Opinion
1:22-cv-5804-GHW
08-02-2024
DAIKWAN GILES, Petitioner, v. AMY LAMANNA, Superintendent of Five Points Correctional Facility, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Gregory H. Woods, United States District Judge
Daikwan Giles brought this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition to challenge his 2013 New York state conviction for second degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon. He argued that his criminal trial did not comport with constitutional due process because of judicial bias, prosecutorial misconduct, and a Brady violation involving the suppression of evidence that, had it been introduced at trial, may have undermined the testimony of one of the key witnesses in the case. Correctly applying the highly deferential standard of review prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996 for most of Mr. Giles's claims, Judge Cave found that the petition should be denied. See Dkt. No. 32 (“R&R”) at 54. She correctly found that (1) an evidentiary hearing is not required, (2) Mr. Giles exhausted each of his claims, (3) “fairminded jurists could disagree” regarding the state court's findings on the Brady claim (although the Court modifies her reasoning on this claim in part), and (4) the state court's rejection of Mr. Giles's prosecutorial misconduct and judicial bias claims was not “contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law” (although again, the Court modifies Judge Cave's reasoning on the prosecutorial misconduct claim in part).
Page numbers throughout this opinion refer to native pagination unless otherwise noted. And capitalized terms herein take on the meanings prescribed in the R&R unless otherwise noted.
Petitioner raises thoughtful arguments in his petition and in his R&R objections. Ultimately, however, AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard of review for claims that have been adjudicated on the merits below. Even if the Court may have reached some different conclusions from those of the state court in the first instance, the Court agrees with Judge Cave that the state court's determinations regarding Mr. Giles's claims of prosecutorial misconduct, judicial bias, and a Brady violation fail to survive the high bar set by AEDPA.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court refers to the R&R for a comprehensive description of the facts and procedural history of this case. See R&R at 2-26. Mr. Giles filed his federal habeas corpus petition on July 7, 2022. Dkt. Nos. 1, 3. Respondent filed a response and opposition on December 23, 2022. Dkt. Nos. 15, 16. Petitioner's reply was filed on January 30, 2023. Dkt. No. 20. Following oral argument in July of 2023, see Dkt. No. 30, Judge Cave issued her careful and well-reasoned Report and Recommendation on April 15, 2024. Dkt. No. 32. On May 24, 2024, Respondent filed a response asking that the Court adopt the R&R in full, Dkt. No. 39, and Petitioner filed objections, Dkt. No. 40 (the “Objections”).
A. The Objections
Petitioner objected to the R&R's analysis of the judicial bias claim, the prosecutorial misconduct claim, and the Brady claim.
As for the judicial bias claim, Petitioner argued that the R&R erred by applying “the wrong legal framework” and not “focus[ing] on the governing standard: whether ‘objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge . . . [was] too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'” Objections at 22 (quoting Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 905, 907 (2017) (per curiam) (some internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 22-28 (articulating these objections in greater detail).
On the prosecutorial misconduct claim, Petitioner objected that the R&R “erroneously rejected Petitioner's claim that the prosecutor violated due process by: (1) stating facts not in evidence-and offering false facts” in his summation pertaining to NYPD's video cameras; “(2) knowingly eliciting false or misleading testimony from Detective Mercado-Gomez,” which was “contradicted by the suppressed police report . . .; and (3) testifying to facts not in evidence in summation” regarding the prosecutor's practice of “offer[ing] deals to witnesses accused of misdemeanors . . . .” Id. at 28-29; see also id. at 30-33 (articulating these objections more fully). Petitioner also argues that “an evidentiary hearing should be held to determine whether the prosecutor's . . . statement [about the video camera] was truthful,” “if” the issue of whether NYPD had access to a video camera during Mr. Giles's 2009 interrogation “is actually in dispute ....” Id. at 30.
On the Brady claim, Petitioner argued in the Objections that “[t]he only question is whether th[e] suppressed evidence-and the evidence that disclosure would have yielded . . . undermines confidence in the trial's outcome.” Id. at 34. And he argued that “[a]s the 440 ‘decision' finding no prejudice ‘involved an unreasonable application [of]' or was ‘contrary to' ‘clearly established' Supreme Court law . . ., this Court should reject the R&R's determination that § 2254(d)(1) bars relief here.” Id. (citations omitted). Specifically, he argued that the R&R “misconstrued Petitioner's argument as to why § 2254(d)(1) was overcome,” asserting that he “did not claim that AEDPA deference was inapplicable because of the ‘type of [federal] claim[s]' asserted here.” Id. at 34 (quoting R&R at 36). Rather, Petitioner argues that “§ 2254(d)(1) was overcome because-even if the 440 court's upshot determination that there was no Brady violation was not unreasonable-the specific reasoning employed by the 440 decision was.” Id. at 35 (citing, inter alia, Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125, 131-32 (2018)); see also id. at 35-39.
Petitioner takes issue with four aspects of the state court's “specific reasoning.” See id. First, Petitioner contests the state court's reliance “on the theory that the Mejia DD5 report was inadmissible hearsay” in assessing the Brady claim, arguing that the admissibility of the report “was simply irrelevant,” and that grafting an “admissibility” requirement onto Brady analyses “would destroy Brady.” Id. at 36. Second, Petitioner argues that the state court's decision was “unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1) and (2) because the “record conclusively establishes that Mejia saw the actual shooter, not a random hoodie-wearing person who was coincidentally at the scene of a shooting with a gun;” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, had Mejia testified, her testimony would have persuaded the jury that the person she saw that night . . . was the actual shooter.” Id. at 37. Third, Petitioner argues that “no fairminded jurist could conclude that ‘voluntariness' controls the materiality assessment,” and that the state court unreasonably “assessed whether the confession was ‘voluntary.'” Id. at 37. He continued: “The R&R appeared to repeat this conflation, stating that Petitioner did not ‘challenge' his ‘statement' and its admissibility.” Id. at 38 (citing R&R at 41-42). Fourth, Petitioner argues that “the 440 court unreasonably found the Mejia police report immaterial based on an affidavit Mr. Giles purportedly signed years after trial (in 2016).” Id. at 39 (noting that “[t]he R&R did not agree with the State's rather surprising reliance on this post-trial statement”). Because these specific reasons were “unreasonable,” Petitioner argued, the Court should review the Brady claim “without deference to the state court's no-materiality finding.” Id.
