Opinion
Case No. 20030577-CA.
Filed January 6, 2005. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Original Proceeding in this Court.
Glenda W. Giles, Eureka, Montana, Petitioner Pro Se.
Alan L. Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent Labor Commission.
Michael E. Dyer and Kristy L. Bertelsen, Salt Lake City, for Respondents TAD Technical Corp. and Liberty Mutual.
Floyd W Holm, Salt Lake City, for Respondents Oakridge Country Club and Workers Compensation Fund.
Theodore E. Kanell and Joseph C. Alamilla, Salt Lake City, for Respondents ACE USA/Pacific Employer's Insurance Co.
Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Glenda Giles petitions for review from the dismissal of her claim for benefits due to an occupational disease.
In 2000, Giles filed an application for hearing, asserting a claim against Oakridge Country Club and its insurers (collectively Oakridge) based on an alleged occupational disease incurred as a result of her employment with Oakridge. Other former employers and other insurers were added to the claim shortly thereafter. An administrative law judge (ALJ) granted respondents' various motions for summary judgment or dismissal of Giles's claim in June 2002. Giles moved for review. Her motion for review was denied in May 2003. Giles filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied in July 2003. Giles then petitioned this court for review.
Giles asserts the Labor Commission (Commission) erred when it affirmed the ruling of the ALJ dismissing her claim against all respondents. The claim was dismissed for different reasons for the various respondents. The claim against the IRS was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction over a federal agency. Giles does not challenge this ruling.
The claim against Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company, Constitution State Service Company, Transportation Insurance Company, and ACE USA/Pacific Employer's Insurance Company (ACE) was dismissed because these insurers did not provide insurance coverage to employers at the relevant times. The claim as against Oakridge was summarily dismissed because of a settlement of a prior claim. The claim against Adecco was summarily dismissed because Giles presented no evidence that would support any causation or contribution to her illness from her employment at Adecco.
The posture of this case determines the standard of review and Giles's burden on review. Giles's claim was dismissed based on motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, agencies are not constrained from granting motions for summary judgment or dismissal if the requirements of rules 56 or 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are met. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1(4) (2004).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the "moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported, an adverse party may not rest on allegations only, but "by affidavits or as otherwise provided . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue" of fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
If this court concludes there is a dispute as to a material issue of fact, it must remand for a determination of the facts.See Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, "[w]hen a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court may properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of fact." Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). Absent a genuine issue of material fact, "the Court need only decide whether, on the basis of the applicable law, the moving party is entitled to judgment." Id. "[B]are contentions, unsupported by any specification of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of fact as will preclude the entry of summary judgment." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 477-78 (Utah 1996).
A motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) admits the facts as alleged, but challenges a plaintiff's right to relief based on those facts. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1994). If materials beyond the pleadings are considered in a motion to dismiss, the motion may be properly considered as a motion for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This court reviews the appropriateness of both summary judgment and of motions to dismiss for correctness as a matter of law. See Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 56, ¶ 11, 96 P.3d 916; St. Benedict's Dev. Co., 811 P.2d at 196.
To prevail on review, Giles must show that a genuine issue of material fact exists or that the Commission erred in its conclusions of law. She has failed to make either showing. As noted above, several insurance providers were dismissed because they did not provide coverage to Giles's former employers during the time of her employment. The fact of coverage periods has not been controverted by Giles. Neither has she shown any legal basis to establish liability for these insurers. As a result, the Commission did not err in dismissing Giles's claim against these insurance providers that did not provide coverage during her employment periods.
Giles argues that the Commission applied the incorrect standard to Adecco's motion for summary judgment, asserting it was really a motion to dismiss. Her assertion is unsupported by the record. Adecco filed a motion for summary judgment on various grounds. Summary judgment was granted based on Giles's failure to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding her employment at Adecco and causation of her illness.
Adecco presented undisputed facts that Giles's employment at Oakridge caused her illness, as shown by Giles's own evidence. Giles provided two letters from Dr. Baker attributing her illness to her employment at Oakridge. One of the letters notes that Giles was in good health prior to her employment at Oakridge. The other letter notes the possibly toxic chemicals she may have been exposed to at Oakridge. Neither letter, nor any other medical documentation, identified Adecco as a contributory source or asserted in any way that her employment there was a factor in her illness. Giles's own evidence established that her employment at Oakridge caused her disease.
When Adecco moved for summary judgment based on the lack of causation, Giles was required to provide specific evidence that could create an issue of fact, a difficult task in the light of her own evidence already submitted. Giles correctly notes that she was not required to prove her claim by a preponderance of evidence at this stage, but she was obligated to present some evidence that would show a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation to preclude summary judgment. Giles stated that she was exposed to unknown fumes while working at Adecco, and acknowledged that Adecco's contribution to her illness was conjectural. Giles stated she "did not know [in 1995], and still does not know, to what extent the exposures she endured while working for [Adecco] may have aggravated, predisposed, or contributed to her diagnosed occupational disease." She also acknowledged that her claim was primarily against Oakridge, and that she was targeting Adecco as well because of a statutory requirement for apportionment since she had not worked at Oakridge for a full year.
