Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-0415-CMC-TER
01-25-2019
JOSEPH GOLSON, Plaintiff, v. LT. MAMIE THOMAS YELDELL and OFFICER BOBBY LOU NEW, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Presently before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25). Because he is proceeding pro se, Plaintiff was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to the moving Defendant's motion could result in dismissal of his case. After two motions for extension of time, Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 37). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Yeldell and New were transport officers at McCormick Prison on February 24, 2015, when Plaintiff sustained an injury to his head after falling backward as he was entering a van. Compl. p. 5 of 14. He alleges that he was taken to McCormick Infirmary and "they" ordered a brain scan but failed to inform Plaintiff of their findings. Compl. p. 5 of 14. He alleges that the "medical doctor" knew of the spot on his brain but provided only "cursory" medical treatment, which amounted to no treatment at all. Compl. pp. 5-6 of 14. As a result of this spot on his brain, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered blindness in his right eye for three days, and numbness in his left arm and fingers, which still exists today. Compl. p. 7 of 14. He asserts that he has not received any treatment for these symptoms. Compl. p. 7 of 14. He seeks $500,000 in compensatory damages, $500,000 in punitive damages, and "an Order from the court for a brain scan to determine the progress of the spot on my brain." Compl. p. 7 of 14.
Plaintiff filed motions to amend to add the "medical doctor," John B. McRee, as a Defendant in this action. Although not a named party, Dr. McRee submitted an affidavit regarding Plaintiff's medical care as alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons discussed above, allowing Plaintiff to amend his complaint to add John B. McRee as a defendant would be futile. See Edell & Assocs., P.C. v. Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, 264 F.3d 424, 446 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999)) (noting that leave to amend is properly denied when amendment would prejudice the opposing party, the moving party has exhibited bad faith, or amendment would be futile). Thus, his motions to amend (ECF Nos. 19, 20, 38) are DENIED.
Defendants Yeldell and New aver that on the morning of February 24, 2015, they were scheduled to transport the Plaintiff to a medical appointment. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 3 (Ex. to Def. Motion); New Aff. ¶ 3 (Ex. to Def. Motion). Any time an inmate is transported from SCDC, policy requires that he have both belly chains and leg irons secured prior to taking him to the van. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 6; New Aff. ¶ 4. Officer New secured the leg irons and belly chains on Plaintiff before escorting him outside. New Aff. ¶ 4.
Officer New was assisting Plaintiff towards the van and also holding an umbrella, since it was raining that morning. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 8; New Aff. ¶ 7. As Officer New grabbed the step stool from the van, he told Plaintiff to wait for him to assist him into the van. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 8; New Aff. ¶ 8. Plaintiff tried to get into the van without assistance. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 9; New Aff. ¶ 9. Plaintiff slipped as he was trying to get into the van. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 9; New Aff. ¶ 9. Plaintiff avers that New knew that it was raining outside and that Plaintiff was feeble, yet he allowed Plaintiff to try to get in the van on his own. Pl. Aff. ¶ 7 (Ex. to Pl. Resp.). Plaintiff also avers that he fell once before in 2014 while in the care of Lt. Yeldell and, thus, she should have told Officer New of him falling previously and stayed to help him get in the van. Pl. Aff. ¶¶ 4,6.
Yeldell came outside after the fall and asked if Plaintiff needed medical care. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 10-11; New Aff. ¶¶ 11-12. Plaintiff refused medical care, but Yeldell told Officer New to take him by medical anyway to be cleared, and also to get him dry clothes since his clothes had gotten wet sitting in the mud. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 11; New Aff. ¶ 13.
Plaintiff asserts that he was taken to the McCormick medical infirmary by a wheelchair and was given something for swelling on his wrist and his blood pressure and heart rate were checked. Pl. Resp. p. 2. Plaintiff told them he had a blackout for a moment, and they told him it was probably related to his diabetes. Pl. Resp. p. 2. Medical cleared him to go on the transport. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 13; New Aff. ¶ 14. He was also given dry clothes. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 13; New Aff. ¶ 14. They then began the transport to the appointment.
Both officers testified that Plaintiff did not need assistance to walk back inside. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 12; New Aff. ¶ 13.
Since they were running late, Defendants contacted the place they were going, and were told they were too late for the appointment and it would have to be rescheduled. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 14; New Aff. ¶ 15. As a result, they turned around to go back to McCormick. Both officers also testified that they spoke to the Plaintiff during the transport, and at no point did he state that he was hurt or needed medical attention. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 15; New Aff. ¶ 16. When they returned, Officer New escorted Plaintiff back to his dorm, and at no time did Plaintiff request medical attention or indicate that he was injured in any way. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 16; New Aff. ¶ 17. He also did not appear to have any difficulty walking into the prison yard when they returned. Yeldell Aff. ¶ 16; New Aff. ¶ 17.
