Opinion
NUMBER 13-19-00176-CV
04-09-2020
GOLIAD COUNTY, TEXAS, Appellant, v. EUGNE CALVIN BONNET, Appellee.
On appeal from the 24th District Court of Goliad County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes
Appellee Eugene Calvin Bonnet was rear-ended in Victoria, Texas by a Golden Crescent Regional Planning Commission (GCRPC) passenger van driven by Arlen Berger. At the scene, Berger provided police with a financial responsibility card that identified GCRPC as the owner of the vehicle and indicated that GCRPC was self-insured through the Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool (TML). Approximately eighteen months later, after TML denied Bonnet's claim, Bonnet filed suit against GCRPC and Berger. Soon after, Bonnet learned for the first time that Berger was operating the GCRPC-owned vehicle in his capacity as a Goliad County employee. Bonnet amended his pleading to join Goliad County, and the County filed a plea to the jurisdiction, claiming it did not receive notice of Bonnet's personal injuries within six months of the incident's occurrence as required under the Texas Tort Claim Act's (TTCA) waiver of immunity. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.025, .101; Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578 S.W.3d 57, 59 (Tex. 2019) (recognizing § 101.101's notice requirements as jurisdictional).
Bonnet conceded that he did not provide the County with formal, written notice but countered that the County acquired actual notice, either at the scene of the accident or subsequently through TML, who, according to Bonnet, was acting as the County's agent. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(b). Alternatively, Bonnet argued that the County should be estopped from claiming it did not receive notice because he was relying on Berger's representations when he notified TML about his personal injuries instead of the County. The trial court denied the plea without comment, and the County filed an interlocutory appeal challenging each of Bonnet's contentions. See id. § 51.014(a)(8). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Both parties submitted evidence concerning the existence of jurisdictional facts. The material facts are not in dispute; instead, the parties dispute the legal significance of those facts.
The City of Victoria is located in Victoria County, which shares a county line with neighboring Goliad County. On January 25, 2016, Bonnet was stopped at a stoplight in Victoria when he was rear-ended by Berger, causing Bonnet's vehicle to strike the vehicle in front of him. According to the police report, Berger "failed to control [his] speed," and Berger later testified that he accidently hit the accelerator instead of the brake pedal.
The GCRPC is a voluntary association of local governments and other agencies that provides, among other services, rural transportation to a seven-county region that includes Victoria and Goliad Counties. GOLDEN CRESCENT REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, http://www.gcrpc.org/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). The GCRPC subcontracts Goliad County Rural Transit, a County department, to provide some of those rural transportation services. Under their agreement, Goliad County Rural Transit maintains and operates three vehicles owned by GCRPC, including the passenger van Berger was driving at the time of the accident.
At the County's direction, Berger provided police with a financial responsibility card that identified GCRPC as the owner of the vehicle and a member of TML. The police provided Bonnet with this information and included it on the Texas Peace Officer's Crash Report. The crash report does not indicate that Berger was driving the vehicle in his capacity as a Goliad County employee, and there is no evidence that Berger disclosed this information to Bonnet. Goliad County is self-insured through the Texas Association of Counties (TAC), not TML.
Berger contacted his supervisor, Mary Wade, who is the operations manager for Goliad County Rural Transit. Wade testified that she went to the scene "[t]o investigate the accident," and after Berger admitted to causing the accident—Berger's third rear-end collision in the past month—Wade fired him on the spot. Although Wade was aware of Bonnet's property damage, she believed that Bonnet was uninjured; Bonnet, eighty-six years old at the time of the accident, told Berger and the responding officers at the scene that he was not injured, and Berger subsequently relayed this information to Wade. However, in the following days Bonnet began experiencing neck, back, and shoulder pain. Bonnet sought medical treatment for his injuries and eventually required shoulder surgery.
