Opinion
NO. 2019-CC-1402
01-28-2020
GLOBAL MARKETING SOLUTIONS, L.L.C. v. BLUE MILL FARMS, INC., et al.
PER CURIAM
Granted. As explained in the district court's per curiam submitted to this court, "this court and all parties hereto at all times clearly contemplated that a written judgment would be submitted in this matter." Therefore, the delay for seeking writs under Rule 4-3 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal commenced from the date of notice of the May 8, 2019 written judgment. Relators' notice of intent was filed within thirty days of the mailing of notice of the May 8, 2019 judgment. See Kosmitis v. Bailey , 96-1573 (La. 10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1167 (explaining that "[b]ecause a written judgment was clearly contemplated at all times by the trial court and all parties," the writ delays commenced from the date of notice of the written judgment).
Accordingly, the ruling of the court of appeal declining to consider relators' writ application is vacated and set aside. The case is remanded to the court of appeal for consideration of relators' writ application on the merits.
Hughes, J., would deny.
Crain, J., recused. Assigns an affidavit for the record.
Crichton, J., dissents and assigns reasons as to the recusal of Justice Crain.
Attachment
RECORD ENTRY
Attached is my sworn affidavit to be entered into the Court's record of this matter.
/s/
WILLIAM J. CRAIN, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
Attachment
AFFIDAVIT
BEFORE ME, the undersigned notary public, personally came and appeared:
WILLIAM J. CRAIN
who, after being duly sworn, did depose and state:
I have no personal or financial interest in the cases captioned Global Marketing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Chevron U.S.A., et al, Docket No. 19-C-1886 or Global Marketing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Blue Mill Farms, Inc., et al No. 19-CC-1402. I have never performed a judicial act in another court in either of these cases. I can and will fairly and impartially decide any issues presented in these cases based solely on the facts and law applicable to the same. I do not harbor any hostility towards either the parties or their attorneys in the captioned cases, which might impair my ability to be fair and impartial.
/s/
WILLLIAM J. CRAIN
SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS 22nd DAY OF JANUARY, 2020.
Crichton, J., dissents and assigns reasons:
I disagree with the majority of this Court's decision to recuse Justice William Crain in this matter and would deny the motion. In my view, recusal is neither required by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, see La. C.C.P. art. 151(A)(4) ("a judge shall be recused when he is "biased or prejudiced toward or against the parties or the parties' attorneys to such an extent that he would be unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings"), or federal law, see Rippo v. Baker , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 905, 197 L.Ed. 2d 167 (2017) (the only constitutionally permissible inquiry to be applied at the recusal hearing is, "objectively speaking, ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable’ ") (emphasis added). See also LaCaze v. Louisiana , –––U.S.––––, 138 S.Ct. 60, 199 L.Ed. 2d 1 (2017) ; State v. LaCaze , 16-0234 (La. 3/13/18), 239 So.3d 807, 813, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 321, 202 L.Ed.2d 218 (2018). Despite the moving parties' assertions to the contrary, Justice Crain's sworn Affidavit demonstrates that he "can and will fairly and impartially decide any issues presented – in these cases based solely on the facts and law applicable to the same." A campaign mailer such as the one at issue here cannot – and should not – be the basis of recusal.
Retired Judge James Boddie, Jr., appointed Justice Pro Tempore for Justice Marcus R. Clark, also voted to deny the recusal motion.
The cases to which the moving parties are referring are the "legacy lawsuits," which identify the litigation brought by landowners seeking to require oil and gas companies to pay for restoration of land that has been environmentally compromised.
The majority's decision to grant recusation under these circumstances, notwithstanding our colleague's sworn statement, is misguided, if not patently wrong, as neither federal case law or state law requires it. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority's decision and would deny the recusal motion.
BODDIE, J., dissents as to the recusal of Justice Crain.