Opinion
C.A. No. 01C-12-212 RRC.
Submitted: September 26, 2003.
Decided: October 3, 2003.
Upon Third-Party Defendant Tracy Goorland's Motion for Summary Judgment. GRANTED.
Joseph J. Rhoades, Esquire and A. Dale Bowers, Esquire, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Michael A. Pedicone, Esquire, Attorney for The Continental Insurance Company and Gloria P. Thomas.
Anthony Figliola, Esquire and Joseph M. Toddy, Esquire (pro hac vice), Attorneys for Young Men's Christian Association of Delaware.
Michael I. Silverman, Esquire, Attorney for Tracy Goorland.
ORDER
This 3rd day of October, 2003, upon consideration of a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") filed by Third-Party Defendant Tracy Goorland ("Defendant Goorland"), it appears to the Court that:
1. The issue before the Court is whether a parent, Defendant Goorland, can be held potentially liable for the alleged negligent supervision of her unemancipated minor child, plaintiff Jacob Goorland, resulting in injury to that child, when the child was unattended for about one to four minutes before being struck by a moving vehicle in the parking lot of a facility he had just exited. Relying on Delaware Supreme Court precedent that offers broad immunity to parents in situations such as this (and treating any arguable factual issues as matters of law to be decided by the Court given the public policy issues concerned), the Court finds that Defendant Goorland cannot be held liable under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, any action seeking contribution from Defendant Goorland for the injuries sustained by plaintiff Jacob Goorland is barred, and her Motion is therefore GRANTED.
2. This litigation results from personal injuries sustained by an unemancipated minor, Jacob Goorland (age four at the time of the accident), who is Defendant Goorland's son. On January 5, 2000, Jacob Goorland was struck by a vehicle being driven by defendant Gloria Thomas ("Thomas") while located within the parking lot of a Young Men's Christian Association ("YMCA") facility, also a defendant in this lawsuit. Jacob Goorland, who was unaccompanied by his mother, Defendant Goorland, at the time, had recently exited a building within which YMCA then operated.
In its Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint, defendant YMCA asserted as an affirmative defense that "[t]his accident was caused by the negligence of Jacob M. Goorland's mother . . . [Defendant] Goorland." From the briefing on its motion to add Defendant Goorland as a third-party defendant and on the instant motion, YMCA's position relative to that assertion is as follows:
Def. YMCA's Answer ¶ 26. YMCA then filed a third-party complaint against Defendant Goorland.
That motion was granted on February 6, 2003 without opposition. Dkt.# 41.
• "At her deposition . . . [Defendant] Goorland . . . admitted that on the day of the accident, her child . . . was under her care, custody, and control . . ."
• "At the deposition of [eye]witness Geraldine Sanchez . . . Ms. Sanchez testified that . . . [Jacob Goorland] appeared to be unattended by . . . [Defendant Goorland] in the YMCA parking lot for a period of one (1) to two (2) minutes."
• "At the deposition of the co-[d]efendant, Gloria P. Thomas . . . Ms. Thomas testified that . . . [Defendant] Goorland had left her child unattended inside the YMCA prior to the accident for two (2) to four (4) minutes."
• "Due to . . . [her] reckless and/or grossly negligent conduct in failing to know the whereabouts of her child and failing to provide adequate supervision of her child . . . [Defendant] Goorland is completely or partly responsible for the injuries sustained by said child."
• Delaware law permits suits by a child against a parent in cases such as this. See Williams v. Williams . . . ."
Def YMCA's Mot. to Join ¶ (6 Dkt.# 40).
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10.
369 A.2d 669 (Del. 1976) (holding that in an action for negligence arising from an automobile accident brought on behalf of an unemancipated minor child against a parent, the doctrine of parental immunity is not applicable to the extent of the parent's automobile liability insurance coverage, and noting in a footnote "[six] various exceptions to the doctrine of parental immunity," all of which had been recognized in jurisdictions other than Delaware). See infra p. 10.
Id. ¶ 13.
Defendant YMCA therefore contends that Defendant Goorland's "reckless and/or grossly negligent behavior on January 5, 2000 in failing to know the whereabouts of her child and failing to provide adequate supervision of her child were direct causes of the injuries sustained by . . . [Jacob Goorland], clearly positioning this case as an exception to the limited parental immunity doctrine as set forth in "Williams."
Def YMCA's Resp. to Def. Goorland's Mot. for Summ. J. at 5 (Dkt.# 60).
