Opinion
B306214
04-28-2021
ALEJANDRO GONZALEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SWISSPORT SA, LLC, Defendant and Respondent.
Parris Law Firm, R. Rex Parris, Jason Fowler, Khail A. Parris, John M. Bickford; Law Office of Twila S. White and Twila S. White for Plaintiff and Appellant. De Castro Law Group, José-Manuel A. de Castro and David G. Larmore for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC685391) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Affirmed. Parris Law Firm, R. Rex Parris, Jason Fowler, Khail A. Parris, John M. Bickford; Law Office of Twila S. White and Twila S. White for Plaintiff and Appellant. De Castro Law Group, José-Manuel A. de Castro and David G. Larmore for Defendant and Respondent.
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A jury found in favor of plaintiff Alejandro Gonzalez and against defendant employer Swissport SA, LLC (Swissport) for violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), arising from disability discrimination, a failure to accommodate, a failure to prevent discrimination, and for wrongful termination. The jury awarded a total of $1,050,000 in non-economic damages to Gonzalez.
Swissport moved for a new trial as to damages. On April 13, 2020, the trial court granted Swissport's motion. It concluded Gonzalez's counsel's improper focus on Gonzalez's medical condition, which was not attributable to Swissport's conduct, tainted the damages award. Gonzalez appeals from this order.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Swissport's motion for new trial and, therefore, we affirm the April 13, 2020, order.
BACKGROUND
A. Facts Giving Rise to Gonzalez's Complaint
Gonzalez began working for Service Air at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in 2005 as a baggage handler. He was promoted to the position of bag room coordinator. According to Gonzalez, this position did not require him to lift baggage, but he did so in order to "help." Later, Service Air merged with or was acquired by a Swissport company, and Gonzalez's employer became Swissport SA, LLC, defendant in this matter. Gonzalez testified his position did not change after the merger. Janet Tatum, a human resources manager for Swissport at LAX, testified that the coordinator position did not exist at Swissport, that Gonzalez's position was lead ramp agent, and that this position required him to lift baggage.
On or about September 12, 2016, while lifting baggage at work, Gonzalez felt pressure in his chest. It was determined that his aorta had burst, and he had a mechanical valve implanted. During part of his time in the hospital, Gonzalez was in a coma. In January 2017, he was released to return to work with the restriction that he could not lift, push, or pull more than 15 pounds.
On or about January 21, 2017, Gonzalez's brother, Jose Gonzalez, drove Gonzalez to work. Gonzalez was advised that before he could return to work, he would have to meet with Tatum.
For clarity, we refer to plaintiff Alejandro Gonzalez as "Gonzalez" and Jose Gonzalez as "Jose."
On January 23, 2017, Gonzalez met with Tatum. Tatum advised Gonzalez that there were four positions open: a fueling agent, ramp agent, cabin cleaner, and a position in cargo. Gonzalez did not qualify for these positions, however, because they required him to lift, push, or pull more than 15 pounds. The parties dispute what occurred next. According to Gonzalez, Tatum told him he was "done," and terminated him. Tatum testified that she advised Gonzalez that they would follow up with him in 60 days to advise him of any openings, encouraged him to seek unemployment, and asked him to keep her apprised of any changes to his work limitations.
On January 31, 2017, Gonzalez came into work to turn in his badge and vest. He handed them to an employee, who testified that he told her he quit.
As a result of his separation from Swissport, Gonzalez no longer had medical insurance. He could not afford coumadin, a medication that was prescribed to him following his valve implant. He later suffered a brain aneurysm or stroke. Eventually, he found employment as a gas station cashier.
B. Gonzalez's Claims Before the Jury
On December 1, 2017, Gonzalez filed a complaint, which included causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to prevent discrimination, and waiting time penalties. Gonzalez sought economic damages, including lost past and future earnings and benefits, compensation for "personal injuries," and reimbursement for past, present, and future hospital bills. He also sought non-economic and punitive damages. On the eve of trial, Gonzalez dismissed his claims for economic damages. Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court granted Swissport's motion for nonsuit as to punitive damages. Thus, only the claims for non-economic damages were before the jury.