Petitioner concluded the Objections by asking the Court to, “[a]t a minimum,” issue a certificate of appealability or hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 40.
B. The Response
Respondent filed a response to the objections on June 13, 2024. Dkt. No. 44 (the “Response”). In the Response, Respondent contended that Petitioner's Objections largely “repeat[] many of the same arguments presented” below. Id. at 1.
As for the Brady claim, Respondent argued that the state court reasonably rejected it because, in Respondent's view, it was neither exculpatory nor material, id. at 2-4, and “the court did not base its rejection of the Brady claim on the admissibility of the undisclosed statement ....[I]t merely pointed out that the exculpatory value of the statement was speculative given that it was ‘vague, confusing, [and] unclear as to whether [Mejia] was speaking from personal knowledge and contradicted by her later statements,'” id. at 4.
Respondent also argued that Petitioner's Objections merely “rehashe[d]” the arguments of prosecutorial misconduct that he raised below, id. at 5; that the prosecutor's comment in summation regarding the NYPD camera “was not so grave an error as to rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” id.; and that “no prejudice ensued from the remark,” which was subsequently withdrawn and stricken from the record, id. at 6. Respondent agreed with Judge Cave's assessment of Detective Mercado-Gomez's testimony, too, arguing that the prosecutor did not knowingly elicit false testimony from him. Id. at 6-7. And Respondent argued that the comment regarding any potential deal offered to one of the prosecution's witnesses “was a fair response to the defense summation” and, even if erroneous, was “harmless.” Id. at 7.
Finally, Respondent argued that “the judge did nothing wrong” in “correctly warn[ing] the witness” (who Petitioner argued the judge had “threatened”) of the consequences of refusing to testify; and that “no clearly established Supreme Court precedent holds ‘that due process required the trial court to proceed in a different manner when dealing with a recalcitrant witness such as Rodriguez.'” Id. at 7-8 (quoting R&R at 53). Respondent contended that the state court “reasonably determined” that any error by the state court was “harmless.” Id. at 9.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
District courts may “accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A district court must “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). “To the extent, however, that the party makes only conclusory or general arguments, or simply reiterates the original arguments, the Court will review the Report strictly for clear error.” IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. v. Nat'l Settlement Agency, Inc., No. 07-cv-6865-LTS-GWG, 2008 WL 4810043, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2008) (citation omitted); see also Ortiz v. Barkley, 558 F.Supp.2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Reviewing courts should review a report and recommendation for clear error where objections are merely perfunctory responses, argued in an attempt to engage the district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original petition.”) (citation omitted). “Objections of this sort are frivolous, general and conclusory and would reduce the magistrate's work to something akin to a meaningless dress rehearsal. The purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act was to promote efficiency of the judiciary, not undermine it by allowing parties to relitigate every argument which it presented to the Magistrate Judge.” Vega v. Artuz, No. 97 Civ. 3775 (LTS)(JCF), 2002 WL 31174466, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court treats Petitioner's objections to Judge Cave's conclusions in the R&R as sufficiently precise to merit de novo review of the R&R. Petitioner timely objected, and his objections are “specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the magistrate judge's proposal.” McDonaugh v. Astrue, 672 F.Supp.2d 542, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court reviews Judge Cave's conclusions de novo, although the Court does so in accordance with the framework prescribed by AEDPA, as described below.
To be clear, the Court does not review all of the underlying claims with the pre-AEDPA standard of de novo review. As explained below, the Court finds AEDPA's deferential standard of review applicable to most of the claims.
The Court begins by restating the AEDPA standard of review, and then reviews Judge Cave's conclusions on the judicial bias, prosecutorial misconduct, and Brady claims in turn.
A. AEDPA Standard of Review
Since AEDPA was enacted, “federal habeas review of state court convictions has been narrowly circumscribed.” Portalatin v. Graham, 624 F.3d 69, 78 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). “Where . . . the challenged state court decision was adjudicated on the merits, the writ may not issue unless the state court proceeding: ‘(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'” Id. at 79 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (“This is a ‘difficult to meet,' and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'” (internal citations omitted)).
The Second Circuit has “held that a state court ‘adjudicates' a petitioner's federal constitutional claims ‘on the merits' when it states that it is disposing of the claims on the merits and reduces its disposition to judgment.” Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 2003); see also id. at 160-61 (finding that “[a]s the state court adjudicated petitioner's claims ‘on the merits,' we apply the deferential standard of review prescribed by AEDPA”). “If a state court has not adjudicated the claim ‘on the merits,' we apply the pre-AEDPA standards, and review de novo the state court disposition of the petitioner's federal constitutional claims.” Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir. 2001). “To determine whether a state court has disposed of a claim on the merits, we consider: ‘(1) what the state courts have done in similar cases; (2) whether the history of the case suggests that the state court was aware of any ground for not adjudicating the case on the merits; and (3) whether the state court's opinion suggests reliance upon procedural grounds rather than a determination on the merits.'” Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 230 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 93); see also Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001) (“‘Adjudicated on the merits' has a well settled meaning: a decision finally resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.”).
See also Ryan v. Miller, 303 F.3d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 2002) (“A state court need not analyze each individual claim or cite federal law in order to adjudicate a claim, so long as it states it is disposing of the claim on the merits, and it issues a judgment.” (citing Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 93-94 (“So, to invoke the deferential standards of AEDPA, the state court need only dispose of the petitioner's federal claim on substantive grounds, and reduce that disposition to judgment. No further articulation of its rationale or elucidation of its reasoning process is required.”); Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312 (“[A] federal habeas court must defer in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to the state court's decision on the federal claim-even if the state court does not explicitly refer to either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law.”)); id. (“We have found a claim ‘adjudicated on the merits,' triggering the AEDPA standard of review, where the claim was dismissed by the state court with the blanket phrase, ‘[D]efendant's remaining contentions are without merit.'” (citing Brown v. Artuz, 283 F.3d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 2002)); Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 94 (concluding that a claim was “adjudicated on the merits” by the state court even though it did not “mention[] . . . relevant case law,” because “there is nothing in [the state court's] decision to indicate that the claims were decided on anything but substantive grounds,” and concluding that “[t]hus, . . . we must review that [state court's] decision under AEDPA's deferential standards).