3. Defendant Goorland argues (and Plaintiffs agree) that there are no material facts in dispute and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that YMCA's third-party complaint is barred by the doctrine of limited parental immunity as most recently addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Huang; Defendant Goorland concedes that "[e]vidence of [her] parental negligence may be relevant in this case," but she nonetheless maintains that such evidence "is not actionable . . . and summary judgment should be granted [in her favor]." She maintains that on the date and time of Jacob Goorland's injury, she was exercising parental authority/discretion in the supervision of her child, and that such action on her behalf cannot constitute the basis for liability with respect to her son, which she maintains is the recognized public policy of Delaware as acknowledged in Schneider v. Coe. Defendant Goorland argues that Williams is not on point, as she contends that that decision was limited only to injuries to minors resulting from automobile accidents involving parents driving in a negligent manner, a contention which she argues is supported by Schneider.
Dkt.# 61.
652 A.2d 568 (Del. 1995) (holding that Delaware law recognizes a doctrine of "limited" parental immunity which does not preclude presentation of evidence to establish the negligent supervision of an unemancipated child as a supervening cause of a minor child's personal injury).
Def Goorland's Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 16.
405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979) (declining to abrogate parental immunity in actions against parents for negligent supervision of their children and concluding that where parental control, authority, or discretion is involved, the rule or parental immunity must be preserved).
Defendant Goorland lastly contends that there has been no abrogation of parental immunity in the context of injuries to a minor involving parental supervision, as reflected in the Huang Court's language that "[w]hile the national trend has been toward eroding the doctrine of parental immunity," that Court nonetheless had decided "to adhere to all of [its] prior precedents . . . [where parental supervision is involved]."
Huang, 652 A.2d at 572 (quoted at Def. Goorland's Reply ¶ 8).
4. In response, YMCA's primary argument is that Defendant Goorland is not immune from suit based on her conduct, which YMCA contends constituted reckless and/or grossly negligent behavior; it argues that such conduct is an "exception" to the doctrine of parental immunity recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Williams, and that this "exception" was not overruled by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Schneider.
Additionally, YMCA maintains that the cases cited by Defendant Goorland are distinguishable, in that unlike the parents in both the Huang and Schneider cases, Defendant Goorland was not exercising parental authority/discretion in the supervision of her child when Jacob Goorland was injured. YMCA's chief distinction is that the period of time within which Jacob Goorland was apart from his mother (between one and four minutes) is much greater than that period involved in Huang (approximately thirty seconds, according to the parent involved); YMCA further distinguishes this case on the basis that unlike the parent in Schneider (who "ran after" his son but failed to reach him before the son was kicked in the head by a small horse), Defendant Goorland "did not know the whereabouts of her . . . son at the time of the accident. . . ."
Schneider, 405 A.2d at 683.
Def. YMCA's Mem. in Supp. of Resp. to Def. Goorland's Mot. at 7.
YMCA lastly argues that Delaware's policy of precluding suits between parent and child "is based on outdated theories and thinking[,]" and that "the national trend is to abrogate the doctrine of parental immunity in cases such as this." To that end, YMCA specifically delineates the jurisdictions that it contends have completely abrogated the doctrine, those that have partially abrogated the doctrine, those that have declined to abrogate the doctrine, and those that have never recognized the doctrine. Nonetheless, YMCA argues that "alternatively . . . [this Court should] make clear exception to the doctrine as . . . already set out in Williams. . . ."
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 13.
5. Defendant Thomas has also filed a response to Defendant Goorland' s Motion, through which Thomas requests either that this Court deny the Motion, or immediately certify the issue to the Delaware Supreme Court. Thomas' argument rests upon the supposition that "[i]f the Supreme Court could abrogate the [s]pousal [i]mmunity doctrine by case law, Beattie v. Beattie, . . . then this Superior Court can and should rule that at least to the extent that insurance coverage exists . . . the [p]arental [i]mmunity doctrine should not bar either suits by or on behalf of children against parents or third party actions against parents for negligence which proximately causes injury to their children."
630 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1993) (holding that the doctrine of interspousal immunity, which prevents one spouse from suing the other in tort, was "no longer a viable concept" and no longer met "the needs of modern society").
Def. Thomas' Resp. to Def. Goorland's Mot. ¶ 3.
