Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-02496
08-06-2018
OCTAVIO GOENAGA, Plaintiff v. STEVE MACDONALD, et al., Defendants
(CONABOY, J.)
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is a motion for sanctions filed by Defendant Correctional Officer ("C/O") Clark. (Doc. 73). Pro se prisoner-Plaintiff Octavio Goenaga—an inmate at the Dauphin County Prison—initiated the instant suit on December 31, 2014, seeking damages for the deliberate indifference to his medical needs and injuries sustained as a result of the "unnecessar[il]y aggressive" treatment by C/O's. (Doc. 1). Goenaga filed an amended complaint on May 26, 2016. (Doc. 39). On March 30, 2017, the Court dismissed all claims against all defendants except for Goenaga's excessive force/failure to intervene claim against Defendant Clark. (Doc. 62). On April 10, 2017, Defendant Clark filed an answer to the amended complaint. (Doc. 63). I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant Clark filed the instant motion for sanctions seeking dismissal of Goenaga's claims for failure to comply with a court order, and for failure to comply with his discovery obligations. (Doc. 73). On December 6, 2017, the Court granted the motion to compel discovery filed by Defendant Clark, ordering Goenaga to respond to Defendant Clark's discovery requests within 30 days of the date of the Order. (Doc. 71). To date, Goenaga has failed to respond to those requests. Defendant Clark asserts that he will be significantly hindered in responding to the claims asserted against him without this discovery (Doc. 73, at ¶ 5), and seeks dismissal of the claims against him. On July 17, 2018, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing Goenaga to show cause why his complaint should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the Court's Order Compelling Discovery, and further, why he has failed to respond to the motion for sanctions. (Doc. 72). To date, Goenaga has not responded to the order. Further, the Court notes that a review of the Bureau of Prison inmate locator indicates that Goenaga was released from custody on January 16, 2018. See https ://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/. Further, the order to show cause was returned to the Court with a notation that he was no longer at the address (Doc. 79). Plaintiff has not updated his address on the docket. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion for sanctions be GRANTED, and the case be DISMISSED. II. DISCUSSION
Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may impose sanctions on a party that fails to comply with an order compelling discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2). "Dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 is a matter for the discretion of the district court." Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc., v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 691 (3d Cir.1988) (citing Nat'Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) (per curium)). The sanction of dismissal, however, "is disfavored absent the most egregious circumstances." U.S. v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867-68 (3d Cir.1984). Where the proposed sanctions include dismissal with prejudice, entry of default judgment, or the preclusion of claims or defenses, the exercise of that discretion is governed by six factors originally enumerated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir.1984). Knoll v. City of Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 409-10 (3d Cir.2013). These factors include:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal[, default judgment, or preclusion or claims or defenses], which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 (emphasis added).
"In balancing the Poulis factors, there is no 'magic formula' or 'mechanical calculation' to determine how they are considered." Miles v. Elliot, No. 94-4669, 2011 WL 857320, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Mar.10, 2011) (citing Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir.2008). "Although each factor need not be satisfied for the trial court to dismiss a claim [or entry of default], any and all doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits." Wirerope Works, Inc. v. Travelers Excess & Surplus Lines Co., No. 07-169, 2008 WL 2073375, at *3 (E.D.Pa. May 12, 2008) (citing Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir.2003); Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir.1988); Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir.2002), Adams v. Trustees of the N.J. Brewery Emps. Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir.1994)). Examples of cases where default judgement was entered or a case was dismissed include: National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) (reversing the Third Circuit in holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint under Rule 37 where the district court found that plaintiff demonstrated "flagrant bad faith" amounting to a "callous disregard" of his responsibilities); Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369 (3d. Cir.1992) (upholding the district court's entry of default judgment where litigant "flagrantly" violated court orders); and Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co. 843 F.2d 683 (1988) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding damages evidence at trial where plaintiff repeatedly failed to comply with discovery orders and produced unsupported damages evidence one week before trial). The Court has considered the six factors, and finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal of the case.
First, there is no doubt that it is Goenaga's personal responsibility to respond to the Court's Order, and to Defendant's discovery requests. Goenaga, as a pro se litigant, has the ultimate and sole responsibility to prosecute his claim and to comport with court orders. See Hoxworth v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1992). "As a general rule, a pro se litigant is responsible for his failure to comply with court orders." Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 117 (3d Cir.2011); see also Gieniec v. Smith, No.3:09-cv-02330, 2011 WL 6130723, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Dec.8, 2011) ("Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and thus is responsible for ... informing the Court of his address, responding to discovery requests, and complying with Court orders."). He has failed to do either, and most recently, has failed to advise the court of his current address. See Durah v. Rustin,No.05-1709, 2006 WL 2924788, at *1 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 10, 2006). As such, the first factor, the extent of the party's personal responsibility, weighs in favor of dismissal.
