Opinion
Submitted June 9, 1999
September 20, 1999
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Patterson, J.). dated August 25, 1998, which denied her motion to vacate a prior undated order of the same court granting the motion of the defendants Madhav Gudi, Krishnmurthi Sundaram, and Brooklyn Hospital Center pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a) for leave to file a late motion for summary judgment.
David P. Kownacki, P.C., New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Aaronson, Rappaport, Feinstein Deutsch, LLP, New York, N Y (Steven C. Mandell of counsel), for respondent Madhav Gudi.
Callan, Regenstreich, Koster Brady, New York, N.Y. (Michael P. Kandler of counsel), for respondent Krishnmurthi Sundaram.
Bartlett, McDonough, Bastone Monaghan, LLP, White Plains, N Y (Edward J. Guardaro, Jr., of counsel), for respondent Brooklyn Hospital Center.
LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, LEO F. McGINITY, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
CPLR 3212 (a) provides that motions for summary judgment shall be made no later than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, except with leave of court on "good cause" shown. The Supreme Court is afforded latitude with respect to determining whether good cause exists for permitting late motions for summary judgment, and it may entertain a belated but meritorious motion in the interest of judicial economy where the opposing party fails to demonstrate prejudice ( see, Quinlan v. Kaufman, 258 A.D.2d 453 [2d Dept., Feb. 1, 1999]). We find that the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the respondents to file late motions for summary judgment ( see. Quinlan v. Kaufman, supra).
BRACKEN, J.P., THOMPSON, GOLDSTEIN, McGINITY, and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.