6. Summary judgment is granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Nonetheless, "in a subset of cases, arguable factual determinations are classified as legal because of a view. . . ., that public policy concerns require reasoned, consistent, and reported judicial determination of the matter at issue."
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991).
Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99-100 (Del. 1992).
11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.11[7][a] (3d ed. 2003).
7. Under its classic formulation, the doctrine of parental immunity prohibits "an unemancipated minor child. . .from suing a parent for damages allegedly caused by parental negligence." In Delaware, the doctrine appears to have been first recognized in the case of Strahorn v. Sears, Roebuck Co.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 754 (7th ed. 1999).
123 A.2d 107 (Del.Super.Ct. 1956) (denying defendant corporation's motion to join injured minor's father as a third-party defendant and holding that the fact that contribution was sought by the defendant rather than a direct action having been brought by the injured child did not alter that result).
In its 1960 disposition of McKeon v. Goldstein (and although not specifically discussed in terms of doctrinal underpinnings in the text of its opinion), the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that the parent of an injured minor could commit an independent act of negligence unforeseen by the defendant in a given case, i.e., the act could be a supervening cause of injury, and the defendant would therefore be absolved of any liability for the injury to the minor child. The McKeon Court therefore stated that "the determination of proximate cause is a question . . . for the trier of facts." In the Delaware Supreme Court's 1995 disposition of Huang, that Court specifically "adhere[d] to that [prior] holding . . . [of McKeon].
164 A.2d 260 (Del. 1960) (holding, according to Huang, that even when a parent was not — and could not be — a named defendant, the trier of fact must still decide whether that parent's negligent supervision was the sole proximate cause, i.e., supervening cause, of the parent's minor child's injury).
See DEL. P.J.I. CIV. § 21.3 (2000) ("Superseding Cause").
McKeon, 164 A.2d at 263.
Huang, 652 A.2d at 572.
In 1976, the Delaware Supreme Court was faced with an issue of first impression in Williams, supra, namely "whether an unemancipated child may recover in an action against a parent for injuries caused by the parent's negligent operation of [an] automobile." After observing that the law of parental tort immunity was then "in a state of change in many jurisdictions[,]" the Supreme Court stated that "the judicial trend is now clearly toward a steady erosion of the doctrine by exception and repudiation." In a footnote, the Court then surveyed those jurisdictions that had repudiated the doctrine in whole or in part, and concluded by enumerating six of the ""various exceptions" then recognized by other jurisdictions. Included among those exceptions to parental immunity recognized were: 1) suits by emancipated children; 2) suits against the estate of a deceased parent; 3) suits for willful or intentionally inflicted torts; 4) suits for reckless or grossly negligent conduct; 5) suits against a parent acting in the relation of employer; and 6) suits by an unemancipated child against a parent for injury to his property interests. The Williams Court ultimately concluded that "in an action for negligence arising from an automobile accident, brought on behalf of an unemancipated minor child against a parent, the doctrine of parental immunity is not applicable to the extent of the parent's automobile liability insurance coverage; but that, otherwise, the doctrine is applicable in such case." The Court's reasoning was predicated on the fact that "[w]hen insurance is involved, the action between parent and child is not truly adversary [as] both parties seek recovery from the insurance carrier to create a fund for the child's medical care and support without depleting the family's other assets."
Williams, 369 A.2d at 669.
Id. at 670.
See Williams, 369 A.2d at 670 n. 1.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 672 ( citing Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975)).
In making its ruling, the Williams Court explicitly stated that it was not overruling Strahorn, supra, as that case was "clearly distinguishable on its facts." As stated by the Williams Court, "[i]n Strahorn, the child was injured after twisting free of his father's grip" and directly involved "was the question of the exercise of parental discretion and control." The Williams Court therefore concluded that whether that Court would adopt parental immunity when faced with issues of parental authority and discretion were presented "must await another case."
Id. at 673.
Id.
Williams, 369 A.2d at 673.
That "other case" was the Schneider litigation, supra, presented to the Supreme Court in 1979. The issue offered, according to the Court, was "whether a parent who negligently supervises his unemancipated child can be liable for the resulting injury to his child"; in deciding this question of negligent supervision, the Court concluded that "where parental control, authority, or discretion is involved, the rule of parental immunity must be preserved." Thus the facts of a given case are relevant to determine whether that immunity is implicated.
Schneider, 405 A.2d at 682.
Id. at 684.
See Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence — Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.4th 1066 (1981).
