Opinion
Case No. 8:04-CV-889-T-17TGW.
May 12, 2006
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on:
Dkt. 31 Motion for Summary Judgment Dkt. 39 Opposition
The Complaint in this Section 1983 case includes: 1) Count I as to Defendant City of Lakeland for false arrest/imprisonment; 2) Count II as to Defendant Polk County Sheriff's Office for false arrest/imprisonment; 3) Count III as to Defendant John Mort for violation of civil rights, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983; and 4) Count IV as to Defendant E. Rauch, for violation of civil rights, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.
The Court conducted oral argument on the Motion on March 9, 2006.
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 c.
The plain language of Rule 56 c mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
Issues of fact are genuine only if a reasonable jury considering the evidence presented could find for the non-moving party. (Citation omitted). Material facts are those which will affect the outcome of the trial under governing law. In determining whether a material fact exists, the court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655, 656 (11th Cir. 1983). All doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. See Hayden v. First Nat'l Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 996-7 (5th Cir. 1979).
II. Facts
The Amended Complaint (Dkt. 8) is based on the stop of Plaintiffs' motor vehicle on November 3, 2001 by Defendant Mort, of Lakeland Police Department, when the dispatcher of the Lakeland Police Department notified Defendant Mort that the motor vehicle was stolen. Plaintiffs' motor vehicle resembled another vehicle which was reported stolen. The description of the stolen vehicle was a "maroon extended cab Ford pickup last seen heading north on Lakeland Hills Boulevard." (Mort Deposition, p. 23). The Lakeland Police Department dispatcher mistakenly confirmed that the tag number was that of the stolen vehicle.
Defendant Mort stopped Plaintiffs' vehicle and ordered Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez out of his vehicle at gunpoint. Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez was handcuffed and placed in the back of a police cruiser by Defendant Mort. Defendant Rauch, of Polk County Sheriff's Office, assisted Defendant Mort in the traffic stop. Defendant Rauch ordered Plaintiff Maria Gonzalez out of the motor vehicle at gunpoint, and forced her to kneel on the ground while another law enforcement officer handcuffed her.
The entire traffic stop took place during a twenty minute time span. Plaintiffs were released when the law enforcement officers discovered that Plaintiffs' motor vehicle was their own vehicle and not the stolen vehicle.
III. Defendants' Motion
Defendants Rauch and Mort seek entry of summary judgment as to Counts III and IV on the basis of qualified immunity. Defendants argue that there was probable cause to stop, arrest and briefly detain Plaintiffs. Defendants also argue that there was arguable probable cause for the stop and arrest.
Defendants also argue that any claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is foreclosed by the claims asserted under the Fourth Amendment, and there is no viable claim under the Fifth Amendment.
Defendants City of Lakeland and Polk County seek entry of summary judgment as to Counts I and II. Defendants argue that there was probable cause to stop, arrest and briefly detain Plaintiffs, as well as arguable probable cause.
IV. Plaintiffs' Response
Plaintiffs argue that under the facts of this case Plaintiffs' arrest was not reasonable, and Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs argue that in light of the totality of the circumstances, there was no probable cause or arguable probable cause, the conduct of the law enforcement officers was not reasonable, and they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs' due process rights. Plaintiffs argue that they repeatedly told Defendants the insurance papers and registration were inside the vehicle, and the law enforcement officers refused to answer Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez's question immediately as to what was wrong with the registration, which Plaintiffs contend constitutes deliberate indifference.
Plaintiffs argue that there were factual differences between the motor vehicle that was reported stolen, and their vehicle, that the alleged thief was a Black individual, and Plaintiffs are Mexican individuals, and the law enforcement officers violated their own agency's procedures and written General Orders. Plaintiffs also argue that the law enforcement officers used excessive force when the law enforcement officers stopped and arrested Plaintiffs at gunpoint.
V. Discussion
A. Count III — Defendant Mort
B. Count IV — Defendant Rauch
Defendants have requested the entry of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity due to the presence of actual probable cause for Plaintiffs' arrest, as well as arguable probable cause.
