Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC340829, Terry Green, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of John Y. Igarashi and John Y. Igarashi for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Office of John M. Kalajian and John M. Kalajian for Defendants and Respondents.
KRIEGLER, J.
This appeal concerns plaintiff Robert Gomez’s claim that he was wrongfully terminated by defendant Lee Armstrong Co., Inc. (LAC) in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleged the same claim against LAC’s owner, defendant Steve Armstrong (Armstrong), under an alter ego theory. According to plaintiff’s allegations, he had a long-term employment relationship with LAC as a floor-installer. Twice, when pulling up tiles or carpet on an LAC jobsite, he encountered the carcinogen asbestos. Plaintiff notified his supervisors and refused to do additional work on those projects. As a result, he contends LAC reduced his work hours before firing him for his asbestos complaints, using the pretext that he refused to show up to work when ordered at a time when the employer knew he had conflicting childcare responsibilities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of LAC and Armstrong, finding insufficient evidence as to various elements of plaintiff’s claims. As relevant to this appeal, the trial court found no substantial evidence of the required nexus between the public policy of preventing an employee’s exposure to asbestos and plaintiff’s termination as an at-will employee, and no evidentiary basis for disregarding LAC’s corporate status.
Plaintiff has abandoned a second cause of action for breach of implied contract.
In his timely appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because defendants failed to (1) comply with the procedural requirement that a moving party’s separate statement of undisputed facts separately identify each cause of action and each supporting material fact claimed to be without dispute, and (2) present evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proof to plaintiff to show the existence of a material issue of disputed fact, leaving genuine issues of disputed facts as to all the elements of plaintiff’s wrongful dismissal claim, as well as to his alter ego allegation as to Armstrong. Plaintiff also contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion for reconsideration.
Our independent review demonstrates that summary judgment was properly granted and there was no abuse of discretion in denying the reconsideration motion. We therefore affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff worked as an LAC employee installing floors. “On several occasions,” in that capacity, while “pull[ing] up tiles, carpet and/or other substances,” plaintiff “came into contact with” asbestos. On each such occasion, plaintiff immediately informed his supervisor of the asbestos contamination. When Armstrong denied the presence of asbestos at the job site, plaintiff had samples tested. The test results from an independent laboratory were positive for asbestos. Because of his frequent complaints, Armstrong relieved plaintiff from his “head or lead position at many sites” and gradually diminished plaintiff’s work hours until LAC terminated his employment on approximately May 31, 2005.
Plaintiff cited California Code of Regulations, title 8, sections 1528 and 1529, as expressing this state’s public policy of protecting employees from harmful exposure to hazardous, cancer-causing substances including asbestos. Plaintiff alleged on information and belief that he was terminated from his employment because he refused to work in the presence of asbestos, in violation of public policy, which caused him to suffer injuries, including lost wages and employment benefits.
Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion
Defendants moved for summary judgment as to both claims alleged in the complaint; Armstrong contending there was no triable issue as to the existence of an employment relationship between him and plaintiff, and LAC contending there were no triable issues as to specific elements of plaintiff’s claims, including the existence of the required nexus between the alleged public policy violation and plaintiff’s termination. According to LAC, the termination was motivated by plaintiff’s refusal to show up for work as requested.
Concerning the alter ego allegations, defendants presented evidence that LAC was incorporated in 1989 and was in good standing at all relevant times. LAC maintained required workers’ compensation and liability insurance, along with its contractor’s license. As to plaintiff’s employment status, defendants presented evidence that LAC hired plaintiff in 1996 on an “at will” basis.
Plaintiff knew older buildings typically had floor tiles containing encapsulated asbestos. Throughout his career with LAC and other employers, plaintiff frequently installed new flooring over such asbestos-containing tiles. The first time plaintiff told Armstrong that he did not want to work in the presence of asbestos was in connection with an October 2004 project for the Boeing company in Huntington Beach. At that project, plaintiff did not do any demolition work. Rather, he was assigned to install flooring. As plaintiff admitted, he “did not remove any of the asbestos floor tiles [at the Boeing site] at the direction of [LAC].”
According to plaintiff’s discovery responses: A few days later, in a lunch meeting, Armstrong told plaintiff that although there was asbestos at the Boeing facility, LAC did not permit its employees to leave a jobsite until replacements arrived. Armstrong told plaintiff that he need not work at the Boeing site or any other where he did not “feel comfortable”—he would assign plaintiff to other jobs.
