Opinion
2002-08453
Argued February 10, 2003.
March 17, 2003.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Joseph, J.), dated August 5, 2002, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Galvano Xanthakis, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Anthony Xanthakis and Kyle S. Edmonds of counsel), for appellants.
Ferro, Kuba, Bloom, Mangano, Gacovino Lake, P.C. (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac DeCicco, New York, N.Y. (Brian J. Isaac and Julie T. Mark of counsel), for respondents.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., LEO F. McGINITY, SANDRA L. TOWNES, WILLIAM F. MASTRO, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The infant plaintiff allegedly was injured while playing with other children on a trampoline in the defendants' backyard. Although the defendants were not the "insurer[s] of the children entrusted to [their] care, [they were] under a duty to adequately supervise such children, and [they] can be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the lack of adequate supervision" (Fernandez v. Stepping Stone Day School, 291 A.D.2d 530; 530-531; see Appell v. Mandel, 296 A.D.2d 514; Singh v. Persaud, 269 A.D.2d 381). The defendants did not demonstrate their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, since there are questions of fact as to whether they adequately supervised the infant plaintiff and, if not, whether the inadequate supervision was a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff's injuries (see Fernandez v. Stepping Stone Day School, supra; Singh v. Persaud, supra). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
RITTER, J.P., McGINITY, TOWNES and MASTRO, JJ., concur.