Under Section 2254(d)(1):
To qualify as “clearly established” for the purposes of federal habeas review, a rule of law must be embodied in the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta,” of Supreme Court precedent. And, for a state court decision to be “contrary to,” or an “unreasonable application of,” that Supreme Court precedent, the decision must: (1) “arrive[] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law”; (2) “decide[] a case differently than [the Supreme Court] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts”; or (3) “identif[y] the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably appl[y] that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” If none of these conditions is met, even if the federal court would have reached a different conclusion on direct review, the petition must be denied.Portalatin, 624 F.3d at 79 (quoting Williams v. Taylor', 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)) (brackets in Portalatin). “The Supreme Court has explained that an ‘unreasonable application' is one that is ‘more than incorrect or erroneous'; it must be ‘objectively unreasonable.'” Rivas v. Fischer, 780 F.3d 529, 546 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003)). “In other words, the state court's decision must be ‘so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). “The question therefore ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.'” Garlick v. Lee, 1 F.4th 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)).
See also Garlick v. Lee, 1 F.4th 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2021) (“‘A principle is clearly established Federal law for § 2254(d)(1) purposes only when it is embodied in a Supreme Court holding, framed at the appropriate level of generality.' ‘A state court decision is contrary to such clearly established law when the state court either has arrived at a conclusion that is the opposite of the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or has decided a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'” (quoting Washington v. Griffin, 876 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 2017)).
Accord Garlick, 1 F.4th at 129 (“An unreasonable application of clearly established federal law occurs when ‘the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case, so that the state court's ruling on the claim was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'” (quoting Washington, 876 F.3d at 40).
“Deciding whether a state court's decision ‘involved' an unreasonable application of federal law or ‘was based on' an unreasonable determination of fact requires the federal habeas court to ‘train its attention on the particular reasons-both legal and factual-why state courts rejected a state prisoner's federal claims,' and to give appropriate deference to that decision.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018) (internal citations omitted). And the Supreme Court has “h[e]ld that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.... It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time[,] i.e., the record before the state court.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181-82.
As for Section 2254(d)(2), “a ‘state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'” Cardoza v. Rock, 731 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). “Where ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree' as to the relevant finding, that is not sufficient to supplant the state court's factual determination.” Id. (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006)). “Nevertheless, the state court's finding might represent an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts' where, for example, reasonable minds could not disagree that the trial court misapprehended or misstated material aspects of the record in making its finding, see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 528, or where the court ignored highly probative and material evidence, see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346 (2003).” Id.
Moreover, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct” and the petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-(A) the claim relies on-(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
B. Judicial Bias
Judge Cave correctly set forth the law on judicial bias, and she correctly concluded that “the First Department's decision that the trial court did not deprive Mr. Giles of a fair trial is not an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, Supreme Court precedent regarding judicial bias.” R&R at 54. Mr. Giles contends that “[t]he state-trial judge's intervention into the adversarial process-by threatening a prosecution witness,” Mr. Rodriguez, “with perjury charges if [Mr. Rodriguez] did not accuse Mr. Giles of murder-violated due process because it reached a ‘significant extent' and was ‘adverse to the petitioner to a substantial degree,' ‘risk[ing] . . . [the] lack of the appearance of a neutral judge.'” Objections at 21 (quoting Francolino v. Kuhlman, 365 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2004)). In sum, Petitioner argues that “the R&R applied the wrong legal framework and did not focus on the governing standard: whether ‘objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge . . . [was] too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'” Id. at 22 (quoting Rippo, 580 U.S. at 907). He argues that the R&R erred in its analysis of the judicial bias claim for a number of reasons, none of which moves the Court.
1. The Section 2254(d)(1) Arguments
Mr. Giles's first contention-that the R&R “engaged” the wrong “standard,” id.-is unconvincing. Mr. Giles criticizes the R&R for “consider[ing] whether the trial court correctly determined that Rodriguez was not telling the truth.” Id. (citing R&R at 52) (emphasis in original). He argues that Judge Cave should not have reviewed “whether the state court's assessment of Rodriguez'[s] credibility was ‘correct,'” but instead should have asked “whether the [state's] court's extreme intervention into the adversarial process demonstrated a significant risk of actual bias-a standard the R&R never squarely engaged.” Id.
At the outset, the Court observes that Petitioner did not object to Judge Cave's finding that Mr. Giles's claims of judicial bias were “adjudicated on the merits” below. See R&R at 35. The Court reviews this finding for clear error and finds none. See IndyMac Bank, F.S.B, 2008 WL 4810043, at *1. Given that the claims of judicial bias were adjudicated on the merits by the state court, the Court “appl[ies] the deferential standard of review prescribed by AEDPA.” Shabazz, 336 F.3d at 160-61; accord Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 93-94; Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312. The Court is not asked to determine, in the first instance, whether “objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” See Rippo, 580 U.S. at 287 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Cardoza, 731 F.3d at 178 (“[A] ‘state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'”). The question before the Court is instead whether the state court proceeding “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Portalatin, 624 F.3d at 78 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This standard is “highly deferential.” See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181.
The only claim that Petitioner contends, in his Objections, was not reached on the merits is “the false-working-camerastatement claim.” Objections at 30 n.9. This is addressed below.
As Judge Cave correctly concluded, “Giles points to no Supreme Court precedent holding that due process required the trial court to proceed in a different manner when dealing with a recalcitrant witness such as Rodriguez.” R&R at 53. In his objections, Petitioner first cites Rippo, which held that “the Due Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge ‘ha[s] no actual bias.' Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'” 580 U.S. at 287 (internal citations omitted). He then cites Williams v. Pennsylvania, which held “that under the Due Process Clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant's case.” 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016); see also id. (“The Court asks not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, ‘the average judge in his position is ‘likely' to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.'” (citation omitted)). Last, he cites a Second Circuit case, which held “that the Daye standard for habeas relief applies regardless of whether judge-shopping occurs.” Francolino, 365 F.3d at 143 (referencing Daye v. Attorney General, 712 F.2d 1566 (2d Cir. 1983).; see also id. (articulating the “Daye standard” as: “a habeas petitioner must show that the trial judge's intervention in a jury trial reached a ‘significant extent' and was adverse to a ‘substantial degree'”).
