Opinion
CA CR 10-262
Opinion Delivered November 3, 2010
Appeal from the Saline County Circuit Court, [CR09-276-4], Honorable Robert Leo Herzfeld, Judge, Affirmed.
After a bench trial, Deanna Goforth was convicted of breaking or entering and of theft of property. She contends on appeal that the trial court erred by denying her motions for a directed verdict. We affirm.
A motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Coggin v. State, 356 Ark. 424, 156 S.W.3d 712 (2004). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Cluck v. State, 365 Ark. 166, 226 S.W.3d 789 (2006). A conviction will be affirmed if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resort to speculation or conjecture. Id.
A person who breaks or enters into any building or structure for the purpose of committing theft commits the offense of breaking or entering. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-202(1) (Repl. 2006). A person who knowingly exercises unauthorized control over an interest in the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property commits theft of property. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2006).
When a person assists another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and is liable for the conduct of both. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-402(a)(2) (Repl. 2006); e.g., Cook v. State, 350 Ark. 398, 408, 86 S.W.3d 916, 922 (2002). A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of facilitating the offense, the person aids or attempts to aid the other person in committing the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403(b)(2) (Repl. 2006). Factors relevant in determining whether an accused person is an accomplice include his or her presence near the crime, opportunity to commit the crime, and association with a person involved in the crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation. Hutcheson v. State, 92 Ark. App. 307, 213 S.W.3d 25 (2005). A participant cannot disclaim responsibility because he or she did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime as a whole. Cook, supra.
Evidence presented by the State included testimony by the victim, John Spencer, and by Detectives Robert Hammons and Bill Jackson from the Criminal Investigations Division of the Saline County Sheriff's Department. Spencer testified to events that began around 8:30 a.m. on December 4, 2008. From his back porch, he noticed movement and heard something in his storage shed. He stepped out, and four people ran from the shed into the woods through a top-to-bottom hole freshly cut in his six-foot fence.
Spencer gave chase, and the four individuals split up. Spencer followed one, who later proved to be Goforth, who disappeared inside the fence of a home on Mandy Lane that was catty-cornered from Spencer's home. He found her within seconds, hiding behind a bush, and held and questioned her for ten minutes or so until police arrived. She refused to name the other individuals he had observed and told him that she had been "doing something else." When he commented that fingerprints would tell the story and lying would do no good, she showed him her gloved hands and said there would be no prints.
Afterward Spencer discovered that a large air compressor, impact tools, and a big tool box were missing from his shed; he saw chain saws and some toolboxes out of place, stacked outside "to be transported." In the evening he responded to a telephone call from police and went to the Mandy Lane home, where he saw some of the missing items in a parked pickup truck. Several people there had been handcuffed by police, but Goforth was not among them.
Detective Hammons testified that Goforth had been placed in a deputy's car before he and Detective Jackson arrived at the Mandy Lane residence. She told them that she was house sitting for a friend there. Police found brothers Jack and James (Jim) Henson, who lived at the house, inside "playing possum" as if they were asleep, and Goforth was taken to the Saline County Detention Center to be interviewed. The officers saw a vehicle in the Hensons' carport, a check of the VIN came back to Goforth, and she told officers the vehicle was hers.
At trial Detective Hammons identified the audio CD of his interview with Goforth, which was then played and admitted into evidence. Goforth stated in the interview that Jim Henson was her boyfriend, she often stayed at his residence on Mandy Lane, and she sometimes did meth with him, including that morning when there was some mixed into her coffee. Referring to a five-gallon bucket "supposed to have chemicals and stuff in it," she said she had helped Jim look for an alleged meth lab on property adjacent to his house and helped get rid of "stolen stuff." She said she was not worried about the neighbor's meth lab but was worried about Jim's brother.
Detective Jackson testified that he had been present during Goforth's interview and had returned to the Mandy Lane residence in the evening. He and other officers observed Jack Henson driving a pickup truck, but Jack backed up and went inside when he saw Jackson and the others. Sherry Vocque, who also lived there, "took off into the woods." Spencer arrived to identify a compressor and other things loaded into the truck as items missing from his shed.
Goforth moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State's case, contending that the evidence showed only that she was unlawfully on the property of another person. She argued that the State, although proving that other people went into Spencer's shed with the purpose to commit theft or knowingly obtained or exercised unlawful control over his property, had not shown that she unlawfully entered the structure or assisted anyone else in entering it with the purpose of committing theft. She argued that her mere presence at the scene, knowledge of the wrongdoings of others, and guilt by association were not sufficient to show that she went into the structure with the purpose to commit theft or knowingly obtained or exercised unlawful control over the property. On the charge of breaking or entering, she argued that the evidence did not show she entered a structure or assisted anyone else in entering with a purpose to commit theft of property; as for theft, she argued the evidence did not show that she exercised unauthorized control over the stolen property.
The trial court, noting Goforth's statement that she had exited Spencer's building, reasoned that she first must have been inside it. The court found that she was there at least to aid, assist or abet her colleagues with theft of the property that was stolen, and that it was unreasonable under the circumstances to believe she was there just to watch. Her motions for directed verdict were denied.
Goforth testified in her own defense, agreeing that the CD was "pretty much accurate" about what she told the officers and what had happened. Her attorney stipulated that her testimony would not differ from what she said in the interview. Her directed-verdict motions were renewed and again denied.
Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Cluck, supra. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the fact finder to decide. Id. The credibility of witnesses is an issue for the fact finder, which is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony and which resolves questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Id.
A defendant's efforts to conceal a crime and lying to police about one's involvement can be considered as evidence of guilt, which can also be inferred from the defendant's improbable explanations of incriminating conduct. Barrett v. State, 354 Ark. 187, 119 S.W.3d 485 (2003); Smith v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 135. Fleeing from the scene of the crime is also relevant to the issue of guilt. Crutchfield v. State, 306 Ark. 97, 812 S.W.2d 459 (1991).
Here, Spencer identified Goforth as one of the individuals who fled from his shed, from which items were removed and placed outside, and who escaped through a recently cut hole in the fence. She was caught hiding in a bush at her boyfriend's residence, which was located near Spencer's home and where she often stayed. She told Spencer that the gloves she was wearing would prevent any fingerprints from being found. Before admitting to investigators that Jim Henson was her boyfriend, she attempted to explain her presence by stating that she was house sitting; she also gave an improbable explanation for her presence on the victim's property.
Goforth's unlawful presence near the storage shed and flight from the victim, her opportunity to steal items stored in the shed, and her association with persons involved in the crimes they committed suggests that she jointly participated in the crimes of breaking or entering and of theft of property. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was substantial evidence to uphold her convictions.
Affirmed.
HART and ROBBINS, JJ., agree.