In Schneider, the parents of the injured minor lived on the second floor of an apartment house, and the minor child was "impatient to leave" in anticipation of a car ride; when his parents observed that the minor was not at the top of the steps where he was told to wait for them, "they assumed he was waiting for them. . .downstairs." Later, when the father emerged from the apartment house and observed his son entering a field across the street where a small horse was tethered, "before he could reach him, the pony kicked [the son] on the head, resulting in partial paralysis of . . . [the boy's] left side." The father thereafter sued both the owner and lessee of the land, and the lessee filed a third-party complaint against the father seeking contribution; this Court granted the father's motion for summary judgment on the ground of parental immunity under Strahorn, supra, and its progeny.
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id.
On appeal, the lessee argued "that the parental immunity doctrine lacks the support of public policy when the tortfeasor has liability insurance and. ., the doctrine should [therefore] be held inapplicable to the extent of such insurance coverage"; apparently the lessee argued that this result was mandated by the Supreme Court's ruling in Williams, supra. In response, the Supreme Court declined to extend Williams, instead holding that "[p]arental immunity will not be abrogated where the duty arises from the family relationship, for to do so would manifestly tend to disturb domestic tranquility." "Unlike driving an automobile," the Court wrote, "supervision of one's children involves issues of parental control, authority, and discretion that are uniquely matters of a very personal type of judgment." The Supreme Court therefore affirmed this Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the injured minor's father.
Id.
Schneider, 405 A.2d at 684.
Id.
The Supreme Court appears to have most recently addressed the issue of parental immunity for negligent supervision in its 1995 disposition of the Huang case. That matter reached the Supreme Court after this Court certified an interlocutory appeal based upon a pretrial ruling that it had made, the effect of which was "to preclude reference at trial to the alleged negligent conduct of . . . [the injured minor's] mother." In its certification, this Court expressed concern that the Supreme Court's decision in Beattie, supra, "placed the continued viability of Delaware's limited parental immunity doctrine in question [,]" and that its pretrial ruling may have been "deemed to [be in] conflict" with McKeon, supra.
Huang, 652 A.2d at 569.
Id.
In response to this Court's first expressed concern, the Supreme Court rejected any argument that in light of its abrogation of interspousal immunity in Beattie, the doctrine of parental immunity should likewise be abrogated; instead, the Supreme Court again decided "to adhere to all of [its] prior precedents with regard to the issue of parental immunity." With regard to this Court's second expressed concern, the Supreme Court decided "to adhere to its prior holding in McKeon that evidence of a parent's negligent supervision may be presented to establish that such negligence was a supervening cause of a minor child's personal injury." The Supreme Court therefore reversed this Court's pretrial rulings, which had been contrary to the appellate rulings made by that Court.
Huang, 652 A.2d at 572 ( citing Williams and Schneider).
Id. at 570.
With regard to evidence of a parent's negligence as a supervening cause, the Supreme Court in Huang explicitly stated that "[i]n cases where the parental immunity doctrine applies, defendants who decide to assert the parent's negligence as a supervening cause adopt essentially an "all or nothing' legal strategy." The Supreme Court explained:
Id. at 573.
• First, where parental control, authority, or discretion is involved, e.g., in potential actions against parents for negligent supervision of their children, the rule of parental immunity is preserved in Delaware and precludes direct claims by a minor child, as well as third-party claims for contribution.
• Second, if the parent's negligence is relevant to the minor child's theory of liability, but not actionable, a defendant may introduce evidence to establish that the parent's negligence was a supervening cause of the minor child's injury.
• Third, if the parent's negligence was a proximate cause but not a supervening cause, the parent's negligence does not provide a basis for reducing full payment to the minor child or the basis for a claim of contribution by any defendant determined to be a tortfeasor, since by definition the parent cannot be a joint tortfeasor.
Huang, 652 A.2d at 574 (internal citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
This last point was arrived at because "[t]he trier of fact may decide that the parent's negligence and the negligence of one or more of the defendants were all proximate causes of the child's injury[,]" a result which would lead to that parent not being liable "since the parent is immune from direct liability or liability for contribution . . . [under those circumstances].
Id. (emphasis in original).