In reviewing this caselaw, the Court agrees with Judge Cave that Petitioner has failed to establish that the state court proceeding's “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Portalatin, 624 F.3d 69, 78 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The state court's finding on the judicial bias claim did not “arrive[] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law,” (2) “decide[] a case differently than [the Supreme Court] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts,” or (3) “identif[y] the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably appl[y] that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Cotto, 331 F.3d at 230 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, the state court decision was not “contrary to,” nor involved an “unreasonable application of,” any of the cases cited in Petitioner's Objections, or any other cases of which the Court is aware. Accordingly, “even if the federal court would have reached a different conclusion on direct review,” Petitioner's judicial bias claim must be denied. See Cotto, 331 F.3d at 230.
Second, Mr. Giles argues that the R&R erred in analyzing any impact of the judge's comments on the jury, contending that it is “irrelevant that the [state] court did not make its comments to the jury” because the “right to an impartial judge” is rooted in “structural fairness” considerations, and it is “not exclusively concerned with jury impact.” Objections at 23 (citing Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Francolino, 365 F.3d at 142). Petitioner is correct that judicial bias analyses are “not exclusively concerned with jury impact,” see id.; indeed, Judge Cave correctly noted this herself in the R&R. See R&R at 51 (correctly stating the law that “[a] trial judge's intervention in the conduct of a criminal trial would have to reach a significant extent and be adverse to the defendant to a substantial degree before the risk of either impaired functioning of the jury or lack of the appearance of a neutral judge conducting a fair trial exceeded constitutional limits” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)); see also id. (correctly stating the law that “even if the jurors are not swayed from an independent discharge of their solemn responsibilities, [the habeas court evaluates whether] the judge's [action] creates a risk that the trial will not be perceived by the defendant or the public as a fair adjudication of guilt or innocence, presided over by a neutral magistrate obliged to deal evenhandedly” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 51-52 (noting that “objective observers in the courtroom did not perceive the trial court's conduct as compromising the defendants' due process right to a fair trial or improperly influencing the verdict”).
Ultimately, the state court's finding that the trial judge's comments to Mr. Rodriguez did not “compromise[] the court's neutrality,” see Giles, 188 A.D.3d at 579, was neither “contrary to,” nor involved an “unreasonable application of,” Supreme Court precedents. See R&R at 51 (“Judicial statements or rulings that are ‘disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties[] or their cases do not support a claim of bias or partiality unless they reveal ‘such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.'” (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Francolino, 365 F.3d at 143; Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).
Marshall states: “The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process. The neutrality requirement . . . preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, ‘generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done,' by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.” 446 U.S. at 242 (internal citations omitted). Later, Petitioner also cites to Weaver v. Massachusetts for the proposition that judicial bias violations are “structural errors.” See Objections at 28 (citing Weaver, 582 U.S. 286, 301 (2017)). Weaver-which makes that comment in dicta-does not itself address the issue of judicial bias.
Third, Petitioner argues that “[t]he R&R's insistence that the trial judge correctly concluded [that] Rodriguez was committing perjury actually confirms the trial judge's egregious abandonment of the duty of neutrality” because “judges do not determine whether a witness' trial testimony is more believable than pretrial (and unconfronted) testimony and then intervene ....” Objections at 26-28. But again, Petitioner has not identified any caselaw indicating that the state court decision was “contrary to,” or involved an “unreasonable application of,” federal law-which is the question before the Court under AEDPA's framework.
Fourth, Mr. Giles argues that the R&R improperly “shoehorn[ed] the lack of an objection- purely a procedural-default question-into the due-process merits analysis, reasoning that if there was no objection, there was no risk of bias.” Objections at 25-26 (citing R&R at 52). This misreads the R&R. Judge Cave, after correctly laying out the legal standard, found that the state court's proceedings had not resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied or was contrary to clearly established federal law. In reaching this conclusion, she “[v]iew[ed] the entirety of the trial record.” See R&R at 54. She observed: “That neither defense attorney objected to any of the trial court's admonishments of Rodriguez-almost all of which occurred outside the presence of the jury- suggests that objective observers in the courtroom did not perceive the trial court's conduct as compromising the defendants' due process right to a fair trial or improperly influencing the verdict.” Id. at 52-53 (citing Reid v. Philips, No. 04 CIV. 1338(NRB), 2004 WL 1920218, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2004) (undertaking a similar analysis)) (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). This was cited as one among many reasons supporting Judge Cave's conclusions; she simply did not find that because defense counsel did not object, there was therefore “no risk of bias.” See Objections at 25.
Accordingly, “even if the federal court would have reached a different conclusion on direct review,” see Cotto, 331 F.3d at 230, Petitioner's judicial bias claim, insofar as it is brought under Section 2254(d)(1), is denied.
