Summary
stating individual remarks can constitute evidence of discrimination if there is some additional evidence and nexus between comments and challenged employment decision
Summary of this case from Mentonis v. Abbott Labs. Inc.Opinion
2014-03-11
Thomas GODBOLT, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. VERIZON NEW YORK INC., Defendant–Respondent. Community Service Society of New York, The Bronx Defenders, The Fortune Society, Inc., Legal Action Center, The Legal Aid Society, Legal Services NYC, MFY Legal Services, Inc., National Employment Lawyers Association/NY, The Osborne Association and Youth Represent, Amici Curiae.
Alterman & Boop LLP, New York (Arlene F. Boop of counsel), for appellant. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York (Robert S. Whitman of counsel), for respondent.
Alterman & Boop LLP, New York (Arlene F. Boop of counsel), for appellant. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York (Robert S. Whitman of counsel), for respondent.
Community Service Society, New York (Paul Keefe of counsel), for amici curiae.
MAZZARELLI, J.P., SWEENY, DeGRASSE, MANZANET–DANIELS, GISCHE, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy S. Friedman, J.), entered January 23, 2013, which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated from his employment on the basis of his race and his past criminal convictions, in violation of the State and City Human Rights Laws (Executive Law § 296 et seq. ; Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–107[1][a], [7] ) and Correction Law § 752.
Defendant explained that it terminated plaintiff because he failed to disclose his prior criminal convictions on his employment applications, which plaintiff admitted, and demonstrated that every one of its employees who were found to have falsified an employment application was terminated ( see Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 305, 786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 819 N.E.2d 998 [2004];Bennett v. Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 92 A.D.3d 29, 936 N.Y.S.2d 112 [1st Dept.2011], lv. denied18 N.Y.3d 811, 2012 WL 1432090 [2012] ).
Plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact. He presented no evidence that defendant's proffered reason for his termination was pretextual and identified no evidence that he was treated differently from similarly situated employees because of his race or criminal history. There is no evidence to support his claim that the investigator exceeded his investigative authority or that his investigation was animated by racial bias. The fact that the investigation, which initially was focused on claims of intoxication at work, found evidence of unrelated criminal convictions did not render the investigation unreasonable or improper.
Even under the mixed-motive analysis applicable to City Human Rights Law claims, plaintiff's claim fails, because there is no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that race or criminal history played any role in defendant's decision to terminate him ( see Bennett, 92 A.D.3d at 40–41, 936 N.Y.S.2d 112).
Plaintiff relies on one remark made in an email exchange that took place weeks after the decision to terminate him was made and that concerned the resolution of his union's grievance following the termination. In the email, one of defendant's employees responsible for making the decision to terminate plaintiff declined to reconsider the penalty because of the nature of plaintiff's convictions and his concern about the liability that defendant would assume if plaintiff committed a similar crime while on company time. However, “[s]tray remarks such as [this], even if made by a decision maker, do not, without more, constitute evidence of discrimination” ( Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 98 A.D.3d 107, 125, 946 N.Y.S.2d 27 [1st Dept.2012] ). Indeed, plaintiff did not demonstrate a nexus between the employee's remark and the decision to terminate him ( see e.g. Mete v. New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 21 A.D.3d 288, 294, 800 N.Y.S.2d 161 [1st Dept.2005] ).
We decline to hold, as urged by plaintiff and amici, that the stray remarks doctrine may not be relied on in determining claims brought pursuant to the City Human Rights Law, even as we recognize the law's “uniquely broad and remedial purposes” ( Bennett, 92 A.D.3d at 34, 936 N.Y.S.2d 112 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The doctrine is not inconsistent with the intentions of the law, since statements “constitute evidence of discriminatory motivation when a plaintiff demonstrates that a nexus exists between the allegedly discriminatory statements and a defendant's decision to discharge the plaintiff” ( Schreiber v. Worldco, LLC, 324 F.Supp.2d 512, 518 [S.D.N.Y.2004];see Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Group, Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115–116 [2nd Cir.2007] ).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.