Summary
noting that "[w]hile receipt of Social Security Disability benefits are not conclusive proof that [the plaintiff] was disabled, it is indicative of disability"
Summary of this case from U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.Opinion
No. 3:01-CV-1287-P
October 1, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is the following:
1. Defendant Medical City Dallas Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment, with brief in support and appendix, filed July 26, 2002;
2. Plaintiff Gonzales' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, with brief in support and appendix, filed August 21, 2002; and
3. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 9, 2002.
After a thorough review of the parties' briefs and the applicable law, for the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Vicki Gonzales ("Plaintiff" or "Gonzales") filed this action against Defendant Medical City Dallas Hospital ("Medical City") on July 3, 2001, alleging discriminatory practices in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., arising out of Medical City's refusal to rehire Gonzales on two occasions in 1999. Def.'s M.S.J. at 2.
On November 29, 1994, Plaintiff re-injured a previous back injury while at work. Id. at 5. Despite her attempts to work, Plaintiff was not able to complete a full shift of work again performing all required tasks and duties, due to her severe pain. Id. On July 5, 1995, Plaintiff resigned her position as Assistant Head Nurse, but remained an employee on medical leave until March 1996. Id. at 6. In March of 1996, Plaintiff formally resigned because she could no longer perform the essential functions of her job. Id. As part of her resignation, Plaintiff also entered into a Compromise and Settlement Agreement ("Settlement") whereby Plaintiff was paid $20,000 in exchange for a release of any then-existing claims arising out of her employment at Medical City or injuries she suffered while working at Medical City. Id. at 7. The Settlement was modified to include that if Plaintiff became physically able to perform the essential functions of the position of a registered nurse, Medical City would offer Plaintiff an opportunity for reemployment. Id. In June and July of 1999, Plaintiff applied for but was not offered employment at Medical City. These two instances form the basis from which Plaintiff claims Medical City discriminated against her based on her disability.
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of informing the district court of the basis for its belief that there is an absence of a genuine issue for trial, and of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate such an absence. Id. at 323. However, all evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
Once the party has made an initial showing, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party defending the motion for summary judgment cannot defeat the motion unless he provides specific facts that show the case presents a genuine issue of material fact, such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Mere assertions of a factual dispute unsupported by probative evidence will not prevent a summary judgment. Id. at 248-50; Abbot v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1993). In other words, conclusory statements, speculation and unsubstantiated assertions will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, and on which he bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; Washington v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 839 F.2d 1121, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988). A motion for summary judgment cannot be granted simply because there is no opposition, even if the failure to oppose it violates a local rule. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Adminstracion Central Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.3d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985). However, when the nonmovant fails to provide a response identifying the disputed issues of fact, the Court is entitled to accept the movant's description of the undisputed facts as prima facie evidence of its entitlement to judgment. Eversly v. Mbank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 173-174 (5th Cir. 1999); Nordar Holdings, Inc. v. Western Sec. (USA) Ltd., No. 3:96-CV-0427-H, 1996 WL 739019, *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 1996).
Finally, the Court has no duty to search the record for triable issues. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). "The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise matter in which the evidence supports his or her claim." Id. A party may not rely upon "unsubstantiated assertions" as competent summary judgment evidence. Id.
II. ADA EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
The ADA is a federal antidiscrimination statute designed to remove bafflers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available to persons without disabilities. Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 1996). A Plaintiff may establish a violation of the ADA by "presenting direct evidence [of discrimination] or by using the indirect method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in an ADA case, a plaintiff must show that he or she (1) suffers from a disability, (2) was qualified for the job, (3) was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) was replaced by a non-disabled person or treated less favorably than non-disabled employees. Diagle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995).
One of the pivotal issues in this case which defendant raises is whether or not Gonzales was disabled, so as to come within the protection of the ADA. According to the ADA, "Disability" means: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2). The Court will evaluate each part of the statutory definition in turn.