On the afternoon of Tuesday, May 31, 2005, LAC assi plaintiff to install flooring at Cedars-Sinai Hospital the next day. Plaintiff admitted that he had worked at the hospital on the prior Wednesday afternoon. That project would not expose plaintiff to any toxic substances. Plaintiff telephoned LAC personnel on May 31, informing Armstrong and Dan Grimes, “I’ll pass,” when they requested plaintiff to report to the hospital worksite. Plaintiff contends he was then terminated. The following day, plaintiff took a temporary employment position as a floor-installer, earning the same hourly rate as he did with LAC.
Most significantly for purposes of this appeal, defendants argue summary judgment was appropriate because (1) there was no evidence to support liability as to Armstrong on an alter ego theory, and (2) there was no evidence that plaintiff’s termination was motivated by improper public policy concerns—rather, plaintiff was an at-will employee who was terminated for refusing to show up, as requested, to a work assignment.
Plaintiff’s Opposition
On January 27, 2004, plaintiff was the supervisor on an LAC flooring project. Plaintiff perceived a danger of releasing asbestos in the course of pulling up old carpet. He instructed the crew to tape the carpet down instead. Armstrong arrived at the work site and ordered the crew to continue pulling up the carpet. Plaintiff and another crew member refused, but the others continued to work. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s separate statement that Armstrong “expressly ordered” plaintiff “to pull-up asbestos tiles” at that time. Plaintiff had testified at his deposition that he never received an LAC work order to demolish asbestos tile.
Plaintiff asserts that asbestos-containing tiles had been glued to the carpet and were being pulled up with the carpet. When such tiles are pulled up, there is a danger that asbestos will be released. However, his record citation does not support those assertions. Nor do plaintiff’s record citations support the quoted rebuke he attributes to Armstrong. “To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.]” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
The following month, plaintiff received a “retaliatory” performance review from LAC, identifying specific work areas in which he needed to improve, including “problem solving as a supervisor” and the need to increase productivity at job sites. Armstrong noted plaintiff’s “problems with authority” and the importance of encouraging plaintiff to understand the importance of “team work.” Plaintiff argued the timing and nature of the evaluation demonstrated an obvious retaliatory motive. Plaintiff also claimed that over the following months, LAC passed him over for work assignments and “stripped” him of his “lead” position.
When plaintiff arrived at a Boeing company building in Huntington Beach, he saw a 100-foot by 12-foot area of asbestos-containing tile that had been “pulled up.” Plaintiff told the crew to stop work. They ignored his request, and plaintiff left the jobsite. By virtue of his safety training while an LAC employee, plaintiff believed picking up asbestos tile was wrongful and hazardous. The trial court sustained defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s opposition statements that LAC ordered him to work in a location where “asbestos tiles had been ripped and scraped, without proper asbestos abatement” such that asbestos fragments were “open to the air.” Defendants had objected on the grounds that plaintiff’s discovery responses established that he had no personal knowledge of the demolition process at the site and no expertise to render such an opinion. A few days later, plaintiff returned to the jobsite, found asbestos tiles in dumpsters, and took samples for testing. The test results were positive as to the flooring tiles and adhesive.
Plaintiff purports to quote extensively from profanity laden rebukes by Armstrong pertaining to the Boeing incident. As defendants point out, however, plaintiff fails to include record citations for almost all of those quotations. We therefore refuse to consider that supposed evidence. As is well established, “any reference in the brief must be supported by a citation, regardless of where in the brief that reference appears.” (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239, fn. 16; Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979 [reviewing court may disregard contentions unsupported by citation to the record]; Aguimatang v. California State Lottery (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 769, 796 [reviewing court may disregard evidentiary contentions unsupported by proper page cites to the record].) As to the one phrase attributed to Armstrong that does have a record citation, plaintiff misquotes the record by adding expletives not contained in the record source.
On March 19, 2005, Rodney Marshall, an LAC employee, telephoned plaintiff from a jobsite, telling plaintiff that they encountered asbestos (“hot”) tile. Plaintiff responded that they should cease work. Plaintiff telephoned Armstrong and informed him that they could not continue work on that job. Two months later, when LAC assigned plaintiff to work on a Wednesday night in May, plaintiff declined, saying, “I’ll pass.” Plaintiff asserted LAC’s request was retaliatory because LAC had been “repeatedly told and knew” plaintiff had child custody obligations on Wednesday nights, and therefore could not work on those nights. Accordingly, his termination for refusing to work that night was a mere pretext.