C. Jury Voir Dire
The trial court based its decision to grant a new trial, in part, on Gonzalez's counsel's conduct during voir dire. We summarize portions of the voir dire relevant to our analysis.
Prior to commencing voir dire, Gonzalez's counsel delivered a "mini opening" to the jury panel. Then, in questioning Prospective Juror No. 15, an emergency room physician, Gonzalez's counsel asked, "As you heard in opening, there is a heart condition and a stroke. Is that going to impact you in any way in being a juror on this case?" Counsel then asked, "As far as a stroke, you've seen it. From your experience, can that have certain impact on people later on?" He followed up by asking three additional questions: (1) "Can it impact their memory?" (2) "Make them a little slower sometimes?" (3) "As far as some of the issues that may come up in this trial, like, how and why a stroke developed[, i]s that something that you evaluate as part of your practice?"
Gonzalez's counsel then questioned Prospective Juror No. 3, who confirmed that he was a medical resident. Counsel asked, "But that means, just so everybody understands, you're a doctor, right?" Counsel then asked, "[H]ave you had experiences dealing with people that have been in a coma?" In responding to counsel's question, Prospective Juror No. 3 stated, "It sounds like for Mr. Gonzalez, after his aortic aneurysm repair was probably in a surgical intensive care unit, based on the brief story we got." Following this response, Swissport's counsel asked to approach the bench. The court declined the request but advised the venire, "This is not a medical case in the sense that we're dealing with treatment for Mr. Gonzalez. This is a case about whether his employer failed to give him accommodations because of that medical condition. So while there is some tangential relevance with regard to his medical condition, our focus is basically on the interactions between Mr. Gonzalez and Swissport." Later, outside the presence of the prospective jurors, the trial court inquired of Swissport's counsel, "[D]id I address the issue on the medical? That was out of bounds." Swissport's counsel indicated he was satisfied with the court's admonishment.
Gonzalez's counsel asked the prospective jurors whether any of them would be reluctant to award damages over a certain amount. In response, one juror observed that he or she would "want to know . . . like, before the stroke and the heart problems—I just—things to quantify it, you know, to see." Counsel sought to clarify this comment, asking, the "types of things you'd want to see is how Mr. Gonzalez was before." The trial court interrupted and warned counsel, "Preconditioning now. Next question."
The following day, outside the presence of the jury, Gonzalez's counsel inquired whether he could ask the prospective jurors if they would be willing to award a specific dollar amount in damages. Swissport's counsel objected, and noted, "particularly if the discussion continues to be a conversation about dollar amounts attached to damages caused by an aneurysm as opposed to employment damages." The trial court agreed and observed, "You do run the risk of getting a tainted verdict by failing to keep separate the issue of, wow, this guy has really had a tough way to go and has issues related to having to recover, but then you have your claim, which is I was mistreated on the job, and there are certain feelings that flow from that. You should be very, very careful that to the extent that this jury is tainted by the former . . . , that's a verdict that would be subject to attack on appeal. . . . So it's actually to your advantage not to blur that line." Swissport's attorney argued that opposing counsel had been blurring the distinction from "the get go" and asking questions that "invit[ed] the jury to put money in the wrong bucket." The trial court responded that it would permit Swissport to address the issue in its voir dire and that the court would "further address it."
During Gonzalez's continued voir dire relating to damages, one juror expressed concern about being able to quantify damages to make a person whole as a result of health issues. Gonzalez's counsel attempted to clarify that the case was one about wrongful termination and its impact on Gonzalez. The prospective juror responded that "[t]here's no amount of money that will make a person whole, having suffered health-related issues." Another prospective juror stated he heard about wrongful termination that resulted in Gonzalez having mental anguish. He or she then asked, "So, are those the dots that we should be connecting? It was a conduct specifically to the wrongful termination that, therefore, caused this anguish and other issues? Or is there more to the story that we—because I heard there was a stroke. . . . Is there a lot more to the wrongdoing by the defendant that we're clearly not hearing that causes anguish and all the other things he's dealing with?" Gonzalez's counsel responded that the prospective jurors had "only gotten a short snippet." The trial court then interceded, advising the prospective jurors, "[L]et's be clear—because this is starting to concern me a little bit. . . . [W]e don't know if anybody is going to accept whether Swissport did anything that you would find compensable." The trial court explained, "That's why my questions with regard to wait until you hear everything before reaching any conclusions is where I want you to be focused."
