual body cavity search in the first place.Id. at 20.
However, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence, statistical or otherwise, to support her arguments, and “surviving summary judgment . . . requires evidence, not unsupported conjecture.” See Graves v. Lioi, 930 F.3d 307, 324 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Shirvinski v. U.S. Coast Guard, 673 F.3d 308, 320 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting plaintiff's “attempt[ ] to build his case through pure inference”); Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 423 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding a claim was “ripe for an adverse summary judgment determination” when “it was based upon a theory without proof” and dependent on “speculation and the piling of inferences”); Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 962 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting plaintiff's “attempt[ ] to build one vague inference upon another vague inference to produce a factual issue”)).
There is no evidence in the record regarding how many male detainees were in the four other holding cells at the time of Plaintiff's detention, and there is no evidence to suggest that any of those four holding cells were empty or that any male was being held alone in a cell at that time. Nor is there evidence showing that any man was not subjected to a strip search upon entry into the facility. Notably, this equal protection claim is alleged against only Defendants Brown and Baldwin in their individual capacities, but there is no evidence that either Defendant treated men- or even other women-differently from how they treated Plaintiff, let alone that any unequal treatment “was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” See King, 825 F.3d at 220; see also ECF No. 86 at 12. On this record, no reasonable jury could find that either Defendant Brown or Defendant Baldwin violated Plaintiff's equal protection rights. Accordingly, summary judgment on the equal protection claim is appropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Brown and Baldwin (ECF No. 78) be granted.
B. Motion filed by Defendants Knight, Darling, Branch, and Taylor (ECF No. 79)
Defendants Knight, Darling, Branch, and Taylor move for summary judgment on the one remaining § 1983 claim alleged against them-that is, a claim for supervisory liability for the alleged violations of Plaintiff's equal protection and due process rights. ECF No. 79; see ECF No. 40 at ¶¶ 58-64. They argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim against them. ECF No. 791 at 5-10. They further contend that Defendants Darling and Knight are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 10-13.
1. Defendants Taylor and Branch
Defendants argue that Defendants Taylor and Branch should be dismissed for their lack of involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. ECF No. 79-1 at 5-6. Specifically, they maintain Defendants Branch and Taylor were not involved in the drafting of the strip search policy, were not the supervisors of Defendants Brown or Baldwin, and were not involved in the supervision of officers and staff in booking. ECF No. 79-1 at 5-6; ECF No. 79-10. Both worked in the administrative side of the detention center and had no responsibility for drafting policies or enforcing policies other than for those persons in their chain of command. ECF No. 79-1 at 5-6; ECF No. 79-11.
Plaintiff offers no argument and presents no evidence to materially dispute these Defendants' lack of involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. See ECF No. 82. The undersigned therefore recommends granting Defendants Taylor and Branch summary judgment. See Jones v. Fam. Health Ctr., Inc., 323 F.Supp.2d 681, 690 (D.S.C. 2003) (finding that Plaintiff waived claims not addressed in an opposition memorandum, even though counsel advised the court that she had not intended to abandon those claims), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Fam. Health Centers, Inc., 98 Fed.Appx. 959 (4th Cir. 2004).
2. Defendants Darling and Knight
Defendants argue that Defendants Darling and Knight should be granted summary judgment because Plaintiff has not shown these supervisory Defendants are liable under § 1983. ECF No. 79-1 at 6-10. They further contend that Defendants Darling and Knight are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 10-13.
Pure supervisory liability will not lie in § 1983 actions. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977))). Rather, to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, Plaintiff must show facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus, a supervisory liability claim in the § 1983 context is premised upon “a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict[.]” Id. at 798 (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1984)).
To satisfy the requirements of the first element, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) the supervisor's knowledge of (2) conduct engaged in by a subordinate (3) where the conduct poses a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 799. Establishing a “pervasive” and “unreasonable” risk of harm requires evidence that the conduct is widespread, or at least has been used on several different occasions and that the conduct engaged in by the subordinate poses an unreasonable risk of harm of constitutional injury. Id.
As for the second element, a plaintiff “may establish deliberate indifference by demonstrating a supervisor's continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses”:
The plaintiff assumes a heavy burden of proof in establishing deliberate indifference because[] ordinarily, the plaintiff cannot satisfy h[er] burden of proof by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents, for a supervisor cannot be expected to promulgate rules and procedures covering every conceivable occurrence within the area of h[er] responsibilities. Nor can [s]he reasonably be expected to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of h[er] properly trained employees when [s]he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct. A supervisor's continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses, however, provides an independent basis for finding [s]he either was deliberately indifferent or acquiesced in the constitutionally offensive conduct of h[er] subordinates.Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, causation is established when the plaintiff demonstrates an affirmative link between the supervisor's inaction and the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Id. “[P]roof of causation may be direct where the policy commands the injury of which the plaintiff complains or may be supplied by the tort principle that holds a person liable for the natural consequences of his actions.” Id. (cleaned up).
