Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1159, Section: I/3.
November 22, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions: (1) a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by defendants, the State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, and (2) a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by defendant, John Anderson. Plaintiff, Janet Narcisse Goins, has not filed an opposition to these motions.
Rec. Doc. Nos. 13 and 12, respectively.
Background
Plaintiff's action arises out of the death of her son, Emmanuel Narcisse, who was allegedly killed on May 1, 2003, while incarcerated at the Bridge City Correctional Center for Youth ("BCCY") located in Bridge City, Louisiana. Plaintiff seeks damages pursuant to both state and federal law. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated her son's constitutional rights for which she seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also seeks damages pursuant to state law for her son's pain and suffering, i.e., a survival claim, and for her son's wrongful death. Defendant, John Anderson, is the warden of BCCY, and he has been sued solely in his official capacity as the warden of BCCY.
Rec. Doc. No. 1.
Rec. Doc. No. 12. See Rec. Doc. No. 1, ¶ 4. Plaintiff misidentifies warden John Anderson as "Joan Anderson."
Standard for a Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." When analyzing a Rule 12(c) motion, the pleadings should be construed liberally, and a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if there are no material facts in dispute and questions of law are all that remain. Brittan Comm. Int'l Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 313 F.3d 899, 904 (5th Cir. 2002); Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998); Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 1367 (2004)). In determining whether to grant a Rule 12(c) motion, a court "must look only to the pleadings and accept all allegations in them as true." St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Convalescent Serv., Inc., 193 F.3d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1999). "[T]he central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief." Brittan, 313 F.3d at 904 (internal quotations omitted).
Where, as here, a defendant asserts in a motion for judgment on the pleadings that the pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court will analyze the motion pursuant to the standards governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Jones v. M.L Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999); Boswell v. Honorable Governor of Texas, 138 F. Supp. 2d 782, 784-85; see also Scott v. The Houma-Terrebonne Housing Authority, 2002 WL 31007412, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2002) (citing St. Paul Ins. Co. of Bellaire, Texas v. AFIA Worldwide Ins. Co., 937 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1991)). Pursuant to that standard, the Court will not dismiss a complaint "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim." Jones, 188 F.3d at 324 (citing Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1401 (5th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, the Court should not dismiss the claim "unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. (citing Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1999) ("A dismissal will not be affirmed if the allegations support relief on any possible theory.").
Defendants, the State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, assert that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because they are immune from civil suits in federal court pursuant to the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.
"[I]n order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations. . . ." Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 1989)). Additionally, "'legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.'" Blackburn, 42 F.3d at 931 (quoting Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)). "[T]he complaint must contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery . . . or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial." Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A pleading may fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for one of two reasons. Walker v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990). "First, the law simply may not afford relief on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint. . . . Second, regardless of whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief, the pleadings may be so badly framed that the plaintiff is not entitled to a trial on the merits." Id.
Standard for a 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted "only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). In order to assess whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, this Court may look to the complaint and the undisputed facts in the record. See id. When analyzing the complaint, this Court will take the allegations in the complaint as true. Sawar Partnership v. United States, 67 F.3d 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1995). Because the burden of proof on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction, Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing McDaniel v. United States, 899 F. Supp. 305, 307 (E.D. Tex. 1995)), Goins "constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." See id. (citing Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Analysis
Section 1983 provides a right of action against:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, or usage, of any State of Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any right, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). It is well established that a state and its agencies are not "persons" under section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 50, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989). Further, a lawsuit against a government official in his official capacity is treated as a lawsuit against the entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996). John Anderson, the warden of the BCCY, is an agent of a state agency. Official capacity claims against him are treated as claims against the state. See Jenkins v. Lee, Civ.A. 98-2367, 1999 WL 97931 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 1999).
Unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution provides immunity to states from federal court lawsuits brought by private persons. Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Penhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984)). Pursuant to statute, Louisiana has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5106(A); Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish-Council-President Government, 279 F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 2002); Jenkins, 1999 WL 97931, at *2.
Whether sovereign immunity also applies to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections requires some analysis. The Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits against a state agency if the agency is so closely connected to the state that the state itself is the party in interest. See Vogt v. Bd. fo Comm'rs of the Orleans Levee District, 294 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit has previously analyzed the Department of Public Safety and Correction's status and it has determined that the Department of Public Safety and Corrections is protected by the Eleventh Amendment from lawsuits brought in federal court. See Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1999). The Department of Public Safety and Corrections has not waived its immunity. See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5106(A).
