Opinion
3177 EDA 2022 867 EDA 2023 J-A04024-24
10-10-2024
GIOVANNA AND ROBERT DAILEY v. RONALD SMITH AND DAISY VAI RONALD SMITH v. DAISY VAI APPEAL OF: DAISY VAI RONALD SMITH v. DAISY VAI Appellant
Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 17, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 200300722, 210300226
Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 17, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 200300722
BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J. [*]
OPINION
COLINS, J.
Appellant Daisy Vai appeals from the judgment entered against her and in favor of plaintiff Ronald Smith by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in a personal injury automobile accident case following a jury trial. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in not submitting the issue of comparative negligence to the jury, we vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.
This action arose out of a March 20, 2019 two-car accident at the intersection of Broad and Reed Streets in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The accident occurred when defendant Vai, who was traveling northbound on Broad Street, made a left turn while Smith was driving southbound on Broad Street and Smith's car collided with Vai's car. N.T. Trial, 10/17/22, at 66-67, 136-37, 139-40, 154, 166-70; N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 24-25; N.T. Trial, 10/19/22, at 20. Smith filed suit against Vai seeking damages for injuries that he suffered in the accident.
The action was tried to a jury from October 17 to 20, 2022. At trial, Smith testified that that Vai made a left turn in front of him when he was almost in the intersection and that he slammed on his brakes but was unable to stop and collided with Vai's car. N.T. Trial, 10/17/22, at 166-70, 193. Smith admitted in both his opening statement and his testimony that he was driving 30 to 35 miles per hour and that the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. Id. at 20-21, 25-26, 171, 191-92. Vai testified that she believed when she started her turn that she could make the turn safely and that she did not see Smith's car until she began her turn. Id. at 136-37, 142-43, 147, 149-54.
Another action for injuries from the same accident, Dailey v. Smith, No. 210300226 (C.P. Philadelphia), was brought by one of Smith's passengers, Giovanna Dailey, and her husband against Vai and Smith, and was consolidated and tried with this action. The claims in the Dailey action have been resolved and are not at issue in this appeal.
At the close of the evidence, Smith moved for a directed verdict that Vai was negligent and that her negligence had caused his injuries, and Vai moved for a directed verdict that Smith had been negligent in speeding and that his negligence was a cause of the accident. N.T. Trial, 10/19/22, at 27-35. The trial court granted Smith's motion, denied Vai's motion, and ruled that Vai could not present the question of Smith's comparative negligence to the jury. Id. at 31-32, 35-38, 44, 46. The trial court charged the jury only with determining the extent of damages. N.T. Trial, 10/20/22, at 16-23.
The jury awarded $285,000 to Smith. N.T. Trial, 10/20/22, at 33-40. Vai filed a timely post-trial motion seeking, inter alia, a new trial on the ground that the trial court erred in granting Smith's motion for a directed verdict and in not submitting the issue of Smith's comparative negligence to the jury. Smith filed a post-trial motion seeking an additional award of stipulated past medical expenses and a motion for delay damages. The trial court denied Vai's post-trial motion and granted Smith's post-trial motion and delay damages motion, molding the verdict to add $8,000 in economic damages and $19,545.92 delay damages. Trial Court Orders, 11/22/22. Judgment was entered in favor of Smith and against Vai in the amount of $304,545.92 on March 17, 2023. This timely appeal followed.
Vai argues in this appeal that the trial court erred in granting Smith's motion for a directed verdict and in not submitting the issue of Smith's comparative negligence to the jury and that a new trial is therefore required. We agree.
For comparative negligence of a plaintiff to be submitted to the jury, there must be evidence from which the jury could find both that the plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence caused the injuries for which he seeks damages. Zimmerman v. Alexander Andrew, Inc., 189 A.3d 447, 458 (Pa. Super. 2018); Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2005). Where there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find both of these elements, the issue of the plaintiff's negligence must be submitted to the jury, no matter how strong or persuasive the countervailing evidence is, and failure to do so is reversible error. Zieber v. Bogert, 747 A.2d 905, 908-09 (Pa. Super. 2000), aff'd, 773 A.2d 758 (Pa. 2001); McCullough v. Monroeville Home Association, Post 820, Inc., 411 A.2d 794, 795-96 (Pa. Super. 1979)
In considering whether a trial court properly refused to submit an issue to the jury, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the party who sought to submit that issue to the jury. Hall v. Episcopal Long Term Care, 54 A.3d 381, 396-97 (Pa. Super. 2012); International Diamond Importers, Ltd. v. Singularity Clark, L.P., 40 A.3d 1261, 1268-74 (Pa. Super. 2012). Viewing the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to Vai, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find both that Smith was negligent and that his negligence was a cause of the accident and the injuries that he suffered in the accident.