Based on the undisputed facts, summary judgment for Adecco was appropriate. Giles's own evidence showed employment other than her employment at Adecco as the cause of her illness. She did not provide any evidence that would support causation based on her Adecco employment. Although Giles asserts she was exposed to numerous fumes at Adecco, exposure does not show causation. Furthermore, bare contentions are insufficient to create an issue of fact. See Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 477-78 (Utah 1996). As a result, the Commission did not err in granting summary judgment to Adecco.
The Commission dismissed Giles's claim against Oakridge based on a prior settlement of Giles's claim for benefits due to an occupational injury. Giles's earlier claim alleged that she was exposed to chlorine after a leak, and asserted that the exposure caused a host of physical and mental symptoms. The Commission denied benefits, finding that there was no exposure to chlorine gas and that any chemical exposure did not cause Giles's symptoms. Giles sought review in this court. Before a decision on appeal was reached, Giles and Oakridge entered into a settlement agreement to resolve the disputed claim.
The settlement agreement provided benefit payments to Giles based on her permanent and total disability due to the host of symptoms she had identified. The parties stipulated to her total permanent disability. The parties also agreed to the payment terms to resolve Giles's claim based on those symptoms. Shortly before the settlement agreement was executed, Giles's symptoms were diagnosed as porphyria, the illness on which her occupational disease claim was based.
The undisputed material facts are that Oakridge and Giles entered into a settlement agreement to resolve Giles's claim and specify payment terms for Giles's total permanent disability based on the same symptoms diagnosed as porphyria. Giles argues that her illness of porphyria is different than her injury claim based on the underlying symptoms of porphyria. However, there is not a genuine dispute that the claims have the same basis.
Giles acknowledges that the settlement resulted in a stipulation that she was totally and permanently disabled based on her identified symptoms. Giles admits she was found to be permanently and totally disabled, and "she is not stating she is additionally permanently and totally disabled as a result of this occupational disease." Rather, Giles was only advancing a new causal theory in her new claim.
In the course of her occupational disease claim, Giles repeatedly admits that the symptoms for which she received compensation are the same symptoms providing the basis for her porphyria diagnosis. She has stated "the majority of these [1991] symptoms and health problems are consistent with a diagnosis of chemically induced porphyrinopathy." In her motion for review in July 2002, Giles states porphyria "explains virtually all of Giles's complaints." Additionally, "virtually all of Giles's twenty-nine complaints addressed [in 1991] can be explained by a diagnosis of porphyria." There is no dispute that the symptoms presented by Giles in 1991 provide the basis for her diagnosis of porphyria.
The settlement agreement was a full settlement for Giles's disability based on her employment at Oakridge. The settlement bars Giles from receiving additional compensation based on the same symptoms even if now known as porphyria. In addition to the contractual basis barring further benefits, Giles is also statutorily barred from double recovery. Utah law provides that compensation for an occupational disease "is not in addition to compensation" payable for occupational injury. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-111 (2001). Because Giles was paid benefits based on her symptoms and total permanent disability in settlement of her occupational injury claim, she is barred from receiving additional payment for her symptoms as an occupational disease.See id. Based on the undisputed fact that Giles's injury claim and her illness claim are based on the same underlying symptoms, her illness claim is barred, and the Commission did not err in dismissing her claim.
Over the course of Giles's workers' compensation claims, ongoing since 1991, this statutory section has been amended and moved. Because the substance and import of the section has not changed over this period, we cite to the current section for convenience.
Giles also argues that the Commission improperly made new findings regarding her closed occupational injury claim. She appears to equate the Commission's conclusions regarding the relationship between her disease claim and her accident claim with reopening the prior claim and making new findings. This premise, however, is incorrect.
The Commission did not change any of the findings in the first case. It simply determined the connection between the two cases, noting the basis for both claims was porphyria, even if not labeled as such in the first claim. The Commission did not need to find at any point that Giles was in fact injured. Giles acknowledges that the settlement stipulated to her total and permanent disability based on the same symptoms that were diagnosed as porphyria shortly before the settlement was executed. These facts lead to conclusions about the relationship between her injury claim and her disease claim. The Commission properly concluded that Giles's disease claim was barred by the settlement agreement as well as by statute.
Additionally, Giles asserts that a 1997 settlement agreement regarding a wage claim against Oakridge prevented Oakridge from using the 1995 settlement agreement as a defense against her occupational illness claim. She did not raise this issue until her request for reconsideration, and thus, this matter was untimely presented to the Commission. Even if it were properly raised, however, it is without merit. The 1997 settlement agreement preserved Giles's ongoing occupational illness claim, but it did not waive any defense that Oakridge may have. Neither did it supercede the 1995 settlement agreement, as Giles argues. The two agreements relate to entirely different matters, and the 1997 agreement does not reach the content of the 1995 agreement.
We have reviewed Giles's additional arguments and find them to be without merit. We do not address them further here. See Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 833 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (noting the principle that the court "need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument").
The Commission's dismissal of Giles's occupational disease claim is affirmed.
James Z. Davis, Judge, Norman H. Jackson, Judge and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.