During Swissport's "mini opening," counsel emphasized that the case was not about how Gonzalez came to suffer an aneurysm, and the questions posed by Gonzalez's counsel during voir dire as to the effects of an aneurysm were irrelevant to the case.
D. The Trial Court Excluded the Testimony of Gonzalez's Cardiologist
The following day, the court conducted an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to consider Swissport's objection to the testimony of Dr. Michael Bowdish, a heart surgeon who examined Gonzalez in September 2016. Dr. Bowdish had been asked to testify as to three topics: (1) the heart disease condition that led to the need for Gonzalez's emergency surgery; (2) the reasons why a person who had a mechanical valve replacement may suffer a stroke; and (3) mental health issues, which Dr. Bowdish acknowledged was outside his area of knowledge. During the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, Dr. Bowdish explained that when a mechanical valve is implanted, the patient must take the medication coumadin daily. Otherwise, the valve may stop functioning, causing the patient to develop acute heart failure or a blood clot that may get dislodged to another part of the body. Dr. Bowdish did not offer any testimony about the cause of Gonzalez's stroke.
Citing Evidence Code section 352, the trial court excluded Dr. Bowdish's testimony as more prejudicial than probative, outside the scope of Gonzalez's discrimination claim, and irrelevant to emotional damages. The court observed that Gonzalez himself could testify that he would not have quit his job at Swissport because he needed medical insurance to afford the coumadin medication he was required to take. Observing that there was no dispute as to Gonzalez's condition, the court found that having the cardiologist testify was an attempt to "tug[ ] at the heartstrings of the jury to get empathy." The court commented, "I'm only going to let you try your case that you have, not the one you want to have."
E. Gonzalez's Testimony Relating to His Medical Condition and Emotional State
During direct examination, Gonzalez's counsel asked Gonzalez if he remembered being at the first hospital that his brother took him to on September 12, 2016; if he remembered talking to any doctors there; if he remembered being at a second hospital; if he remembered talking to any doctors at the second hospital when he first arrived or at all on that day; and what he understood happened to him. Gonzalez testified that he did not remember any of these things; that he only remembered being transported by ambulance from the first to the second hospital; and that the doctor later told him that his aorta had burst. After the heart valve surgery, he had to participate in rehabilitative therapy because he "couldn't provide for [himself]. [He] was strapped to a bed. [He] couldn't get up because [he] couldn't walk, and [he] couldn't talk." When he was discharged from the hospital, he was placed on five medications.
Gonzalez testified that after Tatum terminated him on January 23, 2017, he went home, went into his backyard, and cried. He did not "go out for days." He could not accept the way he was terminated. He loved "everything" about working for Swissport and felt very important working there. He "lost [his] job, and then [he] lost his motivation for life." When he later turned in his uniform and badge, he was embarrassed, humiliated, and wanted to cry. After doing so, he again went into his backyard and cried. He no longer felt important. Before he was terminated, he used to go bike riding, shopping, walking, and out to eat for fun. After he was terminated, he "just stay[ed] home."
Gonzalez explained he was scared that because he lost his job, he would lose his health insurance, and would not be able to afford his medication. Gonzalez's counsel established that after his termination, Gonzalez stopped taking his medication. He then asked, "What happened after you stopped taking that medication?" Gonzalez responded, "I had two blood clots in my brain." Counsel inquired, "What medical treatment, if any, did you receive for that?" Swissport's counsel objected on the basis of relevance. The trial court overruled the objection. Gonzalez testified that he had two bypass surgeries "to [his] skull." He testified that he has memory problems and that he cannot understand things as easily as he did before.
