Opinion
CA 9:20-cv-03554-DCC-MHC
07-19-2022
Wesley L. Givens, Plaintiff, v. Daniel Harouff, John Palmer, Kayala Shervey, Kameron Lave, Sgt. Lite, Officer Poitevien, Burzinski, and McCuen, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the above-named Defendants. ECF No. 46. The Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff Wesley L. Givens (“Plaintiff”) of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' Motion. ECF No. 48. Plaintiff has not filed a Response; however, he filed two motions for injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 51 and 59) which are also addressed herein. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.). Because the Motions addressed herein are dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Request Separation/Permanent Restraining Order (ECF No. 51); a Motion for Restraining Order (ECF No. 59), a Motion for a Physical and Mental Exam (ECF No. 62), and a Motion for Discovery (ECF No. 63), which the undersigned will liberally construe as a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion, to the extent he argues summary judgment is improper in those filings.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated while an inmate within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). Specifically, he alleges use of excessive force, inadequate conditions of confinement related to food and personal items, and inadequate medical treatment. All of Plaintiff's claims arise from his transfer from Lieber Correctional Institution (“LCI”) to Perry Correctional Institution (“PCI”), both SCDC facilities.
Defendants have submitted numerous documents to the Court, including affidavits, incident reports, medical records, photos, and videos of the entire transfer. From the moment Plaintiff arrived at PCI's main gate until he was placed in his cell, the actions of Plaintiff and the SCDC employees were recorded on videotape. ECF No. 46-6. Defendants were all involved in escorting Plaintiff from the transport van to his cell at PCI. The following rendition of events comes from the video evidence submitted to the Court and the relevant incident reports. See ECF No. 46-3 (videos from LCI); ECF No. 46-5 (photos). ECF No. 46-6 (videos from PCI); ECF No. 46-7; ECF No. 46-8 (incident reports).
The facts are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the non-moving party on Defendants' Motions. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). To the extent that the videos clearly depict the events at issue, they will prevail over contrary versions of the events submitted by either side. “[W]hen a video ‘quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by [the plaintiff] . . . so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt [the plaintiff's] version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.'” Witt v. West Virginia State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)). However, this principle does not permit a court to “reject a plaintiff's account on summary judgment” if the “documentary evidence, such as a video,” merely “offers some support for a governmental officer's version of events.” Id. (emphasis in original).
On August 27, 2020, Plaintiff was transported from LCI to PCI. At LCI, Plaintiff was instructed to pack up his belongings for transfer. Plaintiff refused, became combative, took an object, and shattered his cell window. Two bursts of chemical munitions were discharged into Plaintiff's cell but were not effective in resolving the conflict. Subsequently, Plaintiff started a fire outside his cell. A forced cell movement team ultimately removed Plaintiff from his cell. At that point, Plaintiff was escorted to the medical department where he was decontaminated and medically cleared. While placing Plaintiff into the transport van, he attempted to spit on a correctional officer. While being transported from LCI to PCI, Plaintiff caused extensive damage to the interior of the van. ECF No. 46-5 (photos of van). He continued to spit on or in the direction of an SCDC employee during transport.
Because of Plaintiff's conduct at LCI, there was a team of SCDC employees, comprised of Defendants, waiting on Plaintiff when he arrived at PCI. Plaintiff was given a directive to exit the van, but he did not comply. When Plaintiff exited the van, he fell to the ground. While being escorted from the main gate to his dormitory, Plaintiff was combative, physically resisted, attempted to spit on officers, and made multiple threats against Defendants and their families.
Medical personnel came to Plaintiff's holding cell and the nurse's post-evaluation interview was recorded. ECF No. 46-6. According to the nurse, Plaintiff had a healthy appearance and there were no obvious abrasions, cuts, or other injury. The nurse did note a little redness on Plaintiff's wrists from the restraints. In a medical record generated the following day, the nurse noted that, “All I could see of any redness of any kind was around his wrist and that is because he was so agitated and difficult he caused this himself. There were no broken areas on his wrist or anywhere on his skin.” ECF No. 46-9. This medical record also noted that the inmate “was spitting, screaming and climbing in the cell as soon as he was placed there.”
Although the record was generated the following day (August 28), the nurse who generated the report was recounting Plaintiff's condition immediately following the transfer into his cell on August 27. See ECF No. 46-9 (describing the events of the previous evening and noting that the nurse “finally got the opportunity to assess [Plaintiff] at [approximately] 8:30pm”).