2. The Section 2254(d)(2) Argument
Nor does Petitioner's Section 2254(d)(2) argument entitle him to relief. Petitioner correctly observes that a writ of habeas corpus may issue pursuant to either Section 2254(d)(1) or 2254(d)(2). See Objections at 23. But, just as he fails to meet the bar set by 2254(d)(1), so too he fails under 2254(d)(2). Petitioner argues that the state court's “factual finding that the trial court did not threaten Rodriguez with perjury charges if he did not ‘change' his testimony-but merely ‘warned' Rodriguez of the consequences of perjury-was unreasonable because it defied the record.” Objections at 24 (citations omitted). Mr. Giles argues that the only “reasonable way” to read the trial judge's comments is as “threaten[ing] Rodriguez with a perjury indictment if he continued to testify in a particular manner: he did not see the shooter.” Id. (emphasis in original). But reasonableness is a high bar. And as Judge Cave correctly reasoned, the “burden to show a deprivation of due process resulting from the intervention of a state trial judge” is “high.” See R&R at 50-51; see also id. (“A trial judge's intervention in the conduct of a criminal trial would have to reach a significant extent and be adverse to the defendant to a substantial degree before the risk of either impaired functioning of the jury or lack of the appearance of a neutral judge conducting a fair trial exceeded constitutional limits.” (quoting Daye, 712 F.2d at 1572) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For context, the trial judge stated, among other things: “if your testimony does not change with respect to the material issues that you've testified to that are so completely contradicted by your prior statements, you will be subject to a perjury indictment and an arrest and prosecution for the crime of perjury[,]” as well as “any other action that might be taken regarding contempt.” R&R at 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although Judge Cave's recommendation that this claim be dismissed was predicated on a Section 2254(d)(1) finding and not a finding under Section 2254(d)(2), see R&R at 54, the Court agrees with her ultimate conclusion that the judicial bias claim should be denied given the high bar for habeas review prescribed by AEDPA. In reaching its own finding on the judicial bias claim, the First Department reasoned:
We do not find that there was any error warranting reversal when, without objection and outside the jury's presence, the court warned an uncooperative witness, whose trial testimony contradicted his grand jury testimony, that he could be prosecuted for perjury. The court identified the conflict in the witness's sworn statements, directed him to tell the truth, and correctly stated the possible legal consequences involved. We do not find that this action compromised the court's neutrality.People v. Giles, 188 A.D.3d 579 (1st Dep't 2020). The factual finding that the trial judge “warned” Mr. Rodriguez “that he could be prosecuted for perjury” is not unreasonable in the context of the full colloquy that took place between the trial judge and Mr. Rodriguez. As Judge Cave correctly observed in the R&R, the trial judge found that Mr. Rodriguez's “trial testimony was ‘contradictory and not just inconsistent' with his grand jury testimony and that the prosecutor had ‘established the basis for impeachment,'” assigned him counsel, and then advised him of the possibility of “a perjury indictment” and “any other action that might be taken regarding contempt.” See R&R at 13-14 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
On this record, the state court's finding that Mr. Rodriguez was “warned” that he “could be prosecuted for perjury” was not unreasonable, even if the Court might have “reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Cardoza, 731 F.3d at 178 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, “‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree' as to the relevant finding,” id.-namely, whether the trial judge merely “warned” Mr. Rodriguez of the potential possibility of a perjury charge, or affirmatively “threatened” him to change his testimony to avoid that charge, in the way Petitioner describes. And “[w]here ‘[r]easonable minds . . . might disagree' . . ., that is not sufficient to supplant the state court's factual determination.” Id. (quoting Rice, 546 U.S. at 341-42).
That said, it is far from clear that the Court would have agreed with Petitioner in the first instance. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) (“judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.... Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration-even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration- remain immune.”); see also R&R at 51.
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Judge Cave correctly stated the law on the prosecutorial misconduct claim, and-although the Court modifies the R&R's reasoning in part-the R&R correctly concluded that this claim should be denied because Mr. Giles “has failed to establish that the First Department's denial of his Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” R&R at 49. The Court again observes that Petitioner did not object to Judge Cave's finding that Mr. Giles's claims of judicial bias regarding the prosecutor's summation were “adjudicated on the merits” below. See R&R at 35. The Court finds no clear error in this finding. Because this claim was adjudicated on the merits below, the Court “appl[ies] the deferential standard of review prescribed by AEDPA” in analyzing it. Shabazz, 336 F.3d at 160-61; accord Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 93-94; Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312. Petitioner objects to the R&R's conclusions denying relief on this claim on several grounds.
First, Petitioner contends that the R&R erred in considering “whether the prosecutor's statements were ‘respons[ive]' to defense counsel's summation,” arguing that this issue is “irrelevant” because “a prosecutor cannot respond to a defense counsel's summation with . . . lies or facts not in evidence.” Objections at 30 (quoting R&R at 45) (citing Plymail v. Mirandy, 8 F.4th 308, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1985)). Far from establishing that the state court's decision was contrary to or unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, however, United States v. Young demonstrates that the state court-as well as Judge Cave-did not err in considering the full context of the prosecutor's summation. See Young, 470 U.S. at 11-12 (stating that the prosecutor's “remarks must be examined within the context of the trial to determine whether the prosecutor's behavior amounted to prejudicial error,” and stating that “[i]n this context, defense counsel's conduct, as well as the nature of the prosecutor's response, is relevant”); see also Giles, 188 A.D.3d at 579 (holding that “[t]he challenged portions of the People's summation generally constituted fair comment on the evidence, reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and permissible responses to defense arguments”).
The Supreme Court could not have been clearer on this point: “Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, would not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding. Instead, . . . the remarks must be examined within the context of the trial to determine whether the prosecutor's behavior amounted to prejudicial error. In other words, the Court must consider the probable effect the prosecutor's response would have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly. In this context, defense counsel's conduct, as well as the nature of the prosecutor's response, is relevant.” Id. The Young Court continued: “In order to make an appropriate assessment, the reviewing court must not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor's remarks, but must also take into account defense counsel's opening salvo. Thus the import of the evaluation has been that if the prosecutor's remarks were ‘invited,' and did no more than respond substantially in order to ‘right the scale,' such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction.” Id. at 12-13.
Second, Petitioner takes issue with the prosecutor having “withdrawn” his statement about the NYPD video camera, arguing that doing so “does not cure the false-evidence problem.” Objections at 30. Petitioner cites no caselaw to explain how the state court's decision was contrary to or unreasonably applied federal law on this point; accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish that the writ should issue on these grounds.
Third, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief under Section 2254(d)(1) on the prosecutorial misconduct claim insofar as Detective Mercado-Gomez, Petitioner argues, “created the false impression that he had never spoken to anyone about the ‘second shooter'” when he testified that he did not “know the second shooter;” and so “[i]t would be unreasonable . . . to conclude that Detective Mercado-Gomez'[s] testimony was not misleading regarding that material issue.” Id. at 31 (citing Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957)). Judge Cave reasoned that “the prosecutor's question was not whether the police knew there was a second shooter, but whether they knew who the second shooter was, which they did not determine-albeit incorrectly-until Detective McCrosson . . . identified Odiase from a prior arrest photo in the NYPD database.” R&R at 48-49 (emphasis in original). She continued: “Because Giles has not established that Detective Mercado-Gomez's testimony was false, he cannot establish that his conviction was ‘obtained through the use' of or failure to correct false testimony.” Id. at 49.