Based on the information contained on the financial responsibility card, Bonnet directed his medical providers to submit his bills to TML for payment. On February 18, 2016, TML sent written correspondence to Bonnet acknowledging his "claim for injury related to the accident of January 25, 2016." Bonnet communicated with a TML adjustor about his personal injuries several times over the following eighteen-month period, providing various medical records and documents at TML's request, until TML ultimately denied Bonnet's claim. As a result, Bonnet filed suit against Berger and GCRPC to recover for the personal injuries and property damage he allegedly suffered as a result of Berger's negligence. Bonnet subsequently amended his petition to join Goliad County after discovering that Berger was operating the GCRPC vehicle in his capacity as a County employee.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
Generally, governmental immunity protects the state's political subdivisions from suits for money damages. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011). It has two components: immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Id. (citing Gen. Servs. Comm ' n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 594 (Tex. 2001)). Immunity from suit must be waived by legislative enactment or constitutional provision, id. (citing Little-Tex, 39 S.W.3d at 594), and "a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.034.
The TTCA waives a governmental entity's immunity from suit and liability for property damage and personal injury caused by the negligence of an employee operating a motor vehicle within the scope of employment. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021, .025. However, the TTCA also contains a jurisdictional notice requirement—unless the governmental unit received actual notice, claimants must provide the unit with formal, written notice of their claim within six months of the incident's occurrence or the claim is barred by immunity. Id. § 101.101; Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 59. "The purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure prompt reporting of claims in order to enable governmental units to gather information necessary to guard against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial." Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (citing City of Houston v. Torres, 621 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex. 1981)). Prompt reporting allows the governmental unit "to investigate while facts are fresh and conditions remain substantially the same." Torres, 621 S.W.2d at 591.
Formal, written notice must reasonably describe: "(1) the damage or injury claimed; (2) the time and place of the incident; and (3) the incident." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(a). "To have actual notice, a governmental unit must have the same knowledge it is entitled to receive under the written notice provisions of the TTCA." City of San Antonio v. Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. 2018) (citing Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. 2004)). Thus, "[a] governmental unit has actual notice under the TTCA if it has subjective knowledge of (1) a death, injury, or property damage; (2) the governmental unit's fault that produced or contributed to the death, injury, or property damage; and (3) the identity of the parties involved." Id. (citing Cathey, 900 S.W.2d at 341).
Immunity from suit deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction. Williams, 353 S.W.3d at 133. It is the plaintiff's burden to plead facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep ' t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) (citing Tex. Ass ' n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)). A plea to the jurisdiction may challenge either the plaintiff's pleadings or the existence of jurisdictional facts, in which case the parties may present evidence and our review of the trial court's decision mirrors that of a traditional motion for summary judgment. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012) (citations omitted). "Whether a governmental unit has actual notice is a fact question when the evidence is disputed, but it is a question of law when the evidence is undisputed." Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d at 776 (citing Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 348).
III. ANALYSIS
The County does not dispute that it had subjective knowledge that Berger's negligent operation of a motor vehicle in the course and scope of his employment caused property damage to Bonnet's vehicle. Instead, by its first issue, the County argues that Bonnet's alleged personal injuries represent a distinct and separate claim, and because there is no evidence that the County was aware of Bonnet's claimed injury, that claim, as opposed to his property damage claim, should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. We need not reach this issue, however, because we conclude, under the narrow facts of this case, that the County is estopped from claiming that it did not receive notice of Bonnet's alleged personal injuries.
Because the estoppel issue is dispositive, we also do not reach the County's contention that TML's subjective knowledge of Bonnet's personal injuries cannot be imputed to the County under an agency theory. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
A. Estoppel Requirements
In general, "a city cannot be estopped from exercising its governmental functions." White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tex. 2006). However, the Supreme Court of Texas has recognized that in exceptional cases, estoppel may apply where (1) justice requires it, and (2) doing so will not interfere with the exercise of governmental functions. Id. at 774 (citing City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 836 (Tex. 1970)); Roberts v. Haltom City, S.W.2d 75, 80 (Tex. 1976). "Evidence that city officials acted deliberately to induce a party to act in a way that benefitted the city but prejudiced the party weighs in favor of applying the exception . . . ." Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 775 (citation omitted). Another factor to consider is whether the misleading actions resulted in the permanent loss of the plaintiff's claim against the governmental entity. Id. "The court, not the jury, determines whether the exception applies." Id. at 774 (citing Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 245 (Tex. 1999)).