As stated above, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants Brown or Baldwin violated her constitutional rights. Accordingly, because Plaintiff cannot establish a “constitutional injury,” she cannot establish an “affirmative causal link” between any constitutional injury and any action or inaction by Defendants Knight and Darling. Thus, summary judgment on the supervisory liability claim is warranted. See Doe v. Rosa, 664 Fed.Appx. 301, 304 (4th Cir. 2016) (“There can be no supervisory liability when there is no underlying violation of the Constitution.”); Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 420 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff's claim for supervisory liability fails because the plaintiff did not establish an underlying constitutional violation by the officer charged with the misconduct); Temkin v. Frederick Cnty. Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 724 (4th Cir. 1991) (“Because of a lack of section 1983 liability on [the subordinate's] part, the entry of summary judgment in the [supervisor's] favor was proper.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to forecast evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Defendant Knight had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct engaged in by Defendant Brown. Plaintiff points to Defendant Knight's deposition testimony to suggest he knew that detainees were being asked to remove their tampons during searches. ECF No. 82 at 7-8. However, review of the excerpts of Defendant Knight's testimony does not support this assertion. Rather, when asked if he was aware that every woman was being strip searched or that a woman wearing a tampon would be “forced to remove it” during a strip search, Defendant Knight testified that he “didn't know the process they were doing,” “wasn't aware of it” before this litigation, that it “[w]asn't [his] understanding,” and that he thought they “were searching the ones . . . that appeared to have some type of problem,” but that he now “assume[s] that [tampon removal] was part of [the search] because that's part of the area they were - we were having trouble with people hiding stuff.” ECF No. 82-9 at 4-5. He further testified that his office is not in the detention center and that he “hardly ever get[s] over there other than once a week or so.” Id. at 3. On this record, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to show that Defendant Knight had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct engaged in by Defendant Brown, such that Plaintiff cannot establish her supervisory liability claim against Defendant Knight.
Finally, even if the court were to find that Defendant Brown's conduct violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights and that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish supervisory liability as to either Defendant Knight or Defendant Darling, summary judgment would still be appropriate because they are entitled to qualified immunity.
“Under Shaw, Plaintiff must make a double showing: (1) whether supervisory liability under § 1983 was clearly established at the time of the incident; and (2) whether the alleged underlying constitutional violation was also clearly established.” Turner v. Thomas, 313 F.Supp.3d 704, 715 (W.D. Va. 2018), aff'd, 930 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 2019). Here, although supervisory liability in the § 1983 context is clearly established, Shaw, 13 F.3d at 801, the constitutional violation underlying Plaintiff's allegation of supervisory liability is not. As explained above, at the time of Plaintiff's search, the preexisting law was not so clearly that every reasonable official would understand that the search violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, because existing precedent had not placed the constitutional question “beyond debate,” Cantley, 771 F.3d at 205-06, Defendants Knight and Darling are entitled to qualified immunity. See Turner, 313 F.Supp.3d at 715.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Branch, Taylor, Knight, and Darling (ECF No. 78) be granted.
C. Motion filed by Defendant Dorchester County Sheriff's Office (ECF No. 80)
Finally, the undersigned turns to the Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendant DCSO. ECF No. 80. Plaintiff brings only state-law claims against DCSO-specifically, a claim for reckless infliction of emotional distress and a claim for negligence/gross negligence, brought pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. ECF No. 40 at ¶¶ 55-57, 69-81.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “trial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been extinguished.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966). In analyzing whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts are to consider the following factors: judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 & n.7 (1988). The undersigned concludes that the balance of these factors weighs in favor of remand. See Id. (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”).
Having recommended that Plaintiff's claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction be dismissed, the undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims in this case and, instead, remand the claims against DCSO to the state court where Plaintiff originally filed this action.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant Brown and Baldwin's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 78) be GRANTED, that Defendant Taylor, Branch, Knight, and Darling's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 79) be GRANTED, and that those six individual Defendants be dismissed with prejudice from this action.
It is further RECOMMENDED that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and REMAND this action against DCSO, including DCSO's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 80), to the state court where Plaintiff originally filed this action.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).