It is undisputed that Defendants Mort and Rauch were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority as law enforcement officers when they stopped Plaintiffs' motor vehicle. Defendant Mort testified that he was on patrol for the Lakeland Policy Department when he received the call about the stolen truck. After seeing Plaintiffs' vehicle, which is somewhat similar in appearance to the vehicle reported stolen, Defendant Mort began following the vehicle (Dkt. 34-2, p. 72, L. 22-3) and reported Plaintiffs' tag number to dispatch. Dispatch reported that the tag on Plaintiffs' vehicle was that of the stolen truck (Dkt. 34-2, p. 75, L. 7-8). Defendant Mort initiated a felony traffic stop based on the information from dispatch.
Defendant Rauch testified that he responded to the request of Lakeland Police Department Sergeant Walden for assistance with a confirmed stolen vehicle, a felony stop (Dkt. 32, p. 20, L. 19).
1. Qualified Immunity
Since it is undisputed that the police officers were acting within their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. The Court is required to consider the threshold question whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show that the officers' conduct violated a constitutional right. If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiry. If a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next step is to ask whether the right was clearly established in the particular context of the case. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. See Saucier v. Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001).
Plaintiffs contend that under the facts of this case, Plaintiffs were stopped, arrested and detained without probable cause. Plaintiff argue that there was no actual probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs, because the conduct of Defendants was not reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances, and was deliberately indifferent towards Plaintiffs' due process rights.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs and Defendants have described the events of November 3, 2001 as a stop, a detention and an arrest. An investigatory stop is constitutionally permissible when it is based on "reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring. While "reasonable suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675-76). The standard for determining the presence of reasonable suspicion requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.
A law enforcement official who reasonably but mistakenly concludes that reasonable suspicion is present is still entitled to qualified immunity. When an officer asserts qualified immunity, the issue is not whether reasonable suspicion existed in fact, but whether an officer had "arguable" reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop. See Jackson v. Paul, 206 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2000).
An arrest must be supported by probable cause. See Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872 (11th Cir. 2003). Probable cause is established when "`the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed or is about to commit an offense.'" See Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425 (11th Cir. 1998). The standard for determining the presence of probable cause requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.
An arrest without probable cause is unconstitutional, but officers who make such an arrest are entitled to qualified immunity if there was arguable probable cause for the arrest, i.e. if a reasonable police officer, knowing what the Defendants Mort and Rauch knew, could have believed that there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest. See Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 870 (1998). Arguable probable cause is distinct from actual probable cause.
As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, decisions of the Supreme Court and [the Eleventh Circuit] make clear that what counts for qualified immunity purposes relating to probable cause to arrest is the information known to the defendant officers or officials at the time of their conduct, not the facts known to the plaintiffs then or those known to a court later.
Since a different standard applies to the stop of Plaintiffs' vehicle and to any subsequent arrest, the Court will address each issue separately.
2. The Stop
Defendant Mort testified in his deposition that he began following Plaintiffs' vehicle because it was similar to the description of the stolen motor vehicle that was broadcast by the Lakeland Police Department. (Mort Deposition, p. 24). The description which was broadcast did not include the tag number of the stolen motor vehicle. Defendant Mort read the tag number of Plaintiffs' vehicle to dispatch, who told Defendant Mort that Plaintiffs' vehicle was the stolen vehicle. (Mort Deposition, p. 24). After this confirmation, Defendant Mort continued to follow Plaintiff's vehicle while he waited for back-up units to assist in the felony traffic stop (Mort Deposition, p. 25-26).
Sergeant Walden, Lakeland Police Department, communicated by Nextel direct with Defendant Rauch, Polk County Sheriff's Office, that Defendant Mort was following a confirmed stolen vehicle, and asked Defendant Rauch to assist Defendant Mort. Defendant Rauch testified in his deposition that he relied on Sergeant Walden's statement that the Lakeland Police Department confirmed that the vehicle was stolen (Rauch Deposition, p. 20).
To effect the stop, Defendant Mort stopped behind Plaintiffs' vehicle at a traffic light. When Defendant Rauch arrived, Defendant Mort signaled to Defendant Rauch that Plaintiffs' vehicle was the confirmed stolen vehicle. Both Defendants approached the vehicle with their guns drawn, and shouted commands at Plaintiffs to exit the vehicle with their hands up. Once Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez got out of his vehicle, Defendant Mort direct Plaintiff to step behind the vehicle. Defendant Mort then frisked and handcuffed Plaintiff, and placed Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez in the back seat of Defendant's patrol car.
