Opinion
04-05-2016
In re Patricia GILL, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Mercy COLLEGE, et al., Respondents–Respondents.
Patricia Gill, appellant pro se. Locke Lord LLP, New York (Kara M. Cormier of counsel), for Mercy College, Evan Imber–Black, Michael Sperling, Lois Wims, Kimberly Cline, Shelly Akin and Deirdre Whitmab, respondents. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Dona B. Morris of counsel), for the City of New York Commission on Human Rights, respondent.
Patricia Gill, appellant pro se.
Locke Lord LLP, New York (Kara M. Cormier of counsel), for Mercy College, Evan Imber–Black, Michael Sperling, Lois Wims, Kimberly Cline, Shelly Akin and Deirdre Whitmab, respondents.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Dona B. Morris of counsel), for the City of New York Commission on Human Rights, respondent.
Opinion
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Alexander W. Hunter, Jr., J.), entered February 24, 2015, denying the petition to reverse a determination of respondent City of New York Commission on Human Rights (NYCHR), dated March 27, 2014, which dismissed petitioner's complaint against respondent Mercy College and several of its administrators and employees, and dismissing the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
As the article 78 court found, petitioner failed to exhaust her administrative remedies (see CPLR 7801[1]; Watergate II Apts. v. Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 N.Y.2d 52, 57, 412 N.Y.S.2d 821, 385 N.E.2d 560 [1978] ). NYCHR's Determination and Order after Investigation is a non-final order; petitioner's failure to apply to the Chairperson for review of the dismissal of her complaint within 30 days of service of notice thereof (Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–113[f] ) bars her from litigating the dismissal in a court of law (Watergate II Apts. v. Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 N.Y.2d at 57, 412 N.Y.S.2d 821, 385 N.E.2d 560; Koch v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 84 A.D.2d 520, 443 N.Y.S.2d 382 [1st Dept.1981], affd. 55 N.Y.2d 864, 447 N.Y.S.2d 925, 432 N.E.2d 797 [1982] ). Moreover, judicial review would in any event be time-barred, because this proceeding was brought more than 30 days after service of the determination (see Administrative Code § 8–123[h] ). Petitioner's ignorance of the statute of limitations does not excuse her untimeliness (see generally Harris v. City of New York, 297 A.D.2d 473, 747 N.Y.S.2d 4 [1st Dept.2002], lv. denied 99 N.Y.2d 503, 753 N.Y.S.2d 806, 783 N.E.2d 896 [2002]; see Matter of Okoumou v. Community Agency for Senior Citizens, Inc., 17 Misc.3d 827, 833, 842 N.Y.S.2d 881 [Sup.Ct., Richmond County 2007] ).
We have considered petitioner's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.
TOM, J.P., FRIEDMAN, RICHTER, GISCHE, GESMER, JJ., concur.