As noted above, Smith admitted that the speed limit was 25 miles per hour and that he was driving at a speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour. N.T. Trial, 10/17/22, at 20-21, 25-26, 171, 191-92. That was sufficient for the jury to find that he was negligent. Reid v. Oxendine, 419 A.2d 36, 39 (Pa. Super. 1980); Sodders v. Fry, 32 A.3d 882, 887 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); Lahr v. City of York, 972 A.2d 41, 50-51 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Indeed, these admissions established as a matter of law that Smith was negligent and required the trial court to instruct the jury that it must find Smith negligent. Sodders, 32 A.3d at 887-88; Lahr, 972 A.2d at 50-51.
The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to find that Smith's negligence was causal. Vai did not introduce any expert testimony that Smith's negligence contributed to the accident. This, however, did not preclude the jury from finding that Smith's speeding was a cause of the accident and his damages. Causation of automobile accidents is not generally a subject beyond the knowledge of ordinary jurors that requires expert testimony. Vrabel v. Commonwealth, 844 A.2d 595, 598-99 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (holding that "because the use of motor vehicles is so common, courts do not restrict testimony about the operation of motor vehicles to expert witnesses" and that plaintiff was not required to introduce expert testimony to prove causation of truck accident). Smith, who bore the burden of proving that Vai's negligence caused the accident, likewise did not introduce any expert testimony concerning the cause of the collision.
As noted above, Vai testified that she believed that she had enough space and time to make the turn safely. N.T. Trial, 10/17/22, at 137, 147, 152-54. Speed of an oncoming car obviously affects whether there is sufficient time and space to make a turn across a lane. Although Smith testified that he was only one or two car lengths away when Vai turned across his lane, id. at 169, Vai testified that she did not see him before she began her turn. Id. at 136, 142-43, 149-51, 154. Which version of these events was to be believed was for the jury to determine. In addition, both Vai and Smith testified that Smith struck Vai's car hard and with sufficient force to push it into a parking lot. Id. at 147-48, 154, 168, 170, 211-12. The speed of a vehicle that hits another vehicle clearly affects the force of the collision.
Given this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude without expert testimony that Smith's driving 20 to 40 percent faster than the speed limit affected Vai's ability to see him in time and to judge her ability to make the left turn and therefore was one of the causes of the accident. A jury could also conclude that Smith's speeding contributed to the force of the accident and was therefore a cause of his injuries. In fact, this Court has held that in an accident of this very type, lay testimony that the oncoming car was speeding and that the turning driver did not see the oncoming car when he began his turn was sufficient for the jury to find the oncoming driver liable for negligence. Reid, 419 A.2d at 39.
Because the evidence showed as a matter of law that Smith was negligent and there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that his negligence was a cause of the accident and of his damages, the trial court erred in granting Smith's motion for a directed verdict and taking the issue of Smith's contributory negligence from the jury. A new trial is therefore required. Zieber, 747 A.2d at 908-09; McCullough, 411 A.2d at 795-96. Smith argues that this new trial should be limited to the question of Smith's comparative negligence. We do not agree.
A new trial may properly be limited to the apportionment of causal negligence where there is no error in the jury's determination concerning the plaintiff's negligence or damages and the only issue is apportionment of liability between defendants. Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 507 A.2d 1, 11-14 (Pa. 1986). Here, however, the error involves the plaintiff's negligence, not mere apportionment among defendants. Smith's comparative negligence is a defense to liability, both as a reduction of liability and a complete defense, if the jury were to find that Smith's causal negligence was greater than Vai's causal negligence. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a). A new trial on liability is therefore necessary.