While Defendant Mort secured Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez, Defendant Rauch directed Plaintiff Maria Gonzalez to exit her vehicle. After Plaintiff got out of her vehicle, another police officer handcuffed Plaintiff, took her down the road, and directed Plaintiff to kneel on the cement roadway. Plaintiff Maria Gonzalez was not searched.
3. The Test for Reasonable Suspicion
An investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Supreme Court adopted a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop: 1 "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception," which turns on whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped had engaged or was about to engage in a crime. The second part of the inquiry requires the Court to determine whether the stop when too far and matured into an arrest before there was probable cause, that is, "whether [the stop] was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."
4. Facts Known by Defendants At Inception of Stop
In their Statement of Facts (Dkt. 39), Plaintiffs point out facts which Plaintiffs contend render the stop of their vehicle unreasonable:
1. The description of the stolen motor vehicle broadcast by Lakeland Police Department was "1989 Ford Truck Extended Cab, burgundy and silver in color." Plaintiffs' truck was a 1999 Ford F 150, 4 door with extended cab, burgundy with gold trim.
2. There was a blue 5 gallon kerosene can in the truck bed of the stolen motor vehicle.
3. A black male stole the Pollock vehicle. Plaintiffs are Mexican Americans.
Plaintiffs argue that when Defendant Mort took Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez to the back of the car, he frisked him, handcuffed him, and told Plaintiff Gonzalez that he was driving a stolen car. Before Plaintiff was placed in the back of the police cruiser, Plaintiff Gonzalez told Defendant Mort that all of his papers, registration and insurance were in the truck in the sun visor (Dkt. 39, p. 3), repeatedly asked what was wrong with the car registration, and told Defendant Mort that Plaintiff purchased the truck brand new.
After Plaintiffs were secured in handcuffs, Defendant Rauch searched Plaintiffs' motor vehicle and Defendant Mort searched a computer database for the registered owner of the vehicle and its status. This search revealed that Plaintiffs' motor vehicle was registered to Plaintiffs.
Defendant Mort told Sergeant Moncrief, Lakeland Police Department, that the motor vehicle was registered to Plaintiffs, and Sergeant Moncrief directed Defendant Mort to release Plaintiffs. Sergeant Moncrief explained to Plaintiffs at that time that the stop was based on mistaken information. Plaintiffs were in handcuffs for approximately twenty minutes.
5. The Stop Was Justified
In determining whether arguable reasonable suspicion is present, the Court must determine whether a reasonable officer who had the knowledge of Defendants Mort and Rauch could have believed that stopping Plaintiffs' motor vehicle was lawful.
There is no dispute that Defendant Mort believed that Plaintiffs' vehicle was a stolen vehicle at the time of the stop, even though that belief was shown to be mistaken a short time later. Plaintiff Gonzalez notes that Defendant Mort told him so when Defendant Mort took Plaintiff to the police cruiser. The knowledge that Plaintiffs' motor vehicle was stolen came to Defendant Mort from a trustworthy source, the Lakeland Police Department. Defendant Rauch's knowledge came to Defendant Mort from Sergeant Walden, Lakeland Police Department, and from Defendant Mort, both of whom are trustworthy sources. The Court therefore finds that the stop of Plaintiffs' motor vehicle was justified at its inception.
The factual differences between the stolen motor vehicle and Plaintiffs' motor vehicle, the blue kerosene can and the identity of the thief do not render the stop of Plaintiffs' vehicle unreasonable by proving the absence of arguable reasonable suspicion. These issues provide a focus for Defendants' investigation after the stop of the vehicle. Defendants' knowledge before the stop was that Plaintiffs' vehicle was a confirmed stolen vehicle.
Plaintiffs have argued that the publication by Polk County Sheriff's Office of the correct tag number while Defendant Rauch was responding renders his conduct unreasonable. In his deposition, Defendant Rauch testified as to his communication by Nextel with Sergeant Walden, his participation in the traffic stop, and the contents of his report. There is no testimony that establishes that knowledge of the correct tag number was within Defendant's knowledge before initiation of the traffic stop, and that Defendant Rauch had the opportunity to communicate the correct tag number to Defendant Mort. Defendant Rauch testified that he relied on the knowledge of the Lakeland Police Department, not the Polk County Sheriff's Office, and did not independently verify the information.