Plaintiff was seen for a follow-up on August 28, 2020, by PCI medical staff. ECF No. 4610. As noted in this visit, “[Plaintiff] was escorted to Delta medical exam room by multiple officers. [Plaintiff's] gait [was] steady and no acute distress noted upon arrival. SCDC medical screen was performed.” ECF No. 46-10 at 2. The medical record assessment further provided, “[n]o open sores noted to skin, no needle marks, bruises []old scars noted on arms and BLE. Mild redness noted to bilateral wrists, handcuffs in place.” ECF No. 46-10 at 2; ECF No. 46-11.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 46. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Defendants in their individual capacities and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The gravamen of the Amended Complaint pertains to alleged excessive force by Defendants, though Plaintiff includes a litany of other alleged constitutional violations. As discussed below, none of Plaintiff's claims are viable, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
A. Official Capacity Claims
As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Defendants are SCDC employees; thus, with regard to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacities, Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Simpson v. S.C. Dep'tof Corr., No. 2:19-CV-2245-RMG, 2020 WL 582321, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (noting SCDC employees are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits brought against them in their official capacities). Accordingly, summary judgment is proper for Defendants in their official capacities as to all of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
B. Individual Capacity Claims
To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001). At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff must show Defendants' personal involvement for liability to attach under § 1983. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171-72 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting a plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights and finding certain defendants were entitled to summary judgment because “they lacked sufficient personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations”).
1. Excessive Force Claim
To establish a constitutional excessive force claim, an inmate must establish both an objective and subjective component. Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 2019). “The objective component asks whether the force applied was sufficiently serious to establish a cause of action.” Id. This is not a high bar: “as long as the force used is more than de minimis, the objective component is satisfied, regardless of the extent of the injury.” Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2021).
The subjective component is more demanding and asks a single question: “whether the officers acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Id. at 302 (citation omitted). That is, the subjective component is concerned with the underlying intent or motive of the officer that applied the force. Id. The core inquiry for the Court is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 239 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).
This subjective standard is unlike the “objective reasonableness” test courts apply under the Fourth Amendment: “The question is not whether a reasonable officer could have used force to maintain discipline, but whether these particular officers did use force for that reason.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 113 (emphasis in original).
Corrections officers employ force in “good faith”-i.e., permissibly-when “they are motivated by an immediate risk to physical safety or threat to prison order.” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302 (cleaned up) (citation omitted). Conversely, officers cross the line into an impermissible motive when “they inflict pain not to protect safety or prison discipline but to punish or retaliate against an inmate for his prior conduct.” Id.; see also Brooks, 924 F.3d 113 (noting corrections officers cross the line “when they inflict pain not to induce compliance, but to punish an inmate for intransigence or to retaliate for insubordination”). An officer's use of force on an inmate who is “‘restrained and compliant and posing no physical threat' raises the specter of such an impermissible motive.” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302 (quoting Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 102 (4th Cir. 2017)).
An officer's subjective motive may be proven through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 308-09. The Supreme Court has set forth the following non-exclusive factors to assist courts in assessing whether an officer has acted with the requisite state of mind: “(1) ‘the need for the application of force'; (2) ‘the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used'; (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.'” Iko, 535 F.3d at 239 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). “If a reasonable jury could find, based on inferences drawn under the Whitley factors or other evidence, that correctional officers used force maliciously to punish or retaliate against an inmate, then summary judgment is not appropriate.” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302-03.
Here, after considering the aforementioned Whitley factors and the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the subjective component. The video evidence submitted to the Court shows the force used by Defendants to escort Plaintiff to his cell at PCI was not constitutionally excessive. There was a need for Defendants to escort Plaintiff to his cell, and minimal force was used for the transfer. See Frost v. New York City Police Dep't, 980 F.3d 231, 256 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[A]lthough perhaps the struggle . . . could have been gentler, the video footage does not suggest that the officers' actions could reasonably be viewed as excessive.”). Moreover, Plaintiff was combative, noncompliant, and threatened Defendants and their families; thus, Defendants' conduct was entirely appropriate given the circumstances. See Dean, 984 F.3d at 302 (noting officers employ force in good faith when their actions are motivated by an immediate risk to physical safety or by a threat to prison order)
The video evidence and the associated Incident Reports overwhelmingly demonstrate that Defendants' actions were taken in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, rather than maliciously or sadistically. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 276 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting summary judgment is proper under Scott when there is evidence, like a videotape, “of undisputed authenticity that shows some material element of the plaintiff's account to be ‘blatantly and demonstrably false.'” (citation omitted)). Plaintiff has not produced evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude otherwise. See Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 227 (4th Cir. 2016) (“To survive summary judgment, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The undersigned, therefore, recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. See Shiheed v. Harding, 802 Fed.Appx. 765, 768 (4th Cir. 2020) (upholding summary judgment for officers where video evidence clearly demonstrated that excessive force was not used in violation of the Eighth Amendment after analyzing Whitley factors).