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court expressed concern over Gonzalez's testimony that he suffered two blood clots. The court observed, "[t]hat should have never come out. There's been no testimony or no linkage that defendant, Swissport, created those blood clots. There's been no testimony, expert or otherwise, to associate any medical condition of [Gonzalez] connected to how he felt post termination. And I am fearful and I think this has been [Gonzalez's counsel's] strategy the whole time, is to impute those feelings to [Swissport]'s conduct. . . . Had I received a motion in limine, I would have granted that. That's absolutely more prejudicial than probative and designed to confuse this jury. And I think [Gonzalez's counsel] knew that."
Gonzalez's counsel disagreed, and observed there was no objection to the question. Swissport's counsel argued that it did not object because the question as posed did not call for a lay opinion, the answer was nonresponsive, and he did not want to highlight the answer by moving to strike it. Swissport requested that the court provide a curative instruction. Gonzalez's counsel insisted the testimony should be considered by the jury. The court determined the issue would need to be revisited.
F. Jose's Testimony Relating to Gonzalez's Medical Condition and Emotional State
Jose testified that he drove his brother to and from LAX on January 21, 2017. Gonzalez had been happy to return to work to "get[ ] his life back." When he picked up Gonzalez from LAX, however, Jose could tell Gonzalez was not happy. Similarly, when Jose picked up Gonzalez from LAX on January 23, 2017, Gonzalez did not want to talk and appeared to be devastated.
Over Swissport's objection on the basis of relevance, [Jose] also testified that Gonzalez had a stroke. Gonzalez's counsel then posed questions relating to the effects of the stroke, to which the trial court sustained Swissport's objection. The court stated, "I know where you're going. Stay focused. Next question," and directed, "Change your subject matter." Yet, Gonzalez's counsel continued to ask questions about the effects of the stroke: "[D]id you ever experience conversations with [Gonzalez] where it seemed as though he wasn't understanding you?" Again, Swissport objected and the court sustained the objection. Gonzalez's counsel asked, "Have you experienced . . . where you have to ask [Gonzalez] the same question multiple times in order to get an answer from him?" Jose answered, "Yes" before Swissport interposed an objection. The court overruled Swissport's objection. Swissport objected three additional times to questions relating to the effects of the stroke. The court overruled two of the objections, but granted a motion to strike one response by Jose, in which he acknowledged that "receiving information" is "challenging for [Gonzalez] now."
Gonzalez's counsel also posed several questions to Jose that focused on Gonzalez's demeanor and what occurred at the hospital on September 12, 2016. After Swissport's ninth objection to this line of questioning, the trial court called counsel to the bench for a sidebar. The trial court questioned the relevancy of the testimony Gonzalez's counsel sought to elicit from Jose, "other than to generate empathy for this person's tough situation."
Following the sidebar, Gonzalez's counsel asked Jose about the physical therapy Gonzalez had to undergo following his valve replacement surgery. Swissport objected. Gonzalez's counsel argued it went to the issue of damages, but acknowledged the therapy occurred prior to Gonzalez's attempted return to work. The trial court sustained the objection.
G. Trial Proceedings Following the Presentation of Evidence
During the discussions between the court and counsel relating to jury instructions, the trial court and Gonzalez's counsel vociferously disagreed as to whether Gonzalez's medical condition and treatment before he was terminated from Swissport were relevant to his claims and damages. The trial court concluded, "I'm going to stop trying to protect the integrity of the verdict." When Swissport inquired whether the court would provide a curative instruction, the court determined it would give Swissport "considerable leeway" to argue that Gonzalez had put forth evidence of damages that were not part of the case. The court advised, "I will note for the record, I have some concerns of how this evidence—how this case has been presented and the potential—significant potential for this jury confusing what they're supposed to decide and what evidence is in support of what they decide. . . . I'll live with whatever happens, whatever any [C]ourt of [A]ppeal decides that I did or did not do properly."
During closing argument, Gonzalez's counsel argued that the jury's award of future non-economic damages should reflect "what was taken from him." He continued, "[Y]ou look to the future. He's 44 years old. What impact is this going to have on the rest of his life. You know, he had a stroke, and he's impacted mentally because of it."