B. Applying Estoppel to Counties
As a threshold issue, was must decide whether a county may be estopped from performing a governmental function. In declining to extend estoppel to other governmental units, two of our sister courts observed that the Supreme Court of Texas had never applied estoppel to any governmental entity other than a municipality. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Hous. v. Harris Cty. Toll Rd. Auth., 356 S.W.3d 85, 90-91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Odessa Tex. Sheriff's Posse, Inc. v. Ector County, 215 S.W.3d 458, 469-70 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied). Their reluctance was based on the fact that municipalities perform both governmental and proprietary functions while other governmental units, like the County in this case, perform governmental functions only. Enterprise Leasing Co., 356 S.W.3d at 90-91; Ector County, 215 S.W.3d at 469-70. While it is true that municipal street maintenance was a proprietary function under the common law when Roberts was decided in 1976 and has since been statutorily redefined as a governmental function, compare Jezek v. City of Midland, 605 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. 1980) with TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a)(4), Roberts does not limit estoppel to a municipality performing proprietary functions. To the contrary, the Roberts Court explicitly recognized that estoppel may apply to "a governmental function . . . where justice requires it and where no governmental function is impaired." 543 S.W.2d at 80; see also Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 776 & n.3 (explaining that the "justice requires" exception is only necessary because a city is performing governmental functions; on the other hand, when a city performs proprietary functions, it is subject to the same duties and liabilities as those incurred by private parties).
Moreover, more recently in Texas Department of Transportation v. A.P.I. Pipe and Supply, LLC, a case decided after Enterprise Leasing and Ector County, the supreme court declined, on the merits, to apply equitable estoppel against the Texas Department of Transportation, implying that the "justice requires" exception is not limited to cities. See 397 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Tex. 2013) ("For estoppel to apply against the government, two requirements must exist . . . . Neither requirement exists here." (emphases added)). Thus, we find nothing incongruous about applying estoppel to a county performing a governmental function so long as "justice requires it and where no governmental function is impaired." See Roberts, 543 S.W.2d at 80
C. Justice Requires Estoppel in this Case
We acknowledge at the outset that this exception is indeed rare, having been applied only twice by the supreme court; however, each of those cases bears more than a passing resemblance to the case before us. In Roberts, the plaintiff filed suit against a city for injuries sustained after falling on a city-maintained street. Id. at 76. The city filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to give written notice to the designated city official as required by the city charter, a condition precedent to maintaining a personal injury suit against the city. Id. at 76-77. In response, the plaintiff provided evidence that when she spoke with city officials about her claim, they told her that contractors were responsible for the condition of the street where she fell. Id. at 76. The contractors subsequently denied liability, claiming they were not performing any repairs on that portion of the street. Id. at 77. At that point, however, the thirty-day period to provide the city with written notice had expired. Id. Citing the purpose of the estoppel doctrine and the Court's "equitable power to prevent injustice," the Roberts Court concluded that a fact issue existed as to whether city officials made misleading statements that prevented the plaintiff from complying with the charter's notice provision, and if so, the city should be estopped from profiting from its wrongful conduct. Id. at 78, 80. Thus, a "[c]ity may be estopped by the conduct of its officials if [a claimant] relied upon such conduct in failing to file a notice of claim and if a reasonably prudent person would have so relied." Id. at 80.
"The purpose of estoppels is to prevent injustice and protect those who have been misled." Roberts v. Haltom City, 543 S.W.2d 75, 80 (Tex. 1976) (citing Kuehne v. Denson, 219 S.W.2d 1006 (Tex. 1949)).
Similarly, in City of San Antonio v. Schautteet, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging the city negligently destroyed their house by fire, and the city moved for summary judgment, contending the plaintiffs failed to comply with the ninety-day written notice provision in the city charter. 706 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). The plaintiffs provided evidence that, a month after the fire, the city attorney made representations that the city would investigate the plaintiff's claim, but the city did not deny the claim until after the notice period had expired. Id. The supreme court held that the city attorney's representations raised a material fact issue regarding estoppel because such representations may have misled the plaintiffs into believing that no further steps were necessary until the city completed its investigation. Id. at 105.