With respect to the medical treatment he received, Dr. McRee avers that even though the incident occurred on February 24, 2015, and Plaintiff was given insulin daily in the diabetic clinic, which means he had daily access to the medical staff, he did not mention any problems from this incident to medical until March 30, 2015, over a month after this incident. McRee Aff. ¶¶ 9-12 (Ex. to Def. Motion). In fact, Plaintiff received a full assessment in medical on March 13, 2015, and was specifically asked about any ongoing problems, yet he did not mention this fall or any alleged injuries from the fall. McRee Aff. ¶ 11. However, Plaintiff asserts that this assessment was in the diabetic clinic, and the medical staff is strict about requiring inmates to sign up for sick call to address problems unrelated to diabetes. Pl. Resp. p. 5. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not sign up for sick call until March 30, 2015. When he complained to medical on March 30, 2015, about alleged problems from this incident, he was assessed and found to have no objective symptoms to match his complaints. McRee Aff. ¶ 12.
Dr. McRee avers that a brain scan was ordered on June 4, 2015, due to symptoms that were possibly stroke related, and not related to this incident. McRee Aff. ¶¶ 15-17. The results, which McRee avers were explained to Plaintiff, indicated an old blood clot, which required no further treatment. McRee Aff. ¶¶ 15-17. Plaintiff returned to sick call on June 18, 2015, complaining of continued tingling in his hands and face, and was told that the results of his brain scan were normal. Pl. Resp. p. 7. Plaintiff was ultimately diagnosed with Bells Palsy. McRee Aff. ¶¶ 18-19, 22. Plaintiff admits that he was told of the Bells Palsy on June 23, 2015, but claims he was given that diagnosis because it was cheaper to treat than "trying to explore more about the blot clot on my brain." Pl. Resp. pp. 6, 9. Dr. McRee avers that none of these findings were related in any way to Plaintiff's fall. McRee Aff. ¶¶ 18-19, 22.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet "the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits." Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
IV. DISCUSSION
In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts pursuant to § 1983 that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety and to his medical needs. Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). A legal action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). To be successful on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
A. Deliberate Indifference to Safety
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety because Lt. Yeldell knew Plaintiff had fallen before and both Defendants knew that it was raining and he was feeble when he attempted to get into the transport van yet they failed to take any precautions to protect him from falling. Any claim brought challenging the conditions of confinement is properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In order to state a claim of constitutional significance regarding prison conditions, a plaintiff must present facts demonstrating that the challenged conditions resulted in a deprivation of a basic human need that was objectively "sufficiently serious" and that, subjectively, the defendant prison officials acted with a sufficiently "culpable state of mind" with regard to the conditions. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). To satisfy the objective element of a conditions claim, the plaintiff must show that he has sustained a serious or significant mental or physical injury as a result of the challenged conditions. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1380-1381 (4th Cir.1993). To satisfy the subjective element of a conditions claim, plaintiff must show that the defendant officials acted with deliberate indifference toward the risk of harm.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to present evidence sufficient to show that he sustained a serious or significant mental or physical injury as a result of his fall on February 24, 2015. Plaintiff complains that he suffered a brain injury as a result of the fall, but fails to present sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact with respect to that assertion. Plaintiff first complained of memory and coordination issues a month after the fall, on March 30, 2015. On May 29, 2015, Plaintiff complained of numbness and burning to his arm, face, and leg, and exhibited signs of a possible stroke. As a result, Dr. McRee ordered an MRI. The MRI showed an old blood clot, which Dr. McRee opined would not have caused the symptoms Plaintiff was experiencing. He also opined that the blood clot would not have been caused by the fall on February 24, 2015. Although Plaintiff disagrees with Dr. McRee regarding the significance or cause of the blood clot, he fails to present evidence to create an issue of fact. Thus, he fails to satisfy the objective element of his claim, that is, that he sustained a serious or significant injury as a result of his fall.
