Summary
providing that where no time is fixed for settlement, it is presumed that a reasonable time was intended
Summary of this case from Davis v. Northridge Development AssocOpinion
Argued March 21, 1951
Decided April 17, 1951
Contracts — Construction — Time of performance — Delivery of deed — Reasonable time.
1. Where no time is fixed for the delivery of a deed, it is presumed that a reasonable time was intended. [259]
2. Where a contract for the sale of land and a dwelling house and barn provided for delivery of possession "as soon as legally possible after . . . (vendors) have found a suitable place to live," and it appeared that two years and five months had elapsed before the purchaser sued for specific performance but defendants had not found another place to live, it was Held that plaintiffs were entitled to possession. [258-60]
Equity — Specific performance — Tender of consideration — Necessity — Repudiation by opposite party.
3. Where one party to a contract has repudiated it, tender of the consideration is not required by the other party as a prerequisite to a suit for specific performance. [259-60]
Before DREW, C. J., STERN, STEARNE, JONES, BELL, LADNER and CHIDSEY, JJ.
Appeals, Nos. 228 and 229, March T., 1950, from decree of Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Dec. T., 1948, No. 3, in case of C. Parker Glover et ux. v. William Frederick Grubbs et al. Decree affirmed.
Bill in equity. Before PURVIS, P. J.
Decree entered in favor of plaintiffs. Defendants appealed.
John E. Winner, with him Floyd V. Winner and Galbreath, Braham Gregg, for appellants.
Samuel W. Greer and Greer Greer, submitted a brief for appellees.
This is an appeal from a decree in equity compelling William Frederick Grubbs and Clara Agnes Grubbs, defendants, to convey a certain farm to C. Parker Glover and his wife, Dorothy, plaintiffs, in accordance with an agreement of sale made between the parties to this suit.
The agreement of sale was executed in May, 1946, and covered a 53 acre farm and buildings located in Cranberry Township, Butler County. After more particularly describing the property, the agreement provided that the purchase price for the western 20 acres was to be $3500 and for the remaining 33 acres, which included the house and barn, $6000. It further provided that possession to the 33 acre tract was "to be given as soon as legally possible after . . . [defendants] have found a suitable place to live". On September 10, 1946, in accordance with the terms of this agreement, plaintiffs paid to defendants the sum of $3500 and received a deed to the 20 acres. Defendants have never tendered a deed to plaintiffs for the 33 acre tract despite repeated requests by plaintiffs. Instead, in the fall of 1948, more than two years after the agreement was executed, defendants began making permanent improvements to the house on that land and, upon seeing this, plaintiffs filed this bill in equity for specific performance.
Defendants argue that because the contract does not set forth the time when the conveyance was to be made it is too indefinite to be enforced by a court of equity. However, it has been repeatedly held that where no time is fixed for the delivery of the deed, it is presumed that a reasonable time was intended: Suchan v. Swope, 357 Pa. 16, 53 A.2d 116; Kearney v. Hogan, 154 Pa. 112, 25 A. 1076. Defendants contend that those authorities are not controlling because in this case there was a condition precedent which has not been fulfilled, i.e., that defendants find a suitable place to live. In Kearney v. Hogan, supra, there was a condition precedent that the vendor clear the title of all encumbrances. We there held that he had a reasonable time in which to satisfy that condition. Certainly here two years and five months was ample time for defendants to find a new home. Furthermore, both defendants testified that they had made permanent improvements to the house because they had decided not to go through with the agreement. They may have acted in good faith initially in their search for a home but they could not abandon that search which was required by the terms of the contract and then set up those terms as a defense to this suit.
Defendants also urge that plaintiffs are not entitled to specific performance because they failed to make a formal tender of the consideration. In view of the evidence in this case, tender was unnecessary. The testimony shows that plaintiffs at all times were ready to pay and on two occasions offered defendants an additional $500 if they would move out promptly. Moreover, the obvious and express repudiation of the agreement by defendants would have made a formal tender of the purchase price a useless formality which the law will not require: Erkess v. Eisenthal et ux., 354 Pa. 161, 47 A.2d 154. Under all of the circumstances here present the decree for specific performance was properly entered.
Decree affirmed. Costs to be paid by defendants.