In this case, the circumstances of the accident were inherently misleading. We do not agree, as the County suggests, that a reasonably prudent person would have reason to suspect that the GCRPC transit van was being operated by a person other than a GCRPC employee, let alone an employee of a neighboring county. The County perpetuated these misleading circumstances by instructing Berger to provide a financial responsibility card identifying GCRPC as the financially responsible party. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 601.002(3) (defining "financial responsibility" as "the ability to respond in damages for liability for an accident that . . . arises out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle"). It makes no difference that Berger provided the card to the police instead of Bonnet directly—the intent and effect were the same; like Roberts, the County's actions led Bonnet to reasonably believe that GCRPC, not the County, was vicariously liable for the accident. See Roberts, 543 S.W.2d at 76. Bonnet's reliance is evident by the fact that he submitted his "claim for injury" to TML within a month of the accident, much like the plaintiff in Roberts who pursued her claim with the contractors after the city identified them as the responsible parties. See Roberts, 543 S.W.2d at 77.
In addition to the three GCRPC-owned vehicles, Goliad County Rural Transit also operates three County-owned transit vehicles. When asked why she did not instruct Berger to provide a financial responsibility card identifying Goliad County as a financially responsible party when Berger was operating the vehicle in the course and scope of his employment with the County, Wade responded, "I don't know."
The benefit to the County and the prejudice to Bonnet are clear; as in Roberts and Schautteet, the notice period expired while Bonnet acted in reliance upon the County's representations. See Roberts, 543 S.W.2d at 76; Schautteet, 706 S.W.2d at 104. Moreover, like the plaintiffs in Roberts and Schautteet, only equitable estoppel will revive Bonnet's extinguished claim against the County. See Roberts, 543 S.W.2d at 76; Schautteet, 706 S.W.2d at 104. Therefore, we conclude "the circumstances clearly demand [estoppel's] application to prevent manifest injustice." See Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 774.
We also note that if TML had paid Bonnet's claim on GCRPC's behalf, Bonnet would have been precluded from recovering against the County under the one satisfaction rule. See Sky View at Las Palmas, LLC v. Mendez, 555 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. 2018) ("Under the one satisfaction rule, a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for any damages suffered." (quoting Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 390 (Tex. 2000))).
D. No Impairment of a Governmental Function Shown
When determining whether estoppel will interfere with a governmental function, "the relevant inquiry is whether estopping the [government] in a single instance will bar the future performance of that governmental function or impede the [government's] ability to perform its other governmental functions." Super Wash, 198 S.W.3d at 776. For example, in Super Wash, the supreme court held that estopping a city from enforcing its zoning ordinance would also interfere with the city's ability to regulate traffic and protect the public safety, "both of which are classic governmental functions." Id. at 777-78 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a)).
Here, there is nothing to suggest that estopping the County from claiming it did not receive notice of Bonnet's personal injuries would interfere with the County's performance of any specific governmental function. Instead, the County generally asserts that its continued defense and potential liability in this case will necessarily divert public funds that would otherwise be used to perform governmental functions. Of course, protecting the public fisc is an oft-cited policy for immunity's continued existence, see, e.g., Nazari v. State, 561 S.W.3d 495, 508 (Tex. 2018) (collecting cases), but we conclude that such an allegation is too attenuated to meet the standard articulated in Super Wash. See 198 S.W.3d at 776.
IV. CONCLUSION
"[S]overeign immunity is founded on the presumption that governments will do justice to their citizens, by one means or another." Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 382 (Tex. 2006) (Brister, J., concurring) (citing State v. Snyder, 66 Tex. 687, 18 S.W. 106, 109 (1886)). Under the narrow facts of this case, we conclude that Goliad County is estopped from claiming it did not receive notice of Bonnet's personal injuries. The trial court's order denying the County's plea to the jurisdiction is affirmed.
GREGORY T. PERKES
Justice Delivered and filed the 9th day of April, 2020.