Again, because plaintiff fails to include any record citation, we refuse to consider Rodney’s supposed statement to plaintiff concerning the completion of that project.
Concerning the alter ego allegations, plaintiff did not dispute that LAC was in good standing at all relevant times and maintained required workers’ compensation and liability insurance, along with its contractor’s license. Plaintiff’s evidence that Armstrong was the alter ego of LAC consisted of plaintiff’s testimony that he was paid for doing work at Armstrong’s home (but there was no evidence as to the source of that payment) and that Armstrong was the sole shareholder of LAC.
Trial Court Rulings
At a hearing on December 8, 2006, the parties extensively argued the summary judgment motion, and the trial court took the matter under submission after expressing its inclination to grant the motion. On December 13, the court issued a written decision, granting summary judgment as to both defendants. Among other things, the court found no triable issue of fact as to a nexus between plaintiff’s complaints about having to work in the presence of asbestos and his termination. It also found no evidentiary basis for disregarding LAC’s corporate status under an alter ego theory.
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration with evidence not presented in opposition to the summary judgment motion, including: (1) deposition testimony taken on December 4, 2006, from LAC employee Roberto Caudillo concerning the Boeing incident; (2) deposition testimony taken November 21, 2006, from LAC employee Rodney Marshall concerning the March 19, 2005 incident; and (3) a declaration executed on November 26, 2006, by LAC employee Marco Gonzales concerning the Boeing incident. The trial court denied the motion, finding the additional facts presented did not demonstrate a triable issue of fact “on the key issue identified in” its summary judgment ruling—the absence of a nexus between the public policy violation and plaintiff’s termination.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of both defendants and in denying his motion for reconsideration. We first assess the summary judgment ruling.
Summary Judgment Ruling
“‘A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.] In the trial court, once a moving defendant has “shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established,” the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff “may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings . . . but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action . . . .” [Citations .]’ [Citation.]” (Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 137, 143 (Evard), citing Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476-477.)
Initially, plaintiff argues the trial court should have denied the summary judgment motion on procedural grounds because defendants failed to comply with the requirement that a moving party’s separate statement of undisputed facts separately identify each cause of action and each supporting material fact claimed to be without dispute (see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)). We review such contentions for abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1208 (Parkview) [“The trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment because the opposing party failed to comply with the requirements for a separate statement . . . is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”].)
This rule was renumbered and modified, effective January 1, 2007. At the time of trial, the substance of rule 3.1350 was contained in rule 342.
There was no abuse of discretion. The trial court reasonably found the moving papers gave adequate notice of the specific bases on which each defendant sought summary judgment. “The requirement of a separate statement from the moving party and a responding statement from the party opposing summary judgment serves two functions: to give the parties notice of the material facts at issue in the motion and to permit the trial court to focus on whether those facts are truly undisputed.” (Parkview, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210.) As the trial court found, defendants’ joint statement adequately served those functions. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the record does not indicate the alleged lack of specificity in the moving papers caused the trial court to misallocate the burden of proof in reaching its summary judgment decision.
Plaintiff also argues that defendants failed to present evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proof to plaintiff to show the existence of a material issue of disputed fact. In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, the California Supreme Court recognized a tort cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Tameny established an exception to the principle that an employer may discharge an at-will employee for any reason by holding that an employer may not do so when the discharge violates fundamental principles of public policy. (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71; Jersey v. John Muir Medical Center (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)
Plaintiff’s action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy required him to prove: (1) he was employed by LAC; (2) LAC discharged him; (3) “the alleged violation of public policy was a motivating reason for the discharge”; and (4) the discharge caused him harm. (Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623, 641, citing, Jud. Council of Cal. Civ. Jury Instns. (2004) CACI No. 2430; BAJI Nos. 10.06, 10.41, 10.42 & 10.43.) In this appeal, we focus on the third element, which requires a nexus between the employee’s termination and the employer’s alleged public policy violation.
Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of whether the alleged asbestos-related misconduct by defendants amounted to an actionable public policy violation (defendants presented evidence that LAC’s flooring activities were exempt from the relevant regulations).
