Summary
In Girard v. United States Rubber Co., 84 R.I. 319, at page 322, we stated: "By force of the statute, compliance with the decree of the full commission is, in the absence of a stay, a condition precedent to the right to prosecute an appeal therefrom to this court."
Summary of this case from Koshgarian v. HawksleyOpinion
July 13, 1956.
PRESENT: Flynn, C.J., Condon, Roberts, Andrews and Paolino, JJ.
1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Appeal. Compliance with Decree of Full Commission. Before appealing to supreme court from decree of full commission employer did not comply with terms of the commission's decree granting compensation and medical expenses, and supreme court denied employer's motion to stay the decree until appeal therefrom had been determined. Held, that as a result of the decision denying stay of the decree respondent was placed in the position of not having complied with sections 4 and 7 of the act before filing its claim of appeal with the commission and, therefore, the contention of the employee that the appeal was not properly taken and should be dismissed was granted. G.L. 1938, c. 300; P.L. 1954, c. 3297, art. III, §§ 4, 7.
2. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Appeal to Supreme Court. Condition Precedent. By force of the statute, compliance with the decree of the full commission is, in the absence of a stay, a condition precedent to the right to prosecute an appeal to supreme court. P.L. 1954, c. 3297, art. III, §§ 4, 7.
3. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Appeal to Supreme Court. Compliance with Decree Below. If an appellant has reasons which lead him to believe that supreme court would stay operation of the decree of the full commission, prudence requires that he comply with the decree until a stay is actually granted if he would avoid the hazard of a loss of the right to prosecute his appeal in the event that his motion for a stay is denied. G.L. 1938, c. 300; P.L. 1954, c. 3297, art. III, §§ 4, 7.
ON MOTION TO REARGUE.
4. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Reinstatement of Appeal. Form of Motion for Reinstatement. Employer filed motion for reargument following dismissal of its appeal based on failure to comply with the terms of the decree before filing its claim of appeal.
Held, that where such motion, in substance and effect, sought reinstatement of the appeal for hearing on the merits, the supreme court would treat it as such a motion.
5. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Motion for Reinstatement of Appeal. Among the allegations of fact stated as grounds for reinstatement of appeal employer showed that it had made timely and full payment of all accrued compensation as a condition of the proper prosecution of its appeal.
Held, that on further consideration court was of the opinion that in the circumstances of record the motion presented grounds to warrant the granting thereof and the employer's appeal would be reinstated for hearing on the merits.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS wherein the employee filed an original petition for compensation and medical expenses. From a decree of commission, affirming the decree of a single commissioner granting the petition, employer appealed. Before filing claim of appeal it did not comply with the terms of the decree but instead filed a motion in supreme court for a stay of decree. In the meantime the employee filed with the commission a petition to adjudge employer in contempt and filed in supreme court a motion to dismiss the appeal. Employee's motion to dismiss granted, appeal dismissed, and cause ordered remanded to workmen's compensation commission for further proceedings. Following hearing on motion to reargue court treated such motion as one for reinstatement and, accordingly, employer's appeal was reinstated for hearing on the merits, and parties authorized to assign it for hearing to a day certain in accordance with the rules of practice.
Michaelson Stanzler, Milton Stanzler, for petitioner.
Ambrose W. Carroll, for respondent.
This is an original petition for workmen's compensation and medical expenses. From a decree of the workmen's compensation commission, affirming the decree of the single commissioner granting the petition, respondent has appealed to this court. Before filing its claim of appeal respondent did not comply with the terms of such decree. Instead it filed a motion in this court to stay the decree until its appeal therefrom was determined. In the meantime the petitioner had filed with the commission a petition to adjudge respondent in contempt. She also filed in this court a motion to dismiss the appeal.
On January 25, 1956 we heard the parties on the motion to stay and we reserved decision. The motion to dismiss was assigned for hearing on March 23, 1956 together with the appeal, subject to the disposition of the motion to stay. On that date we heard the parties fully on both matters, but withheld further consideration thereafter until decision was rendered on the motion to stay. On May 22, 1956 our opinion denying such motion was filed. See Girard v. United States Rubber Co., 84 R.I. 230, 122 A.2d 747. In that opinion we held that the purpose of secs. 4 and 7 of article III, chapter 3297, public laws 1954, was "to prevent a losing party from staying the operation of such decree by the simple expedient of claiming an appeal to this court." At the same time we construed the language of those sections as not intending to preclude this court from exercising its power to grant a stay if in the opinion of the court circumstances warranted such action. Because we perceived no such circumstances in the case at bar we denied respondent's motion to stay.
[1, 2] The result of that decision places respondent in the position of not having complied with secs. 4 and 7 before filing its claim of appeal with the commission. The petitioner contends that such appeal was not properly taken and therefore should be dismissed. We are of the opinion that this position is well taken. By force of the statute, compliance with the decree of the full commission is, in the absence of a stay, a condition precedent to the right to prosecute an appeal therefrom to this court.
If an appellant has reasons which lead him to believe that this court, in the special circumstances of his case, would stay the operation of the decree and if he files a motion therefor he should nevertheless comply with the decree until a stay is actually granted. Prudence requires such caution if he would avoid the hazard of a loss of the right to prosecute his appeal in the event that his motion for a stay was denied.
In the case at bar respondent failed to exercise such prudence. As a result thereof and in view of our dismissal of its motion for a stay, it may not now prosecute its appeal to this court. Whether respondent may hereafter reinstate its appeal if it complies with the decree appealed from we do not inquire at this time.
The petitioner's motion is granted, the appeal is dismissed, and the cause is remanded to the workmen's compensation commission for further proceedings.
ON MOTION FOR REARGUMENT.
NOVEMBER 30, 1956.
After our opinion granting the petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal was filed, Girard v. United States Rubber Co., 84 R.I. 319, 127 A.2d 242, the respondent asked and received permission to file a motion to reargue the case.
The motion sets forth the travel and alleges other pertinent facts and law which are relied upon to warrant a reinstatement of the appeal for hearing on the merits. Among such allegations is the fact that respondent has made timely and full payment of all accrued compensation as a condition to the proper prosecution of the appeal in this court. A hearing on the motion was held at which counsel for each party submitted oral argument and thereupon the court reserved decision.
In our judgment the instant motion, although entitled a motion for reargument, actually in substance and effect seeks a reinstatement of the appeal for hearing on the merits. Consequently we have treated it as such a motion.
After further consideration we are of the opinion that in the circumstances of record the motion presents grounds to warrant the granting thereof. Accordingly, the respondent's appeal is hereby reinstated for hearing in this court on the merits, and the parties may assign it for such hearing to a day certain in accordance with the rules of practice.
Motion granted.