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff could satisfy the objective element, he must then show deliberate indifference. "Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it." Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir.1999). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) It is a subjective standard; the official must know the facts from which an inference of serious harm could be drawn and must actually draw the inference. Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 389 (4th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
The Fourth Circuit has explained that liability under the deliberate indifference standard requires two showings:
First, the evidence must show that the official in question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm. It is not enough that the officers should have recognized it; they actually must have perceived the risk. Second, the evidence must show that the official in question subjectively recognized that his actions were inappropriate in light of that risk. As with the subjective awareness element, it is not enough that the official should have recognized that his actions were inappropriate; the official actually must have recognized that his actions were insufficient.Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir.2004) (emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff asserts that Yeldell was aware that he previously fell during a transport and, thus, she was deliberately indifferent to his safety by not being present to help Plaintiff into the van. However, Plaintiff fails to show that he had any requirements for extra accommodations or assistance as a result of prior falls. Nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff needed Yeldell's assistance in particular or that he needed more than one officer to assist him into the van. In addition, although Plaintiff disputes that New instructed him to wait on him to assist him, it is undisputed that Plaintiff attempted to enter the van on his own. He does not allege that New forced him to enter the van on his own or that he asked New for assistance and New refused. To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show "more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36. A plaintiff must show that a prison official "wantonly and obdurately failed to take precautions for his safety in deliberate indifference to a specific known risk of harm...." Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793 (4th Cir.1987). Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants "wantonly and obdurately" failed to take precautions for his safety. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate on this claim.
B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants failed to provide him with appropriate medical care following his fall. As an initial matter, neither Yeldell or New are medical personnel. To bring a claim alleging the denial of medical treatment against non-medical prison personnel, an inmate must show that such officials were personally involved with a denial of treatment, deliberately interfered with a prison doctor's treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physician's misconduct. Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Prison personnel may rely on the opinion of the medical staff as to the proper course of treatment. Id. Plaintiff does not present facts sufficient to show that these Defendants were personally involved in denying treatment, deliberately interfered with medical treatment, or were indifferent to a physician's misconduct. Plaintiff admits that Defendants took him for a medical evaluation after his fall. Plaintiff does not allege that these Defendants had any other involvement with his subsequent medical treatment. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff's medical indifference claim against Yeldell and New.
Plaintiff names no other Defendants in this action, however, he has filed motions to add Dr. McRee as a Defendant. Defendants have submitted an affidavit of Dr. McRee as well as Plaintiff's medical records, which show that adding McRee as a defendant would be futile because Plaintiff cannot present sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment as to a claim against McRee.
As with the deliberate indifference to safety claim above, to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must show that he had serious medical needs and that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)). A "serious medical need" is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). To constitute deliberate indifferent to a serious medical need, "the treatment [a prisoner receives] must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825. 1985)). However, "mere '[d]isagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care' are not actionable absent exceptional circumstances." Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 840 (4th Cir. 1985)).
For the same reasons discussed above, Plaintiff fails to meet the objective prong by showing that he had a serious medical need. Further, the record reflects that Dr. McRee addressed Plaintiff's symptoms and treated them. Plaintiff was seen right after the fall. He does not assert that he complained of symptoms at that time and medical personnel failed to treat him. When he later complained of pain resulting from the fall, he was treated with pain medication. When Plaintiff later complained of numbness and burning and exhibited signs of a possible stroke, he was scheduled for an MRI and seen by an outside doctor, who diagnosed him with Bells Palsy, which Dr. McRee opines was unrelated to his fall. Although Plaintiff complains that Dr. McRee did not inform him of or treat him for the blood clot seen on the MRI, he fails to dispute Dr. McRee's finding that his symptoms were unrelated to the blood clot, and the blood clot was unrelated to the fall. The record reflects that Plaintiff continued to receive treatment. However, Plaintiff feels the treatment he received was not appropriate because he was given a false diagnosis. As stated above, however, he fails to present evidence to support this theory. Further, "[a]lthough the Constitution does require that prisoners be provided with a certain minimum level of medical treatment, it does not guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of his choice." Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir.1988). Prison officials implement the type and amount of medical treatment at their discretion. See Allah v. Hayman, 442 F. App'x 632, 635 (3d Cir.2011) (holding that deliberate indifference standard "requires much more" than taking issue with the "amount and kind of medical care" an inmate received); Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1014 (7th Cir.2006) (finding that a prison doctor who prescribed non-surgical means of treating an inmate's hernia was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's medical needs where the doctor formed a professional opinion, other doctors agreed, and the inmate continued to have associated abdominal pain); Faison v. Rosado, 129 F. App'x 490, 492 (11th Cir.2005) (noting that although a prisoner "might not agree with the method of treatment provided, matters of medical judgment do not give rise to a § 1983 claim"). Thus, Plaintiff fails to show his constitutional rights were violated with respect to the medical treatment he received.
In sum, Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to either his claim of deliberate indifference to safety or his medical indifference claim. Thus, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) be granted and this case be dismissed in its entirety.
See also footnote 1.
s/Thomas E. Rogers, III
Thomas E. Rogers, III
United States Magistrate Judge January 25, 2019
Florence, South Carolina