2. Other constitutional claims
Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by (1) denying him blankets/clothing/mattress, (2) sexually assaulting him, (3) denying him medical care, and (4) by violating the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff has not produced evidence sufficient to support any of these claims, much less create a genuine dispute of material fact to survive summary judgment.
Although unclear, Plaintiff may also be alleging that Defendants violated the Constitution by violating SCDC's policies. However, this Court has found that violations of policies and procedures alone, even if they occurred, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (noting § 1983 “does not provide any relief against prison rules violations assuming, arguendo, that such a violation occurred”). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff may be asserting a claim on this basis, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
As an initial matter, even construing the Amended Complaint liberally, as this Court must, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants had any personal involvement in these alleged constitutional violations. Rather, Plaintiff's allegations are framed in sweeping generalities by merely listing Defendants and briefly leveling bald assertions of wrongdoing. See, e.g., ECF No. 20 at 7 (“Lt. Burzinski - perjury, excessive use of force, violation of state rules/policies . . . Sgt. Lite - same as above”); ECF No. 20 at 9 (“Also [they] denied medical treatment.”). Such conclusory assertions are insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. See Thompson, 312 F.3d at 649 (noting conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion).
For this reason, and the reasons that follow, Plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation under any of the theories he appears to allege. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
i. Conditions of confinement
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege that the conditions of his confinement at PCI were intolerable to the extent that they constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiff makes a single reference to “mattress, blankets, socks, boxers, and sheets.” ECF No. 20 at 6.
Even construing the Amended Complaint liberally, as this Court must, Plaintiff does not allege-or cite to any evidence in the record that could lead a reasonable jury to believe-that Defendants had any personal involvement in the alleged taking of his mattress, blankets, socks, boxers, and sheets, which is fatal to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to point to evidence in the record that supports a threshold essential element of a § 1983 claim, summary judgment is appropriate on this ground alone. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment).
Although Plaintiff later alleges that his “boxers were taken and that he was left in his room with nothing completely naked,” he does not state or otherwise identify who took his boxers. See ECF No. 20 at 9. Moreover, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is not verified, nor is there any evidence before the Court in this regard.
Even assuming Plaintiff had alleged personal involvement, his claims still fail because he has not shown there is any genuine dispute of material fact on this claim. Indeed, the video evidence shows that Plaintiff was clothed at all times-with the exception being the required strip search. ECF No. 46-6 (videos from PCI); ECF No. 46-20 at 2. Once Plaintiff arrived at PCI, he was placed in a control cell based on his behavior in accordance with SCDC policy. ECF No. 4620 at 2. Plaintiff was given a control cell blanket and one pair of boxers. ECF No. 46-20 at 2. Once Plaintiffwas removed from the control cell, he was issued a mattress, blanket, jumpsuit, washcloth, towel, socks, a fork, a cup, and two pairs of boxers. ECF No. 46-20 at 2; ECF No. 46-21. On October 12, 2020, Plaintiff was issued the following items: two sheets, one towel, one washcloth, and two large boxers. ECF No. 46-20 at 2; ECF No. 46-21. There is no evidence that Plaintiff was denied any personal item. In fact, the only evidence before the Court is that Plaintiff received every item he references in his Amended Complaint. Thus, his claim fails, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (noting that, in the face of a properly supported motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rest on his allegations to get to a jury without “any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint”).