Plaintiffs also argue that during the incident Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez told Defendants that his registration papers and insurance papers were within his vehicle. While this fact is relevant to the scope of the subsequent investigation, it does not prove that the initial stop was without arguable reasonable suspicion.
While Plaintiffs have argued the events on which their Complaint is based should never have happened, and in fact could have been avoided if Defendants had exercised more care, and that the entire incident could have been resolved in a matter of seconds with appropriate inquiry as to the correct tag on the vehicle, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has directed the Court to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and directed that in such cases the Court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. See Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiffs have argued that this case is similar to Kingsland v. City of Miami, 383 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), and the Court should deny Defendants' Motion for summary Judgment. InKingsland, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the non-movant's version of disputed facts, and concluded that the district court's finding that probable cause and reasonable suspicion were present could not stand. The Eleventh Circuit found that there were genuine issues of material fact whether the defendants: 1) manufactured probable cause; 2) failed to conduct a reasonable investigation, and 3) ignored certain facts within their knowledge. The district court's determination of qualified immunity also could not stand because without further factfinding, the district court could not determine whether arguable probable cause existed when it was unclear how much of the proffered evidence was manufactured or misrepresented, or what further knowledge, if any, would be attributed to defendants if they had investigated freely.
After consideration, the Court concludes that the factual situation in this case is significantly different from the facts of Kingsland. In this case, there is no perceptible motive to manufacture probable cause or reasonable suspicion, as there was in Kingsland, and there is no genuine dispute that the entire incident was based on a mistaken communication from the Lakeland Police Department. Sgt. Moncrief admitted the mistake of the Lakeland Police Department to Plaintiffs at the time of the incident. Given the totality of the circumstances, the Court has found there was arguable reasonable suspicion for the investigative stop.
6. Whether Stop Became An Arrest Prematurely
The second part of the test for reasonableness under Terry is to determine whether the stop went too far and matured into an arrest before there was probable cause, that is, "whether [the stop] was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."
At the outset, the Court notes that it is not convinced that there was an arrest in this case. The piece of knowledge that triggered the stop was the identification of the vehicle as the stolen vehicle, and the stop was executed as a felony traffic stop, not a routine traffic stop, or a brief stop of a suspicious individual in order to determine his identity or maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information. While the stop was more than momentary, it is not clear if and when the Plaintiffs' detention became an arrest. While Defendant Mort indicated his belief that Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez was driving a stolen vehicle, and placed Plaintiff in the back of the police cruiser, Plaintiff was subsequently released before leaving the scene.
An investigatory stop does not necessarily become an arrest because the occupants of a vehicle are directed to exit their vehicle. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977). The display of weapons and the use of handcuffs also do not transform an investigatory stop into an arrest. See United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572 (11th Cir. 1995). An investigatory stop is not an arrest despite the fact that a reasonable person would not believe he was free to leave. Id. This circuit has recognized that when an officer does not take a detained individual to a police station or an office, this factor indicates an investigatory stop rather than an arrest. See Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 602 (5th cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc)).
The totality of the circumstances determines when an encounter has become too intrusive to be classified as a seizure and has become an arrest, requiring probable cause. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983). In this circuit, the Court is required to evaluate "the law enforcement purposes served by the detention, the diligence with which the police pursue the investigation, the scope and intrusiveness of the detention, and the duration of the detention. See United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2000).
As to the law enforcement purposes served by detention, the most important consideration is whether the police detained Plaintiffs to pursue a method of investigation that was likely to confirm or quickly dispel their suspicions. In this case, the Court finds that Defendants used the tools available to them to quickly dispel their suspicions by searching Plaintiffs' vehicle and the computer database. While Plaintiffs were handcuffed for twenty minutes, there is no indication that Defendants were not diligent during the investigation.
Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez argues that once he was out of his vehicle, he immediately told Defendants the motor vehicle was his and the papers were inside the car. Defendants believed that Plaintiffs were felons at the inception of the stop and were reasonable in drawing weapons and securing Plaintiffs in handcuffs before conducting their investigation. The immediate notice does not render further investigation unreasonable. Plaintiffs have argued that a reasonable officer would have, upon stopping the Gonzalezes and asking a series of questions, looked at the registration to determine if, in fact, Plaintiffs were the true owners of the vehicle as they claimed, and would have run the tag number a second time, in light of factual differences between the stolen vehicle and Plaintiffs' vehicle. The Court is not willing to second guess the decision made by Defendants to secure Plaintiffs before investigating further.