8. After reviewing the above-cited Supreme Court precedent and the facts of this case, the Court concludes that because Defendant Goorland was exercising parental authority over Jacob Goorland on the day and time that he was injured, and because the arguments made by the parties against its application have all been previously rejected by the Supreme Court, the doctrine of parental immunity applies in this case so that action for contribution cannot be maintained against Defendant Goorland. The parties are free, however, to assert at trial that her actions on the date in question constitute a supervening or superseding cause as to Jacob Goorland's injuries, a result that is in alignment with the above-cited precedent upon which this Court has relied.
The Court will treat any "arguable factual" determinations, i.e., whether Defendant Goorland was exercising parental control, authority, and discretion when her son was injured (due to the length of time that he was unsupervised) as determinations of law, given that public policy concerns of parental immunity are involved. See MOORE ET AL. supra note 24.
YMCA's argument that Delaware law permits suits against a parent whose minor child was injured in cases such as this is not persuasive. The exception to parental immunity for conduct that was reckless or grossly negligent upon which YMCA relies was noted only in a footnote to the Williams opinion as one of "various exceptions to the doctrine of parental immunity" which had been recognized in other jurisdictions; this footnote was apparently prompted by the Williams Court's observation that at the time, the law of parental tort immunity was "in a state of change in many jurisdictions[,]" and to this Court's knowledge the exception has never been adopted as the law of Delaware (as is argued by YMCA). That the Williams Court's holding was limited to the automobile injury context and was not expanding the way in which a parent could be sued in tort beyond that limited holding is confirmed by the Court's comment that whether it would adopt parental immunity when faced with "issues of parental authority and discretion . . . must await another case." Because its holding was so narrowly limited then, when that "other case" was presented in Schneider, there was no need for the Schneider Court to contemplate overruling its earlier decision in Williams, given the discrete legal and factual issues involved in each separate case. It is, in this Court's thinking, why the Schneider Court "decline[d] to extend Williams. . . to abrogate parental immunity in actions against parents for negligent supervision of their children."
Williams, 369 A.2d at 670.
Id. at 673.
Schneider, 405 A.2d at 684.
YMCA's effort to distinguish cases such as Schneider and Huang based upon the length of time that Jacob Goorland was left completely unattended is similarly unpersuasive. The Schneider Court recounted in its factual recitation that the injured minor's parents therein had similarly left their child unattended on the assumption that "he was waiting for them . . . downstairs." The Huang Court affirmatively and explicitly stated that "in . . . actions against parents for negligent supervision of their children, the rule of parental immunity is preserved. . . ." Thus parents in Delaware enjoy a broad immunity from actions involving their potential negligence, an immunity Tracy Goorland falls within by virtue of her having had her son Jacob under her authority on the day of the accident.
Id. at 683.
Huang at 574.
See Schneider, 405 A.2d at 684 (stating that "where parental control, authority, or discretion is involved, the rule of parental immunity must be preserved").
Lastly, YMCA's argument that this Court should abrogate parental immunity because Delaware's jurisprudence on this issue is based upon "outdated theories and thinking" and that ""the national trend is to abrogate the doctrine is an argument that was raised and then rejected by the Supreme Court in the Huang case itself, as reflected by the Court's language that "[w]hile the national trend has been toward eroding the doctrine . . ." the Court nonetheless "adhere[s] to all of [its] prior precedents. . . .," The Court will therefore not endorse this argument since it has already been heard and rejected by Delaware's highest court.
Huang, 652 A.2d at 572.
9. Nor will the Court entertain defendant Thomas' alternative request that this Court certify the issue raised in Defendant Goorland's Motion to the Supreme Court based on that Court's decision in Beattie, supra. As expressed in Huang, the exact argument made by Thomas (that "to the extent . . . insurance coverage exists . . . the [p]arental [i]mmunity doctrine should not bar either suits by or on behalf of children against parents or third party actions against parents for negligence which proximately causes injury to their children") was raised and rejected when the Supreme Court decided "to adhere to all of [its] prior precedents with regard to the issue of parental immunity." Because of that fact, the question proposed to be certified does not satisfy the criteria of the relevant rule, and the Court therefore declines to grant Thomas the relief of certification that she seeks.
Def. Thomas' Resp. to Def. Goorland's Mot. ¶ 3.
Huang, 652 A.2d at 572 ( citing Williams and Schneider).
See SUPR. CT. R. 41 (stating that certification will be accepted by the Supreme Court "only where there exist important and urgent reasons for an immediate determination . . . of the questions certified[,]" such reasons including, inter alia, unsettled questions of law).
10. For all of the above reasons, Defendant Goorland's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.