A. Substantially Limiting Impairment
As Defendant notes, Plaintiff concedes that she was not actually disabled when she applied for a nursing position in 1999. D's Rply. to Pl.'s Rsp. to D's M.S.J. at 3. Plaintiff recognizes that she was able to perform major life activities and essential job functions when she applied for a nursing position in 1999. Pl.'s Rsp to D's M.S.J. at 15-16. Accordingly, this Court will proceed to evaluate Plaintiffs case accepting that fact that Plaintiff was not disabled in 1999, at the time she applied for a nursing position.
B. Record of Disability
Gonzales claims that she has a record of impairment. Id. at 15. The EEOC regulations provide: "Has a record of such impairment means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (k). Therefore, not only must Gonzales show that she has a record of injury or impairment, but the evidence must demonstrate that her impairment substantially limited a major life activity. Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Systems of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 2001).
To show that she had a record of injury or impairment, Gonzales alleges that Medical City had a record of her disability, and that she was forced to resign because of it. Medical City had doctor's reports explaining Gonzales' condition and the treatment that Gonzales was undergoing. According to Dupre, the evidence must demonstrate that Gonzales' impairment substantially limited a major life activity. Id. The Fifth Circuit is instructive in Dupre holding that "not all impairments are serious enough to be considered disabilities under the statute." Id. at 614. The ADA does not define either "substantially limits" or "major life activity," but the EEOC has promulgated regulations under the ADA that define those terms. Id. To determine if an impairment is substantially limiting, the Court considers "(1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or expected duration, and (3) its permanent or expected permanent or long-term impact." Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App., § 1630.2(j)).
To support her claim, Gonzales states that she had a record of limitations on major life activities caused by her impairment, "including a limitation on walking, sitting, standing, pushing, pulling, and lifting, as well as long standing hip and back pain." Id. Furthermore, at the time of her resignation in 1996, she was walking with a cane, and could not sit for even short periods of time. Gonzales claims to have been experiencing substantial limitations in most of her daily activities including cooking, doing housework, washing clothes, grocery shopping and other tasks. Pl.'s App. at 3. Gonzales filed for disability benefits with the Social Security Administration and began receiving benefits in the Spring of 1998. Id. While receipt of Social Security Disability benefits are not conclusive proof that Gonzales was disabled, it is indicative of disability. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is a fact issue as to whether or not Gonzales was substantially limited in a major life activity. Thus, because the Court finds this to be a fact issue, the Court also finds that there is a fact issue as to the existence of a record of such impairment.
C. Regarded as Disabled
Gonzales also argues that Medical City regarded her as disabled. In order to be "regarded as" disabled, a plaintiff must: "(1) have a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities, but be treated as such by an employer; (2) have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, but only because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment; or (3) have no actual impairment at all, but be treated by an employer as having a substantially limiting impairment." McInnis v. Alamo Community College Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 2000).
It is undisputed that Medical City had knowledge of Gonzales' impairment when she left in 1996. That is precisely the reason why Gonzales resigned, because she could no longer perform the duties of her job. Furthermore, Medical City was aware of her condition from the doctors notes on file. Gonzales argues that the record would allow a jury to find that Medical City regarded her as having a substantially limiting impairment of a major life activity. An employer does not necessarily regard an employee as having a substantially limiting impairment simply because it believes the employee is incapable of performing a particular job. Dupre, 242 F.3d at 616. Defendant asserts that both of the hiring individuals considering Gonzales for employment did not consider Gonzales disabled at the time of Gonzales' re-application in 1999.
Defendant's own self-serving comments are not enough to evidence on which to base summary judgment, especially in light of the overwhelming indications of health problems on Gonzales' application and in her file. On the summary judgment record, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that Defendant did not regard Gonzales as disabled. Thus, the court finds that plaintiff has established her prima facie case, and next considers Defendant's asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
III. LEGITIMATE, NONDISCRIMINATORY REASON AND PRETEXT
Once the plaintiff has stated a prima facie case, the defendant must articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action that adversely affected the employee. Diagle, 70 F.3d at 396 (quoting Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)). While an employer need not prove the legitimate reason, it must produce some evidence to support it. Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, (1993)). If the employer produces any evidence "which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action," then the employer has satisfied its burden of production. Id. Once the employer has done this, the presumption of unlawful discrimination disappears and the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the articulated reason was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. McInnis v. Alamo Community College Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 282 (5th. Cir 2000).
