Opinion
July 19, 1983.
Workmen's compensation — Limitation of actions — Petition to set aside final receipt — The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736 — Failure to raise question properly.
1. Time periods established by provisions of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, for filing a petition to set aside a final receipt present an absolute bar to the right to such relief which cannot be ignored in the absence of clear and precise evidence that the delayed filing was the result of the employer's fraud or its equivalent, and such defense can be first raised on appeal although not raised initially before the referee. [527]
Submitted on briefs May 12, 1983, to Judges WILLIAMS, JR., CRAIG and DOYLE, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 131 C.D. 1982, from the Order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in case of Gregory Gnall v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., No. A-81173.
Petition to the Department of Labor and Industry for workmen's compensation benefits for new injury and to set aside final receipt. Benefits for new injury denied. Final receipt set aside. Employer appealed to the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. Order granting petition to set aside reversed. Petitioner appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
Robert J. Gillespie, Sr., Bigelow, Gillespie Cooper, for petitioner.
James R. Pocius, Lenahan Dempsey, for respondents.
Gregory Gnall appeals from an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, which reversed the referee's decision and denied Gnall's petition to set aside a final receipt.
Gnall suffered a compensable injury to his back on October 19, 1976, and his employer, Bethlehem Mines Corporation, made payments pursuant to The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act until December 10, 1976, when Gnall signed a final receipt.
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P. S. § 1-1066.
On October 13, 1978, Gnall again injured his back while working, and on March 12, 1980, he filed both a new claim petition and a petition to set aside the final receipt.
After several hearings, at which the parties presented evidence on both petitions, the referee dismissed Gnall's claim petition, but granted his petition to set aside the final receipt and awarded compensation.
Bethlehem appealed that part of the referee's order setting aside the final receipt, and the board reversed the referee's decision on the grounds that Gnall had not filed the petition within the three-year time limit prescribed by § 434 of the Act.
Section 434 of the Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P. S. § 1001, provides, in relevant part:
A final receipt, given by an employee or dependent entitled to compensation under a compensation agreement notice or award, shall be prima facie evidence of the termination of the employer's liability to pay compensation under such agreement notice or award: Provided, however, That a referee designated by the department may, at any time within three years from the date to which payments have been made, set aside a final receipt, upon petition filed with the department, or on the department's own motion, if it be shown that all disability due to the injury in fact had not terminated.
Gnall argues here, essentially, that because his employer did not raise the § 434 time limit before the referee, it waived the right to do so on appeal.
Following our limited scope of review, we must reject Gnall's contention and affirm the board's order.
Stewart v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 50 Pa. Commw. 479, 413 A.2d 437 (1980).
"The time period provided by Section 434 is an absolute bar to the right to obtain additional compensation and courts may not extend the period unless the claimant proves by clear and precise evidence of more than doubtful weight that the receipt was procured by the employer's fraud or its equivalent." Stewart v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 50 Pa. Commw. 479, 481-82, 413 A.2d 437, 439 (1980).
Gnall does not argue that he met that requirement; indeed his brief does not even seek an opportunity to present evidence of fraud or its equivalent.
The cases have firmly established that the time limits of the Act are mandatory, and, in the absence of a legally sufficient justification, a tribunal has no authority to consider a late petition.
Overmiller v. D. E. Horn Co., 191 Pa. Super. 562, 159 A.2d 245 (1960).
Accordingly, we affirm.
ORDER
NOW, July 19, 1983, the order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, No. A-81173, dated December 24, 1981, is affirmed.