Although Smith's comparative negligence is a distinct question from the amount of damages that he sustained from the accident, we cannot say that a new trial can be limited to liability. A new trial can be limited to a specific issue only where the issue as to which the error occurred is not intertwined with the other questions determined by the jury. Mader v. Duquesne Light Co., 241 A.3d 600, 614 (Pa. 2020); Banohashim v. R.S. Enterprises, LLC, 77 A.3d 14, 23 (Pa. Super. 2013). Determination of the causal effect of Smith's speeding, which the jury was incorrectly denied the opportunity to consider, is intertwined with the issue of damages, as it requires consideration of whether and the degree to which Smith's speed contributed to the injuries for which he claimed damages. Indeed, this Court has held that where the plaintiff's comparative negligence is a critical issue in the case and the jury has not made a proper determination of comparative negligence, a new trial cannot be limited and must include both liability and damages. Banohashim, 77 A.3d at 23-27 (new trial could not be limited to damages where instructions on comparative negligence were inadequate); Oblon v. The Ludlow-Fourth Corp., 595 A.2d 62, 67 (Pa. Super. 1991) (new trial could not be limited to plaintiff's comparative negligence and was required on all issues because determination of plaintiff's causal negligence was intertwined with defendants' negligence and jury decisions on percentages of causal negligence could affect damages decision).
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in granting Smith's motion for a directed verdict and in not submitting the issue of Smith's comparative negligence to the jury. We therefore vacate the judgment entered in favor of Smith and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial on liability and damages at which the issue of Smith's comparative negligence is to be submitted to the jury.
Judgment vacated. Case remanded for new trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Stabile joins the opinion.
Judge McLaughlin files a dissenting opinion.
Judgment Entered.
DISSENTING OPINION
McLAUGHLIN, J.
I respectfully disagree that there was any evidence that Ronald Smith's exceeding the speed limit by five to 10 miles per hour contributed to this car accident. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's grant of Smith's motion for a directed verdict and its denial of Daisy Vai's request to submit the issue of comparative negligence to the jury. I therefore dissent.
The court granted Smith's motion for a directed verdict on whether Vai was negligent and whether her negligence had caused Smith's injuries. See N.T., 10/19/22, at 29-30, 32. The court also denied Vai's motion for a directed verdict on whether Smith had been negligent, for speeding, and whether that negligence had been a contributing cause to the accident. Id. at 30, 35. The court denied the motion due to the lack of evidence of causation. Id. at 3738.
To make a plaintiff's contributory negligence a triable issue, a defendant must introduce evidence that the plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of his own injury, i.e., a substantial factual cause. See Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276, 1280 (Pa.Super. 2005); Zieber v. Bogert, 747 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa.Super. 2000). A party's negligent conduct is not a proximate cause of another's injury if the injury would have occurred even if the party had not been negligent. Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) § 432(1).
See Simon v. Hudson Coal Co., 38 A.2d 259, 260 (Pa. 1944) (adopting Section 432).
Evidence of causation is required even where a party was negligent per se. Lux v. Gerald E. Ort Trucking, Inc., 887 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Pa.Super. 2005); see also Cabiroy v. Scipione, 767 A.2d 1078, 1079 (Pa.Super. 2001) ("The doctrine of negligence per se does no more than satisfy a plaintiff's burden of establishing a defendant's negligence. It does not end the inquiry. The plaintiff still bears the burden of establishing causation"). In other words, it is not enough for a defendant to assert that the plaintiff violated the law. There must also be evidence that the harm would not have occurred absent the plaintiff's violation.
Here, as the majority observes, Smith's exceeding the posted speed limit was negligence per se. Majority Opinion at 5. Although Smith testified that he was traveling at the rate of traffic, his failure to adhere to the legal speed limit establishes as a matter of law that he breached a duty of care. However, this legal fact did not relieve Vai of adducing evidence that Smith's negligence contributed to causing the accident. See Lux, 887 A.2d at 1288. Yet Vai provided no evidence - expert or otherwise - that the accident would not have happened if Smith had been driving within the posted speed limit.
The majority relies on the fact that "Vai testified that she believed when she started her turn that she could make the turn safely and that she did not see Smith's car until she began her turn." Majority at 3; see also id. at 6. Because the "[s]peed of an oncoming car obviously affects whether there is sufficient time and space to make a turn across a lane," the majority finds Vai's testimony sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that "Smith's driving 20 to 40 percent faster than the speed limit affected Vai's ability to see him in time and to judge her ability to make the left turn and therefore was one of the causes of the accident." Majority at 6. I disagree.
First, while Vai did testify that she did not see Smith's vehicle approaching before she started to turn, she did not testify that she could not have seen it because it was still far away when she began to turn. Nor did she say that the accident occurred because Smith approached the intersection too quickly for her to judge the situation accurately. Instead, Vai testified that while on the northbound side of the street, she stopped at a redlight and saw an SUV that had stopped in the inner lane of the southbound traffic, with its turn signal on, "trying to park or do whatever[.]" N.T., 10/17/22, at 141, 154. Vai also saw vehicles approaching from five to 10 feet behind the SUV. Id. at 142. Vai nevertheless began to turn, and was already in the intersection, when she saw Smith's vehicle switch lanes to go around the stopped SUV. Id. at 142-44, 151, 154.
