Opinion
4:24-CV-1-M
07-16-2024
WILLE GILYARD, Plaintiff, v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATE Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Robert B. Jones United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the court on the Social Security Administration's (“SSA”) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, insufficient process and service of process, and failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (4), (5), and (6). [DE-4]. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, failed to respond, and the matter is ripe for determination. The motion is referred to the undersigned for a memorandum and recommendation to the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Local Civ. R. 72.3(c). For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be allowed.
I. Background
Willie Gilyard initially filed a complaint against the Social Security Administration in the Small Claims division of the District Court for Craven County, North Carolina on December 11, 2023, seeking “2500 for pain and mental stress and anxiety” and $969 in monthly income, in total demanding $3,469. [DE-1-1]. The SSA filed its notice of removal on January 2, 2024, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(1) and 1446, on the grounds that the matter is against an agency of the United States. [DE-1]. On January 9, 2024, the SSA moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, insufficient process and service of process, and failure to state a claim. [DE-4]. Gilyard failed to respond to the motion.
II. Discussion
A court must dismiss all or part of an action over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a threshold question that must be addressed before considering the merits of the case. Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“if the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). The plaintiff, as the party opposing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, has the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction does, in fact, exist. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). “In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the district court is to regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Id. (citations omitted).
Pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,520 (1972). The court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.', Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits, and the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); see Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404,413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that a “liberal interpretation” of a complaint does not warrant a “complete rewriting”); Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241,243 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997).
The doctrine of derivative jurisdiction provides that if “the state court did not possess jurisdiction over [the] claim against the federal defendants,... the district court did not gain proper jurisdiction of the claim upon its removal.” Kinard v. United States, No. 5:21-CV-510-FL, 2022 WL 447069, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 14, 2022) (quoting Palmer v. City Nat. Bank, of W.Va., 498 F.3d 236, 246 (4th Cir. 2007)); see also Bullock v. Napolitano, 666 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Congress has specifically abrogated the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction in cases removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, but it has not done so with respect to actions removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1442.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f) (abrogating the derivative jurisdiction doctrine with respect to cases “removed under this section”); Palmer, 498 F.3d at 246)). “[W]hen faced with an action removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442, a district court must determine whether the state court in which the case originated had subject matter jurisdiction; and if it did not, the claim must be dismissed.” See Spirakis v. Foreclosure of Deeds of Tr. of Bank of N.C. to BNC Credit Corp., No. 7:14-CV-19-F, 2014 WL 2854877, at *2 (E.D. N.C. June 23, 2014) (citing Bell v. Shinseki, 1:10-CV-475, 2010 WL 4683626, at *1 (M.D. N.C. Nov. 10, 2010)).
The court explained:
[b]ecause the North Carolina state court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, the district court did not acquire jurisdiction by reason of the case's removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) from the state court to federal court. The jurisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdiction. If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties, the federal court acquires none, although it might in a like suit originally brought there have had jurisdiction. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); see also Rodas v. Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610, 614-19 (7th Cir. 2011); Palmer v. City Nat'l Bank of W.Va., 498 F.3d 236, 244-46 (4th Cir. 2007).Bullock, 666 F.3d at 286 (internal quotations omitted).
Although the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint are sparse, Plaintiff seeks “monthly income” from the SSA, which appears to be a request for benefits. The Small Claims division of the District Court of Craven County did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim because claims for judicial review of decisions by the Commissioner of Social Security must be brought in the proper United States District Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Latimer v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:12-CV-406-MOC-DSC, 2012 WL 3542567, at *2 (W.D. N.C. July 26, 2012) (dismissing claim for monthly payments from SSA, where removal from state court was made pursuant to § 1442 and the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction precluded the federal court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction). Because the state court lacked jurisdiction, the district court did not gain proper jurisdiction upon removal. Furthermore, as for Plaintiffs request for emotional distress damages, to the extent a claim against the SSA is not one seeking review of a final decision of the Commissioner, it is barred by sovereign immunity. See Miles v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21CV321, 2022 WL 4104670, at *3 & n.6 (M.D. N.C. Sept. 8, 2022) (recommending dismissal of case against the SSA commissioner where the cause of action did “not involve review of a final decision by the Commissioner, as required under sections 405(g) and (h)” and was thus beyond the court's jurisdiction) (citing Jarrett v. United States, 874F.2d201,203 (4th Cir. 1989)), adopted by, 2022 WL 14761013 (M.D. N.C. Oct. 25, 2022). Accordingly, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction and sovereign immunity, and Plaintiffs claim must be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction be allowed.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on the parties. You shall have until May 15, 2024 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If a party does not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, the party will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, the party's failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar the party from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).