Similarly, the second factor, prejudice to the moving party, weighs in favor of dismissal. A finding of prejudice does not require "irremediable harm." Rather, "the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to [effectively prepare] a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial." Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir.2003). Indeed, "it is quite sufficient if he does nothing, knowing that until something is done there will be no trial ." Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 32 F.R.D. 375, 377 (E.D.Pa.1961). Here, Goenaga's failure to comply with discovery requests, to respond to Court orders, or to file his brief in opposition to Defendant's motion for sanctions impedes Defendant's ability to prepare a trial strategy. Goenaga's inactions, coupled with the significant time and resources expended by Defendant in litigating this action, have created an unnecessary stalemate, which prevents Defendant from moving forward with this litigation and renders the time and resources expended by Defendant largely unproductive. Defendant Clark is unable to prepare for trial at this point. Accordingly, the Court finds that the second Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The third factor, the history of dilatoriness, also weighs in favor of dismissal. This case, which is over three years old at this juncture, should be moved forward. Goenaga's failures to respond to Court orders, and his failure to assure that his case will move forward by updating his address with the Court, suggest a pattern of dilatoriness which weighs in favor of dismissal.
The fourth factor, Goenaga's willful or bad faith, requires the court to consider whether the plaintiff's conduct reflects mere inadvertence or negligence, or rather "strategic," intentional or self-serving behavior." Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. "Under this factor, the District Court must consider whether the conduct was the type of willful or contumacious behavior which [can be] characterized as flagrant bad faith." Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262. Generally, willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior. Id. Conversely, "[i]f the conduct is merely negligent or inadvertent, [the court] will not call the conduct 'contumacious.'" Id. Here, the facts are insufficient to support a conclusion that Goenaga's conduct to date has been willful or in bad faith. The record does not support a finding that he refused to conduct discovery. See Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262. Without providing Goenaga "a full and fair opportunity to present the reasons he did not attend the conference" or conduct discovery, this Court cannot find that he acted contumaciously. Id. However, while the Court does not have adequate information to support a finding of bad faith or willfulness, this factor does not necessarily weigh against dismissal.
In considering the fifth factor, the effectiveness of alternative sanctions, this Court finds that there are no appropriate sanctions other than dismissal. Generally, "sanctions less than dismissal [are] ineffective when a litigant, such as [Plaintiff], is proceeding pro se." See Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed. Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir.2011); Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir.2002) (per curiam); see eg., Nowland v. Lucas, Civil No .1:10-CV-1963, 2012 WL 10559, at *6 (M.D.Pa. Jan.3, 2012) ("This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion."). Here, Goenaga's status as a pro se litigant prevents this Court from sanctioning him or using alternative sanctions to steer this litigation onward, especially considering that Goenaga has failed to abide by court orders to date, and has failed to update his address with the Court since his release. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The final Poulis factor is the meritoriousness of Goenaga's claims. "A claim ... will be deemed meritorious when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff...." Poulis, 747 F.2d at 87. Goenaga has alleged that Defendant Clark violated his constitutional rights to be free from excessive force and by failing to intervene. While on its face, Goenaga's amended complaint (Doc. 39) appears to state a claim, and Defendant Clark has filed an answer (Doc. 63) to the amended complaint, with the absence of any discovery or record before the Court, it is nearly impossible for this Court to determine the meritoriousness of Goenaga's claims at this juncture. Further, consideration of this factor cannot save Goenaga's claims, since he is now non-compliant with his obligations as a litigant. Goenaga cannot fail to address the merits of his claims, and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for denying a motion to sanction him. Turner v. Lopez, No. CIV.A. 3:13-872, 2013 WL 5603260, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2013). Furthermore, as stated above, it is well-settled that " 'no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' Ware, 322 F.3d at 222, [and it is] clear that 'not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.' Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373." Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d at 263. Therefore, the untested merits of the non-compliant plaintiff's claims, standing alone, cannot prevent imposition of sanctions. Turner v. Lopez, No. CIV.A. 3:13-872, 2013 WL 5603260, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2013). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
To reiterate, when weighing the Poulis factors, there is no "magic formula" or "mechanical calculation" that automatically warrants dismissal for failure to prosecute. Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008). Quite the contrary, the Court is guided by the Third Circuit's admonition that "no single Poulis factor is dispositive," and that "not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint." Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, on balance, the Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal of this action for lack of prosecution and failure to comply with Court orders, and the only factor potentially weighing against dismissal is that Plaintiff does not appear to have acted in bad faith. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion for sanctions (Doc. 73) be granted, this case be dismissed, and the Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. Dated: August 6, 2018
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated August 6, 2018.
Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.Dated: August 6, 2018
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge