Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-2960, Section "R" (4).
May 19, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Rene Gibson has not filed an opposition to the motion. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES defendants' motion to dismiss.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gibson was arrested on October 8, 2004, by the New Orleans Police Department on a theft charge. He alleges that, upon arriving at central lockup, he was incarcerated in an overcrowded, unsanitary cell. He also alleges that he filled out two grievance forms but that his grievance complaints were ignored.
On November 2, 2004, Gibson filed a pro se in forma pauperis complaint against defendants, claiming that his treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, Gibson alleges that, after his arrest, he was placed in a two-man cell with four other inmates, where he apparently had to sleep on the floor and where other inmates crossed over him and urinated around him all night. Gibson's complaint indicates that he was not incarcerated at the time he filed suit, because it lists an address on Frenchman Street in New Orleans, Louisiana. His motion to appoint counsel was denied on May 11, 2005.
Defendants now move to dismiss, arguing that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), a prisoner who has not alleged physical injury fails to state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12 (b) (6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court must resolve doubts as to the sufficiency of the claim in plaintiff's favor. Vulcan Materials Company v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Id.; Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)). "A pro se complaint is to be construed liberally with all well-pleaded allegations taken as true." Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants seek to dismiss Gibson's complaint on the ground that a prisoner who has not alleged a physical injury is precluded from seeking compensatory damages under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Defendants' reliance on the PLRA is misplaced. The Fifth Circuit has held that the PLRA applies to only those suits filed by "prisoners," which the Act defines as "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." Janes v. Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that, because plaintiff was not incarcerated or detained when he filed complaint, PLRA did not apply). In Janes, the Fifth Circuit specifically approved of Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1998), in which the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the physical injury requirement of § 1997e(e) to a civil rights action that a former prisoner brought after he was released on parole. Id. at 323. The Kerr court also held that a person's status as a "prisoner" under the PLRA is determined at the time suit is brought. Id. Because Gibson was not a prisoner when he brought this suit, the PLRA and its physical injury requirement do not apply. Janes, 215 F.3d at 543. Accordingly, the Court denies defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).