Notably, Vai, who was stopped at a red light, conceded that she was required to yield to any oncoming traffic before making a turn. Smith, who had the green light, had no duty to avoid Vai after he entered the intersection. See Andrews v. Long, 228 A.2d 760, 761 (Pa. 1967); Imes v. Empire Hook & Ladder Co., 372 A.2d 922, 923 (Pa.Super. 1977) (en banc).
Therefore, Vai did not testify that "the coast was clear," when she began her turn, and that it was Smith's excessive speed that prevented her from estimating the time she needed to cross the opposing lanes of traffic. Rather, she admitted that she saw traffic still approaching the intersection in the inner lane. Additionally, Vai did not testify as to how much of the outer lane of southbound traffic was in her view when she began her turn, if any, considering she saw an SUV and the approaching traffic in the inner lane. In sum, Vai testified that she did not initially see Smith because he was in the inner lane and decided to change lanes at the same time Vai began to turn -not because he had been speeding.
See Halbach v. Robinson Bros., 98 A.2d 750, 751 (Pa.Super. 1953) (rejecting argument that driver turning left was contributorily negligent as a matter of law where fog prevented her from seeing more than 250 feet or seeing oncoming truck traveling 30 to 35 miles per hour in a 15 mile-per-hour school zone).
Vai argued only that the jury should find Smith contributed to causing the accident by violating the speed limit - not by changing lanes.
Second, even if we disregard Vai's testimony that there was an SUV potentially blocking her view, and oncoming traffic when she made her turn, and further assume that Vai did not see any southbound traffic - as the jury was free to reject any portion of the testimony - there was still no evidence for the jury to conclude that, had Smith been travelling 25 miles per hour rather than 30 to 35 miles per hour, the accident would not have occurred. There was no testimony regarding the size of the street, the intersection, or the extent of either driver's field of vision. There was no testimony as to how long it would have taken Vai to traverse the intersection, had the collision not occurred. There was no testimony as to how the additional five to 10 miles per hour affected the time it would have taken Smith to travel the distance between the two vehicles, once they became visible to each other, the reaction times involved, or the distance required to stop at either driver's speed.
The majority points to Reid v. Oxendine, 419 A.2d 36 (Pa.Super. 1980), as "an accident of this very type." Majority at 6. I respectfully do not find Reid dispositive here. In Reid, the driver of the turning car, who was the plaintiff, testified that before making his turn, "he looked up the highway, saw that the road was clear, started his turn, looked again, and then drove across the southbound lanes[.]" 419 A.2d at 37. He testified that he could see approximately 300 to 550 feet up the road and that no vehicles were approaching when he started to turn. Id. at 37-38. He testified that the defendant, who had been driving in the outer lane of opposing traffic, left 75-feet long skid marks before colliding with his vehicle. Id. Another witness confirmed the defendant had been speeding. Id. at 38. We found this was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude the defendant's negligence had caused the accident. Id. at 39.
Thus, in Reid, there were facts in evidence supporting a conclusion that if the defendant had not been driving at such an excessive speed, the plaintiff would have seen the defendant and would not have turned, or the defendant would have been able to stop within the relevant distance to the intersection. We did not rely on his technical violation of the speed limit, alone, to supply the evidence of causation.
Here, unlike in Reid, Vai did not testify that she could see up the street and that it was clear. She testified that there was traffic approaching the intersection. The only evidence of the distance between the two cars was that they were only two car-lengths away from each other when Vai turned into the intersection. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 169; N.T., 10/18/22, at 25. Vai put on no testimony to enable a jury to conclude that if Smith's car had been going 25 miles per hour in this scenario the vehicles would have avoided each other. This record simply does not contain enough data to conclude the accident would not have occurred if Smith had been driving the speed limit.
The majority further observes that "[t]he speed of a vehicle that hits another vehicle clearly affects the force of the collision." Majority Op. at 6. It finds Vai's testimony that the force of the collision pushed her car off the street sufficient for the jury to conclude "that Smith's speeding contributed to the force of the accident and was therefore a cause of his injuries." Id.
Again, Vai put on no testimony regarding the degree to which Smith injuries would have been mitigated if the vehicles had collided with Smith traveling 25 miles per hour, rather than 35 miles per hour. It is not for an appellate court to assume facts Vai failed to put in evidence. I respectfully dissent.
[*] Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.