During its closing argument, Swissport argued that Gonzalez's damages stemming from his medical issues or discontinuation of medical insurance were not relevant to the issues to be decided by the jury. Counsel clarified the issue was the amount of damages Gonzalez suffered from the loss of his job with Swissport.
H. The Jury's Verdict
The jury returned a special verdict finding that Swissport engaged in disability discrimination in violation of FEHA, failure to accommodate in violation of FEHA, failure to prevent discrimination in violation of FEHA, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The jury found Swissport was not liable for failure to engage in the interactive process or for waiting time penalties. The jury awarded $250,000 for past non-economic damages and $800,000 for future non-economic damages to Gonzalez.
I. The Trial Court Grants Swissport's Motion for New Trial as to Damages
Swissport moved for a new trial as to damages. Swissport argued the evidence was insufficient to support the damages award, and Gonzalez improperly introduced evidence and argument of his medical condition to garner the jury's sympathy.
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the trial court decided the motion without oral argument. On April 13, 2020, the trial court granted the motion for new trial as to Gonzalez's damages. In a written ruling, the court found as follows:
"This [c]ourt concludes that the motion for new trial must be granted. The [c]ourt cannot conclude that the verdict as to the damages was not prejudiced by the improper voir dire and inappropriate statements made by [Gonzalez]'s counsel throughout the trial. Upon review of the trial transcript and from the [c]ourt's recollection of the trial, there were several irregularities that suggest the verdict was tainted by sympathy for [Gonzalez]'s medical condition as opposed to the issue in the case which is the discriminatory conduct of [Swissport]. For example, [Gonzalez]'s counsel asked improper questions to [P]rospective [J]uror [N]o. 15 and [P]rospective [J]uror [N]o. 3 about strokes and being in a coma and mentioned that [Gonzalez] had a heart condition and aortic aneurysm. . . .
"Throughout the trial, the [c]ourt repeatedly asked [Gonzalez]'s [c]ounsel to stay focused on what happened between Gonzalez and Swissport and not to blur the line with the issues related to recovering from [Gonzalez]'s aneurysm because there was a risk of getting a tainted verdict. . . . [Gonzalez]'s [c]ounsel did not follow the [c]ourt's initial instructions and repeated reminders. The [c]ourt concludes that the damages awarded were reached as a result of [Gonzalez]'s counsel's inappropriate and irrelevant focus on the health condition of [Gonzalez,] which were not attributable to [Swissport]'s conduct. Therefore, the [c]ourt orders a new trial on damages only."
Gonzalez timely appealed the order.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
Code of Civil Procedure section 657 sets forth seven grounds upon which a trial court may grant a full or partial new trial. Relevant here, section 657 permits a new trial based upon: "1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial. [¶] . . . [¶] 5. Excessive or inadequate damages. [¶] 6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision." (§ 657.)
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 657 directs that when granting a new trial, the trial court must "specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated." (§ 657.) "When the trial court provides a statement of reasons as required by section 657, the appropriate standard of judicial review is one that defers to the trial court's resolution of conflicts in the evidence and inquires only whether the court's decision was an abuse of discretion." (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2007) 41 Cal.4th 624, 636 [observing the purpose of the statement of reasons is to promote judicial deliberation before action and to make the right of appeal more meaningful, giving the appellant information as to which aspect of the trial to defend].) The statement of reasons must be sufficiently specific "to facilitate appellate review and avoid any need for the appellate court to rely on inference or speculation." (Id. at p. 634)
In such a case, " '[t]he determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears. This is particularly true when the discretion is exercised in favor of awarding a new trial, for this action does not finally dispose of the matter. So long as a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification under the law is shown for the order granting the new trial, the order will not be set aside.' [Citation.] A new trial order ' "must be sustained on appeal unless the opposing party demonstrates that no reasonable finder of fact could have found for the movant on [the trial court's] theory." ' [Citation.]" (Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1248, 1275-1276; see Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 932 ["the presumption of correctness normally accorded on appeal to the jury's verdict is replaced by a presumption in favor of the [new trial] order"].)