Here, the Defendant claims that it did not hire Plaintiff because (1) Plaintiff refused to allow Medical City to contact her recent employer, (2) Plaintiff was not the most qualified applicant, and (3) Plaintiff (lid not have the requisite acute care experience. Def.'s M.S.J. at 2-3. After Defendant has proffered its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring Plaintiff, Plaintiff must then at least raise a fact issue that these reasons were unlawful pretexts for discrimination. The court finds that Gonzales has presented substantial evidence as proof that Defendant's reasons were pretextual.
In 1997, Gonzales had an interview with Ina Frank, in which Frank allegedly told Gonzales that Gonzales would be perfect for the job. Gonzales was called back for a second interview, and it is then that the interviewer, Linda Branson, said that the hospital was looking for an L.V.N. and not an R.N. During this conversation, Mary Prasher, the Nurse Recruiter for Human Resources at Medical City walked past the office. Gonzales contends that it was because of Prasher's knowledge of Gonzales' health problems that she was not hired. Later, Linda Branson allegedly told Gonzales that if she wanted a job at a Columbia Facility, she would have to apply somewhere where Gonzales' application would not be processed through Medical City. Later, in 1999, Gonzales spoke with Irma Bartlebaugh about a job at Medical City. Bartlebaugh allegedly told Gonzales to apply and said that she would hire Gonzales back "in a heartbeat." It is because of that conversation that Gonzales applied again in 1999.
Medical City contends that its primary reasons for not rehiring Gonzales was because Gonzales checked the box on her application indicating that Medical City could not contact her last employer. However, Gonzales was sent three letters stating why she would not be rehired, and had various conversations with Human Resources staff at Medical City, and at no time did anyone indicate that one of the primary reasons for not rehiring Gonzales was Gonzales' refusal to allow Medical City to contact her previous employer. While Medical City may be correct that it was not required to give Gonzales any reasons for not rehiring her, it nonetheless did give plaintiff some reasons for its actions. It is at least suspicious that the alleged primary reason for not rehiring Gonzales was not even mentioned.
Furthermore, as indicated previously, it is undisputed that Medical City had knowledge of Gonzales' impairment when she left in 1996. It is also undisputed that both of Gonzales' applications in 1999 stated she left her previous job in 1998 due to health reasons, and at least one application stated that Gonzales had been unemployed for the last fifteen months due, in part, to health reasons. Finally, Mary Prascher, one of the hiring individuals, testified that in response to Gonzales' initial application, Prascher went to the injury coordinator and asked about Gonzales' health. Prascher testified that she spoke to the injury coordinator to inquire whether Gonzales was eligible for rehire under the Settlement Agreement. However, viewing all of the evidence in light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is apparent that Defendant was aware of plaintiffs prior health history with Medical and was also aware of more current health issues Gonzales had as reflected in her applications in 1999. As noted above, Defendant's own self-serving comments claiming to have no knowledge of Gonzales' health problems are not enough evidence on which to base summary judgment, especially in light of the overwhelming indications of health problems on Gonzales' application and in her file.
In summary, the court finds there are fact issues with respect to whether plaintiff had a record of a disability, or was regarded as disabled by defendant. The court also finds that plaintiff has raised a fact issue with respect to whether defendant's articulated reasons for its actions were pretextual.
Defendant has filed a motion to strike certain summary judgment evidence submitted by plaintiff. That briefing has not yet been completed. Nonetheless, the court's decision as to summary judgment is not affected by the outcome of defendant's motion to strike. The court finds there are fact issues for trial. The issue of whether some or all of the evidence defendant seeks to strike is admissible at trial will be decided at trial.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, upon careful review of the parties' arguments, the summary judgment evidence, and the relevant law, for the reasons stated above, the court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.