Opinion
CV136041656S
07-06-2016
John V. Golicz et al. v. Thomas T. Rooney et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Salvatore C. Agati, J.
FACTS
The instant matter arises from a land use dispute between abutting property owners. On July 2, 2014, the plaintiffs, John Golicz and Julie Golicz, filed a four-count second amended complaint sounding in requests for temporary and permanent injunctions and causes of action for quiet title against the defendants, Thomas Rooney and Tammey Rooney aka Tammy Rooney. On February 13, 2015, the defendants filed a three-count second amended counterclaim sounding in requests for declaratory judgment and an action to settle title and interest on the basis of adverse use. Given the particular procedural circumstances of the present case, the following alleged facts are relevant.
The plaintiffs and the defendants are respective owners of property lots 118 and 128 located on Grove Avenue in Madison, Connecticut. In a letter dated June 12, 2013, the plaintiffs expressed the intent to develop lot 118 and construct a residential house. Also in this letter, the plaintiffs expressed an intent to use a deeded right-of-way across the defendants' property for vehicular access to lot 118. On June 30, 2013, the plaintiffs received a letter from the defendants' attorney stating that there was doubt as to the existence of the plaintiffs' entitlement to the right-of-way given the defendants' erection and maintenance of a split-rail fence across the right-of-way. The defendants took the position that they retained the right to continue maintenance of the fence on the basis of adverse possession.
The defendants further maintain that in order to meet Madison zoning regulations setting out the proper dimension of lots for development, the plaintiffs filed a " lot line revision" with the Madison Land Records, adding part of lot 119 to lot 118. On the basis of this issue, the defendants seek a declaratory judgment that the " lot line revision" constituted an improper and unapproved subdivision in violation of General Statutes § 8-25 and Madison subdivision regulations § 2.1. Furthermore, the defendants maintain that the current dimensions of lot 118 do not possess the requisite frontage. On the basis of this issue, the defendants seek a declaratory judgment that lot 118 cannot be developed as a separate building lot because it is not in compliance with Madison zoning regulations § 2.4.
The defendants erroneously cite to General Statutes § 8-23. General Statutes § § 8-25 and 8-26 govern the approval of subdivisions by municipal planning commissions. Section 8-25(a) provides in relevant part: " No subdivision of land shall be made until a plan for such subdivision has been approved by the commission." Section 8-26(a) provides in relevant part: " All plans for subdivisions and resubdivisions, including subdivisions and resubdivisions in existence but which were not submitted to the commission for required approval, whether or not shown on an existing map or plan or whether or not conveyances have been made of any of the property included in such subdivisions or resubdivisions, shall be submitted to the commission with an application in the form to be prescribed by it. The commission shall have the authority to determine whether the existing division of any land constitutes a subdivision or resubdivision under the provisions of this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorize the commission to approve any such subdivision or resubdivision which conflicts with applicable zoning regulations."
Madison subdivision regulations § 2.1 provides: " In accordance with the provisions of C.G.S. § 8-25, no subdivision of land shall be made and no land in any subdivision shall be sold or offered for sale until a plan for such subdivision has been approved by the Commission."
Madison zoning regulations § 2.4 provides: " No building shall be built on any lot unless such lot has a frontage of at least 25 feet on a public street, or unless it has unobstructed, exclusive right-of-way at least 25 feet wide to a public street. The area of any such right-of-way shall not be included in the area of any lot."
On or around November 5, 2014, the plaintiffs submitted an application for a building permit and they received a building permit from the Madison Building Department on or around January 14, 2015. Subsequently, the defendants appealed the issuance of the permit to the Madison Zoning Board of Appeals (board) on or around February 5, 2015. The defendants challenged the permit on the grounds that the plaintiffs violated Madison subdivision regulations § 2.1 and zoning regulations § 2.4. The board denied the defendants' appeal on July 7, 2015. The defendants further appealed to the Superior Court. See Rooney v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Madison, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket no. CV-15-6056196-S. The administrative appeal before the Superior Court is currently pending.
On June 25, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their initial motion to dismiss the defendants' second amended counterclaim and memorandum of law in support. They, then, filed an amended motion to dismiss and memorandum of law in support on February 25, 2016. On April 22, 2016, the defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion to which the plaintiffs replied on April 29, 2016. The defendants filed a surrebuttal on May 2, 2016. This matter was heard at the short calendar on May 2, 2016.