ii. Sexual assault
Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted during the course of the strip search that took place on August 27, 2020. ECF No. 20 at 9; see also Jackson v. Holley, 666 Fed.Appx. 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting allegations of sexual abuse can amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
Plaintiff's claims fail, as they are blatantly contradicted by the video evidence of the strip search and the accompanying investigative report by the Division of Police Services that investigated Plaintiff's allegations of sexual assault and rape. ECF No. 46-6 (videos from PCI); ECF No. 46-16; ECF No. 46-10. That evidence shows no sexual assault occurred during the strip search, and Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown or argued otherwise. See Ellis v. Elder, No. 7:08-CV00642, 2009 WL 275316, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 4, 2009) (“In stating such a claim, however, the inmate must allege facts on which he could prove that the unwanted touching had some sexual aspect to it; his own perceptions alone that the contact was of a sexual nature are not sufficient.” (citing and collecting cases)). Accordingly, summary judgment is proper for Defendants. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); Harris, 927 F.3d at 276 (noting summary judgment is proper under Scott when there is evidence, like a videotape, “of undisputed authenticity that shows some material element of the plaintiff's account to be ‘blatantly and demonstrably false.'” (citation omitted)).
iii. Medical Claims
Plaintiff's claim, that Defendants denied him medical care, is an allegation that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement . . . [and] ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.'” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). To sustain his constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and (2) an objective showing that those needs were serious. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting a “plaintiff must demonstrate that the officers acted with ‘deliberate indifference' (subjective) to the inmate's ‘serious medical needs' (objective)”); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (to state an Eighth Amendment claim, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence [1] deliberate indifference to [2] serious medical needs” (emphasis added)).
The subjective prong of deliberate indifference is a “very high standard” and merely negligent behaviors do not meet the subjective mens rea requirement. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit has recognized two different aspects of an official's state of mind that must be shown to satisfy the subjective prong in this context: “First, actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate is required” and, second, “the officer must also have recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate arising from his medical needs.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable . . . for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).
As to the objective prong, a “serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 241).
Here, Plaintiff's claim fails for two reasons. First, as already noted above, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants acted personally to deny medical care or interfered with any treatment. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); Wilcox, 877 F.3d at 170 (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate on this ground alone.
Second, Plaintiff has failed to show evidence that satisfies either the objective or subjective prong of a deliberate indifference claim. As a general matter, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that he either requested or was denied medical treatment. Indeed, an examination of Plaintiff's SCDC medical records reveals just the opposite and reflects an extensive amount of medical attention received by Plaintiff. From the date of the alleged incident on August 27, 2020, through December 31, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by medical professionals a total of eighty-one times. See ECF No. 46-19.
These medical records also reflect numerous occasions on which Plaintiff refused evaluation, refused to answer any questions, or was so argumentative and combative that the medical encounter was terminated by the medical examiner. Plaintiff cannot establish a deliberate indifference claim on such facts. See, e.g., Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 892 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding no deliberate indifference when inmate refused offered medical care); Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494, 500 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding no deliberate indifference when inmate refused to take preliminary test before beginning treatment); Scarbrough v. Thompson, No. 10-CV-901, 2012 WL. 7761439, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2012) (holding that where inmate refused medical care from a nurse, “any alleged delay or interference in treatment was due to [the inmate's] own actions” and could not subsequently “be transformed into an Eighth Amendment claim”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:10-CV-901, 2013 WL 1100680 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013).
As to the day Plaintiff was transported to PCI, the evidence shows that medical personnel traveled to Plaintiff's cell where he was evaluated for injuries. According to the nurse, Plaintiff had a healthy appearance and there were no obvious abrasions, cuts, or other injury. ECF No. 466; ECF No. 46-9. Moreover, Plaintiff was seen for a follow-up the following day, where he was again evaluated and a SCDC medical screen was performed. ECF No. 46-10. No injuries were assessed from either medical evaluation. ECF No. 46-6; ECF No. 46-9; ECF No. 46-10. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show both an objectively serious medical need and how Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need. The undersigned therefore recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on this claim.
