Summary
noting that plaintiff, before being appointed decedent's personal representative, had no capacity to assert claims for decedent's wrongful death and personal injuries
Summary of this case from Cherry v. Hillside Manor Rehabil. Extended CareOpinion
Argued August 29, 1977
Decided October 4, 1977
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, THOMAS J. HUGHES, J.
Arthur N. Seiff for appellant.
Steven Di Joseph, Thomas R. Newman and Barry G. Saretsky for respondents.
MEMORANDUM.
Order affirmed. In this case, as distinguished from Vastola v Maer ( 39 N.Y.2d 1019) and Caffaro v Trayna ( 35 N.Y.2d 245), the original suit was not brought by one with the capacity to sue for the infant's personal injuries, the infant then being deceased and no personal representative of his estate having been appointed. Accordingly, when the personal representative was appointed and the "second amended" summons served, both subsequent to the expiration of the Statute of Limitations, there was no pre-existing action to which it could "relate back" (see CPLR 203, subd [e]; Vastola v Maer, supra; Caffaro v Trayna, supra).
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur.
Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.