DISCUSSION
Under the current circumstances, the court may consider whether to stay the present proceedings until the related administrative appeal has been fully adjudicated. " An order staying proceedings does not terminate the action but merely postpones its disposition. It may be modified or vacated by the court whenever, in the exercise of a sound discretion, it is considered necessary or proper to do so." Success Centers, Inc. v. Huntington Learning Centers, Inc., 223 Conn. 761, 771, 613 A.2d 1320 (1992); quoting Gores v. Rosenthal, 148 Conn. 218, 221, 169 A.2d 639 (1961). " A stay leaves the court in a position to monitor the progress in the parallel litigation, and to reassert its jurisdiction over the parties' dispute if the interests of justice so dictate or require. It is abundantly clear that allowing parallel actions to proceed will require needless additional expenditures of time and resources of the litigants, counsel and the courts, will not further or promote judicial economy[, ] and, may tend to encourage forum shopping and condone procedural gamesmanship at the expense of the interest of justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marshall v. Marshall, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FA-07-4012382-S (February 27, 2008, Munro, J.) (45 Conn.L.Rptr. 139, 143, ) rev'd on other grounds, 119 Conn.App. 120, 988 A.2d 314 (2010) (reversing trial court's granting motion to strike), cert. granted 296 Conn. 908, 993 A.2d 467 (2010) (appeal withdrawn November 18, 2010).
" A trial court has inherent authority to stay an action until another pending action has been fully adjudicated." Marshall v. Shanley, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-14-6022518-S, (September 22, 2015, Lee, J.). " In the absence of a statutory mandate, the granting of an application or a motion for a stay of an action or proceeding is addressed to the discretion of the trial court . . . [T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C., 116 Conn.App. 289, 311-12, 975 A.2d 715 (2009). " Furthermore, [c]onflicting decisions, which create a confused and unsettled state of the law . . . should be avoided, if possible. A stay is appropriate for this action to proceed in an efficient and organized way, avoiding potentially inconsistent results." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. XVIVO, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-15-6030021-S (February 9, 2016, Wiese, J.) (61 Conn.L.Rptr. 805, 807, ).
Absent statutory mandate and authority to the contrary, Superior Courts have, within the bounds of discretion and where judicial economy and consistency necessitate, sua sponte, stayed current proceedings to allow related or parallel proceedings to go forward. See generally Graham v. XVIVO, LLC, supra, 61 Conn.L.Rptr. 805, (pending appeal); Marshall v. Shanley, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-14-6022518-S, (pending completion of underlying litigation to malpractice action); Cuevas v. Medinas, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-14-6010704-S, (December 8, 2014, Moore, J.) (pending completion of foreign action); Tinnerello v. Pezzolisi, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-11-6011320-S, (March 20, 2012, Martin, J.) (pending appeal); Ruisi v. O'Sullivan, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-11-5013596-S, (May 2, 2011, Karazin, J.T.R.) (pending appeal); Marshall v. Marshall, supra, 45 Conn.L.Rptr. 139, (pending motion to reopen, reargue, and for articulation and expiration of all appeal periods or completion of all appeals).
As noted, an administrative appeal of the board's decision parallels the present action. Where the defendants here seek declaratory relief by way of counterclaim regarding the plaintiffs' alleged violations of Madison zoning and subdivision regulations and pertinent provisions of our General Statutes, the defendants, on appeal, seek an order sustaining their initial appeal to the zoning board of appeals on substantially similar grounds as their counterclaims. Although on appeal the Superior Court will be reviewing the conclusions of the zoning board of appeals for error, the core issue of the counterclaims here and of the parallel appeal is the same: whether the plaintiffs' property is in violation of relevant municipal and state zoning laws and, therefore, the plaintiffs' pursuit of developing their property cannot proceed because it is unlawful.
For purposes of judicial economy, staying the present action would minimize repetitive litigation on similar issues, particularly when briefs have been filed in the administrative appeal and the trial date has been scheduled. Also, the plaintiffs and the defendants are parties to the appeal; both parties would save on litigation costs by not pursuing simultaneous actions. In addition, neither party will be prejudiced. The defendants have availed themselves of the opportunity to challenge the validity of the plaintiffs' building permit and, therefore, the plaintiffs' compliance with zoning laws, through administrative channels. As to the plaintiffs, because the validity of their building permit remains in question, they are likely unable to commence the intended development of their property. Thus, until the status of their permit is determined, a judgment from this court regarding the parties' respective property interests would be ineffectual. Moreover, such a judgment on either the plaintiffs' or the defendants' claims may muddle the issues or create the risk of collateral issues being raised on appeal.
Along this vein, for this court to consider and render a decision on the defendants' requests for declaratory judgment at this time would likely cause confusion in light of substantially similar issues pending on appeal. This court and the court overseeing the appeal may render conflicting decisions with differing legal effects. For example, if the defendants' appeal is sustained and remanded to the board, the board would be required to review their decision in accordance with the presiding court's conclusions. If this court in the present action were to grant the declaratory relief sought under this scenario, the effect would be a final judgment, which would open these issues to further appeal and undercut the purpose of the order from the administrative appeal allowing the board to revisit the defendants' grievance. Alternatively, if this court were to find that the plaintiffs were in compliance and deny declaratory relief in this scenario, the courts' conclusions would be in direct conflict and, again, these issues would be open to further appeal. In such scenarios, a new difficulty of resolving the discrepancies would arise and this dispute would be unnecessarily prolonged. Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy and judicial consistency, the court stays the current proceedings until completion of the administrative appeal.