Here, as the trial court found, defendants presented evidence that LAC terminated plaintiff because he was an at-will employee who refused a work assignment that entailed no potential exposure to asbestos—a justification that was independent of plaintiff’s complaints concerning potential exposure to asbestos on the jobsite. Defendants submitted evidence that: (1) LAC gave plaintiff 24 hours’ notice of his assignment to install flooring at Cedars-Sinai Hospital on Wednesday, June 1, 2005; (2) plaintiff had worked at that site on the prior Wednesday afternoon; (3) the project would not expose plaintiff to any toxic substances; (4) plaintiff refused the June 1 assignment, telling LAC personnel, “I’ll pass.” That evidence showed plaintiff could not establish the third element of his wrongful termination action, and shifted the burden to plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue—a burden requiring plaintiff to set forth specific facts to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to that element of his cause of action. (See Evard, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 143.)
Plaintiff presented no substantial evidence to dispute defendants’ evidentiary showing that plaintiff was an at-will employee. He does not dispute that his refusal of the Cedars-Sinai work assignment would justify his termination as such an employee.
Plaintiff argues he identified evidence which supported a reasonable inference that LAC’s justification for his termination was a mere pretext. We disagree. If, as was the case here, the employer meets its burden by showing a legitimate reason for the challenged action, the burden shifts to the employee to “demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer’s stated reasons were untrue or pretextual . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.” (Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038, italics omitted [discrimination case] (Cucuzza).) “In order to raise an issue as to the employer’s credibility, the employee must set forth specific facts demonstrating ‘“such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence.’”’” (Ibid., italics omitted; Villaneuva v. City of Colton (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1195.) While it is true a plaintiff need not present direct evidence of the employer’s improper motive, speculation will not suffice. (Cucuzza, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1038.) “[E]ven though we may expect a plaintiff to rely on inferences rather than direct evidence to create a factual dispute on the question of motive, a material triable controversy is not established unless the inference is reasonable. And an inference is reasonable if, and only if, it implies the unlawful motive is more likely than defendant’s proffered explanation.” (Ibid., citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 858.)
To raise an inference of improper motive, plaintiff points to his performance review in February 19, 2005, more that two weeks after the January incident. Plaintiff asserts the timing and nature of the evaluation demonstrated a retaliatory motive. As defendants point out, however, plaintiff testified at his deposition that all the LAC floor installers were evaluated at that same time. Additionally, plaintiff’s evaluation was not entirely negative; plaintiff received high marks with regard to his adherence to company safety policy, knowledge of the trade, individual working skills, timeliness, and thoroughness in completing projects. Among other things, plaintiff was cited as “display[ing] a high quality of craftsmanship” and “an overall good attitude” shown in his positive interaction with clients and prompt attendance at job sites. Plaintiff was recognized as “an excellent company employee” who “[a]lways has the company’s best interests in mind”—“a valued employee,” who “could improve on a few areas.” Therefore, because the evaluation did not take place in close proximity to plaintiff’s asbestos-related complaint, all installers were evaluated at that time, and the evaluation had no apparent bearing on plaintiff’s termination more than three months later, it provides no substantial evidence of improper motivation by LAC.
Plaintiff also argues a reasonable inference of improper motive arises out of his assertion that in the months after the January incident, LAC passed him over for work assignments and “stripped” him of his “lead” position. However, the deposition testimony on which plaintiff relied for that assertion showed that LAC changed its policy so that all the installers took turns being “lead man.” Moreover, plaintiff failed to identify any specific lost work opportunity, and there was no evidence that plaintiff suffered any loss of income or benefits as a result of those alleged actions.
As the trial court found, plaintiff never alleged the “retaliatory” performance review was independently actionable. Rather, plaintiff relied on it to support an inference that his subsequent termination was motivated by improper motives.
Finally, plaintiff points to his evidence that it was “only” two months after the March incident, when LAC assigned plaintiff to work on a Wednesday, at which time he “passed.” Plaintiff asserted LAC’s request was retaliatory because LAC had been “repeatedly told and knew” plaintiff had child custody obligations on Wednesday nights and, therefore, could not work on those nights. As support for those factual assertions, plaintiff relied on his response to defendants’ second set of form interrogatories, directed to defendants’ Request for Admission No. 36, in which plaintiff denied that he “worked Wednesday afternoons and evenings throughout his employment with defendant [LAC].” In that interrogatory response, plaintiff asserted Armstrong and Grimes of LAC “were aware that” in the 11 years plaintiff worked for the company, he “did not work Wednesday evenings and nights because he had custody of his children.” During his course of employment, he would assist on those nights on “extremely rare occasions (less than twice per year)” and “only as a favor to Armstrong.”
