Opinion
CIVIL NO: 4:18-CV-00544
02-19-2019
JAMIE GIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. Northumberland County and Northumberland County Prison, Defendants.
(Judge Brann) () REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
The plaintiff, Jamie Giffin ("Mr. Giffin"), filed a complaint on February 8, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County purportedly asserting false imprisonment, due process violations, and malicious prosecution claims against the defendants. Defendants, Northumberland County and Northumberland County Prison ("the defendants"), removed the case to this court, and, on March 23, 2018, moved to dismiss it. For the reasons discussed below, we recommend that the Court grant the defendants' motion to dismiss. We also recommend that the Court grant Mr. Giffin leave to amend his complaint.
Defendants in their Notice of Removal incorrectly cited diversity of citizenship jurisdiction as their basis for removal. In this case, however, the basis for removal is federal question jurisdiction.
II. Background and Procedural History.
In his complaint, Mr. Giffin alleges that he was arrested "without investigation" and was held, while awaiting trial, by Northumberland County Prison for 26 months from May 2015 to July 2017. After being found not guilty on a Friday afternoon, Mr. Giffin alleges, the Northumberland County Prison did not release him until the following Monday morning. Mr. Giffin also alleges that the prosecution ignored all the evidence, including the exculpatory evidence proving innocence with respect to his false imprisonment, due process violations, and malicious prosecution claims. As a result, Mr. Giffin is seeking monetary damages for suffering abuse, slander, loss of wages, and custody of his two daughters.
The defendants submitted the jury verdict finding Mr. Giffin not guilty of all charges against him and a Court order dismissing the charges. Doc. 4-3 at 2-3. The Court's order is dated June 30, 2017, but, according to a "FILED" stamp on the order it was not filed by the Clerk of Court until July 3, 2017. Id. at 3.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The defendants also filed a brief in support of their motion to dismiss. Although Mr. Giffin was ordered to file a brief in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, he has failed to do so.
Mr. Giffin did, however, email the undersigned regarding whether there would be a jury trial for this case and whether the defendants had gotten the case dismissed. Doc. 6.
III. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards.
In accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When reviewing a motion to dismiss, "[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, we "consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents." Id. at 230.
"A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)." L.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F.Supp.2d 762, 769-70 (M.D. Pa. 2012). "Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and of the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). "A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id.
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). But a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that,
"because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."Santiago v. Warminister Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
IV. Discussion.
A. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted Against the Northumberland County Prison.
Mr. Giffin brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 "does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right." Id. To establish a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
The Northumberland County Prison cannot be a defendant in this action. "Courts have repeatedly recognized that a prison or correctional facility is not a person for purposes of civil rights liability." Pigford v. Cumberland Cnty. Prison, No. 3:11-CV-598, 2011 WL 1375267, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2011) (citing cases and holding that "the Cumberland County Prison is clearly not a person and therefore not subject to civil rights liability"). Therefore, the Northumberland County Prison is not properly named as a defendant in this civil-rights action.
B. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted Against Northumberland County.
A municipality, such as Northumberland County, cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, "under § 1983, local governments are responsibly only for 'their own illegal acts.'" Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in original). To state a claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege that the violation of his rights was caused either by a policy or by a custom of the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000). Municipal policies include the decisions of a government's lawmakers and the acts of its policymaking officials as well as municipal customs, which are acts or practices that, even though not formally approved by an appropriate decision maker, are so persistent and widespread as to have the force of law. Id.; Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003). In other words, a municipality "can be held responsible as an entity when the injury inflicted is permitted under its adopted policy or custom." Mulholland v. Gov't County of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996)).
A policy or custom can be shown in any of four ways:
(1) the existence of a formal policy, officially promulgated or adopted by a municipality; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; or (2) that an official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question took action or made a deliberate, specific decision that caused the alleged violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986) (citation omitted); or (3) the existence of an unlawful practice by subordinate officials so permanent and well settled as to constitute
"custom or usage" and proof that this practice was so manifest or widespread as to imply the constructive acquiescence of policymaking officials, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127-30 (1989); or (4) if liability is based on a claim of failure to train or supervise, that "the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom...[municipal employees] came into contact." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).Nye v. Cumberland Cty., No. 1:14-CV-713, 2016 WL 695109, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2016).
"To satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was." McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Additionally, there must be a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Here, Mr. Giffin fails to allege any policy or custom on the part of Northumberland County regarding his underlying claims of false imprisonment, due process, and malicious prosecution. He further fails to allege any direct causal link between such a custom or policy and the alleged claims of false imprisonment, due process, and malicious prosecution. Mr. Giffin has not plead any facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that Northumberland County promulgated an official policy; that an official with final policymaking authority took action or made a decision that caused the alleged violation of his constitutional rights; that there was a custom or practice of subordinate officials that was so well settled and widespread so as to constitute a custom to which policymaking officials acquiesced; or that Northumberland County, with deliberate indifference, failed to train or supervise its employees. In sum, Mr. Giffin fails to allege a policy or custom of the County that caused the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted against Northumberland County.
Defendants argue that Mr. Giffin has failed to plead facts showing that he has claims for false imprisonment, due process violations, and malicious prosecution. Since Mr. Giffin has failed to plead a claim upon which relief can be granted for the reasons we already stated above, we need not consider those arguments at this time.
C. Leave to Amend.
Before dismissing a complaint under the screening provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, " a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Philips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, in light of the liberal-amendment requirement, Mr. Giffin should be granted an opportunity to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and attempt to state a claim upon which relief can granted against the defendants. Thus, we will recommend that Mr. Giffin be given leave to file an amended complaint to attempt to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
V. Recommendation.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 3) be GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Mr. Giffin be granted leave to amend to attempt to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Any amended complaint must be titled as an amended complaint and must contain the docket number of this case. Any amended complaint must be complete in all respects; it must be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint already filed. Any amended complaint will completely replace the original complaint. If an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint will have no role in the future litigation of this case. Any amended complaint must also comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive
further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 19th day of February, 2019.
S/Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Chief Magistrate Judge