Opinion
01-10-2024
In the Matter of Mark B. GIBSON, appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF the NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, et al., respondents.
Heilig Branigan LLP, Holbrook, NY (Michael J. Miller of counsel), for appellant. Letitia Janies, Attorney, General, New York, NY (Judith N. Vale and Sarah Coco of counsel), for respondents.
Heilig Branigan LLP, Holbrook, NY (Michael J. Miller of counsel), for appellant.
Letitia Janies, Attorney, General, New York, NY (Judith N. Vale and Sarah Coco of counsel), for respondents.
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., LARA J. GENOVESI, BARRY E. WARHIT, LILLIAN WAN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board dated February 23, 2021, which affirmed the denial of the petitioner’s application for relicensure, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (David T. Reilly, J.), dated Janu- ary 10, 2022. The judgment denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
In November 2013, the petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test, resulting in the revocation of his driver license. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter the DMV) for relicensure, which was denied by the DMV Driver Improvement Bureau on December 8, 2020. After the denial was affirmed by the DMV Administrative Appeals Board, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the determination. In a judgment dated January 10, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. The petitioner appeals.
[1–4] "The applicable standard of review in this matter is whether the challenged determination ‘was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion’ " (Matter of Gorecki v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 201 A.D.3d 802, 803, 162 N.Y.S.3d 85, quoting Matter of Gerber v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 129 A.D.3d 959, 960, 11 N.Y.S.3d 648; see CPLR 7803[3]). "In applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, a court inquires whether the determination under review had a rational basis" (Matter of Halperin v. City of New Rochelle, 24 A.D.3d 768, 770, 809 N.Y.S.2d 98 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Manning v. New York State–Unified Ct. Sys., 153 A.D.3d 623, 624, 60 N.Y.S.3d 251). "Under this standard, a determination should not be disturbed unless the record shows that the agency’s action was ‘arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational or indicative of bad faith’ " (Matter of Halperin v. City of New Rochelle, 24 A.D.3d at 770, 809 N.Y.S.2d 98, quoting Matter of Cowan v. Kern, 41 N.Y.2d 591, 599, 394 N.Y.S.2d 579, 363 N.E.2d 305; see Matter of Manning v. New York State–Unified Ct. Sys., 153 A.D.3d at 624, 60 N.Y.S.3d 251). "A determination is rational where it has ‘some objective factual basis, as opposed to resting entirely on subjective considerations’ " (Matter of Gorecki v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 201 A.D.3d at 803, 162 N.Y.S.3d 85, quoting Matter of JSB Enters., LLC v. Wright, 81 A.D.3d 955, 956, 917 N.Y.S.2d 302).
[5] Here, the DMV’s determination to deny the petitioner’s application for relicensure was rational and not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Acevedo v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 29 N.Y.3d 202, 229, 54 N.Y.S.3d 614, 77 N.E.3d 331; Matter of Argudo v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 149 A.D.3d 830, 832, 51 N.Y.S.3d 589). The petitioner’s driving record supported the denial of his application. The petitioner had three alcohol related driving offenses and a serious driving offense within the 25-year look back period (see 15 NYCRR 136.5[b][2]). Furthermore, the petitioner failed to demonstrate an exemption from the regulations since he failed to present any "unusual, extenuating[,] and compelling circumstances" that may form the basis to deviate from the general policy (id. § 136.5[d]; see Matter of Argudo v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 149 A.D.3d at 830–831, 51 N.Y.S.3d 589). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit.
CONNOLLY, J.P., GENOVESI, WARHIT and WAN, JJ., concur.