It is unclear whether the First Department adjudicated this question on the merits. That court found that there was no due process violation for prosecutorial misconduct owing to the prosecutor's summation, but the opinion does not comment on the exchange with Detective Mercado-Gomez-a different kind of prosecutorial misconduct due process claim. See People v. Giles, 188 A.D.3d 579, 579 (2020); see also R&R at 43-44 (correctly setting out the law for prosecutorial misconduct claims predicated on a prosecutor's comments during summation, and for those predicated on the knowing use of perjured or false testimony). In any case, the Court need not resolve whether Section 2254(d)'s standard of review applies to this false-testimony due process claim because “nothing turns on it here.” Cf. Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 52-55 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying the pre-AEDPA standard of review and “[a]ssuming arguendo that the petitioner's due process claim was not adjudicated on the merits,” because that the claim would be denied “even [when] review[ed] . . . de novo”).
While the Court disagrees with Judge Cave's finding that “the prosecutor's question was,” necessarily, “whether they knew who the second shooter was,” R&R at 48 (emphasis in original), the Court agrees with her conclusion that Petitioner has failed to establish that the detective's testimony was in fact false, such that his conviction was improperly obtained, see id. at 49. Specifically, the exchange between the prosecutor and the detective was:
Q. In [the Interview], at some point in time, [Giles] mentions the person Boogs, a second shooter. In your interviews with the other witnesses to the crime, did you or any member of your team know the second shooter?
A. No.
Q. In the first statement Mr. Giles made to you, did he tell you there was a second shooter?
A. Not that I'm aware of, no.R&R at 48 (quoting Dkt. No. 17 at 1299) (internal quotation marks omitted). This exchange could be read to indicate either that the detective did not know whether there was a second shooter, or that he did not know who the second shooter was. The second question posed in the colloquy suggests that Judge Cave's reading might be more plausible, but it is not clear either way. Thus, this exchange does not show that the prosecutor “knowing[ly] use[d]” false testimony, nor that the prosecutor “allow[ed] [false testimony] to go uncorrected when it appear[ed],” see R&R at 14 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)-precisely because, as Judge Cave correctly found, “Giles has not established that Detective Mercado-Gomez's testimony was false,” id. at 49 (citing Napue v. People of State of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).
Petitioner's remaining arguments-taking issue with the prosecutor's conduct as a whole, and arguing that “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood that the false [statements] could have affected the [verdict],'” Objections at 31-32 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976))-do not hold water, for the same reasons that Judge Cave dismissed these arguments in her R&R. Namely, “the prosecutor's statements, viewed in the context of the entire trial, did not ‘rise to a constitutionally infirm level of severity.'” R&R at 45 (citation omitted); see also id. at 46 (noting that “‘broad latitude' [is] afforded to summations” (citing United States v. Smith, 778 F.2d 925, 929 (2d Cir. 1986)); id. at 47 (“Accordingly, the Court finds that the prosecutor's remarks-both in isolation and in the context of the entire trial record-‘were not sufficiently severe to warrant habeas relief when considered in light of other facts.'” (citations omitted)). And “the First Department's rejection of Giles' Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” Id. (citation omitted). Petitioners like Mr. Giles “must overcome an ‘extremely high' burden to successfully establish a prosecutorial misconduct claim in the habeas context.” Ortiz v. Barkley, 558 F.Supp.2d 444, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). For the reasons articulated in the R&R, Petitioner has not done so here.
D. Brady Claim
Judge Cave also correctly stated the law on the Brady claim, and she correctly concluded that relief on this ground should be denied-although the Court modifies the R&R's reasoning in part. See R&R at 42 (concluding that “because there are at least three aspects of the trial court's decision rejecting Giles' Brady Claim about which fairminded jurists could disagree, ‘AEDPA thus requires this Court to defer to the state court's decision on this claim.'”).
As Judge Cave correctly observed, the legal standard includes a materiality assessment, which is important to the Court's conclusion here. Namely, “where the defense makes a specific request and the prosecutor fails to disclose responsive evidence,” “[t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (citation omitted) (cited in the R&R at 38). And as the R&R correctly concluded, “the trial court's application of Brady was not unreasonable,” insofar as (1) “fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether Mejia's statement was evidence ‘favorable' to Giles,” R&R at 39, (2) “fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether Mejia's statement in the DD5 was material to the reliability and credibility of Nolasco's identification of Giles as one of the shooters,” id. at 40, and (3) “fairminded jurists could disagree about whether the failure to disclose Mejia's statement was prejudicial to Giles,” id. at 41.
See a/so Strick/er v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (“There are three components of a true Brady violation: (1) The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued.”); see a/so id. at 281 (“[T]here is never a real ‘Brady violation' unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.”).
As the R&R correctly observed, “Respondent has conceded that the prosecutor erred in failing to disclose Mejia's statement, such that only the first and third elements of a Brady claim are at issue.” R&R at 38 (internal citation omitted).
Petitioner objects to the R&R's conclusions, arguing that Section 2254 “requires” reviewing the Brady claim “without deference to the 440 court's decision;” and that once the claim is reviewed de novo, he should prevail. See Objections at 34. On the issue of deference, Petitioner contends that the “suppressed evidence-and the evidence that disclosure would have yielded-including Mejia's testimony that the hoodie-wearing shooter was a Hispanic man with a beard-undermines confidence in the trial's outcome;” and that because the state court's no-prejudice finding “‘involved an unreasonable application [of]' or was ‘contrary to' ‘clearly established' Supreme Court law . . ., this Court should reject the R&R's determination that § 2254(d)(1) bars relief here.” Id. (citing Kyles v. Whit/ey, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995); R&R at 35-42). Mr. Giles objects to the R&R's findings on a number of discrete grounds.
First, Petitioner contends that the R&R “misconstrued” his argument as to why Section 2254(d)(1) was overcome. He argues it had nothing to do with the “type of claim[]” asserted but, rather “even if the 440 court's upshot determination that there was no Brady violation was not unreasonable-the specific reasoning employed by the 440 decision was.” Id. at 34-35 (citing, inter alia, R&R at 36; Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125, 131-32 (2018)). He argues that because, in his view, the 440 court's “specific reason[s]” were unreasonable, the 440 court's decision is not entitled to deference under AEDPA. See id. at 36.
