Opinion
No. 06-17-00002-CV
08-22-2017
GEORGE MIGUEL GOMEZ, Appellant v. UNKNOWN ROE-PHILLIPS CO V, ET AL., Appellees
On Appeal from the 12th District Court Walker County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1627742 Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On February 10, 2016, Appellant George Miguel Gomez filed suit pro se and in forma pauperis against various employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID). Specifically, Gomez sued Sharon Roe-Phillips and unknown individuals employed by the TDCJ-CID, alleging that they had confiscated his "new balance[,] commissary[-]purchased tennis shoes." As a result of their purported actions, Gomez asked the trial court to order Appellees "to give payment in the total amount of value of said property . . . which ha[d] been wrongfully confiscated . . . ." Appellees filed a motion to dismiss maintaining, among other things, that Gomez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Following a hearing by submission, the trial court granted Appellees' motion and dismissed Gomez' suit as frivolous pursuant to Chapter 14. This appeal followed.
For the sake of clarity, we will refer to Roe-Phillips and the unknown defendants as "Appellees."
Gomez is currently housed in the Wynn Unit of the TDCJ-CID; however, he was housed in the Daniel Unit at the time the alleged cause of action occurred.
Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013). We are unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
Gomez estimated the value of the property "at approximately $49.00."
Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs inmate litigation in cases where an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs has been filed by an inmate. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002(a) (West 2017). The Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 14 to "control the flood of frivolous lawsuits being filed in courts of this State by prison inmates, consuming valuable judicial resources with little offsetting benefit." Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ). Section 14.005 allows a trial court to ensure that an inmate proceeding in forma pauperis has properly used the prison's grievance process when it is applicable to his claim. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005 (West 2017); Smith v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice-Inst. Div., 33 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied).
"The two-step 'Offender Grievance Program' is the sole source of administrative remedy for TDCJ inmates" housed in TDCJ-CID prison facilities. Crain v. Prasifka, 97 S.W.3d 867, 868 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied). An inmate has fifteen days from the date of the alleged incident on which his grievance is based to complete the step one offender grievance form and forward it to the unit's grievance supervisor. Wolf v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Inst. Div., 182 S.W.3d 449, 450-51 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, no writ). In the event the inmate is dissatisfied with the response in his step one grievance, he may appeal by filing a step two grievance within fifteen days of receiving his step one response. Crain, 97 S.W.3d at 868-69. An inmate has exhausted his administrative remedy upon receiving a written response to his step two grievance or in the event 180 days have expired from the date he filed his step two grievance. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 501.008(d) (West 2012).
Assuming an inmate exhausted his administrative remedies, he is then required to file his lawsuit with the trial court before the thirty-first day after the date he received the written decision from the prison grievance system regarding his step two grievance. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005(b). In addition, an inmate is required to attach to his complaint both: (1) an affidavit or unsworn declaration stating the date his grievance was filed and the date the written decision was received by the inmate; and (2) a copy of the written decision from the grievance system. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005(a). These procedural requirements serve at least two purposes. First, an inmate's compliance with the requirements will demonstrate that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, and second, the information provided by the inmate will allow the trial court to determine whether the inmate has filed his claim within the required time period. Garrett v. Borden, 283 S.W.3d 852, 853 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). In the event an inmate has not exhausted his administrative remedies, the trial court may dismiss his case. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005(b).
Because we find the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we vacate the trial court's order and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
"[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's power to decide a case." Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000). It is not presumed and it may not be waived. Tex. Ass'n Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993). Absent subject-matter jurisdiction, a court does not have authority to render judgment and must dismiss the claim without resolving the parties' substantive arguments. City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam). A trial court's judgment rendered without subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be considered a final judgment. Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000).
II. Standard of Review
Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction amounts to fundamental error and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Dallas Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied). An appellate court may address sua sponte the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. "Our standard for reviewing subject matter jurisdiction requires the pleader to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the cause." Id. at 469. We construe a plaintiff's pleadings liberally and examine the pleader's intent. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Whether an appellate court has jurisdiction is a question of law. Id. Accordingly, we evaluate the issue under a de novo standard of review. Mayhew v. Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998).
III. Discussion
Section 24.007 of the Texas Government Code states that the district court has jurisdiction provided by Article V, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.007(a) (West Supp. 2016). It goes on to say that "[a] district court has original jurisdiction of a civil matter in which the amount in controversy is more than $500, exclusive of interest." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.007(b).
Article V, Section 8, provides:
District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other laws on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body. District Court judges shall have the power to issue writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8.
In Texas, the sum of money in controversy between the parties to a civil suit is a substantial component of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Clonts v. Johnson, 294 S.W. 844, 846 (Tex. 1927). In general, unless a defendant specifically alleges the amount pled by the plaintiff is merely a sham for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction, the amount in controversy is determined by the plaintiff's petition. Bland, 228 S.W.3d at 554.
In his petition, Gomez sued for $49.00, the estimated value of the alleged confiscated property. That amount falls below the $500.00 amount in controversy requirement for a district court to acquire jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide the merits of Gomez' case. It should have dismissed his lawsuit for want of jurisdiction without addressing whether the suit was frivolous under Chapter 14. Our jurisdiction of the merits of an appeal extends no further than that of the trial court from which the appeal was taken. Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied). Because the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction, we may not address the merits of Gomez' claims in this appeal.
We, therefore, vacate the trial court's order and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
If an appellate court renders a judgment that the trial court should have rendered, that judgment becomes the judgment of both courts. Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1987).
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice Date Submitted: July 18, 2017
Date Decided: August 22, 2017