Summary
In Gilvin, the court excluded from trial claims for damages because the plaintiff failed to disclose the claim until just weeks before trial and provided no substantial quantification of the elements or computation of the claimed damages.
Summary of this case from City County of San Francisco v. Tutor-Saliba Corp.Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-530 (GK)
August 15, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion In Limine [#44]. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, Reply, and the entire record herein, for the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendants' Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Ron Gilvin, the former Secretary-Treasurer of the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO ("IUE"), brought this action on March 1, 1999. Defendants are IUE, IUE President Edward Fire, and members of the IUE International Executive Board.
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated the IUE constitution and Sections 101(a)(1), 101(a)(2) and 101(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"). Plaintiff argued that Defendants violated his rights by suspending him from the office of IUE Secretary-Treasurer from June 10, 1998 to October 9, 1998 and unlawfully recalling him from that office on October 9, 1998.
On September 15, 1999, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Section 101(a)(1) of the LMRDA and the IUE constitution. See Gilvin v. Fire, No. 99-cv-530, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1999). On July 21, 2000, the Court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff's remaining LMRDA claims. See Gilvin v. Fire, No. 99-cv-530, slip op. at 22 (D.D.C. July 21, 2000). In a decision dated August 21, 2001, the D.C. Circuit reinstated Gilvin's claims under LMRDA Sections 101(a)(2) and (a)(4) arising from his suspension from office. The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of Gilvin's other allegations including claims relating to his recall and removal from office. See Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Trial is now set for October 1, 2002.
On May 16, 2002, Defendants filed the present motion in limine, seeking to preclude Plaintiff from introducing the following evidence at trial: (1) damages resulting from Plaintiff's recall and removal from office; (2) economic damages resulting from the expense restrictions imposed on Plaintiff prior to his suspension; (3) damages for emotional distress resulting from Plaintiff's suspension; (4) Plaintiff's request for reinstatement to the office of IUE Secretary-Treasurer; and (5) IUE officer
II. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff May Not Introduce Evidence of Damages from His Lawful Recall and Removal from Office
As noted above, the D.C. Circuit upheld this Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims relating to his October 1998 recall and removal from the office of Secretary-Treasurer. Nonetheless, Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to compensatory damages including the loss of salary and pension credits resulting from the recall. Plaintiff reasons that this post-recall economic loss was proximately caused by his unlawful suspension and that he is therefore entitled to recover those damages.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his economic damages from the recall may be introduced to the jury because (1) Fed.R.Evid. 403 is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly; (2) a union's actions, though arguably authorized by and not patently unreasonable under the union's governing documents, may be subject to a valid statutory claim if undertaken by union officials in bad faith; and (3) the D.C. Circuit merely found that Gilvin had no procedural or constitutional right to remain in office, and did not limit his claim for LMRDA damages. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's arguments are unpersuasive.
First and foremost, any evidence of Plaintiff's damages resulting from his lawful recall is simply not relevant to his claim for unlawful suspension. Those damages, if any, are the result of the IUE members' determination that Gilvin should no result of the IUE members' determination that Gilvin should no longer represent them. They were not caused by the IUE Executive Board's prior decision to suspend him. Gilvin's post-recall damages are therefore unrelated to and distinct in time from his suspension. Accordingly, this evidence is irrelevant to the resolution of Gilvin's claims regarding his unlawful suspension and is therefore excluded pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 402.
Second, in upholding this Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for unlawful recall and removal, the D.C. Circuit considered and rejected Gilvin's LMRDA claims in connection with his recall from office. Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, that ruling is not limited to Gilvin's "procedural `right' . . . to remain in office." Pl.'s Response to Defs.' Mot. in Limine at 10. Rather, the Court of Appeals specifically found that a union official is not protected from removal by a recall election because, although Gilvin had every right to express his views, the union's membership did not share his views and Plaintiff's removal by the vote of the union's membership represents the "expression of democracy."Gilvin, 259 F.3d at 292.
Third, the cases Plaintiff cites for the proposition that a union' s action taken in bad faith may be subject to a valid statutory claim, even if authorized by the union constitution, are inapplicable. See Monzillo v. Biller, 735 F.2d 1456, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Lamb v. Miller, 660 F.2d 792, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Rogers v. Lucassen, 777 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D.D.C. 1991). In those cases, the plaintiffs alleged that bad faith actions of the unions caused their damages. Here, as addressed above, the damages Gilvin seeks are not the result of action taken by the IUE, namely his suspension. Instead, those damages were caused by the IUE members' vote to remove him from office in a democratically conducted and constitutionally permitted recall. The IUE's motivation is not relevant to such a democratic procedure.
Fourth, even if Gilvin's post-recall damages were relevant to his claim for unlawful suspension, the evidence must be excluded pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. If the jury were presented with evidence of Gilvin's substantial post-recall damages, there is a risk they would increase other LMRDA categories of damages that are imprecise and difficult to quantify.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is precluded from presenting evidence at trial of damages he sustained as a result of his lawful recall and removal from office.
