Opinion
June 8, 1999.
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Ramos, J.).
Plaintiff's causes to set aside the February Transaction and the June Release based upon his claims of incapacity and unconscionability were properly dismissed since plaintiff sought out and was represented by counsel during the relevant period and was not deprived of a meaningful choice respecting his decision to enter either agreement ( see, Matter of Bobst, 234 A.D.2d 7, lv dismissed 90 N.Y.2d 844; see also, Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 N.Y.2d 1, 10). Pursuant to the terms of the June Release, plaintiff waived any claims he may have had against the Execulease defendants (Moskowitz, Leichtling, Goldberg), as well as defendants Parker Chapin and Anthem arising out of the February Transaction. While plaintiff's claims against his attorney for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract were not redundant of his legal malpractice claim, their dismissal was nonetheless proper. Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim based on his counsel's alleged misappropriation of $100,000 is flatly contradicted by documentary evidence ( see, Fisher v. Maxwell Communications Corp., 205 A.D.2d 356), and his breach of contract claim fails to contain an allegation that his counsel breached a promise to achieve a specific result ( see, Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose, 251 A.D.2d 35). Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to support application of the continuous representation doctrine ( see, Zaref v. Berk Michaels, 192 A.D.2d 346, 347-348), and, that being the case, the court properly dismissed plaintiff's legal malpractice claim as time-barred under the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Nardelli, Lerner, Rubin and Saxe, JJ.