As to whether the scope and intrusiveness of the detention exceed the amount reasonably needed by the police to ensure their personal safety, the Supreme Court has stated that officers may take reasonable steps to ensure their safety as long as they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous. Ordering Plaintiff Noe Gonzalez out of his vehicle, frisking him and detaining him in handcuffs in the back of a police cruiser is undeniably a severe intrusion. Detaining Maria Gonzalez in handcuffs on her knees is only a slightly less severe intrusion. Nevertheless, Defendants had information from a trustworthy source that Plaintiffs were felons, and this information renders the severe intrusion reasonable.
As to the duration of the stop, there is no "bright line" test for evaluating the reasonableness of the duration of an investigative stop. The Supreme Court counsels the use of "common sense and ordinary human experience" rather than rigid criteria.See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). The factual situation in this case involves decisions by police officers in the field, and the Court finds that twenty minutes is reasonable in relation to the purpose of the stop.
After consideration, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of qualified immunity based on the presence of arguable reasonable suspicion.
7. Arguable Probable Cause to Arrest
Probable cause to arrest is established when "the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances, that the suspect has committed or is about to commit an offense." See Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998). Arguable probable cause exists where a law enforcement officer "reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed, in light of the information the officer possessed." See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
Defendants detained Plaintiffs with the intent to arrest Plaintiffs. However, during Plaintiffs' detention on the scene of the investigatory stop, Defendants discovered that Plaintiffs' motor vehicle was in fact their own vehicle, and Plaintiffs were then released. The Court concludes therefore that the detention did not mature into an arrest. If there was an arrest, the same facts which provide the basis for the presence of arguable reasonable suspicion also provide the basis for the presence of arguable probable cause. The Court therefore grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to qualified immunity based on the presence of arguable probable cause.
8. Excessive Force
The Court found that Plaintiffs' detention was supported by the presence of arguable reasonable suspicion. The right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. See Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes that the typical arrest involves the use of some force and injury. See Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2000).
The Court notes that the determination of whether an officer used excessive force "turns on a number of factors, such as `the severity of the crime, whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat, and whether the suspect [was] resisting or fleeing. The use of force must be judged on a case by case basis. Because of the lack of a bright-line standard, `qualified immunity applies unless the application of the standard would inevitably lead' a reasonable officer in the defendant's position to conclude that the force was unlawful." See Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442 (11th Cir. 1997). The Court is required to evaluate the use of force "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." See Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993).
In this case, Defendants relied on mistaken information that Plaintiffs stole their motor vehicle, and Defendants executed a felony traffic stop. Both Defendants ordered Plaintiffs to exit the vehicle at gunpoint, and secured Plaintiffs in handcuffs. Plaintiffs did not suffer physical injuries, and complain of emotional damages based on the stop and detention.
The crime involved in this case is a felony. Plaintiffs did pose an immediate threat in that the area in which Plaintiffs were stopped is populated. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not resist Defendants upon being stopped. Because Plaintiffs were driving, and Defendants' knowledge was that the vehicle was stolen, Defendants could reasonably have thought that Plaintiffs were fleeing. Defendants' belief that the motor vehicle was stolen, Defendants' own safety, and the necessity of executing the felony stop in a populated area justifies the use of weapons in stopping Plaintiffs. The nature of the injuries known to Defendants was not such that it would inevitably lead a reasonable officer in their position, knowing what Defendants knew at the time they executed the investigatory stop, to conclude that the force used to restrain Plaintiffs was unlawful.
After consideration, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for summary Judgment as to this issue on the basis of qualified immunity.
9. Other Claims — Fourteenth Amendment, Fifth Amendment
After consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims are properly addressed under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also finds that no relief is available to Plaintiffs under the Fifth Amendment in that all Defendants are state actors. The Court therefore grants the Motion for Summary Judgment to Defendants as to these claims.
C. Count I — City of Lakeland
D. Count II — Polk County Sheriff's Office
Since the Court has granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to Defendants Mort and Rauch based on the presence of arguable reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Defendants, the Court also grants the Motion for Summary Judgment to Defendants City of Lakeland and Polk County Sheriff's Office. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 31) is granted. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for Defendants and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED.