Opinion
Nos. 05-09-00050-CR, 05-09-00051-CR
Opinion Filed January 11, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH TEX. R. APP. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F08-59787-I, F08-59788-I.
Before Chief Justice WRIGHT and Justices FITZGERALD and MURPHY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pertend Gibbs waived a jury and pleaded nolo contendere to two aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon offenses. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at six years' imprisonment in each case. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing her to imprisonment. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case. The background of these cases and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing her to prison in each case because the sentences were not necessary to prevent a recurrence of any criminal behavior. Appellant asserts that because she has no criminal record, has family support, and expressed a sincere desire for probation, the trial court should have considered probation. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve her complaints for appellate review and, alternatively, the record does not support her claims. Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in her motions for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion). After sentencing, appellant did not object to the sentences, and her motions for new trial complained that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for our review. Even if appellant had preserved error, however, her arguments still fail. As a general rule, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for the offense is not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). In these cases, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offenses. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 29.03(a). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the sentences. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We overrule appellant's sole issue on appeal. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.