The analysis set forth in the trial court's order indicates it based its decision on the ground of "irregularities" in the proceedings as set forth in section 657, subdivision 1. Indeed, the trial court expressly references "irregularities" in its analysis. The court cited Gonzalez's counsel's improper conditioning of the jury during voir dire and his failure to comply with repeated admonishments to limit his questions to what happened between Gonzalez and Swissport in support of its determination that "the damages awarded were reached as a result of [Gonzalez]'s counsel's inappropriate and irrelevant focus on the health condition of [Gonzalez]." This rationale supports our conclusion that the order is premised on the ground of irregularities in the proceedings, rather than on an alternative ground of insufficient evidence or excessive damages, which would have required an analysis of the weight of the evidence. (See § 657 ["A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision"].) Accordingly, we review the court's reasons for granting the motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. (King v. U.S. Bank National Association (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 675, 716.)
Based on statements in Gonzalez's opening brief, Gonzalez appears to agree that the trial court based its decision to grant a new trial on an "irregularity in the proceedings."
B. Swissport Did Not Forfeit Its Ability to Seek a New Trial Based Upon a Failure to Object
Before turning to the substance of the trial court's ruling, we address Gonzalez's contention that Swissport forfeited its ability to challenge the damages verdict by failing to object to the alleged improper conduct at trial.
" '[T]he rules applicable to . . . invited error or to estoppel[ ] have no application when an appellate court is considering the propriety of an order granting a new trial. If the trial court had denied the new trial such an error would be considered waived by failure to object. But the trial court has broad discretion in considering motions for a new trial.' " (Neal v. Montgomery Elevator Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198.) " 'To hold otherwise would mean that the trial court, by reason of the action of the parties, would be powerless to correct what might be an obvious miscarriage of justice.' [Citation.] Thus, even though [the movant] technically may have waived his right to claim error with respect to opposing counsel's misconduct, that fact could not impair the power of the court to do justice by granting a new trial." (Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 600, 605; cf. Sabella v. Southern Pacific Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 311, 318-320 [affirming denial of motion for new trial on the ground of attorney misconduct where defense counsel failed to object to the misconduct and request an admonition].)
It is true that Swissport did not object to Gonzalez's counsel's questions on voir dire until after Prospective Juror No. 3 responded to the question about comas. However, thereafter, both the trial court and Swissport sought to prevent further conduct by Gonzalez's counsel that was likely to confuse and prejudice the jury. During voir dire, the trial court admonished Gonzalez's counsel three times. During Gonzalez's presentation of evidence, Swissport objected to questions relating to Gonzalez's health issues at least 18 times. The trial court admonished Gonzalez's counsel for introducing testimony relating to blood clots, and Swissport requested a curative instruction to remedy the admission of this testimony. In any event, because the trial court's order granting a new trial rests on "the power of the court to do justice," any failure by Swissport to object to each and every incident is immaterial to our analysis. (Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 605.)
"The trial judge may prevent improper questions or exclude inadmissible matter on the judge's own motion without any objection by counsel, and the same is true where counsel does object but the objection is insufficient." (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2020) Presentation, § 404; see Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of Social Services (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 162, 173, italics omitted ["[t]rial courts possess some inherent power to exclude objectionable evidence on their own motion" " 'where the evidence is irrelevant, unreliable, misleading, or prejudicial' "].) A trial court "is under a duty to see that a fair trial is accorded the parties on the merits which means excluding on [its] own motion matters that tend only to prejudice the jurors and take them away from a consideration of the case upon its merits and its merits alone." (Fortner v. Bruhn (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 184, 190.)
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting a New Trial as to Damages
Gonzalez argues a new trial as to damages is not warranted because his counsel did not engage in improper conduct. We conclude the irregularities in the proceedings cited by the trial court prevented Swissport from receiving a fair trial. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial.