Petitioner contends that the following “specific reason[s]” cited by the 440 court for its decision were unreasonable: (1) consideration of whether the Mejia DD5 report was inadmissible hearsay, id.; (2) the state court's “adopti[on of] the State's baseless suggestion that Mejia did not ‘see the shooting' but only saw a hoodie-wearing ‘Hispanic male holding a gun only after the shooting had transpired,'” arguing that the “record conclusively establishes that Mejia saw the actual shooter, id. at 37; (3) assessment of whether Mr. Giles's confession was voluntary, arguing that “no fairminded jurist could conclude that ‘voluntariness' controls the materiality assessment,” id.; see also id. at 38-39 (arguing that “[t]he R&R appeared to repeat this conflation, stating that Petitioner did not ‘challenge' his ‘statement' and its admissibility,” and arguing that the statement was “unreliable,” while conceding that “Petitioner did no argue that the statement was involuntary and th[u]s inadmissible”); and (4) the state court's consideration, in its materiality analysis, of Mr. Giles's 2016 affidavit, which postdated the trial, id. at 39; see also id. (acknowledging that “[t]he R&R did not agree with the State's . . . reliance on this post-trial statement . . . and rightfully so”).
Second, because Petitioner contends that the 440 court's decision “involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law” under Section 2254(d)(1), see id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), Petitioner argues that in reviewing the Brady claim without deference, “Petitioner prevails” because “the suppressed police report undermines confidence in the trial's outcome,” id. at 39-40.
Although many of Petitioner's arguments are thoughtfully presented-and may have been convincing had the Court considered the Brady claim in the first instance-AEDPA's standard of review is a high bar. The Court agrees with Judge Cave's ultimate conclusion that “the state court's decision [was not] ‘so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'” Rivas, 780 F.3d at 546 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103); see also R&R at 42. Again, “[t]he question . . . ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.'” Garlick, 1 F.4th at 129 (quoting Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473). In other words, the state court's decision that the undisclosed evidence was immaterial-because there was not “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” that, “had the evidence been disclosed . . ., the result of the proceeding would have been different,” see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-was not “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement,” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.
Because the Brady claim was adjudicated on the merits below, the Court “appl[ies] the deferential standard of review prescribed by AEDPA” in analyzing it. Shabazz, 336 F.3d at 160-61; accord Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 93-94; Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312. And Petitioner's argument that AEDPA does not apply because the “specific reasons” were, in Petitioner's view, “unreasonable” is unavailing. On this point, Petitioner cites Wilson v. Sellers, which states, in dicta:
This is a straightforward inquiry when the last state court to decide a prisoner's federal claim explains its decision on the merits in a reasoned opinion. In that case, a federal habeas court simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable. We have affirmed this approach time and again.584 U.S. at 125 (citing Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39-44 (2009) (per curiam); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 388-392 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523-538). The Wilson Court went on to hold that, “when the relevant state-court decision on the merits . . . does not come accompanied with [the] reasons” for its decision, “the federal court should ‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id. And the cited portions of Porter, Rompilla, and Wiggins stand for the proposition that where a state court “did not decide” a particular issue-in Porter, the issue of “whether Porter's counsel was deficient” in an ineffective assistance claim; and in Rompilla and Wiggins, the element of prejudice in a Strickland claim-courts review “[that] element of [the] claim de novo.” See Porter, 558 U.S. at 39; see also id. at 42 (finding that the state court decision was “unreasonable” because the state court “either did not consider or unreasonably discounted the mitigation evidence adduced in the postconviction hearing”); accord Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390 (stating that the state court “never reached the issue of prejudice, and so we examine this element . . . de novo”); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534 (reviewing de novo the question of whether the petitioner had suffered prejudice, where the state court's reasoned decision rejecting the Strickland claim was premised solely on the conclusion that attorney's performance had not been constitutionally deficient). A similar situation is not present here.
Wilson adds: “Deciding whether a state court's decision ‘involved' an unreasonable application of federal law or ‘was based on' an unreasonable determination of fact requires the federal habeas court to ‘train its attention on the particular reasons-both legal and factual-why state courts rejected a state prisoner's federal claims,' and to give appropriate deference to that decision.” 584 U.S. at 125 (internal citations omitted).
The state court's analysis of the Brady claim proceeds in three parts. First, the 440 court found that the police report, “while exculpatory with respect to [Mr. Giles's] co-defendant . . ., is not exculpatory with respect to [Mr. Giles].” See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 11 (ECF). In reaching this finding, the state court's decision neither unreasonably applied nor was contrary to clearly established federal law, as Judge Cave correctly concluded. See R&R at 39-40 (correctly concluding that “fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether Mejia's statement was evidence ‘favorable' to Giles”).
After reaching this finding, the state court continues: “Moreover, defendant has not established that Mejia's statement . . . would have been admissible at trial or that if she had been identified and located that she would have provided exculpatory testimony.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 12 (ECF). Mr. Giles is correct that Brady material's inadmissibility in its current form is not fatal to a Brady claim. That is to say, “the Government's obligations under Brady to disclose such information does not depend on whether the information to be disclosed is admissible as evidence in its present form. The objectives of fairness to the defendant, as well as the legal system's objective of convicting the guilty rather than the innocent, require that the prosecution make the defense aware of material information potentially leading to admissible evidence favorable to the defense.” United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, “[o]ne consideration that bears on Brady materiality is admissibility.” United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Id. (stating that the undisclosed material's admissibility “remains to be decided on remand,” but that “[f]or our current purposes, we need only satisfy ourselves that: (1) either all or part of the [undisclosed material] is admissible; (2) the [undisclosed material] could lead to admissible evidence; or (3) the [undisclosed material] would be an effective tool in disciplining witnesses during crossexamination by refreshment of recollection or otherwise”). Petitioner's argument that “[t]he admissibility of the . . . report alone was simply irrelevant” is therefore unavailing. Objections at 36.
Notably, the 440 court did not base its decision on its admissibility analysis. The state court first concluded that the report was not exculpatory, and then concluded that it “was not material with respect to” Mr. Giles. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 13 (ECF). And as Judge Cave correctly concluded, “fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether Mejia's statement in the DD5 was material to the reliability and credibility of Nolasco's identification of Giles as one of the shooters.” See R&R at 40-41. In addition, she correctly concluded that “fairminded jurists could disagree about whether the failure to disclose Mejia's statement was prejudicial to Giles.” Id. at 41.