With respect to plaintiff's claim against warden Anderson, as previously stated, lawsuits against state officials acting in their official capacity are considered to be lawsuits brought against the state itself. Accordingly, such lawsuits are generally barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71, 109 S. Ct. at 2304; Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1996).
The Sixth Circuit has held that a section 1983 plaintiff must designate the capacity in which the defendant is being sued. See Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1999). If no designation is made, the defendant is deemed to be sued in his official capacity. Id.
Other courts apply the "course of proceedings" test to determine the capacity in which a defendant is sued. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 4, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105-06, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985); Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Without plaintiff's opposition to Anderson's motion to dismiss and in light of plaintiff's allegations against the warden in her complaint, the Court determines that Anderson has been sued solely in his official capacity. See Parker v. Graves, 479 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1973) (looking to complaint to determine nature of plaintiff's claim in section 1983 case). When it is unclear whether a defendant is named in his official or personal capacity, the Fifth Circuit looks to the "course of proceedings" to determine the nature of the lawsuit. See United States ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of Univ. of Ca., 363 F.3d 398, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding course of proceedings indicated that defendant was sued solely in official capacity because plaintiff never challenged assertion made by defendant in motion to dismiss that defendant was sued in official capacity).
As noted by the Fifth Circuit:
The eleventh amendment clearly interposes a jurisdictional bar to suits against a state by private parties who seek monetary relief from the state in the form of compensatory damages, punitive damages, or monetary awards in the nature of equitable restitution, and also to suits against a state agency or state official when the monied award is to be paid from the state treasury.Clay v. Texas Women's University, 728 F.2d 714, 715 (5th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Relief obtained against state officials is "retroactive," and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, if "[i]t is measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials," and when "[i]t will to a virtual certainty be paid from state funds, and not from the pockets of the individual state officials." Id.; Sessions v. Rusk State Hospital, 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981) ("An award by a federal court of retrospective relief, i.e., damages, payable from the state treasury, is prohibited by the eleventh amendment even though the suit names a state official as the defendant.") (citation omitted). As explained by the United States Supreme Court:
Relief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured in the past by an action of a state official in his official capacity that was illegal under federal law is barred even when the state official is the named defendant. This is true if the relief is expressly denominated as damages. It is also true if the relief is tantamount to an award of damages for a past violation of federal law, even though styled as something else. On the other hand, relief that serves directly to bring an end to a present violation of federal law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment even though accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury.Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2940, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986) (citations omitted).
In the present case, plaintiff's § 1983 claim for damages arises from Anderson's alleged unconstitutional past conduct as warden of BCCY. Plaintiff has not specifically sought any specific injunctive relief and plaintiff has not alleged any continuing violations of federal law which could be addressed by injunctive relief. Instead, plaintiff's § 1983 claim for compensatory and punitive damages is meant to redress plaintiff's son's alleged wrongful death and Anderson's past conduct. Furthermore, such an award of compensatory damages would be paid directly out of the state treasury. See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5108.1 (requiring the state to indemnify state officials for damages awarded for violations of federal civil rights); see also Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 687 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that a lawsuit against a state official acting in his official capacity is "really against the state" due to the Louisiana indemnification statute) (citing Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1986)). Therefore, plaintiff's claim for a damages award insofar as that claim is brought pursuant to § 1983 against the defendant in his official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 claim for monetary damages against Anderson in his official capacity is appropriate.
Finally, the Eleventh Amendment precludes a federal court from entertaining a claim against a state official acting in his official capacity for violations of state law regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102, 89 S. Ct. 900, 909, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984). Therefore, plaintiff's state law wrongful death and survivorship claims against Anderson in his official capacity are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Federal courts are not precluded from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims strictly brought against state officials in their personal capacities. See Wilson v. UT Health Center, 973 F.2d 1263, 1271 (5th Cir. 1992); Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 187-88 (5th Cir. 1986).
Accordingly, and for the above and foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of defendants, the State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, to dismiss plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of defendant, John Anderson, to dismiss plaintiff's claims against him in his official capacity is GRANTED.