The record shows that Gonzalez's counsel led the prospective jurors to believe that Gonzalez's health condition was at issue in the case. Rather than adhere to the trial court's admonitions during voir dire, which sought to focus the trial on the merits of Gonzalez's employment discrimination claims, Gonzalez's counsel repeatedly directed the jury's attention to Gonzalez's heart condition, coma, aneurysm or stroke, and his need for rehabilitative therapy.
Gonzalez's counsel sought to address the impact of Gonzalez's heart condition and stroke when he questioned Prospective Juror No. 15, an emergency room physician. Seeking to harness the juror's medical expertise to his client's advantage, counsel asked several questions about the impact of a stroke, including whether it could cause a patient to lose his memory or slow his thinking. Counsel's next question conveyed to the venire that Gonzalez's heart condition and stroke were relevant to the trial when he asked, "As far as some of the issues that may come up in this trial, like, how and why a stroke developed[, i]s that something that you evaluate as part of your practice?" However, the issue of how and why Gonzalez's stroke developed was not properly before the jury.
Gonzalez's counsel continued to use the medical experience of the prospective jurors through his questioning of Prospective Juror No. 3, asking "just so everybody understands, you're a doctor, right?" Counsel then asked Prospective Juror No. 3 to expound on his familiarity with comas. This question was not relevant to identifying any potential bias held by Prospective Juror No. 3. Furthermore, because Gonzalez's coma occurred prior to the wrongful acts by Swissport and had no bearing on his work restrictions, his coma was irrelevant to demonstrating the merits of his claims or establishing damages.
Thereafter, a prospective juror expressed his or her confusion as to whether the jury was to connect the dots between Gonzalez's wrongful termination and his mental anguish; or whether the jury also was to consider Gonzalez's stroke. Rather than correct the prospective juror's confusion, Gonzalez's counsel responded that the prospective jurors have "only gotten a short snippet." This forced the trial court to intercede again to admonish the venire.
Further, Gonzalez's counsel led Gonzalez through questioning that suggested Swissport was responsible for the two blood clots he suffered several months after his termination. Gonzalez does not submit a plausible argument to support the theory that an employer can be held responsible for a former employee's inability to afford medication, which in turn led to an adverse medical condition. As such, the testimony was irrelevant yet likely to inflame the jury's sympathy.
Gonzalez contends his counsel was not the source of the improper conditioning during voir dire. Further, he argues that the evidence of his medical condition, including the two blood clots, was relevant to challenging Swissport's position that Gonzalez quit his job and to demonstrate the distress he experienced after losing his medical insurance.
We are not persuaded. First, the record plainly demonstrates that Gonzalez's counsel introduced the issues of Gonzalez's heart condition, stroke, coma, and memory problems to the prospective jurors. Second, there was no dispute that Gonzalez was restricted from pushing, pulling, or lifting 15 pounds as a result of his medical condition. Accordingly, further evidence of his medical condition was not necessary to proving the elements of his claims. Third, Gonzalez's own testimony established that he would not have quit because he needed health insurance in order to afford his daily medication, and that he was "scared" after losing his insurance. This testimony was admitted without objection, and was relevant to countering Swissport's claim that he quit, as well as to proving the mental anguish he suffered as a result of Swissport's wrongful conduct. The fact that he later developed blood clots as a result of his inability to afford medication is not attributable to any conduct by Swissport, and is not relevant to proving he did not quit. It was misleading to suggest that by terminating him, Swissport could be held responsible for the medical condition that developed when he stopped taking his medication.
Contrary to Gonzalez's insistence, the trial court's ruling did not address whether the jury's monetary award was supported by the evidence. Rather, the trial court ruled that the monetary award was tainted by the spillover effect of the irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of Gonzalez's heart condition and treatment, which was wholly unrelated to the facts surrounding his termination. The ruling recited specific incidents of Gonzalez's counsel's preconditioning of the jury and forays into irrelevant and prejudicial areas of evidence that prevented Swissport from receiving a fair trial. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial as to damages.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's April 13, 2020, order granting Swissport's motion for new trial on the issue of damages is affirmed. Swissport shall recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.