Thus, this is unlike Dennis v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, cited in the Objections, in which the Third Circuit found that “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court grafted an admissibility requirement onto the traditional three-prong Brady inquiry when it rejected Dennis's Brady claim as to the Frazier documents on the ground that he failed to affirmatively show that the documents were admissible. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's characterization of admissibility as dispositive under Brady was an unreasonable application of, and contrary to, clearly established law as defined by the United States Supreme Court.” 834 F.3d 263, 307 (3d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). The 440 court did no such thing here.
Mr. Giles also contends that the state court's decision was “unreasonable” insofar as it “adopt[ed] the State's baseless suggestion that Mejia did not ‘see the shooting' but only saw a hoodie-wearing ‘Hispanic male holding a gun only after the shooting had transpired,'” arguing that the “record conclusively establishes that Mejia saw the actual shooter.” Objections at 37. This is incorrect. The police report stated that Ms. Mejia “saw [the] shooter,” see R&R at 3 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), but an affidavit submitted in connection with Mr. Giles's codefendant's 440 motion stated that Ms. Mejia “did not see” the shooting, id. at 21 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The record is unclear regarding what, exactly, Ms. Mejia witnessed. And, in any case, the 440 court made this statement-that Ms. Mejia “didn't see the shooting,” Dkt. No. 1 at 24 (ECF)-as part of its analysis of the admissibility of Ms. Mejia's statement. But again, the 440 court did not base its decision regarding materiality on the admissibility issue; and as Judge Cave correctly found, fairminded jurists could disagree regarding the state court's materiality finding. See R&R at 40-41.
Moreover, Petitioner misconstrues the 440 court's decision in arguing that the state court suggested “that ‘voluntariness' controls the materiality assessment.” Objections at 37. The state court did not say as much. Rather, the state court reasoned that “Nolasco's testimony played a much smaller role” in establishing Mr. Giles's guilt than that of his co-defendant-observing that Mr. Giles guilt was established at trial “through his two recorded and voluntary confessions, Nolasco's in-court identification of [Mr. Giles], Lantigua's testimony” identifying Mr. Giles, “and Rodriguez's Grand Jury testimony,” which also identified Mr. Giles. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 14 (ECF). “Moreover,” the state court continued, “ballistics evidence collected from the corner where the eyewitnesses observed defendant firing . . . matched the type and caliber of gun and bullet [that Mr. Giles] confessed to using.” Id. The state court therefore concluded that “[t]he combination of three witnesses who identified [Mr. Giles] as the shooter, two voluntary recorded confessions, and corroborating forensic evidence constituted overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.” Id. As a result, the state court found, “there was no reasonable possibility that [the undisclosed material] would have changed the result of the proceeding had it been disclosed prior to trial.” Id.
None of the caselaw cited by Petitioner indicates that the state court's decision unreasonably applied, or was contrary to, clearly established law. Petitioner does not cite any Supreme Court caselaw holding that a court errs by considering, as one factor among many, the voluntariness of a confession in conducting the materiality analysis under Brady.
Petitioner cites Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, which does not discuss voluntariness and merely underscores the same legal standard that the state court-and the R&R-correctly stated, which is the question of whether in the absence of the Brady material, the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” 514 U.S. at 434; see also id. (“A ‘reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'”); see also Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 645 (7th Cir. 2012) (an out-of-circuit case that is not clearly established federal law); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (not a Brady case); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954) (same).
Mr. Giles also misconstrues the 440 court's decision in his objections regarding the state court's consideration of the 2016 affidavit, which is mentioned in the analysis one time in a footnote, accompanying the comment that the confessions were “voluntary.” See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 14 (ECF) n.11 (“Defendant's claim that his statements were involuntary are contradicted . . . by his own most recent admissions in his affidavit ....”). Petitioner argues that “the 440 court unreasonably found the Mejia police report immaterial based on an affidavit Mr. Giles purportedly signed years after trial ....” Objections at 39. But again, the state court did not state that the report was immaterial “based on” this affidavit, or the voluntariness consideration alone. And, more importantly-as Judge Cave correctly concluded-Petitioner has failed to establish that the state court's decision was an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, clearly established federal law. See R&R at 40 (“[F]airminded jurists could disagree as to whether Mejia's statement in the DD5 was material ....”).
E. Evidentiary Hearing
Judge Cave correctly concluded that an evidentiary hearing is not required. See R&R at 33-34. Petitioner argues that, “if” the issue of whether NYPD had access to a video camera during Mr. Giles's 2009 interrogation “is actually in dispute, an evidentiary hearing should be held to determine whether the prosecutor's . . . statement [about the video camera] was truthful.” Objections at 30 & n.9. Although Petitioner rightly observes that “the Appellate Division did not reach this claim on the merits,” such that de novo review is appropriate, an evidentiary hearing is not required here because Petitioner has failed to show that “the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Even if NYPD did have access to a video camera during Mr. Giles's interrogation, such that the prosecutor's statement was untruthful, this fails to “establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” Id. As discussed at length in both the state court's and Judge Cave's decisions, substantial evidence was introduced against Mr. Giles at his trial. The Court cannot conclude that “no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty” had the jury been aware that the NYPD had access to a video camera.
Once again, Mr. Giles's claims do not prevail because of the high bar set by AEDPA. As the Supreme Court has stated:
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the standard to expand the state-court record is a stringent one. If a prisoner has “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” a federal court “shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim” unless the prisoner satisfies one of two narrow exceptions, . . . and demonstrates that the new evidence will establish his innocence “by clear and convincing evidence.” In all but these extraordinary cases, AEDPA “bars evidentiary hearings in federal habeas proceedings initiated by state prisoners.”Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 371 (2022) (first quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and then quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 395 (2013)) (emphasis added); see also Ruine v. Walsh, No. 00 CIV. 3798 (RWS), 2005 WL 1668855, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2005) (“Even if a petitioner meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), whether that petitioner ought to be afforded an evidentiary hearing remains an issue committed to the district court's sound discretion.” (citing Nieblas v. Smith, 204 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.
F. Certificate of Appealability
Petitioner's request for the Court to issue a certificate of appealability, see Objections at 40, is denied. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court, therefore, adopts the R&R's conclusions in full. For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Giles's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all outstanding motions, to enter judgment for Respondent, and to close this case.
SO ORDERED.