However, as defendants point out, plaintiff testified at his deposition that his child custody obligations were defined by a written visitation order, arising out of his divorce decree. Plaintiff was already divorced at the time be was hired by LAC, and at that time, plaintiff was agreeable to working nights and weekends. The visitation order, produced by plaintiff in discovery, provided that he had custody of his children on Wednesdays from the end of the school day until 7:45 p.m. LAC had scheduled plaintiff to begin work at Cedars-Sinai Hospital at 10:00 p.m. that Wednesday night. Plaintiff had previously worked at that hospital “dozens of times” and had never declined to do so. It took him approximately 30 minutes to drive there. At the time plaintiff told LAC personnel he would “pass” on the work assignment, neither he nor any family member was sick, and he was aware of no family emergency. At no point did plaintiff give LAC a reason for refusing the work assignment. The only thing plaintiff remembered Armstrong saying in response was, “I read you loud and clear.” Plaintiff received no more work assignments and assumed he was fired.
Therefore, as the trial court found, plaintiff’s bare assertion that LAC was aware of his childcare obligations was mere speculation—indeed, plaintiff offered no testimony that he informed LAC about those obligations. Moreover, from his own uncontradicted testimony, it was clear that his child care obligations would not have affected his work availability on the night he “passed.” On the evidence presented below, there was nothing to support a reasonable inference that defendants’ asserted reason for termination was a pretext for discharging plaintiff because of his asbestos-related complaints.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 138 (Sada) is misplaced. In Sada, the terminated employee (a Mexican-American nurse) had received numerous favorable employment evaluations until two days after she filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing implicating hospital personnel. “In light of several factors—the timing of the Medical Center’s termination decision (i.e., a few days after [her supervisor] learned about Sada’s DFEH complaint), the identity of the person making the decision (i.e., a supervisor who made anti-Mexican remarks before and after rejecting Sada for full-time employment), and Sada’s job performance before termination (i.e., praiseworthy until [the supervisor] ordered a ‘reevaluation’)—we conclude that Sada raised a triable issue as to whether the Medical Center terminated her in retaliation for her DFEH complaint.” (Sada, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 157.) As we have shown, plaintiff failed to present any evidence casting substantial doubt on the legitimate termination reason presented by defendants. Again, “an issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not created by speculation or conjecture.” (Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 807.)
Plaintiff’s alter ego allegations as to Armstrong fare no better. “Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its stockholders, officers and directors, with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations.” (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538.) However, “‘[a]s the separate personality of the corporation is a statutory privilege, it must be used for legitimate business purposes and must not be perverted. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300.) “A corporate identity may be disregarded—the ‘corporate veil’ pierced—where an abuse of the corporate privilege justifies holding the equitable ownership of a corporation liable for the actions of the corporation. [Citation.] Under the alter ego doctrine, then, when the corporate form is used to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose, the courts will ignore the corporate entity and deem the corporation’s acts to be those of the persons or organizations actually controlling the corporation, in most instances the equitable owners. [Citations.]” (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 538.) Two general requirements must be met before the alter ego doctrine will be invoked: (1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist; and (2) the result will be inequitable if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone. (Ibid.)
As shown above, defendants presented evidence that LAC was a legal corporation in good standing at all relevant times. Plaintiff had no contrary evidence. As to the first alter ego factor, plaintiff merely presented evidence that Armstrong was the sole shareholder of LAC, and plaintiff had been paid for doing work at Armstrong’s home—without any evidence that LAC paid him. There was no evidence of the second factor. Plaintiff’s evidentiary showing was entirely deficient.
Denial of Reconsideration Motion
Plaintiff also contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling. We review a trial court’s order denying a reconsideration motion for an abuse of discretion. (Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1, 16; Lucas v. Santa Maria Public Airport Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1027.) Under Civil Procedure Code section 1008, subdivision (a), a motion for reconsideration may only be made “based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” (McPherson v. City of Manhattan Beach (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1265.) Without abusing its discretion, the trial court could reasonably find plaintiff did not justify his failure to present the additional evidence at the summary judgment hearing. Most importantly, as the trial court explained, consideration of plaintiff’s “new” evidence would have entailed no different result on the critical issues—the nexus between his termination and the public policy violation and Armstrong’s personal liability.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J.,MOSK, J.