B. Plaintiff May Not Introduce Evidence of Damages for Expense Restrictions Prior to His Suspension
Plaintiff contends that, beginning in April 1997, the Executive Board restricted Plaintiff's reimbursement for lodging and travel expenses. Plaintiff claims that he sustained $30,000 in damages as a result. This evidence must also be excluded from Gilvin's trial.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(C), a party is required to disclose, without awaiting a discovery request, "a computation of any category of damages claimed" and make available for inspection and copying the documents or other evidentiary material on which the computation is based. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) provides that a party who fails to disclose this information may be precluded from using that evidence at trial. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the disclosure requirement in Rule 26(a)(1)(C) and the evidence of his damages for travel restrictions must therefore be excluded.
At no time prior to filing the Pretrial Statement did Plaintiff identify any actual damages resulting from the Executive Board's restriction on his travel expense reimbursements, let alone provide a computation of such damages in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(C). Moreover, even in the Pretrial Statement, Plaintiff failed to reveal any basis for the conclusory assertion that he sustained $30,000 in damages.
Plaintiff's allegations in his Complaint and deposition only suggest that the Executive Board prohibited him from engaging in particular travel. They do not reveal any actual travel expenses Gilvin incurred. In fact, prior to submission of the Pretrial Statement, Gilvin made only one reference to unreimbursed expenses. In an interrogatory answer, Gilvin asserted that he is seeking "[a]ll expenses denied after political censorship of May 1997. Includes living expenses paid to other Executive Board Members and Ed Fire when he was IUE Secretary Treasurer." Def. Ex. C. ¶ 22(A). This assertion is insufficient to sustain Plaintiff's claim for damages resulting from his expense restrictions. Plaintiff never quantified or substantiated the claim with receipts or any other documentation. Nor did he provide any computation of the alleged damages. This failure is particularly significant in light of the fact that less than seven weeks remain before trial. In short, Gilvin has failed to provide any evidence of expenses he incurred that should have been and were not reimbursed.
In fact, trial was originally scheduled to commence eight weeks earlier, on August 5, 2002.
In sum, because Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant with a computation of his damages for expense restrictions and failed to provide any factual basis whatsoever for the claim, Plaintiff may not present evidence at trial of those damages.
C. Plaintiff May Not Introduce Evidence of Damages for Emotional Distress From His Suspension
Plaintiff seeks damages for emotional distress resulting from his suspension. This evidence must also be excluded.
The weight of judicial authority requires proof of actual damages in order to award damages for emotional distress under the LMRDA. See Guidry v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 882 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1989) ("LMRDA claimants who seek damages for emotional distress must adduce some evidence of actual injury"); Rodonich, 817 F.2d at 977-78 (requiring a "physical manifestation of emotional distress before permitting an award"); Bise v. Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 618 F.2d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1979) ("`emotional distress, standing alone, does not constitute a sufficient basis for the awarding of damages under the (LMRDA)'") (quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 315 (9th Cir. 1965)); Bollitier v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, 735 F. Supp. 623, 626 (D.N.J. 1989) (denying emotional damages under LMRDA because plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual or measurable injury and a physical manifestation of emotional distress)
There is authority to the contrary. See Bradford v. Textile Workers of America, 563 F.2d 1138, 1144 (4th Cir. 1977).
"`Such awards could deplete union treasuries, thereby impairing the effectiveness of unions as collective-bargaining agents.'" Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 977 (2d Cir. 1987) (quotingInternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1979)).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he sustained any actual damages as a consequence of his suspension. Plaintiff has not alleged or demonstrated any physical manifestation of his emotional distress nor can he establish any economic loss from the suspension since he was compensated during that time. Moreover, as addressed above, he has not sufficiently alleged any economic loss resulting from his travel and lodging expense restrictions.
Several circuits have differed over the nature of actual damages necessary to establish a basis for awarding damages for emotional distress. Compare Rodonich, 817 F.2d at 978, with Bise, 618 F.2d at 1305. It is not necessary for this Court to determine whether evidence of economic loss is sufficient to sustain an emotional damages claim, or whether physical manifestations of emotional distress are necessary, since Gilvin has failed to adduce evidence of either.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is precluded from introducing evidence at trial of damages for emotional distress resulting from his suspension.
D. Plaintiff Has Waived His Claim for Reinstatement to the Office of Secretary-Treasurer
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief for his suspension, including reinstatement to the office of Secretary-Treasurer of the IUE.
In October 2000, the IUE held an election in which a candidate was elected as Secretary-Treasurer. Although Plaintiff was eligible to run for that position, he did not chose to be a candidate. Therefore, Plaintiff has waived any claim for reinstatement to the office of Secretary-Treasurer. Finally, as of now, that position no longer exists.
E. Plaintiff May Not Introduce Evidence of IUE Officers' Compensation in 1997-1999
Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiff from introducing any evidence concerning the compensation of IUE officers and their reimbursed expenses in 1997-1999. Plaintiff claims this evidence is relevant to prove the restriction on compensation directed against him.
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to introduce this evidence to establish damages resulting from the Executive Board's restriction on his reimbursement for lodging and travel expenses, the evidence must be excluded. As addressed above, Plaintiff is precluded from presenting evidence at trial of these travel-related damages. Therefore, any evidence offered to prove those damages is irrelevant and must be excluded pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 402.
It is not clear from the briefs whether Plaintiff seeks to introduce this evidence for any other purpose.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants' MotionIn Limine. An Order will issue with this Opinion.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion In Limine [#44]. Upon consideration of the motion, opposition, reply, and the entire record herein, for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is this 15th day of August 2002 hereby
ORDERED, that Defendants' Motion In Limine is granted.