Moreover, there is no evidence before the Court that Defendants are medical professionals. “Nonmedical prison employees can be found to have acted with deliberate indifference by ‘intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.'” Krug v. Loranth, No. 1:13-CV-01409-DCN, 2014 WL 4955365, at *7 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2014) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05), aff'd, 599 Fed.Appx. 512 (4th Cir. 2015). “To bring a constitutional claim against non-medical prison personnel, an inmate must show that such officials were personally involved with a denial of treatment, deliberately interfered with a prison doctor's treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physician's misconduct.” Id. Furthermore, non-medical professionals are generally entitled to rely on the medical expertise of medical providers. See Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (“If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . ., a nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). Plaintiff has not shown Defendants denied or delayed access to medical care, and, in any event, Defendants were entitled to rely on the nurse's assessments of Plaintiff during the various medical evaluations that were conducted.
iv. First, Fifth, Fourteenth Amendment violations
As to the First Amendment, Plaintiff makes a conclusory statement that he was unable to speak to an attorney. There are no other allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint related to this claim. As to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Plaintiff merely references these Amendments and does not provide any factual basis as to how they were violated. Defendants argue that these allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fail to set forth any factual basis for relief. The Court agrees.
Even construing the Amended Complaint liberally, as this Court must, Plaintiff does not allege-or cite to any evidence in the record that could lead a reasonable jury to believe-that Defendants had any personal involvement in violating his rights under these Amendments, which is fatal to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); Wilcox, 877 F.3d at 170 (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to point to evidence in the record that supports a threshold essential element of a § 1983 claim, summary judgment is appropriate on this ground alone. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment).
Indeed, Plaintiff's claims, as pled, do not even meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. See ECF No. 20; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. The Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for any misconduct. See id. at 678. The Amended Complaint contains conclusory allegations that do not provide factual detail beyond averring generally that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. See id. (noting that a court is not bound to accept as true a complaint's threadbare, conclusory legal statements that are couched as factual allegations). Indeed, there are no facts from which to infer that Defendants engaged in conduct that ran afoul of the Constitution. See id. at 679 (noting “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). Furthermore, the Amended Complaint provides no specific examples of occurrences in which Defendants violated his rights, nor does it include allegations, with any specificity, of any personal involvement on the part of the Defendants individually.
IV. PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Request Separation/Permanent Restraining Order (ECF No. 51) and a Motion for a Restraining Order (ECF No. 59). In his first motion, Plaintiff requests “separation/permanent restraining order due to past improper misconduct from SCDC employees and injuries.” ECF No. 51. In his second motion, Plaintiff requests an order requiring his transfer to one prison and preventing his transfer to a different prison. ECF No. 59 (requesting to “be transferred to Kirkland Correction for safe keeping in Columbia [and] have a permanent separation against Perry . . . Correction”). Defendants oppose both motions. See ECF Nos. 52 (noting that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at Perry Correctional Institution was Defendants are employed and that Plaintiff's motion does not set forth any factual basis or authorities upon which the motion is based); 64 (noting, again, that Plaintiff no longer is incarcerated at Perry).
Plaintiff has not made a clear showing for relief. A party seeking a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) must establish all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. Id. at 22. Similarly, he must make a clear showing that he is likely to be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. Id. at 2023. Only then may the court consider whether the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff's favor. Finally, the court must pay particular regard to the public consequences of employing the extraordinary relief of injunction. Id. at 24. Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has met these four elements.
The standard for obtaining a TRO is the same as a preliminary injunction. Maages Auditorium v. Prince George's County, Md., 4 F.Supp.3d 752, 760 n.1 (D. Md. 2014).
Nor has Plaintiff established that he is entitled to a permanent injunction. “A permanent injunction resolves the merits of a claim and imposes an equitable remedy because a legal one is inadequate.” Simmons v. Stokes, No. CIV.A. 5:11-175-RMG, 2012 WL 3134221, at *13 (D.S.C. June 20, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:11-CV-175-RMG, 2012 WL 3134236 (D.S.C. Aug. 1, 2012), aff'd sub nom. Simmons v. McFadden, 490 Fed.Appx. 580 (4th Cir. 2012). A party seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate that (1) he has suffered irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant, remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
As explained above, Plaintiff is unable to meet these requirements. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's motions for a restraining order/injunctive relief be denied. See Jones v. Cartledge, No. CIV.A. 9:11-2109-GRA, 2012 WL 4103824, at *11 (D.S.C. Aug. 21, 2012) (recommending that motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent transfer to a different prison be denied), report and recommendation adopted, No. CA 9:11-02109-GRA, 2012 WL 4100404 (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2012); see Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be housed at a particular institution[.]”) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 46) be GRANTED; that Plaintiff's Motion to Request Separation/Permanent Restraining Order (ECF No. 51) and Motion for Restraining Order (ECF No. 59) be DENIED; and that this case be DISMISSED.