Opinion
No. CV 03-0828635 S
December 12, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This is an action by a police union seeking to enjoin the Town of Glastonbury from assigning police personnel from performing traffic duties, claimed to be "extra duty" assignments, on their regular shifts.
The defendant town moves to dismiss the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in addressing the problem by not filing a grievance with the state board of labor relations.
I
Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-107(a) the state board of labor relations "is empowered and directed to prevent unfair labor practices [as defined in § 31-105(6)]." The plaintiff, however, claims that it has not alleged an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the statute, but has filed a grievance with the state board of mediation and arbitration under General Statutes § 7-472 claiming that the defendant breached, rather than repudiated, the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. General Statutes § 7-472 provides in relevant part:
"Mediation by State Board of Mediation and Arbitration. (a) The services of the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration shall be available to municipal employers and employee organizations for purposes of mediation of grievances or impasses in contract or contact reopener negotiations and for purposes of arbitration of disputes over the interpretation or application of the terms of a written agreement . . ." (Emphasis added.)
In Hartford v. Hartford Municipal Employees Assn., 259 Conn. 251, 283, 788 A.2d 60 (2002), our Supreme Court held that "[t]here is no statutory requirement that an unfair practice proceeding supplant a pending arbitral proceeding. Thus, unlike in the case of judicial review, a grievance or arbitral proceeding may exist coextensively with the board's jurisdiction over an unfair practice complaint . . . The primary reason for this distinction is the fact that the state board of mediation and arbitration and the state board of labor relations each have its own field of operation." In this case, the plaintiff's complaint is that the defendant has breached a provision of the collective bargaining unit, not that its conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice. In Hartford v. Municipal Employees Assn., supra, the court illuminated the distinction between legal actions that refer only to violations of a contract and actions that involve a violation of a separate labor relations act pointing out that each addresses a separate wrong. "The board is not deprived by an earlier ruling in a grievance procedure of its duty to enforce compliance with the Municipal Employee Relations Act by utilizing a remedy returning matters to the status quo ante." Id. 475.
In this case, the parties' contract does not contain a provision explicitly mandating the plaintiff to bring its claim before the state board of labor relations, nor is there a statute requiring the plaintiff to do so. Accordingly, the plaintiff has not failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, having properly brought its breach of contract claim to the state board of mediation and arbitration.
II
General Statutes § 52-422 provides:
Order pendente lite. At any time before an award is rendered pursuant to an arbitration under this chapter, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when said court is not in session, any judge thereof, upon application of any party to the arbitration, may make forthwith such order or decree, issue such process and direct such proceedings as may be necessary to protect the rights of the parties pending the rendering of the award and to secure the satisfaction thereof when rendered and confirmed.
Under General Statutes § 52-422, the court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff's application for an order pendente lite or temporary injunction while an arbitration is proceeding. In Goodson v. State, 232 Conn. 175, 180, our Supreme Court stated: "By its express terms, § 52-422 allows the trial court to issue an order only upon application of any party to the arbitration . . . Thus, a pending arbitration is an essential condition that must exist before § 52-422 may be invoked." Id. In this case, the plaintiff has commenced and is a party to an action against the defendant that is pending before the state board of mediation and arbitration, and this proceeding fairly falls under the broad definition of "arbitration" in the statute. Therefore, the plaintiff's application for an injunction qualifies as an application for an order pendente lite and is properly before the court pursuant to § 52-422. Since the court has jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction, defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
WAGNER, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE